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51. Serbia's New President Eyes EU Membership

Author:
Alex Cooper
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Diplomatic Courier
Abstract:
The new Serbian president, Tomislav Nikolic, has been making waves in the international community since winning the May 20th run-off election against incumbent Boris Tadic. Since Nikolic and his center-right Serbian Progressive party and its allies won 73 out of 250 seats in the National Assembly, Nikolic has been making some controvsial statements regarding some of Serbia’s neighbors. Nikolic won with 50.21 percent of the vote, while Tadic won 46.77 percent. The shocking statements from Nikolic began with an interview the president did before the second round of elections on May 6th with the German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. In the interview, Nickolic stated that a “greater Serbia was his unrealized dream” and “Vukovar was a Serbian town in which Croats should not return.” The Croatian President, Ivo Josipovic and other officials have spoken out against Nikolic’s comments. Josipovic and other leaders from the Balkans did not attend Nikolic’s inauguration due to the comments, and the Croatian president cancelled a trip to Belgrade that was supposed to take place at the end of June. During the war following Croatia’s claim to independence from Yugoslavia, Vukovar experienced severe damage from the Yugoslav army that was led by Serbs. After Vukovar fell to the Yugoslav army, over 200 Croats were killed. Many Croatians still view Vukovar's story as a difficult topic. This was the only controversial statement from Nikolic. He recently told Montenegrin state television, “There was no genocide in Srebrenica.” The International Court of Justice and the UN war crimes tribunal have both ruled the massacre of over 7,000 Muslim men and boys in 1995 as genocide. The massacre is the worst atrocity to occur in Europe since World War II. The international community has condemned the remarks by Nikolic. A spokesperson for the European Commission, Pia Ahrenkilde Hansen, said that the comments were “attempts to rewrite history.” Hansen also said, “The atrocities in Srebrenica in July 1995 were a crime against all humankind, and we should never forget it, and we should never allow it to happen again.” On June 14th, the Associated Press reported that EU officials would discuss Nikolic’s recent comments with the new president. While meeting in Brussels, Nikolic attempted to show that Serbia was prepared for EU membership. He claimed, “There is not better future for Serbia than membership in the Union.”
Topic:
International Cooperation, European Union, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

52. Still Lips and Teeth? China-North Korea Relations after Kim Jong-il`s Visit to China

Author:
Dong Ryul Lee
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Only nine months after the visits in May and August of 2010, Kim Jong-il yet again made an unofficial visit to China on May 20, 2011. Although it is uncommon for three visits to take place within the span of a year, there exists some precedent for this within the history of China-North Korea relations. Before and after the Korean War in 1950, Kim Il-sung visited China three times consecutively. In 1964 as the Sino-Soviet split was intensifying, it is said that five meetings took place in both Beijing and Pyongyang. Both times were strategically critical moments within China-North Korea relations. It is generally assumed that Kim Jong-il has been motivated by urgent concerns to make such consecutive visits to China that from a distance look hasty. The issues that North Korea and China currently share can be categorized into three areas: economic aid and cooperation, the leadership succession process in North Korea, and resumption of the Six-Party Talks. These issues are not so different from the agenda that was set during Kim’s previous two visits to China in 2010. In fact, economic aid and the Six-Party Talks has been a regular feature of China-North Korea meetings since the Second Nuclear Crisis broke out in 2002. The speculation that Kim Jong-il visited China three times in order to obtain the Chinese leadership’s support for the succession process is unbalanced. Neither side would want the appearance of China intervening in North Korea’s domestic affairs. For Beijing, such actions would contradict its own policy of non-intervention as well as weaken its position on Taiwan. North Korea, for its part, would not wish to appear to be publicly seeking China’s support that would question the legitimacy of its own Juche ideology that emphasizes independence from great powers. There is a need to focus on the fact that all these three different issues actually resulted in maintaining and stabilizing the North Korean regime. Compared to his previous visits to China, Kim Jong-il’s latest visit in 2011 would appear to be no different. However, during this visit there was stronger public emphasis on the “DPRK-Chinese friendship and traditional alliance.” Notably, upon his arrival in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-il held an unprecedented welcoming party and highlighted the successful results of the visit. Kim even heralded China-North Korea relations by declaring it as the “immortal long march.” Despite this rhetoric, there was a subtle difference between the two countries in the way that they emphasized the strengthening of China-North Korea relations. With the pressure of meeting its declared objective of becoming a “strong and prosperous nation” by 2012, Kim Jong-il appears to have judged that the only alternative in resolving the problem of increasing regime instability is through China. In other words, with this visit to China, North Korea sought to mutually reconfirm the reinforcement of China-North Korea relations7and at the same time, it tried to actively display this friendship. In contrast, China is taking precautions against the possibility that other countries will overestimate China-North Korea relations. For example, the Chinese government made the very unusual gesture of briefing South Korea and other related countries on the contents of the China-DPRK summit immediately following Kim’s visit to China. Furthermore, at the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore, China’s Minister of National Defense General Liang Guanglie emphasized that "We have been advising North Korea, via different channels, not to take the risk." While both North Korea and China are greatly concerned about the reaction of other countries, the message the two countries are trying to send are slightly, but clearly different. Such a difference reflects the complicated and delicate nature of China-North Korea relations.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Intervention, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

