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71. Time for the Strategy of Coevolution: How South Korea Can Shape the Future of the Kim Jong-un Regime

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
2012 is a critical time for North Korea as it has proclaimed that from this year it will achieve the status of a “strong and prosperous nation.” With Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, this immense task now falls upon the shoulders of Kim Jong-un. For the past seventeen years under Kim Jong-il’s rule, North Korea has tried to seek a way to ensure its regime’s survival and guarantee its national security through Songun or military-first politics and the possession of nuclear weapons. Yet, this has actually resulted in international isolation, economic hardships, and an overdependence on China. For North Korea, it was “lost two decades”. It is natural to wonder about what kind of impact Kim Jong-il’s sudden death will have on North Korea in the short run. However, it is more important now to think carefully about what lies ahead for North Korea over the next 20 years under Kim Jong-un’s rule. Upon such a consideration it is also critical to prepare necessary measures in terms of this long-term perspective. The most urgent priority for the newly established Kim Jong-un regime is domestic stability, which means that the regime will have to pursue the legacy of Kim Jong-il’s rule. In this respect, it will continue to possess nuclear weapons, seek economic gains from negotiations over its nuclear program, and attempt to accelerate its economic development under the banner of a “strong and prosperous nation” to gain political legitimacy. So long as Kim Jong-un sticks to “rule by his deceased father’s will,” then North Korea will face the inevitable dilemma it has faced for the last seventeen years. Pursuing regime security by huddling onto nuclear weapons will only continue to ensure Pyongyang’s international isolation. This isolation in turn brings about economic hardship, which consequently has a negative effect on the stability of the Kim Jong-un regime as its legitimacy is still rather weak. These interlinked problems of domestic politics, diplomacy, and economics can be easily locked in a vicious circle. The Kim Jong-un regime must deal with these pending issues in line with a long-term strategy that will guarantee its survival and help North Korea pursue reforms to meet the norms of the twenty-first century civilization. The first stage of this long-term strategy is to seek a policy shift. At some point in the future, Kim Jong-un has to make the strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons and switch from the current military-first politics to economy-first politics. Of course, such a shift is an extremely difficult decision to make, but it would be a good chance to prove the strength of Kim Jong-un’s leadership internally and externally. The second stage is transition and reform. With this step, North Korea will finally take measures toward peaceful development under the basis of a more enlightened Suryong or Great Leader Direct Rule system. Those measures include overcoming the demands for excessive security, moving forward to establish a security system without nuclear weapons, and plan for a North Korean-way of reforms and opening. In order to achieve these goals, North Korea will truly require support from South Korea and the international community. The third stage is the transformation of North Korea to meet the international standard of advancement. In this stage, it is crucial to find a way to encourage North Korea to transform into a nation that seeks moderate security capabilities as well as a new momentum for economic development, democracy, and normal diplomacy. If it succeeds, North Korea could then become a model country which serves for peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula and contribute toward development and stability in Northeast Asia. During this delicate period, it is an imperative to get over single-minded approaches to focus only on the collapse of North Korea or to call for the one-sided effort of either North Korea or the international community to resolve all the issues. Furthermore, it is time to understand the broad range of problems of North Korea and seek a path of coevolution which takes in a bigger picture of peace and stability for not only the Korean Peninsula but also East Asia.
Topic:
Regime Change, Authoritarianism, Leadership, Dictatorship, Totalitarianism, and Transition
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

72. China, the United States, and the Changing Global Architecture

Author:
Seungjoo Lee
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
With the prospect of leadership change in China and the United States in 2012, the possibility for instability and uncertainty in the East Asia region is high. Despite such concerns, it is expected that the current structure of global governance will mitigate the difficulties associated with this period of transition. Considering the importance of global governance, it becomes necessary then to follow the changes in the global and regional architecture and think about how South Korea should meet this challenge. The trio of closely-related summit meetings that took place in November 2011 was such an occasion in which China and the United States grappled to shape the regional and global architecture. These meetings included the G20 Cannes summit on November 3, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit on November 12, and the East Asia Summit (EAS) on November 19. It is important to focus on the fact that during these meetings Beijing and Washington had the chance to examine the intention and capability of each other. In that sense, these meetings were akin to that of a boxing match fought over three rounds using not force but the complex elements of international politics in the twenty-first century that interact to design the regional and global architecture. These elements include power politics in international relations, cooperation and conflict in institutions and networks, and the knowledge power which allows for a consensus among countries by sharing the vision of a new order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, Hegemony, and Leadership
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

73. Chinese Interest on the Korean Peninsula and the Future of North Korea

Author:
Andrei Lankov
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Few people would doubt that the continuing rise of China is the single most influential factor in the evolving geostrategic position of Korea. Over the last 35 years, China has experienced a period of rapid economic growth which is probably without parallel in world economic history, and this period is not over. While China is still far from being in a position to challenge global US hegemony, it is quite possible that it will play a dominant role in East Asia, especially if ongoing changes in the world economy press the US into reducing military spending and downsizing its global role. Indeed, in the last few years China loomed increasingly large in issues of the North Korean politics. Some of the most controversial political problems of present-day Korea are clearly related to China’s rise. The fate of the Jeju naval base, whichever is officially stated, largely depends on whether Korea will eventually chose to balance against or bandwagon with rising China. The problem of the forced deportation of the North Korean refugees attracted much attention of the Korean public to the issues of human rights in China – perhaps, first time when such issues are discussed widely. It seems that the rise of China will present Korea with many a difficult decision. In some cases, confrontation is likely to develop, but usually some kind of compromise is, probably, the best option. Like it or not, most problems in East Asia cannot be effectively solved without cooperation with (or at least the passive support of) China. This is the case with the major long-term issue of Korean politics, that is, the issue of Korean unification.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Leadership
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

74. The Return of Old Putin and the New Future of Russia

Author:
Beom-Shik Shin
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Vladimir Putin who cautiously entered the Kremlin upon his inauguration in March 2000 is now returning to the presidential office with more craft and determination this May 2012. Going by the announcements of Russia’s Central Election Commission (CEC), Putin received 63.75% of the votes, defeating Gennady Zyuganov (17.19%), Mikhail Prokhorov (7.82%), Vladimir Zhirinovsky (6.23%), Sergey Mironov (3.85%) and others to become the next president of the Russian Federation. It had been predicted that Putin would either win by a narrow margin after the second round of voting receiving around 40% of the votes, or he would have had an easy victory receiving around 50% of the votes. His victory though was an overwhelming one, with nearly 64% of the votes. There were controversies nevertheless regarding election fraud. The international election monitoring team dispatched by Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) raised concerns over a number of issues such as questions over the neutrality of Vladimir Churov, the chair of CEC and restrictive media regulations for opposition candidates. Despite these concerns, it would be virtually impossible for opposition candidates to overturn the results. In expectation of such controversies, the Russian government made efforts to minimize criticism of election fraud by installing webcams in ballot boxes. However, rectifying the lack of a fair judgment system should be regarded as a task of utmost urgency if Russia’s election system is to develop. Still, the disputes over election fraud will go on for some time as will the street demonstrations against Putin that appeared after his victory.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Elections, Leadership, and Rigged Elections
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

