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2521. After Doha: II. Is globalisation history?

Author:
Mark P Thirlwell
Publication Date:
12-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
For some observers, the announcement in late July of the indefinite suspension of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations signalled the beginning of the end for globalisation. The fear was that history would repeat itself; just as an earlier era of globalisation came to a bad end, so too could the current episode.
Topic:
Development, Globalization, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Africa

2522. After Doha: I. The search for Plan B

Author:
Mark P Thirlwell
Publication Date:
09-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
On 24 July, the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations was suspended indefinitely, due to irreconcilable differences over the liberalisation of agricultural trade. While the suspension of negotiations may or may not turn out to mark the death of the Doha Round, it will almost certainly mark a watershed for the future of the international trading system. With even a 'good' outcome for the faltering trade round likely to deliver little in terms of new market access when set against the scale of negotiating resources devoted to Doha, the appetite of the world's trade ministers for any repeat performance will be limited. As a result, the era of giant, set piece trade rounds like Doha and its predecessor the Uruguay Round may well be over.
Topic:
Development, International Trade and Finance, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Africa

2523. The next UN Secretary-General

Author:
Dr. Michael Fullilove
Publication Date:
07-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
This Issues Brief assesses the relationship between the United Nations and Asia – both the UN's activities in Asia and the behaviour of Asian states at the UN. Dr Michael Fullilove, Program Director for Global Issues, reviews the current stances of the three major regional powers — China, India, and Japan — towards the UN, previews the September World Summit on UN reform, and examines the prospects for an Asian Secretary-General, which has the potential to thicken Asia's interactions with the UN.
Topic:
Development, Politics, and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States and Asia

2524. The testament of Solomons: RAMSI and international state-building

Author:
Dr. Michael Fullilove
Publication Date:
03-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
The phenomenon of state failure and its remedies constitute a growth area of international politics, partly because of the recognition that state failure generates security threats and partly because it is so very difficult. This Lowy Institute Analysis identifies the critical elements of one small but significant case, about which there is growing international interest: the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The background to the mission was the long-standing tension between the peoples of the two main islands, Guadalcanal and Malaita, which developed in the period 1998-2002 into militant violence which then mutated into widespread criminality and thuggery. Acting on a request from Honiara, the Australian Government and its regional partners elected to lead a new kind of statebuilding intervention.
Topic:
International Relations and Development
Political Geography:
Australia/Pacific

2525. China: Toward a Consumption-Driven Growth Path

Author:
Nicholas R. Lardy
Publication Date:
10-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
In December 2004 China's top political leadership agreed to fundamentally alter the country's growth strategy. In place of investment and export-led development, they endorsed transitioning to a growth path that relied more on expanding domestic consumption. Since 2004, China's top leadership, most notably Premier Wen Jiaobao in his speech to the National People's Congress in the spring of 2006, has reiterated the goal of strengthening domestic consumption as a major source of economic growth. This policy brief examines the reasons underlying the leadership decision, the implications of this transition for the United States and the global economy, and the steps that have been taken to embark on the new growth path.
Topic:
International Relations, Development, and Economics
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

2526. The Doha Round after Hong Kong

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:
02-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Trade ministers from member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) convened in Hong Kong in December 2005 to jump-start the flagging Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The Hong Kong ministerial was not a complete bust. But ministers accomplished only the minimum necessary to keep the Doha Round moving forward—toward an undetermined and probably distant conclusion.
Topic:
Development, Economics, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Asia

2527. The United States Needs German Economic Leadership

Author:
Adam S. Posen
Publication Date:
01-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
On January 13, Germany's new chancellor, Angela Merkel, will have her first official visit with US President George W. Bush. Washington, or at least the part of Washington that still pays attention to transatlantic issues, not just the Bush administration, will be glad to see her given that she is not her US-bashing predecessor Gerhard Schroeder. Though this change in atmosphere is welcome, no one should make too much of it. It is unlikely to make much difference on security issues, where Iran's own actions are forcing the United States and Germany to come together, where German public opinion will keep the governments apart on Iraq, and where neither country is prepared to make major changes to defense budgets and approaches. The Masri case will certainly limit Merkel's interest in appearing too chummy with Bush on security matters.
Topic:
Development and Economics
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Washington, and Germany

2528. Struggle for the Future - The Poison of Populism and Democracy's Cure

Author:
Robert F. Noreiga
Publication Date:
12-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
While the world's attention is focused on a struggling Iraq and a rising China, a battle for the heart and soul of the Americas is being waged closer to home. A simplistic account might describe this confrontation as a tug of war between U.S. president George W. Bush's vision and that of his self-appointed nemesis, Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez. Equally misleading are characterizations that describe the showdown as one between left and right, rich and poor, north and south. But this is not a battle between two powerful leaders or between ideologies of the left and right. The contest being waged in the Western Hemisphere is about democracy itself: can it deliver the goods for impatient publics? On one side are leaders from the left and right who see democratic institutions and the rule of law as indispensable to prosperity and liberty. On the other are those who treat democracy as an inconvenience and see free markets as a threat.
Topic:
Democratization, Development, and Politics
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2529. U.S. Slowdown: Self-Correcting or Self-Reinforcing?

