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Begin New Search Topic Counterinsurgency Publication Year within 25 Years

181. Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot

Author:
Eric T. Olson
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
If the U.S. Army's current experience in ongoing overseas operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan are any indication, reconstruction has become an integral part of the American way of war. And judging from the disappointing results of reconstruction efforts in these operations, measured mostly in terms of the effect that such efforts have had on the course of these wars, there is much lacking in the Army's understanding of reconstruction itself and the role that it will likely play in all future operations, especially in counterinsurgencies (COIN).
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Arms Control and Proliferation, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

182. An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations

Author:
Suzanne C. Nielsen
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
During the 2 decades preceding the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. Army went through tremendous reform and rejuvenation. It recovered from the Vietnam War, transitioned to an all-volunteer personnel model, and refocused on a potential future war against a very capable adversary in Europe. The Army's transformation was evident to external observers: from being seen as an organization in distress in the early 1970s, by 1991 the Army became an organization whose professionalism was the source of admiration. Drawing on the relevant literature, the author seeks to explain this important case of military change.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Vietnam

183. U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap

Author:
Dennis E Keller
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Establishing an effective local police force is one of the most critical elements of successful counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations, but it is a task for which the U.S. Government is the least prepared and capable. The establishment of an effective police force is critical to security sector reform, justice sector reform, and the successful transition to the host nation's security forces. But the United States lacks the institutional capacity to provide an immediate and coordinated civilian police training and advisory effort, particularly in a failed or fragile state. Because hesitation in addressing such problems causes delays in forming and training new police forces, and, even worse, emboldens corrupt and abusive locals who enable insurgents, terrorist groups, and organized criminal networks, the U.S. military must be prepared to support stability operations at regional level and below by assessing, advising, and even training police units until such time as civilian police trainers and mentors arrive on the ground.
Topic:
Crime, Counterinsurgency, and Law Enforcement
Political Geography:
United States

184. U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan

Author:
Richard L. Armitage and Samuel R. Berger
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Al-Qaeda's attack on September 11, 2001, was the deadliest terrorist assault on the United States in history. In the hours and days that followed, Americans learned more about the perpetrators and their links to bases and networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Less than a month later, President George W. Bush launched Operation Enduring Freedom. Much changed nearly overnight as the United States focused military, economic, and diplomatic attention squarely on the region for the first time since the end of the Cold War. In Afghanistan, the Taliban regime—al-Qaeda's sympathetic host—was toppled. In Pakistan, the Pervez Musharraf regime was drafted into Washington's Global War on Terror.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

185. State of Affairs: Three Years After Nisoor Square: Accountability and Oversight of U.S. Private Security and Other Contractors

Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Human Rights First
Abstract:
On September 16, 2007, Black water Worldwide (now X e) private security contractors working for the U.S. Department of State killed 17 unarmed civilians and wounded 24 more in an unprovoked incident in Baghdad's Nisoor Square. A political firestorm immediately ensued in Iraq, the United States and around the world. The incident exposed what had been clear for several years: The United States lacked a coordinated, systematic policy for overseeing private contractors abroad and holding them accountable for serious violent crimes. Now, the United States' reliance on private security contractors in zones of armed conflict is increasing as is the urgent need for effective contractor oversight and accountability. Private contractors continue to outnumber U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both the surge in Afghanistan and the drawdown in Iraq require additional support from private security and other contractors. It is estimated that up to 50,000 contractors will be required to support the Afghan surge and, with the military drawdown in Iraq, the Department of State plans to more than double the number of private security contractors it employs from 2,700 to 7,000. As Iraq and eventually Afghanistan move from military to civilian control and private contractors replace military forces there, the so-called jurisdictional gap over non-Defense contractors widens. If we learned anything from Nisoor Square it is that oversight and accountability gaps must be filled prior to increasing our private contractor force in conflict zones.
Topic:
Security, Crime, Human Rights, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Arabia

186. Al Qaeda's Religious Justification of Nuclear Terrorism

Author:
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
When legendary jihadist Abdullah Azzam was assassinated under mysterious circumstances in November 1989, suspects in his murder included Osama bin Laden and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. After the Soviets were expelled from Afghanistan, Azzam sought to shift jihad to his homeland, Palestine. Zawahiri sought to focus the jihad on Egypt and the other secular Muslim states, in hopes of restoring the caliphate, the rule of Islamic clerics, which had ended after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. After Islamic rule had been re-established in the Islamic world, Zawahiri wrote, “then history would make a new turn, God willing, in the opposite direction against the empire of the United States and the world's Jewish government.”
Topic:
Islam, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Palestine, Egypt, and Assam

187. Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe

Author:
Lorenzo Vidino
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The recent surge in the number of American Muslims involved in terrorism has led U.S. authorities to question the long-held assumption that American Muslims are immune to radicalization, and to follow the example of other Western democracies in devising a comprehensive counter radicalization strategy. Radicalization is a highly individualized process determined by the complex interaction of various personal and structural factors. Because no one theory can exhaustively explain it, policymakers must understand the many paths to radicalization and adopt flexible approaches when trying to combat it. The role of religion in the radicalization process is debated, but theories that set aside ideology and religion as factors in the radicalization of Western jihadists are not convincing. Policymakers who choose to tackle religious aspects should do so cautiously, however, cognizant of the many implications of dealing with such a sensitive issue. Policymakers need to determine whether a counter radicalization strategy aims to tackle violent radicalism alone or, more ambitiously, cognitive radicalism. The relation between the two forms is contested. Challenging cognitive radicalism, though possibly useful for both security and social cohesion purposes, is extremely difficult for any Western democracy.Finding partners in the Muslim community is vital to any counter radicalization program. In light of the fragmentation of that community, a diverse array of partners appears to be the best solution. There is the risk, however, that counter radicalization efforts could be perceived by Muslims as unfairly targeting them. Partnerships with nonviolent Islamists could provide results in the short term, but there are doubts as to their long-term implications. All aspects of a partnership with such groups should be carefully examined before any decision is made. Policymakers need to find ways to empirically measure their programs' effectiveness.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States and America

188. The United States Military as an Agent of Development: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Development Assistance

Author:
Carol Messineo
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The New School Graduate Program in International Affairs
Abstract:
The United States' national security objectives emphasize preventing terrorism through economic and social development in fragile states. Helping to create economic prosperity and legitimate and politically accountable institutions of governance in weak states poses many complex challenges that the international development community and US civilian aid agencies have struggled to address. New US military counterinsurgency doctrine defines “Phase Zero” non - combat development activities as a core military mission equal in importance to that of its combat missions. The US military lacks the development expertise to effectively engage fragile states, as demonstrated by its record in Iraq. The result is a narrow, instrumental understanding of the relationship between security and development that ironically undermines, rather than strengthens, a coherent and effective strategy for dealing with failed states.
Topic:
Security, Development, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States

189. Obama's War: Prospects for the Conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Author:
Bruce Riedel
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
On coming into office, President Barak Obama immediately assembled a team to assess the US situation in Afghanistan and formulate a strategy for the mission. Heading up this team was Bruce Riedel, a former adviser to Presidents Clinton and Bush and a former CIA officer. This paper, based on a CIGI Signature Lecture given by Mr. Riedel in April 2010, discusses the history of the US war on terror since 9/11, specifically the actors involved in initiating the al-Qaeda declaration of war on the US and its allies, and the recent terrorist plots and attacks linked to al-Qaeda, which demonstrate that al-Qaeda and its allies continue to mount terrorist attacks despite the efforts of the US to thwart terrorism.
Topic:
Terrorism, War, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

190. Obama's New Af-Pak Strategy: Can "Clear, Hold, Build, Transfer" Work?

Author:
C. Christine Fair
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
On entering the White House, US President Barack Obama aimed to put the war in Afghanistan at the forefront of his security agenda following eight years of neglect by a Bush administration preoccupied by the war in Iraq. The Obama administration spent nearly On entering the White House, US President Barack Obama aimed to put the war in Afghanistan at the forefront of his security agenda following eight years of neglect by a Bush administration preoccupied by the war in Iraq. The Obama administration spent nearly a year reviewing the situation in Afghanistan and vetting war options amid protracted interagency deliberation and partisan debate. By the end of 2009, President Obama affirmed his administration's commitment to degrading the capabilities of terrorist groups ensconced in Afghanistan and Pakistan and announced that, by the end of July 2011, the US would begin a conditions-based transfer of responsibility to the Afghan government and security forces, enabling the United States to diminish its kinetic military activities in favour of a more "typical" presence with Washington continuing to providing development and economic assistance, plus training for military and civilian personnel. Thus the counter-insurgency mantra of "clear, hold and build" became, under Obama, "clear, hold, build and transfer." This paper evaluates the viability of the "clear, hold, build and transfer" approach in light of the structural challenges to each element and the pressure to deliver results in a short time-frame amid difficult security conditions.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Central Asia