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11. The G20 and Global Governance

Author:
Stephen Kirchner
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Cato Journal
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The Group of 20 sees itself as “the premier forum for international economic cooperation” (G20 2009b). This article examines its evolution and performance, and member countries’ compliance with G20 summit commitments. The G20 evolved as a response to the shortcomings of its predecessor, the G7/8. Yet its creation allowed member countries to avoid confronting many of the problems that arose out of the earlier forum. The best defense of the G20 is that it is the only institution of its type, but it still consumes scarce political and diplomatic capital, sometimes to the detriment of the policy objectives to which it is notionally committed. In this article, I compare data on members’ compliance with G20 summit commitments to proxy measures of the quality of domestic policies and institutions. While the proxies predict G20 compliance, it turns out that G20 compliance has no power to predict subsequent changes in domestic policies and institutions. The main implication of this data is that international economic and political cooperation is a symptom, not a cause, of domestic policies and institutions. Improvement in domestic policies makes the best contribution to advancing the G20 agenda, but such improvements do not appear to depend on the G20 process.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, Governance, and G20
Political Geography:
Global Focus

12. Cross-border Resolution of Financial Firms

Author:
Isabelle Duchane, Kateryna Dzaha, and James Supeene
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
The absence of an effective international regime for cross-border resolution of financial firms led to the disorderly failure of a number of global banks during the global financial crisis, at a high cost to taxpayers and global financial stability. Many jurisdictions still lack sufficient resolution powers and arrangements for cross-border cooperation. This brief proposes that the Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions should be fully implemented within the Group of Twenty (G20) and expanded to include non-G20 states. The FSB should develop a series of model laws on cross-border resolution and endorse a multilateral memorandum of understanding containing reciprocal commitments among the signatories.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Financial Crisis, Reform, and G20
Political Geography:
Global Focus

13. Growth, Innovation and Trade in Environmental Goods

Author:
Céline Bak
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
Reporting on global trade in environmental goods would provide a comprehensive lens into diversification that will be needed for the transition to low-carbon economies, help countries benchmark the shorter- and longer-term impact of policies such as regulation and fiscal stimulus targeted at green growth, as well as innovation, and strengthen the G20 leaders’ commitment to inclusive and sustainable growth by providing visibility into the pace of investments to address climate change.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and G20
Political Geography:
Global Focus

14. Still Broken: Governments must do more to fix the international corporate tax system

Author:
Francis Weyzig
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
The gap between where companies pay tax and where they really do their business is huge, as shown by new research described in this briefing. In 2012, US multinationals alone shifted $500–700bn, mostly to countries where these profits are not taxed, or taxed at very low rates. G20 countries themselves are among the biggest losers. The measures recently announced by the OECD leave the fundamentals of a broken tax system intact and do not stop the race to the bottom in corporate taxation. G20 governments must do more and should strongly support further reforms.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Labor Issues, Governance, Budget, G20, and Income Inequality
Political Geography:
United States

15. Next Steps for the G20: Turkey 2015

Author:
Paul Martin, Thomas A. Bernes, Olaf Weber, Hongying Wang, and Kevin Carmichael
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
On November 15-16, 2015, leaders of the world's major advanced and emerging economies will meet in Antalya, Turkey for the G20 summit. In this special report, CIGI experts present their perspectives and policy analysis on the key priorities facing the G20 at Antalya. The Right Honourable Paul Martin states that the multilateral institutions created to make globalization work should be a G20 priority. Thomas A. Bernes asks whether G20 leaders and the institutions that support them can articulate a “policy upgrade” that brings more credibility than last year’s Brisbane Action Plan. Olaf Weber argues that the next step for the G20 should be the development of policies and guidelines that help to manage climate change and financial risk in a prudential way. Hongying Wang examines China's rare opportunity as it assumes the presidency of the G20 to push for collective new thinking on how to establish a less fragmented and more coherent global framework for investment governance that balances the interests of different stakeholders. Finally, Kevin Carmichael suggests that the G20 should elevate gender balance to the top of its agenda.
Topic:
Economics, Emerging Markets, Globalization, Governance, G20, Financial Markets, and Turkey
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16. A Gilded Alliance: Global Korea’s G-20/Yeonpyeong Moment Revisited

