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Begin New Search Topic International Trade and Finance Publication Year within 25 Years

1581. Roaring tiger or lumbering elephant?

Author:
Mark P Thirlwell
Publication Date:
09-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
In the past, there has been plenty of scepticism about India's economic prospects: for many, Charles De Gaulle's aphorism regarding Brazil, that it was a country with enormous potential, and always would be, seemed to apply equally well to the South Asian economy. While the 'tiger' economies of East Asia were enjoying economic take-off on the back of investment- and export-led growth, the lumbering Indian elephant seemed set to be a perpetual also-ran in the growth stakes. Yet following a series of reform efforts, first tentatively in the 1980s, and then with much more conviction in the 1990s, the Indian economic model has been transformed, and so too India's growth prospects. High profile successes in the new economy sectors of information technology (IT) and business process outsourcing (BPO), along with faster economic growth, triggered a widespread rethink regarding India's economic prospects, and a wave of foreign portfolio investment flowed into Indian markets. Perhaps India was set to be a tiger after all.
Topic:
Economics, Emerging Markets, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, East Asia, Asia, and Brazil

1582. Completing the Doha Round

Author:
Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:
10-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) was suspended indefinitely in late July 2006 after a succession of failed attempts to reach agree¬ment on the modalities for cutting farm subsidies and tariffs. Trade ministers are now consulting on how to put the WTO talks back on track. Without a rapid return to active negotiations, US officials may be relegated to the sidelines in Geneva due to the expiration of US trade promotion authority (TPA)—leaving the Doha Round adrift possibly until the next US administration takes office in 2009 or even longer.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Politics, and Treaties and Agreements

1583. Can Doha Still Deliver on the Development Agenda?

Author:
Kimberly Elliott
Publication Date:
06-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, so named because it was launched in the Qatari capital, is in deep trouble. Negotiators have yet to meet any of the interim deadlines for completing the talks, and they missed another at the end of April 2006. While it is still possible to finish the round by early 2007, the odds are diminishing by the day, and this deadline matters more than most. Trade promotion authority (TPA) in the United States will expire in June 2007, and if the round does not make significant progress before then, TPA might not be renewed, and the round would likely drag on for several more years.
Topic:
Economics, International Organization, International Trade and Finance, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
United States

1584. The Doha Round after Hong Kong

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:
02-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Trade ministers from member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) convened in Hong Kong in December 2005 to jump-start the flagging Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The Hong Kong ministerial was not a complete bust. But ministers accomplished only the minimum necessary to keep the Doha Round moving forward—toward an undetermined and probably distant conclusion.
Topic:
Development, Economics, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Asia

1585. Has EMU Had Any Impact on the Degree of Wage Restraint?

Author:
Adam S. Posen and Daniel Popov Gould
Publication Date:
08-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
This working paper investigates the European Monetary Unification's (EMU) effect on wage restraint—the degree to which wage increases do or do not exceed productivity growth. We find in cross-sectional investigations that wage restraint either is unchanged or has increased following EMU in the vast majority of countries. This finding contradicts the predictions of a widely cited family of models of coordination of labor market bargaining. In particular, one would have expected Germany to display the greatest decline in wage restraint post-EMU under these models, but in our time-series analysis we find no indication of such a decline. The overall shift toward greater wage restraint is consistent with the models that emphasize the gains from monetary credibility. The time-series evidence on Italy, which shows a significant increase in wage restraint after eurozone entry, also supports this view. That said, the increase in wage restraint in the eurozone is matched by that associated with the increase in credibility seen in the United Kingdom and Sweden after their adoption of inflation targeting post-1992.
Topic:
Economics and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Germany, and Sweden

1586. The Case for an International Reserve Diversification Standard

Author:
Edwin M. Truman and Anna Wong
Publication Date:
05-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Rumors about the actual or potential currency diversification of countries' foreign exchange holdings out of dollars are not a new phenomenon. This working paper argues that such concerns about reserve diversification are exaggerated. We present evidence that the extent of actual diversification has been modest to date. Nevertheless, the potential for reserve diversification adds volatility to foreign exchange markets and can catalyze abrupt exchange rate movements. We argue that policymakers acting in their own national interests can do something constructive to reduce the volatility introduced into foreign exchange and financial markets by rumors of large-scale international foreign exchange reserve diversification. We propose the voluntary adoption by major foreign exchange reserve holders in particular of an International Reserve Diversification Standard consisting of two elements: (1) routine disclosure of the currency composition of official foreign exchange holdings and (2) a commitment by each adherent to adjust gradually the actual currency composition of its reserves to any new benchmark for those holdings.
Topic:
Economics, Foreign Exchange, Government, and International Trade and Finance

