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1. Russia’s Crony Capitalism: Stagnant But Stable

Author:
Anders Åslund
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE
Abstract:
The Russian economy is caught in stagnation, but thanks to a skillful macroeconomic policy, the economy has stabilized. The current economic model is dualistic. On the one hand, the so-called systemic liberals are in charge of macroeconomic policy, which they pursue eminently. On the other, President Vladimir Putin allows state corporations, cronies, and law enforcement agencies to dominate the corporate economy, enriching themselves with little consideration of legality. Anders Aslund's paper discusses the state of the Russian economy and the prospects for reform and growth.
Topic:
Corruption, Economics, Reform, Capitalism, Economic growth, Putin, Cronyism, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
Russia and Eastern Europe

2. Pyramid Capitalism: Cronyism, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt

Author:
Ishac Diwan, Philip Keefer, and Marc Schiffbauer
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
Using an original database of 469 politically connected firms under the Mubarak regime in Egypt, we explore the economic effects of cronyism. Previous research has shown that cronyism is lucrative. We address numerous questions raised by this research. First, do crony firms receive favorable regulatory treatment? We find that they do: connected firms are more likely to benefit from trade protection, energy subsidies, access to land, and regulatory enforcement. Second, does regulatory capture account for the high value of connected firms? In our sample, connected firms exhibit superior corporate performance relative to unconnected firms and this is systematically related to regulatory capture. Energy subsidies and trade protection, for example, account for the higher profits of politically connected firms. Third, do crony firms hurt growth? We exploit a natural experiment setting to show that the entry of politically connected firms into previously unconnected sectors slows employment growth and skews the distribution of employment towards less productive smaller firms.
Topic:
Economics, Economy, Business, Networks, and Cronyism
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt