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141. Afghanistan: The Impossible Transition

Author:
Gilles Dorronsoro
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A combination of two critical problems threatens to undermine the mission of the United States-led coalition in Afghanistan: the failure of the counterinsurgency strategy and a disconnect between political objectives and military operations. If anything, the current strategy is making a political solution less likely, notably because it is antagonizing Pakistan without containing the rise of the armed opposition. That has put the coalition in a paradoxical situation, in which it is being weakened militarily by a non-negotiated and inevitable withdrawal while at the same time alienating potential negotiating partners.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

142. Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan: what now for British counterinsurgency?

Author:
Robert Egnell
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
This article analyses the conduct of British operations in Helmand between 2006 and 2010 and discusses the implications for the legacy and future of British counterinsurgency. A number of lessons stand out: first, competence in the field of counterinsurgency is neither natural nor innate through regimental tradition or historical experience. The slow adaptation in Helmand—despite the opportunity to allow the Basra experience to be a leading example of the need for serious changes in training and mindset—is an indication that the expertise British forces developed in past operations is but a distant folktale within the British Armed Forces. Substantially changed training, painful relearning of counterinsurgency principles and changed mindsets are therefore necessary to avoid repeated early failures in the future. Moreover, despite eventually adapting tactically to the situation and task in Helmand, the British Armed Forces proved inadequate in dealing with the task assigned to them for two key reasons. First, the resources of the British military are simply too small for dealing with large-scale complex engagements such as those in Helmand or southern Iraq. Second, the over-arching comprehensive approach, and especially the civilian lines of operations that underpinned Britain's historical successes with counterinsurgency, are today missing.
Topic:
Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Britain, Afghanistan, and Iraq

143. Iraq, Afghanistan and the future of British military doctrine: from counterinsurgency to Stabilization

Author:
Stuart Griffin
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have had profound effects on both the British and US militaries. Among the most important is the way in which they have challenged traditional assumptions about the character of unconventional conflict and the role of the military within comprehensive strategies for encouraging sustainable peace. In the UK, the most important doctrinal response has been JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: the military contribution. Security and Stabilisation is an ambitious attempt to synthesize elements of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peace support and state-building within a single doctrine that reflects the lessons learned from recent British operational experience. This article examines the purpose, impact and potential value of this important innovation in British doctrine. To do so, the article explores the genesis of Stabilization; analyses its impact upon extant British doctrine for counterinsurgency and peace support; discusses its relationship with the most important related US doctrines, FM 3-24: the counterinsurgency field manual and FM 3-07: the stability operations field manual; and debates the function of doctrine more broadly. It concludes by summarizing the primary challenges Security and Stabilisation must overcome if it is to make a serious contribution to the theory and practice of such complex interventions.
Topic:
Security and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and United Kingdom

144. Countering Radicalization in Refugee Camps: How Education Can Help Defeat AQAP

Author:
Francisco Martin-Rayo
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
This paper seeks to analyze some of the causes of radicalization and recruitment in refugee/IDP camps, and makes the argument that receiving a well- rounded education, even if it produces mediocre academic results, is the most effective method of counter-radicalization in crisis situations and reduces the space for extremist organizations to recruit and operate. Radicalization is especially relevant in crisis situations (and the camps that are created to house those displaced) because it can create space for terrorist networks to operate and stage attacks against governments or civilians. In addition, a highly radicalized refugee population can provide a cadre of ideal volunteers for a terrorist organization, as they are more vulnerable than traditional populations, typically come from a violent environment, and have fewer opportunities for personal advancement, thus making a terrorist organization more attractive. the existing literature on radicalization in crisis situations typically identifies three drivers of radicalization: the existence or pervasiveness of an Islamic education; the ability to find gainful employment; and the ability to have freedom of movement (encampment vs. open camp policies). this paper indicates that all three of these characteristics are secondary reasons for radicalization, and that access to a well-rounded education is a powerful enough factor on its own to overcome these obstacles and significantly reduce radicalization and terrorist recruitment in crisis situations. access to a well-rounded education, even if of mediocre quality and even if the student is only able to attend for a few years, is the most important factor in reducing radicalization and terrorist recruitment from a population in a crisis situation, once their basic needs have been satisfied.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, Refugee Issues, and Counterinsurgency