1587. China Needs to Float the Yuan--for China's Sake

Author:
John H. Makin
Publication Date:
05-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
In their April 21 press release following their spring meeting in Washington, D.C., the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors added an important sentence to their usual bland statement that exchange rates should reflect economic fundamentals: Greater exchange rate flexibility is desirable in emerging economies with large current account surpluses, especially China, for necessary adjustments to occur. In their April 21 press release following their spring meeting in Washington, D.C., the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors added an important sentence to their usual bland statement that exchange rates should reflect economic fundamentals: Greater exchange rate flexibility is desirable in emerging economies with large current account surpluses, especially China, for necessary adjustments to occur. The G7, significantly, also called for an increased role for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help countries, including those in the G7 but also China and others in emerging Asia, meet the macroeconomic and financial policy challenge of globalization. Specifically, the G7 supported the strengthening of IMF surveillance, including through increased emphasis on the consistency of exchange rate policies with domestic policies and a market-based international monetary system and on the spillover effects of domestic policies on other countries. The G7s endorsement of greater exchange-rate flexibility and of an enhanced IMF role in implementing it is important. The IMF, having been founded after World War II to maintain stable exchange rates among major economies, has become an advocate on behalf of the major economies of global exchange-rate flexibility. The lesson regarding the need for G7 currency flexibility was learned after Americas August 1971 abandonment of fixed exchange rates, which was followed by a decade of adjustments to higher oil prices that would have wreaked havoc under fixed exchange rates. The lesson for needed currency flexibility in emerging markets was learned after the disastrous attempt, fostered in part by the IMF, to impose fixed exchange rates during the Asian and Russian crises of 1997 and 1998, which prolonged and exacerbated the market gyrations caused by the crises. Sadly, China response to the G7-IMF call for greater currency flexibility has been both negative and misguided. China's foolishly insouciant attitude, captured in a comment by Zhou Xiao-chuan, governor of the Peoples Bank of China, carries with it serious risks both for China and for the world economy. Zhous remark was quoted on April 24 in the Wall Street Journal: [T]he speed of moving forward (on yuan appreciation) is OK. Its good for China and welcomed by many other countries. China's currency has appreciated only 1.2 percent since its initial 2.1 percent revaluation last July 21. That is less than OK. The total 3.3 percent revaluation against the dollar really represents no adjustment at all in view of the 1 to 2 percent inflation differential (lower in China) that has persisted between the United States and China over the past two years. If China had allowed prices to rise instead of mandating caps on prices of important commodities like gasoline, there would be less pressure for the yuan to rise in value. Both the intervention to cap the yuans appreciation and the capping of domestic prices are building up potentially disruptive inflation pressure inside China, as we shall see below. The most dangerous aspect of China's increased efforts to prevent yuan appreciation, as measured by accelerating reserve accumulation over the past year, is the rising pool of liquidity inside China that has resulted. The level of excess reserves in Chinese banks is now larger, relative to GDP, than the level of excess reserves built up in Japan from 2001 to 2005 during the years of a prolonged, desperate struggle against deflation. China's currency undervaluation, coupled with the massive liquidity buildup in its banking system, has resulted in excessive investment in China's state enterprises that have close traditional ties with the liquidity-sodden banks. The usual Chinese response to excess reserves has been to boost reserve requirements for its banks. But to absorb the huge pool of excess reserves now in place, reserve requirements would have to be boosted by 5 percentage points to 12.5 per-cent, going far beyond previous moves of 0.5 to 1 percentage point, and far beyond what China's shaky, insolvent banks could endure. When the Peoples Bank of China boosted its one-year benchmark lending rate on April 26 by 27 basis points (to 5.85 percent), it took a tiny step that will do little to tighten China's monetary stance.
Topic:
Development, Economics, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Washington

1588. What Is Tight Money?

Author:
John H. Makin
Publication Date:
03-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
Concerns over deflation have dominated monetary policy during the past several years in Japan, and also in the United States as recently as 2003. As a result, the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve have been highly accommodative. In Japan, this took the form of a zero interest rate. In the U.S. context, it was manifest in rates at well below normal yardsticks, such as nominal GDP growth that would call for U.S. policy interest rates close to 6 percent rather than at current levels below 5 percent. Unusually accommodative monetary policies and the substantial liquidity flows they have entailed have boosted asset values and compressed risk spreads. Consequently, demand growth has persisted at high levels for long enough to cause modestly higher inflation. The time has come for tighter monetary policy, and central banks in the United States, Europe, and Japan have all begun to apply it.
Topic:
Economics and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, Europe, Israel, and East Asia

1589. Japan Gingerly Exits Deflation

Author:
John H. Makin
Publication Date:
02-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
In August 2000, with the Japanese growth rate holding above 2 percent, the Bank of Japan decided to initiate an end to the zero interest rate policy that it had initiated in March 1999. This step was taken despite the existence of modest deflation, indicated by readings of minus 0.2 to minus 0.5 percent on various measures of inflation. At that time, no central bank had thought seriously about deflation as a threat since the depression of the 1930s.
Topic:
Development, Economics, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Japan, Israel, and East Asia

1590. Bond Market Bubble?

Author:
John H. Makin
Publication Date:
01-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
On Tuesday, January 18, the yield on fifty-year inflation-protected U.K. government bonds (what the British call "indexed-linked gilts") dropped to 0.38 percent, about one-seventh the historical average of just over 2.6 percent for such debt instruments. Just a few months earlier, that yield had been over 1 percent, still extraordinarily low by historical standards, and especially low in an economy that has experienced fifty-three consecutive quarters of positive growth. A yield drop from 1 percent to 0.38 percent on a fifty-year bond corresponds to a 30 percent rise in its price over a period of just three months. That is an annual return of over 100 percent, much higher than the 13 percent annual increase in U.S. house prices at midyear and the 20 to 30 percent gains seen in the stock market before the March 2000 crash. The asset bubble has spread to long-term government bonds, especially those with inflation protection. What is going on here?
Topic:
Economics, Government, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, and Europe