75. Predictions on Power Structure and Policy Changes of the Kim Jong-un Regime

Author:
Chang-Hyun Jung
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors. The new stage of North Korea’s leadership succession began with the rise to power of the third generation leader Kim Jong-un. On 15 April 2012, the newly-appointed First Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea Kim Jong-un made his first public speech during a military parade to commemorate Kim Il-sung’s centenary. It was the official announcement of the opening of the Kim Jong-un regime toward the world. A series of political events from the Meeting of Party Representatives to the Kim Il-sung centenary celebrations clearly show that the third generation of leadership is emerging as a new core power group backed by the second generation. This move means more than just a generational shift in North Korea’s power structure. It indicative of possible changes in policy lines on its internal and external affairs. Kim Jong-un conducted political reshuffles before and after the Meeting of Party Representatives in April 2012, as part of actions to implement a moderate shift in generation and to firmly secure his control over the military. Since smoothly establishing the hereditary succession process, Kim Jong-un not only moved toward assuming political leadership but also swiftly acquired a firm grip on the power elites in the party, government, and military by reorganizing and uniting power elites. It would seem Kim Jong-un’s rule is stable, at least in terms of power structure. The power structure of the Kim Jong-un regime has turned out to be a single leadership where the country is ruled by one strong man rather than a collective leadership. Instead of having “specific figures” as a regent or a guardian through a decentralization of power, North Korea seems to prefer to support the new supreme leader through “collective consultation.” The policies designed and implemented during the last three years of Kim Jong-il’s rule were in fact intended as a policy transformation process to prepare preparation for Kim Jong-un’s rule. These policy directions have been maintained since Kim Jong-un came to power. His first public speech on 15 April can be translated as an announcement on limited changes for a “knowledge-based economy.” This established a new period while inheriting the values of Jaju or independence from the Kim Il-sung era and Songun or military first politics from the Kim Jong-il era. In particular, Kim Jong-un emphasized the significance of “peace,” by stating in the speech, “for our party and the Republic’s government that consider powerful state construction and people’s livelihood improvement to be their general goal, peace cannot be more valuable.” Under Kim Jong-un’s rule with the keyword of “knowledge-based economy,” North Korea is expected to place priorities on improving people’s livelihood and will take on more flexible policy decisions from 2013 when the next administrations in South Korea and the United States will be established. As such it is an inevitable option for North Korea to rebuild its economy and attract foreign investment. Against this backdrop, the administrations in South Korea and the United States should not pressure North Korea but rather wait and respond calmly until the policy lines of the Kim Jong-un regime on economic change and openness are clearer. Above all the first priority should be placed on stable management of North Korean issues, given that many of the participants of the Six-Party Talks will enter into power transition process at the end of 2012. First, the U.S. administration needs to resume contacts with North Korea in order to implement the Leap Day Deal in which Pyongyang would place a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests, as well as freeze its nuclear programs. If the diplomatic pressure from the international community successfully leads North Korea to give up its nuclear activities and ease tensions, it would create the right environment for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Second, it will be worthwhile establishing contact through high-level channels to develop a clearer picture of what are Kim Jong-un’s intention regarding North Korea’s nuclear activities. In providing new opportunities for the North Korean leadership, a policy shift by Pyongyang may take place. Third, it is important that the Lee Myung-bak administration reopens channels for inter-Korean talks even at low-level so as to not leave too much of a burden for the next administration. Offering to hold inter-Korean family reunions for the second half of the year 2012 would be a good start. Fourth, the next administration in South Korea should be committed to establishing a more sustainable North Korean policy that can maintain consistency regardless of any power shift by comprehensively reflecting public opinion during a time when conflict among South Koreans on approaches toward North Korea is becoming worse. Whoever comes into power in South Korea after the presidential election, the main agenda of inter-Korean relations will be on the next inter-Korean Summit. Kim Jong-un has already expressed his willingness to talk, stating “(we) will go hand in hand with anyone who truly desires the country’s reunification and peaceful prosperity.” If the third inter-Korean Summit can be held in 2013, it would be a significant breakthrough in building confidence between two Koreas and solving the North Korean nuclear crisis as well as making progress toward peaceful coexistence.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Authoritarianism, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

76. The 2012 U.S. Presidential Election and Its Implication in East Asia

Author:
Young Kwon Sohn
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
After the extended and fierce campaign, Obama finally clinched the victory in the 2012 presidential election. By gaining more than 300 electoral-college votes, which are disproportionately huge given his popular vote margin of around two percent over Romney(50% vs. 48%), he can legitimately claim national mandate for the next four year, although conservatives will be reluctant to embrace that mandate. After making a history four years ago by becoming the first black president to occupy the White House, he made another history this year by recapturing the presidency amid the still evolving Great Recession with the high unemployment rate around 7.1%. Given this historic nature of Obama’s second term, this paper aims to show how Obama was able to maintain an exceptionally competitive campaign despite the extremely bad national economic conditions. From the widely accepted consensus that the outcome of the U.S. presidential election is largely determined by the economic conditions of the election year, Obama’s successful presidential campaign needs explanation in one way or another. Following that, the paper also attempts to predict what the post-election U.S. East Asia policy look like. Will the post-election U.S. policy be different from the mainline policy of the last four years? If not, what would be rationale of the policy consistency? This paper will address these questions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Elections, and Leadership
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

