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191. The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the Point of No Return

Author:
Dominic Tierney and Dominic D.P. Johnson
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
In 49 B.C., Julius Caesar halted his army on the banks of the Rubicon River in northern Italy. According to Suetonius, he paused in momentary hesitation, before sweeping across the waters toward Rome with the immortal phrase Alae iacta est (The die has been cast). By violating an ancient Roman law forbidding any general to cross the Rubicon with an army, Caesar's decision made war inevitable. Ever since, “crossing the Rubicon” has come to symbolize a point of no return, when the time for deliberation is over and action is at hand.
Topic:
International Relations and Intelligence
Political Geography:
Russia, Germany, and Romania

192. Chronic Misperception and International Conflict: The U.S.-Iraq Experience

Author:
Charles A. Duelfer and Stephen Benedict Dyson
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Why did the United States and Iraq and themselves in full-scale conflict with each other in 1990–91 and 2003, and in almost constant low-level hostilities during the years in- between? We suggest that the situation was neither inevitable nor one that either side, in full possession of all the relevant information about the other, would have purposely engineered: in short, a classic instance of chronic misperception. Combining the psychological literature on perception and its pathologies with the almost unique firsthand access of one of the authors— Charles Duelfer—to the decisionmakers on both sides, we isolate the perceptions that the United States and Iraq held of each other, as well as the biases, mistakes, and intelligence failures of which these images were, at different points in time, both cause and effect.
Topic:
Intelligence
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Soviet Union

193. Abolish the Department of Homeland Security

Author:
David Rittgers
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), an umbrella organization that would oversee 22 preexisting federal agencies. The idea was to improve the coordination of the federal government's counterterrorism effort, but the result has been an ever-expanding bureaucracy.
Topic:
Intelligence, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States

194. Leashing the Surveillance State: How to Reform Patriot Act Surveillance Authorities

Author:
Julian Sanchez
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Congress recently approved a temporary extension of three controversial surveillance provisions of the USA Patriot Act and successor legislation, which had previously been set to expire at the end of February. In the coming weeks, lawmakers have an opportunity to review the sweeping expansion of domestic counter-terror powers since 9/11 and, with the benefit of a decade's perspective, strengthen crucial civil-liberties safeguards without unduly burdening legitimate intelligence gathering. Two of the provisions slated for sunsetroving wiretap authority and the so-called “Section 215” orders for the production of records—should be narrowed to mitigate the risk of overcollection of sensitive information about innocent Americans. A third—authority to employ the broad investigative powers of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act against “lone wolf” suspects who lack ties to any foreign terror group—does not appear to be necessary at all.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Intelligence, National Security, Counterinsurgency, Governance, and Law
Political Geography:
United States

195. Indonesia: Debate Over a New Intelligence Bill

Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
A controversial bill defining the role and functions of Indonesian intelligence agencies has top priority in the Indonesian parliament. It was originally scheduled for enactment in July 2011 but will now be delayed until September or October. It would be better to put the bill on hold even longer until there is a more comprehensive assessment of security needs and how to address them.
Topic:
Security, Democratization, Development, and Intelligence
Political Geography:
Indonesia and Southeast Asia

196. Improving United Nations Intelligence: Lessons from the Field

Author:
Melanie Ramjoué
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The past twenty years have seen an exponential growth of UN peacekeeping in terms of breadth of mandates, scale and duration of operations. Where peacekeepers in the 1960s, 70s and 80s were deployed primarily to monitor ceasefires, they now investigate human rights violations, provide electoral support, and occasionally even support active combat operations. This surge has required a five-fold rise in the UN peacekeeping budget over the past ten years, from USD 1.5 billion in 1999 to almost USD 8 billion in 2011; it has similarly led to a four-fold increase in UN personnel deployed to support peacekeeping activities, from 27,000 military, civilian and police peacekeepers in 1999 to over 120,000 in 2011.
Topic:
Intelligence, International Organization, United Nations, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Geneva, Finland, Germany, Estonia, and Denmark