Author:
John H. Makin
Publication Date:
11-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
The U.S. economy has slowed to a level below its trend growth rate during the second half of 2006. Trend growth, the rate that can be sustained over time without rising inflation, is probably about 3 percent, having been reduced by a quarter of a percentage point by weaker productivity data. As has often been the case over the past five years, the slowdown itself has set into motion market adjustments that may mitigate or even reverse it. Since August, interest rates on benchmark tenyear treasuries have dropped by about 60 basis points. That reduction, coupled with a stock market that is rising in part because of lower interest rates, has caused an easing of financial conditions equal to nearly 100 basis points since late June on the Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index. Meanwhile, since August, the price of oil has dropped by about $18 per barrel—which, if sustained, would be enough to add about 0.7 percentage points to U.S. growth over the next year.
Topic:
Development, Economics, and Markets
Political Geography:
United States and America

2530. China Needs to Float the Yuan--for China's Sake

Author:
John H. Makin
Publication Date:
05-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
In their April 21 press release following their spring meeting in Washington, D.C., the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors added an important sentence to their usual bland statement that exchange rates should reflect economic fundamentals: Greater exchange rate flexibility is desirable in emerging economies with large current account surpluses, especially China, for necessary adjustments to occur. In their April 21 press release following their spring meeting in Washington, D.C., the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors added an important sentence to their usual bland statement that exchange rates should reflect economic fundamentals: Greater exchange rate flexibility is desirable in emerging economies with large current account surpluses, especially China, for necessary adjustments to occur. The G7, significantly, also called for an increased role for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help countries, including those in the G7 but also China and others in emerging Asia, meet the macroeconomic and financial policy challenge of globalization. Specifically, the G7 supported the strengthening of IMF surveillance, including through increased emphasis on the consistency of exchange rate policies with domestic policies and a market-based international monetary system and on the spillover effects of domestic policies on other countries. The G7s endorsement of greater exchange-rate flexibility and of an enhanced IMF role in implementing it is important. The IMF, having been founded after World War II to maintain stable exchange rates among major economies, has become an advocate on behalf of the major economies of global exchange-rate flexibility. The lesson regarding the need for G7 currency flexibility was learned after Americas August 1971 abandonment of fixed exchange rates, which was followed by a decade of adjustments to higher oil prices that would have wreaked havoc under fixed exchange rates. The lesson for needed currency flexibility in emerging markets was learned after the disastrous attempt, fostered in part by the IMF, to impose fixed exchange rates during the Asian and Russian crises of 1997 and 1998, which prolonged and exacerbated the market gyrations caused by the crises. Sadly, China response to the G7-IMF call for greater currency flexibility has been both negative and misguided. China's foolishly insouciant attitude, captured in a comment by Zhou Xiao-chuan, governor of the Peoples Bank of China, carries with it serious risks both for China and for the world economy. Zhous remark was quoted on April 24 in the Wall Street Journal: [T]he speed of moving forward (on yuan appreciation) is OK. Its good for China and welcomed by many other countries. China's currency has appreciated only 1.2 percent since its initial 2.1 percent revaluation last July 21. That is less than OK. The total 3.3 percent revaluation against the dollar really represents no adjustment at all in view of the 1 to 2 percent inflation differential (lower in China) that has persisted between the United States and China over the past two years. If China had allowed prices to rise instead of mandating caps on prices of important commodities like gasoline, there would be less pressure for the yuan to rise in value. Both the intervention to cap the yuans appreciation and the capping of domestic prices are building up potentially disruptive inflation pressure inside China, as we shall see below. The most dangerous aspect of China's increased efforts to prevent yuan appreciation, as measured by accelerating reserve accumulation over the past year, is the rising pool of liquidity inside China that has resulted. The level of excess reserves in Chinese banks is now larger, relative to GDP, than the level of excess reserves built up in Japan from 2001 to 2005 during the years of a prolonged, desperate struggle against deflation. China's currency undervaluation, coupled with the massive liquidity buildup in its banking system, has resulted in excessive investment in China's state enterprises that have close traditional ties with the liquidity-sodden banks. The usual Chinese response to excess reserves has been to boost reserve requirements for its banks. But to absorb the huge pool of excess reserves now in place, reserve requirements would have to be boosted by 5 percentage points to 12.5 per-cent, going far beyond previous moves of 0.5 to 1 percentage point, and far beyond what China's shaky, insolvent banks could endure. When the Peoples Bank of China boosted its one-year benchmark lending rate on April 26 by 27 basis points (to 5.85 percent), it took a tiny step that will do little to tighten China's monetary stance.
Topic:
Development, Economics, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Washington