Author:
Haejong Lee
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Alliance is an instrument for national interest, which is dependent upon the international environment and defined by domestic, democratic political processes. This commonsense notion of alliance was not fully embraced by the incoming South Korean administration of Lee Myung Bak in 2008. For the Lee administration, South Korea’s alliance with the United States was much more than an instrument of foreign policy. The alliance embodied South Korea’s political identity and was severely damaged by the preceding Roh Moo Hyun administration’s anti-American, pro–North Korean policies. The restoration of the Republic of Korea (ROK)–US alliance was both the goal and key to its national security strategy of Global Korea to enhance South Korean’s influence, contribution, and stature on a global scale. Thereafter, in a circle of the alliance’s cheerleaders in both Seoul and Washington, the alliance has almost taken its own life: the alliance should be protected from disruptive political forces and modernized/adjusted/expanded into new dimensions for the preservation of the alliance itself. In the post–Cold War years, the United States has tried to modernize its military alliances in order to preserve its influence at reduced costs. The Barack Obama administration had to mend US alliances strained during the George W. Bush administration’s war on terror. In 2009, Presidents Lee and Obama agreed on “a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope, based on common values and mutual trust.” The so-called Great Recession, triggered by the fall of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, has both brought to power and bedeviled the Obama administration; 9/15 has become a new historical marker, replacing 9/11. The very “common values” of the ROK-US strategic alliance—democracy and market economy—have been put to the test; the worries and cries over the decline of the US have arisen once again. In May 2010, the Obama administration published its national security strategy of national renewal and global leadership. Nation-building at home was the primary goal of and imperative to national security. Along with moral leadership to “live” American values, global architecture to embed both allies and challengers in US-centered institutional networks became a new feature of American global leadership. “The United States can, must, and will lead in this new century,” asserted Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in September 2010 at the Council of Foreign Relations, the oldest bastion of American global leadership. She went on to declare that “the complexity and connection of today’s world have yielded a new American moment, a moment when our global leadership is essential, even if we must often lead in new ways.” Confirming that “the 21st century will be another great American century,” President Obama argued at this year’s Air Force Academy graduation ceremony that “we have laid the foundation for a new era of American leadership.” Global Korea, with a comprehensive strategic alliance and a free trade agreement with the United States and hosting of a G-20 meeting and nuclear security summit, has been an integral part and a success story of American global architecture. The Lee administration was awarded with the first two-plus-two (foreign and defense ministers) meeting in 2010, which had been previously held only with Japan, and a state visit to Washington in 2011. “The relation between our two countries has never been stronger,” commended Secretary of State Clinton in this year’s second two-plus-two meeting. Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-Jin confirmed the 2015 operation control plan and expressed commitment to make “the alliance the best alliance in the world.” American Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta lauded an ongoing trilateral collaboration, including Korea and Japan, to deter North Korea as “another way to strengthen and modernize our alliance.” It is widely disputed that the Obama administration has seized a new American moment and laid the foundation for a new American century. The Obama administration has been beset with rampant unemployment and snowballing deficits. “The Moment of Truth,” a bipartisan commission’s report on the financial crisis, issued a warning in 2010 that it is imperative to raise revenues and to cut both defense and nondefense spending—in short, a complete overhaul of the existing American national security state and social welfare system. However, the political polarization of the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street and resultant partisan gridlock have foiled nation-building at home and led to the first downgrading of the US credit rating and a self-made financial cliff of sequester—mandatory across-the-board budget cuts in the next ten years beginning January 2013. Against its lean and mean years, the Obama administration’s rhetoric of a new American moment or century rings hollow. In contrast, the positive—it couldn’t be better—evaluation on the state of the ROK-US alliance is widely held. Nevertheless, the alliance’s success does not resonate with a (far from positive) strategic reality facing South Korea; nor does the alliance translate into a smooth-working component of American global architecture. The Lee administration has doubled down on its alliance with the US. With the Obama administration’s “strategic patience” or no policy toward North Korea, the Lee administration has succeeded in punishing/isolating North Korea but failed to prevent the latter’s development of nuclear capacity, not to mention the latter’s denuclearization. Or, to put it differently, when it comes to nuclear issues or power transition, North Korea has been on its own, with no South Korean leverage over the latter. Most critically and tragically, Global Korea’s prime moment of hosting a G-20 meeting in November 2010 (in the midst of the final renegotiation of a Korea-US free trade agreement) was followed by North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, which in turn led to a joint Korean-US military exercise including the USS George Washington aircraft carrier and which was opposed by China. In the G-20/Yeonpyeong moment, the Lee administration succeeded in synchronizing its strategic and comprehensive alliance with the US and global contribution but rather miserably failed to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula and manage its relationship with China. On the other hand, the ROK-US comprehensive and strategic alliance does not dispense with politics among allies; nor does it develop into a trilateral cooperation of the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The Lee administration has been at odds with the United States on the issues of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and missile development, albeit much out of public scrutiny. In addition, the Lee administration has recently confronted Japan with the territorial issue of Dokdo and Japanese colonialism, along with a public relations campaign, including President Lee’s visit to Dokdo in August 2012. This was an abrupt turnabout from its attempt to share information with Japan on North Korea through a military accord—a trilateral collaboration that Panetta mentioned as a way to modernize the ROK-US alliance. Faced with a public uproar against the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), the Lee administration canceled the latter’s signing ceremony at the last minute and turned to confront Japan, which reciprocated with its territorial claim and disavowal of historical responsibilities for colonialism, and even a threat to halt financial cooperation. In sum, despite of (or because of, if you will) the much touted success of the ROK-US alliance, South Korea is now in a diplomatic wilderness, isolated from all of its neighbors—North Korea, China, and Japan. Why? It is, I argue, because President Lee’s Global Korea was a vision for a bygone, pre–Great Recession, and pre-G-2 world. As long as the United States confronted an assertive China with allies and new partners, South Korea’s strategic alliance with the United States could serve both the former’s security interests and the latter’s regional architect. The sinking of the Cheonan happened in the context of such confrontations of the United States and China over the South China Seas, which led to the rescheduling of transfer of operational control (from the United States to South Korea) from 2012 to 2015 that had been requested by the Lee administration. However, as the United States began to embrace China and both deemed it necessary to contain security tensions on the Korean Peninsula, an assertive South Korea against North Korea and China became a liability to the United States, and South Korea’s strategic, global, comprehensive alliance with the United States became superfluous, if not necessarily inimical, to South Korea’s local and regional interests. Such was the case after the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Following is a reconstruction of an anticlimax of Global Korea in the historical contexts of the Obama administration’s struggles to forge a new American global leadership.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, G20, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