197. Who Controls Pakistan's Security Forces?

Author:
Shuja Nawaz
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Internal militancy and insurgency are the immediate threats to Pakistan's security. Pakistan's polity is fractured and dysfunctional, allowing the military to assert greater control over Pakistan's response to this growing internal threat. Civilian authorities have missed numerous opportunities to assert control over security matters. Miscalculation by the current civilian government in its attempt in 2008 to exert control over the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate soured civil-military relations at a time when the new army chief favored keeping the army out of politics. The military's interests are expanding to newer sectors, including economic policymaking, since a shrinking economy could hurt military interests and lifestyles. An opportunity to improve security sector governance exists in the proposed National Counter Terrorism Authority, which the government has unduly delayed.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Islam, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
Pakistan

198. Paradox of Power: Sino American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability

Author:
David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Book
Abstract:
The United States and China each have or will soon have the ability to inflict grave harm upon the other by nuclear attack, attacks on satellites, or attacks on computer networks. Paradoxically, despite each country's power, its strategic vulnerability is growing. Particularly since September 11, 2001, Americans have sensed this vulnerability. The extent to which the Chinese sense it is unclear. Vulnerability to nuclear attack is familiar to both countries. But the United States and China are also becoming exposed to damage in space and cyberspace because of their growing reliance on those domains for their prosperity and security, as well as each side's increasing antisatellite (ASAT) and cyber war capabilities. For China, economic integration, production, and commerce-and thus, sustained growth and perhaps political stability-depend vitally on data sharing, making networks and satellites as strategic as they are for the United States. All three strategic domains are "offense dominant"-technologically, economically, and operationally. Defenses against nuclear, ASAT, and cyber weapons are difficult and yield diminishing results against the offensive capabilities of large, advanced, and determined states such as the United States and China. Nuclear weapons are patently offense dominant because a single explosion can destroy a city. Moreover, it is easier and cheaper for China to improve the survivability of its strategic missile launchers, to multiply deliverable weapons, and to penetrate U.S. missile defenses than it is for the United States to maintain a nuclear first-strike capability. Though it has yet to admit it, the United States cannot deny the Chinese the second-strike nuclear deterrent they are determined to have. Satellites are inherently vulnerable: conspicuous, easy to track, and fragile. Destroying them or degrading their performance is easier than protecting them. ASAT interceptors are much cheaper than satellites. Likewise, defending computer networks becomes harder and more expensive as the scale and sophistication of the attacker increase. The woes of the cyber defender are compounded by integrated global markets and supply chains for digital components and equipment-in which U.S. and state-affiliated Chinese corporations are leading competitors-increasing the potential for strategic degradation of network infrastructure and disruption of services. In general, strategic offense dominance gives each country an incentive to invest in offense, which in turn spurs the other to keep pace. Apart from offense dominance, the advance of technology has slashed the costs in lives and treasure of strategic attack, as capabilities have graduated from mass invasion to heavy bombing to nuclear weapons to ASAT and cyber war. If one ignores possible deaths resulting from disruption of public services, ASAT and cyber war might even be considered "nonviolent." As the number of expected casualties from strategic attack options drops, so could international opprobrium and the inhibitions of decisionmakers. Absent deterrence, thresholds for war in space and cyberspace could become perilously low as offenses improve.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, Communism, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

199. Introduction

Author:
Catherine Lotrionte
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Espionage and intelligence-gathering activities have evolved significantly since the end of the Cold War. State governments are no longer the only actors to make use of these practices, and information collection methods range from covert surveillance activities to monitoring financial transactions. Espionage plays an ever-greater role in the operations of states, non-state actors, and corporations, and has, as a result, created a host of new challenges to U.S. interests. The Forum of this issue addresses the changing threat of espionage after the Cold War, some of the new consumers of intelligence, and the unique and effective ways that actors have begun to use these practices.
Topic:
Cold War, Government, and Intelligence
Political Geography:
United States

200. How Reliable is Intelligence on Iran's Nuclear Program?

Author:
Barbara Slavin
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
For a country that has been accumulating nuclear know-how since the Eisenhower administration, Iran has hardly been sprinting toward a bomb. Indeed, repeated prognostications that Tehran was on the verge of becoming a nuclear power have a Chicken Little quality: The sky did not fall over the past decade, and it seems unlikely to do so for the next year or two or three. Still, Iran has made steady progress accumulating the elements and expertise required to make nuclear weapons, and it would be naive and irresponsible to discount what appears to be a cottage industry of piecemeal proliferation.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East