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61. TSG IntelBrief: The Islamic State and the Divided Opposition

Publication Date:
10-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Soufan Group
Abstract:
The self-declared Islamic State (IS)'s strategy of exploiting and exacerbating divisions among its opponents ranks as one of its greatest weapons, and one of the coalition's greatest weaknesses Turkey's airstrikes against the Kurdistan Workers' Party in southeast Turkey are the latest example-and perhaps most damaging in the near-term-of opponents of IS fighting each other instead of the group IS was sustained during its weakest period (2008-2010) in part by exploiting real tensions between various groups-Sunni vs Shi'a, Sunni vs Sunni, Sunni vs Kurd, etc-that prevented an "everybody vs IS" opposition that remains the only way to defeat the group IS will continue to create/exacerbate/leverage the differences between the US and Turkey, Saudi Arabia/UAE and Qatar, the Kurds and various parties, so much so that focus is more on tactically keeping the coalition together and less on strategically strangling IS.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, Insurgency, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Arab Countries, and Kurdistan

62. Sri Lanka's Rehabilitation Program: A New Frontier in Counter Terrorism and Counter Insurgency

Author:
Malkanthi Hettiarachchi
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The liberation tigers of tamil ealam (ltte), sometimes referred to as the tamil tigers, or simply the tigers, was a separatist militant organization based in northern Sri lanka. It was founded in May 1976 by Prabhakaran and waged a violent secessionist and nationalist campaign to create an independent state in the north and east of Sri lanka for the tamil people. this campaign evolved into the Sri lankan Civil War.1 the tigers were considered one of the most ruthless insurgent and terrorist organisations in the world.2 they were vanquished by the Sri lankan armed forces in May 2009. 3 In order to rehabilitate the 11,6644 tigers who had surrendered or been taken captive, Sri lanka developed a multifaceted program to engage and transform the violent attitudes and behaviours of the tiger leaders, members and collaborators. 5 Since the end of the ltte's three-decade campaign of insurgency and terrorism, there has not been a single act of terrorism in the country. Many attribute Sri lanka's post-conflict stability to the success of the insurgent and terrorist rehabilitation program.
Topic:
War and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sri Lanka

63. Mali: Another European Intervention without the EU?

Author:
Sven Biscop, Jo Coelmont, and Rik Coolsaet
Publication Date:
01-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
As French forces are engaged in combat operations in Mali, even belated EU involvement remains crucial, to ensure that the intervention fits in with the political end-state that the EU rightly pursues.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Islam, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Mali

64. Electoral Offensive: Taliban Planning for Afghanistan's 2014 National Elections

Author:
Antonio Giustozzi and Casey Garret Johnson
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The Taliban have more resources and are better organized to disrupt Afghanistan's 2014 national elections than was the case in any of the country's last four elections. Still, there are disagreements between insurgent leaders about carrying out a campaign of violence and intimidation. One group, led by Akhtar Mansur and tied to the Quetta Shura, favored, at least for some time, a more conciliatory approach and in the spring met informally with Afghan government officials to discuss allowing the polls to go forward. Another Group, led by Taliban military commander Zakir and the Peshawar Shura, favors disrupting the election. These upper-level divisions may have little consequence on the ground since rank-and-file fighters are either vowing to carry out attacks regardless or, as has happened in the past, may strike local deals with political entities to look the other way and allow voting to take place.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Democratization, Islam, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Taliban

65. Sectarianism in Lebanon and Syria: The Dynamics of Mutual Spill-Over

Author:
Joseph Bahout
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
When the Arab revolutions reached Syria, the Sunni-Shia cleavage in Lebanon was already well in the making. Syria's turmoil only added fuel to an existing fire in Lebanon. Syria's crisis is intensifying Sunni-Shia tensions in Lebanon on two levels, symbolic and identity-based on the one hand, and geopolitical or interest based, on the other hand. The shift toward identity-based or symbolic forms of sectarianism can probably be explained by the existential character the struggle in the Levant is taking, whereby both “communities,” however imagined or over-constructed, are coming to perceive themselves as defending not only their share of resources or power, but their very survival. Lebanon's minority communities – including Christian and Druze – are increasingly anxious about the changing regional environment. Lebanon and Syria must face the difficult equation of sectarian diversity and national unity.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, Insurgency, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, Lebanon, and Syria

66. The Syrian Conflict's Impact on Lebanese Politics

Author:
Melani Cammett
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The Syrian crisis has had a negative impact on Lebanon's political scene, including the dynamics among political factions within and across the country's major sectarian communities. The political fragmentation of the Sunni community has implications for the growing trend toward political violence triggered by the Syrian conflict. The rise of challengers and the decline of centralized authority within the Sunni community further increase the probability of violence perpetrated by in-group factions. Despite the pressures from the Syrian conflict, mounting sectarian tensions will not inexorably spark another all-out civil war. If Lebanon does not move past the current political deadlock and stagnation, the spillover from the Syrian crisis stands to undermine the country's stability in the longer term.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, Insurgency, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, Lebanon, and Syria