17. Post G20 Seoul Summit Meeting and East Asia

Author:
Yves Tiberghien
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the global economic system has entered a period of intense turbulence, higher systemic risk, and structural change. Many observers and policy-makers recognize the current period as a critical juncture , during which the system of global governance must be successfully upgraded to cope with increasingly globalized and volatile markets. In addition, the global system is undergoing a historic rebalancing in the distribution of power, a process marked by the rise of large emerging countries, primarily China, India, and Brazil. As a consequence, the share of OECD countries in the global GDP has shrunk from 60% to 50% between 2000 and 2011 (PPP basis). This new reality has empowered the new rising emerging economies to demand a larger say in global governance, as witnessed during the debates over the choice of a new IMF Managing Director in June 2011. By chance and also owing to its relatively careful initial design, the G20 Leaders Summit has emerged as the prime forum for the negotiation of changes in the global economic governance. In particular, the G20 represents a relatively stable equilibrium, due to its near equal balancing between developed OECD countries and emerging economies (nearly 10 to 10, depending how one codes Mexico and Korea). The G20 suffers somewhat from its large size, but at least enjoys support from most of its members due to its numerous opportunities for coalition-building and issue-specific balancing. It is true that the G20 in still in the process of proving itself and has to deal with many skeptics. Many analysts in Canada and the U.S. are quick to discount the G20 process as meaningless summitry among too many countries focused on widely divergent domestic agendas. Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini both call this a G-zero situation. Likewise, many leaders in Japan, especially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are very skeptical about the G20’s potential and Japan has broadly not yet accepted the G20 as the central game of global governance, preferring to it the well-established G8. Yet, the G0 or G8 or G193 are not functional options. They represent default realities without the ability to solve any of our global problems. Only the G20 is able to deliver the necessary political leadership to initiate the upgrading of global governance. For this reason, the majority of key countries (including Europe, China, Korea, and many in the U.S.) see the G20 as the core game of global governance and the best option for the enhancement of global cooperation and the restructuring of global institutions. After an interim summit in Toronto, the Seoul summit came at a critical moment when the future of the G20 was in the balance. By managing to deliver visible results and institutional milestones, the Seoul Summit played a key role in the gradual institutionalization of the G20. The Seoul summit provided significant momentum to the G20 and significant legacies. It can be seen as a second high point after the London summit.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, G20, Economic Cooperation, and Summit
Political Geography:
Global Focus