53. Lost in Translation? The Clash of Core Interests and the Future of U.S.-China Relations

Author:
Yang Gyu Kim
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In studying the dynamics of U.S.-China relations, one of the most important questions is what data should be used. A review of all classified documents from the two countries may be the ideal way to secure reliable data, but it is not viable. Interviews with key officials in the two governments could be the next best choice but it is still extremely hard to know whether that person is telling the truth or not. In this regard, the official statements of the two countries are the only reliable and authoritative source for research. Of course in official statements, propaganda may be included and they cannot always be taken at face value. However, as information is ubiquitous in this era of globalization, a government would pay a tremendous cost if it expresses contradictory policies in its own official statements. We can therefore assume that official statements provide information on the general direction of the two country’s policies. Which documents can be accepted as official statements? The United States, of course, makes its policies well known throughout the world and has shown high levels of consistency across different departments of the government over its foreign policy. The official statements of the United States are therefore easily accessible through various official government websites including the State Department. On the other hand, China maintains a rather closed socialist system and there are not many documents that could be identified as official statements except for the regular press conferences of the Foreign Ministry. Even with these press conferences, the spokesperson usually responds to selected questions raised by the media. This brings a considerable limitation in collecting official statements from China. In order to address this difficulty, U.S.-China Relations (UCR) Statement Factsheets include editorials of the news outlets run by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as official statements. Data collection began from November 2010. This period is important because first, it marks one year since the U.S.-China summit in November 2009 and second, it coincides with the G20 Seoul Summit held in November. Particularly the G20 summit was meaningful as it “clearly demonstrated that we are in a period of transition where the United States is no longer the world’s hegemon, yet no new power emerges.” (Sohn and Cho 2010, 1) Third, Xi Jinping was appointed as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission on 18 October, 2010 and is expected to be the next leader of China. This appointment then signals a new period where the next generation of leaders in the CCP will begin to assert their influence and views. For both the statements from the United States and China, English texts are used presented by either the official government department or a CCP-affiliated media outlet. The reason for not using Chinese language sources is that official statements in Chinese tend to be directed at a domestic audience, and the focus here is on the international messages that are being conveyed. The data is collected everyday and published as a monthly report, UCR Statement Factsheet. The UCR Briefing will analyze the UCR Statement Factsheets and summarize what has happened during the period in narrative form. The UCR Briefing will also focus on critical factors and issues in understanding the present and future of U.S.-China relations. This UCR Briefing No. 1 covers official statements of the United States and China from November 2010 to February 2011.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