77. A Path Never Taken: The Options for Kim Jong-un and the Future of the Korean Peninsula

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since Kim Jong-il’s health deteriorated in the summer of 2008, the question of his succession has drawn attention from all over the world. Finally, on September 28 2010, Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il’s third son, rapidly emerged with his guardianship group made up of the close personnel of the “dear leader” at the Third Meeting of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) Representatives. The future direction of the succession process has generated tremendous interest from all over the world, because it is not only related to internal power transition in North Korea but also directly linked with the future of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. The political and diplomatic decisions of Kim Jong-il’s successor will crucially affect his own future, as well that of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Inter-Korean relations, and the international order of Northeast Asia. Kim Jong-un was promoted to the rank of daechang, the equivalent of a four-star general, and appointed vice chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission, in essence holding the de facto post of second-in-command. He was named right after the four members of the politburo standing committee by North Korea's official news agency, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), and his picture was revealed to the public for the first time. This formulated that he became the successor to his father. All in all, he was named as general on the 27th, appointed vice chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission on the 28th, and his picture released on the 29th, which shows precisely the elaborated staging and even hastiness on the part of the North Korean regime. On October 10, Kim Jong-il effectively declared his heir apparent at home and abroad when he attended a massive military parade with Kim Jong-un, commemorating the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers Party of Korea. This remarkable event was broadcasted live in North Korea with even foreign correspondents invited to attend. The succession process was a lot faster than expected, particularly when compared to Kim Jong-il, whose succession process only got off the ground six years after he was designated a member of the Politburo in 1974. It is premature to say which direction Kim Jong-un will go, but it cannot but be seen that his emergence puts more emphasis on ‘continuation’ rather than ‘severance’ or ‘transformation’ from the existing songun or military-first politics. Above all, it is noteworthy that Kim Jong-un took the position of vice chairman of the Party's Central Military Commission rather than positions within its Politburo or Secretariat. This is groundwork to make Kim Jong-un become the “royal” successor of the military-first politics system. Like his father, he will likely exercise the power to interpret the ruling ideology as the sole successor to the “bloodline of Mount Baekdu.” Holding onto the banner of military-first politics, Kim Jong-un will establish it as a “revolutionary” tradition that will form the basis of his succession. Secondly, it is also noticeable that Kim Jong-un’s guardianship group is filled with his father’s people. They were appointed to be heavyweights in the Party and military during the Meeting of Party Representatives. Kim Jong-il’s sister Kim Kyong-hui became a member of the Politburo, her husband Jang Song Thaek became an alternate member of the Politburo, member of the Central Military Commission, and a department director of the Party’s Central Committee, while Vice-Marshal Ri Yong Ho became a Standing Member of the Politburo and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. It is hard to find anyone that could be considered as Kim Jong-un’s people, which is to be understood considering his age and inexperience. There is a dilemma for Kim Jong-un in that he cannot completely rely on the military-first politics. Currently, Kim has not even been officially designated as successor; that will only come when he assumes position as a Standing Member of the Politburo. Such a move can only be possible if he accumulates considerable achievements as he has nothing to his name so far. Presumably, this process needs to be completed before the 7th Party Congress in 2012, leaving Kim Jong-un with little time. Establishing North Korea as an ‘economically strong power,’ one of the three pillars of gangseongdaeguk or strong and prosperous country is something that has yet to be achieved. Pyongyang has already claimed to have achieved the other two pillars of a strong political power and a strong military power. However, as long as the military-first politics is sustained, it is almost impossible for North Korea to pursue the path to economic recovery by itself.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Leadership, Succession, and Transition
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