67. Piecing Together the Jigsaw: Prospects for improved social relations after the armed conflict in northern Mali

Author:
Elise Ford and Ilaria Allegrozzi
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Since January 2012, Mali has been suffering an unprecedented and multi-dimensional socio-political, security and humanitarian crisis. It follows years of weakening state authority, poor governance, a disintegrating army and inter-community tensions. Antagonism and tension between and within communities have built up since the beginning of the conflict, and the rebuilding of social ties and the implementation of a genuine reconciliation process are among the main challenges that must be overcome in order to reconstruct Mali and ensure its long-term stability.
Topic:
Political Violence, Human Rights, Islam, Migration, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Africa and Northern Mali

68. Jihadi Discourse in the Wake of the Arab Spring

Author:
Nelly Lahoud
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This report analyzes jihadi discourse in the wake of the "Arab Spring" to address two related questions: (1) why have global jihadi leaders been struggling to advance a coherent and effective response to the events of the Arab Spring, and (2) why, despite strong rhetoric of militancy, have we witnessed little action on the part of new jihadi groups that have emerged in countries that underwent regime change (i.e., Tunisia, Egypt and Libya) as a result of the Arab Spring? To answer these questions, this study focuses on original Arabic sources in the form of public statements released by global jihadi leaders in response to the Arab Spring and by new groups projecting a jihadi worldview that have emerged in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. It reveals that the factors that are causing the current ideological incoherence of jihadism are the same factors that had once served as the cornerstone of its plausibility in the eyes of its adherents.
Topic:
Political Violence, Diplomacy, Islam, Armed Struggle, Regime Change, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Middle East, Libya, Arabia, North Africa, and Tunisia

69. Colonial Origins of Maoist Insurgency in India: Long Term Effects of Indirect Rule

Author:
Shivaji Mukherjee
Publication Date:
01-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for the Advanced Study of India
Abstract:
In this dissertation I try to answer the puzzle of why the Maoist insurgency in India, which is considered to be the most important internal security threat to the world's largest democracy, occurs in certain districts in India and not others. To restate the puzzle described in the Introduction Chapter, why did the insurgency emerge and consolidate along certain districts in the central-eastern part of India and not in other areas? Why are certain districts affected by the insurgency and not others? Is it as Fearon and Laitin (2003) would argue, purely because of opportunities for rebellion being present in some areas of India in the form of forest cover or mountainous terrain? Is it because of the fact of rebellious tribes or oppressed lower castes facing horizontal inequalities living there as theorized by Murshed and Gates (2005)? Is it as Gurr (1970) would argue because these areas are poorer or with higher levels of economic inequality than others? Yet there are other areas of the country which have similarly high forest cover, poverty, and socio-economically deprived ethnic groups like dalits (lower castes) and adivasis (tribal people), and yet have no Maoist insurgency. Is it as Teitelbaum and Verghese (2011) have recently argued because of colonial direct rule setting up the caste structures and poor quality civil services leading to Maoist insurgency in India? But the Maoist insurgency occurs in certain districts of states like Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Orissa where there was indirect rule through native princes, rather than direct rule. None of these existing theories can fully explain the spatial variation in Maoist insurgency in India. There must be some other omitted variable which explains the full extent of this unusual spatial variation.
Topic:
Security, Communism, Post Colonialism, Armed Struggle, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

70. Is sectarian balance in the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Qatar at risk?

Author:
Ahmad Khalid Majidyar
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
The Persian Gulf states of Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have largely been immune to the rising tide of sectarianism that has rocked the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring. The three monarchies have successfully integrated their Shi'ite minority populations into their countries' sociopolitical and economic spheres, giving those populations little reason to engage in violence or seek political guidance from Iran or Iraq. Omani, Qatari, and Emirati Shi'ites strongly identify themselves as citizens of their respective countries and remain loyal to their ruling regimes. However, the spillover effects of the Syrian civil war—a sectarian conflict between the Shi'ite Iran-Hezbollah-Assad axis and the opposition groups backed by regional Sunni governments—are threatening Sunni-Shi'ite stability in the UAE, Qatar, and to a lesser degree, Oman. The United States should help maintain harmony in these states by reaching out to independent Shi'ite business communities and by working with regional leaders to ensure equal citizenship, political rights, and religious freedom among minority populations.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Islam, Post Colonialism, Insurgency, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Arabia, Oman, and United Arab Emirates