54. Post G20 Seoul Summit Meeting and East Asia

Author:
Yves Tiberghien
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the global economic system has entered a period of intense turbulence, higher systemic risk, and structural change. Many observers and policy-makers recognize the current period as a critical juncture , during which the system of global governance must be successfully upgraded to cope with increasingly globalized and volatile markets. In addition, the global system is undergoing a historic rebalancing in the distribution of power, a process marked by the rise of large emerging countries, primarily China, India, and Brazil. As a consequence, the share of OECD countries in the global GDP has shrunk from 60% to 50% between 2000 and 2011 (PPP basis). This new reality has empowered the new rising emerging economies to demand a larger say in global governance, as witnessed during the debates over the choice of a new IMF Managing Director in June 2011. By chance and also owing to its relatively careful initial design, the G20 Leaders Summit has emerged as the prime forum for the negotiation of changes in the global economic governance. In particular, the G20 represents a relatively stable equilibrium, due to its near equal balancing between developed OECD countries and emerging economies (nearly 10 to 10, depending how one codes Mexico and Korea). The G20 suffers somewhat from its large size, but at least enjoys support from most of its members due to its numerous opportunities for coalition-building and issue-specific balancing. It is true that the G20 in still in the process of proving itself and has to deal with many skeptics. Many analysts in Canada and the U.S. are quick to discount the G20 process as meaningless summitry among too many countries focused on widely divergent domestic agendas. Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini both call this a G-zero situation. Likewise, many leaders in Japan, especially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are very skeptical about the G20’s potential and Japan has broadly not yet accepted the G20 as the central game of global governance, preferring to it the well-established G8. Yet, the G0 or G8 or G193 are not functional options. They represent default realities without the ability to solve any of our global problems. Only the G20 is able to deliver the necessary political leadership to initiate the upgrading of global governance. For this reason, the majority of key countries (including Europe, China, Korea, and many in the U.S.) see the G20 as the core game of global governance and the best option for the enhancement of global cooperation and the restructuring of global institutions. After an interim summit in Toronto, the Seoul summit came at a critical moment when the future of the G20 was in the balance. By managing to deliver visible results and institutional milestones, the Seoul Summit played a key role in the gradual institutionalization of the G20. The Seoul summit provided significant momentum to the G20 and significant legacies. It can be seen as a second high point after the London summit.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, G20, Economic Cooperation, and Summit
Political Geography:
Global Focus

55. Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Analysis of Public Opinion Surveys on Ratification

Author:
Wonchil Chung
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
There was a lot at stake for the Korean Congress in August 2011, and one of them was the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). Regarding this bill, the two main parties have been pitted against one another. The Grand National Party (GNP) asserts that the FTA bill has at least to be submitted to the Standing Committee; while the Democratic Party (DP) suggests the 10+2 renegotiation proposal (see Appendix 1) for the KORUS FTA that impose restrictions on the arrangement. If the DP's proposal is agreed upon by the National Congress, ratification becomes impossible, since the proposal will allow the negotiation of the FTA, in progress for more than four years (2006 to February 2011), to be taken back to square one. It is true that the KORUS FTA has a lot to offer when it comes to economic aspects, as the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) pointed out in its analysis (see Appendix 2). With that in mind, the GNP risks its political position, as public opinion displays distrust and dissatisfaction over the imbalance between Korea and the United States shown during the progress of the negotiation (see Appendix 3).
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

56. Kim Jong-il’s Visit to China and Its Implications

Author:
Dong Ryul Lee
Publication Date:
06-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The North Korean leader Kim Jong-il embarked on a secretive trip to China on May 3, 2010. The five day visit was his first to China in four years and his fifth so far. Kim’s recent visit to China does not seem to be that much different from previous summit meetings between North Korea and China. Although North Korea’s nuclear test in 2009 did not provoke a longer than normal suspension in bilateral exchanges, in essence, progress has been made since the resumption of bilateral diplomatic visits in 2000. The key agenda of the recent summit has been consistent with the principle in which China provides economic assistance in exchange for North Korea’s return to the Six-Party Talks. This principle has been the backbone of Beijing’s North Korea policy, which has been in place since the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula in 2003. Furthermore, this secretive trip to China looks very similar to Kim Jong-il’s last four visits to China, where he toured the industrial regions that have benefited from China’s economic reform and opening. There has been a lot of controversy and diverse assumptions on the reason for Kim’s visit to China. This is particularly attributable to the complicated and delicate nature of inter-Korean relations even though this China-DPRK summit shares many similarities with those of the past. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the political and security environment of the Korean Peninsula in which Kim Jong-il decided to make such a critical strategic decision to travel to China. The visit and the resulting bilateral summit were a successful conclusion to the longest gap in China-DPRK relations since the revival of bilateral ties at the beginning of 2000. Similarly, this summit carries special meaning considering the current deadlock of the Six-Party Talks that has gone on for the past eighteen months. What is more significant is the fact that Kim Jong-il’s trip immediately followed South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s official visit to China on April 30, amid the escalating tensions in inter-Korean relations over the North Korean torpedo attack on the Cheonan. Moreover, North Korea is facing dire domestic circumstances primarily caused by the health problems of Kim Jong-il, the succession issue, instability following the disastrous currency reform of late 2009, and its failing economy struggling under United Nations sanctions. The fact that the China-DPRK summit took place in such a complex environment indicates that a wide range of current issues were involved and it would have a greater impact for stability on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s actions immediately following the bilateral summit with China should be closely examined as it could help South Korea predict how the Cheonan incident will develop. There were no official reports or any specific details of the conversation available for the public due to the opaque nature of the talk. Therefore, it is necessary to scrutinize as well as analyze any subtle moves by both countries that might reflect any possible major agreements between the two sides. There are three major questions that need to be answered when evaluating this recent summit in China. First, what is the significance of the summit regarding China-DPRK relations and Beijing’s policy toward North Korea? Second, did North Korea and China agree on the North’s return to the Six-Party Talks in exchange for Chinese support for its regime? If so, what is the prospect for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks? Third, what impact will this summit have on ROK-China relations in light of the fact that the summit meeting took place while the South Korean-led international investigation into the cause of the Cheonan sinking was in progress?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