78. Post-2012 U.S. Leadership and U.S. Policy toward East Asia

Author:
Young Kwon Sohn
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
2012 the United States will hold another presidential election, and it will surely be a referendum on the first term of the Obama presidency. As usual, the election will attract the attention of the public and the pundits alike, both at home and abroad, particularly at a time when an increasing number of people will be interested in how the election’s outcome will affect U.S. foreign policy and, related to it, the Sino-American bipolar configuration in East Asia. Since the Cheonan incident in the West Sea in the spring of 2009, particularly, the evolution and interaction of the Sino-American relationship in East Asia has become the focus of speculation among policy analysts and practitioners. That said, the outcome of the 2012 U.S. presidential election raises several questions. Will the 2012 presidential election bring a new leadership team to the White House? And will the outcome, new leaders or not, affect the overall tone of U.S. strategy in East Asia? If not, what other factors should be considered in forecasting the future of East Asia? Although a definitive answer to these questions cannot be had when we are still two years away from the 2012 presidential election, addressing them, nevertheless, is an intriguing mental exercise. We can say immediately that it is unlikely that the outcome of the 2012 election will be the dominant factor determining the United States’ strategy in East Asia as of 2013. Because of the rising power of China and the ever-hardening bipolarized structure of power in the region, significant changes in post-2012 East Asia are more likely to be triggered by changes from within East Asia itself, rather than from the United States. An ambitious China, taking a more aggressive posture toward both its neighbors and the United States, could be a potentially destabilizing factor in the region. Internal changes in North Korea could also be regionally destabilizing. The United States’ East Asian policy would thus be somewhat reactive in its general tone, although not passive. The U.S. stance could be firm and even assertive, however, depending on the situation, just as it was recently in dealing with China’s bid for expansion toward the South China Sea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

79. North Korea at the Crossroads

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
08-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
North Korea is now at the crossroads. It needs to make a strategic decision on whether to defend its nuclear program and “military-first politics” against the pressure of increasing international sanctions or to denuclearize and pursue “economy-first politics.” Depending on which decision Kim Jong-il makes, his successor will face either the path of opportunity or the path of peril. Currently, Kim faces the challenge of ensuring a smooth transition of power to his successor. At the same time, he must negotiate with an international community that is trying to induce Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program by simultaneously imposing sanctions on it while offering a comprehensive negotiation package. In this situation, the surrounding countries must construct an international environment that is favorable to convincing North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and join the international community. Furthermore, the neighboring countries need to actively support and develop a clear formula for establishing a lasting peace framework on the Korean Peninsula. Since the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, Kim Jong-il has faithfully followed the will of his father, who stated that North Korea will denuclearize if and only if the United States withdraws its hostile policy and nuclear threat toward Pyongyang. Amidst the backdrop of its increasing international isolation in the post-Cold War era, the North Korean regime made the decision to develop nuclear weapons as to safeguard its survival. However, this decision brought it into sharp conflict with the United States, who strongly opposed Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The United States could not allow a nuclear-armed North Korea that would destabilize the East Asian region. Subsequently, its strategic decision to pursue the nuclear military-first politics has led North Korea to become a “weak and vulnerable nation” rather than a “strong and prosperous nation,” enduring hardships along the “arduous march.” Compared to circumstances in 1994 and 2003, the current situation confronting Kim Jong-il is far more complex and difficult. Not only must he revive a shattered economy but he must also adroitly manage the sensitive process of leadership succession that is still ongoing. If Kim fails to take the initiative to give up his nuclear program and allows the nuclear military-first politics to dominate the succeeding regime, it will become even more difficult for North Korea to make the transition toward a non-nuclear economy-first politics. Given the fact that external pressure from the international community for denuclearization and internal pressure of attenuating stability will only continue to increase, the succeeding regime will be in a position where giving up the card that guarantees its survival is impossible. Moreover, it would be political suicide for the new regime to abandon the nuclear military-first politics. As the son of Kim Il-sung who is the embodiment of Chuche ideology, Kim Jong-il needs to make the critical decision to abandon North Korea’s nuclear program. There is no other method for resolving the tense situation without denuclearization. Nuclear weapons might be a shot of morphine to ease the pain temporarily, but it cannot be the remedy to cure a dying patient.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Leadership, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

80. Promoting U.S. Economic Growth and Security Through Expanding World Trade: A Call for Bold American Leadership

Author:
Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development
Publication Date:
06-2003
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Conference Board
Abstract:
This report presents a leadership vision of a strong and open global trading system, and urges the United States and its trading partners to adopt vital policy reforms, including delinking agricultural subsidies from prices and production while opening agricultural markets everywhere, and eliminating all tariffs and non-tariff barriers in both manufacturing and services.
Topic:
Security, International Trade and Finance, Leadership, Economy, and Economic growth
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America