57. Economic Interdependence, Alliance Cooperation, and Sino-U.S. Complex Interdependence

Author:
Scott Snyder
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
China’s rising economic strength has highlighted a need to understand in greater detail the impact of complex economic interdependence on prospects for alliance cohesion, especially when an ally comes to depend on a potential adversary as its leading trading partner and engine for economic growth. This is an issue that did not come into play to any significant degree in analyzing alliance dynamics during the cold war era precisely because the development of security and economic relationships during that period were aligned with and served to reinforce each other, and the level of economic ties among potential cold-war adversaries was minimal. Analysis of trade relationships among security allies from that period shows a clear correlation of preferences for trading relationships with security partners versus adversaries, but it is not clear based on that data alone that there was necessarily causality between economic trade patterns and security alliances. In fact, structural differences between market economies (that tended to be allied with each other) and non-market economies were a significant deterrent to the development of economic relations with non-security partners during the cold war. In the post-cold war era, economically interdependent trade and investment relationships have been relatively unconstrained by political and security considerations, resulting in a situation where non-security partners such as China, a potential challenger to U.S. power, have become actively integrated in global supply chains as a leading manufacturer of goods for the global market. In considering this question, Dong Sun Lee and Sung Eun Kim have attempted to provide an empirical analysis of the influence of bilateral economic relations as a factor in shaping America’s Asian alliances, concluding that “economic ties do not markedly reinforce the security alliances of East Asia, because they have an asymmetrical structure”(Lee and Kim 2010, 4). But in making the argument that asymmetry matters, Lee and Kim assume that the economic consequences of interdependence are negative for dynamics within the alliance and that these negative consequences may cancel out positive effects of economic interdependence, even though the main argument of that the paper proves is that economic ties do not necessarily reinforce security alliances. The authors’ assertions regarding asymmetrical economic relations as having an impact on alliance dynamics are unproven and not dealt with to any significant degree by the evidence presented in the paper.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Alliance, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

58. Austria's Deepening Economic Integration with Central and Eastern Europe

Author:
Rina Bhattacharya
Publication Date:
08-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Abstract:
The Austrian economy has benefited substantially from the expansion of economic ties with Central and Eastern Europe, which has provided a significant boost to growth, productivity, competitiveness, profits and (more controversially) aggregate employment. Indeed, among the older EU member states, Austria has benefited the most from the transition of the Central and Eastern European countries from planned economies to market economies, and the subsequent entry into the EU of the ten new member states, mostly from Central and Eastern Europe, in 2004. However, important segments of the population in Austria, and in particular low-skilled and semi-skilled workers in the manufacturing sector, appear to have been adversely affected by these developments. There is thus a need for policy measures to help those segments of the workforce that have had difficulty coping with growing competition from Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, more can be done to make Austria a more attractive location for highly skilled and well qualified expatriate workers and to maintain Vienna’s position as a central hub for multinationals operating in the region. These include, in particular, the need to strengthen eastern transportation links and to reduce to a minimum bureaucratic hurdles and red tape for foreign enterprises seeking to operate out of Vienna.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, Economic Cooperation, and Financial Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Austria, and Central Europe