145. Taking Stock: Madrasa Reform in Pakistan

Author:
Kaja Borchgrevink and Kristian Berg Harpviken
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
Searching for the roots of terrorism after the attacks of 9/11, the world's attention turned to Pakistan and to Pakistan's religious schools, the “madrasas”. This put pressure on the Pakistani government to reform the madrasas and ignited a long standing debate on the role of religious education in Pakistan and its links to radicalisation and militancy. This policy brief argues that the madrasa debate is not premised on a fair description of reality. The madrasa sector is diverse. The majority of Pakistan's madrasas are moderate institutions, concerned with promoting Islamic beliefs and knowledge. This makes it important to distinguish between moderate and militant madrasas. Madrasas must be seen as part of an Islamic tradition of learning, not primarily as political groups, but rather as socio-cultural institutions that are revered by many in Pakistan today.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan and South Asia

146. Al Qaeda's Operating Environments: A New Approach to The War on Terror

Author:
Charlie Szrom and Chris Harnisch
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
The environment in which an al Qaeda affiliate operates is one of the most important factors in assessing the threat it poses to US interests. Defeating the militant Islamist network led by al Qaeda requires a nuanced strategy that supports the appropriate combination and prioritization of policies and approaches for each environment in which an al Qaeda affiliate or franchise operates. The US government has not articulated such a strategy, a deficiency that acquires urgency because terrorist groups based abroad have been linked to three attacks against the American homeland in the past year. Building a strategy to oppose the al Qaeda network requires detailed understanding of its different operating environments, the ties between its various parts, and how territory affects its vitality. A comprehensive strategy should deny the al Qaeda network access to operating environments from which it can pose a major threat to the United States and the West.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States and America

147. Abolish the Department of Homeland Security

Author:
David Rittgers
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), an umbrella organization that would oversee 22 preexisting federal agencies. The idea was to improve the coordination of the federal government's counterterrorism effort, but the result has been an ever-expanding bureaucracy.
Topic:
Intelligence, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States

148. Leashing the Surveillance State: How to Reform Patriot Act Surveillance Authorities

Author:
Julian Sanchez
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Congress recently approved a temporary extension of three controversial surveillance provisions of the USA Patriot Act and successor legislation, which had previously been set to expire at the end of February. In the coming weeks, lawmakers have an opportunity to review the sweeping expansion of domestic counter-terror powers since 9/11 and, with the benefit of a decade's perspective, strengthen crucial civil-liberties safeguards without unduly burdening legitimate intelligence gathering. Two of the provisions slated for sunsetroving wiretap authority and the so-called “Section 215” orders for the production of records—should be narrowed to mitigate the risk of overcollection of sensitive information about innocent Americans. A third—authority to employ the broad investigative powers of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act against “lone wolf” suspects who lack ties to any foreign terror group—does not appear to be necessary at all.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Intelligence, National Security, Counterinsurgency, Governance, and Law
Political Geography:
United States

149. Afghanistan Win or Lose: Transition and the Coming Resource Crisis

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The US confronts a wide range of challenges if it is to win the Afghan conflict in any meaningful sense, and leave a stable Afghanistan and Pakistan: Decide on US strategic objectives in conducting and terminating the war. These objectives not only include the defeat of Al Qaeda, but deciding on what kind of transition the US wishes to make in Afghanistan, what goals the US can achieve in creating a stable Afghanistan, US goals in Pakistan, and the broader strategic goals the US will seek in Central and South Asia. Defeat the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but also by eliminating its control and influence over the population and ability exploit sanctuaries in Pakistan and win a war of political transition. Create a more effective and integrated, operational civil and civil-military transition effort by NATO/ISAF, UN, member countries, NGO, and international community efforts through 2014 and for 5-10 years after the withdrawal of combat forces. Build up a much larger, and more effective, mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Give the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy (and lasting stability) at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels by 2014. Dealing with Pakistan in reducing the Taliban-Haqqani network in the NWFP and Baluchistan, and dealing with the broader risk Pakistan will become a failed nuclear weapons state. Shape a balance of post-transition relations with India, Iran, "Stans," Russia, and China that will help sustain posttransition stability. Make effective trade-offs in terms of resources relative to the priorities set by other US domestic and security interests.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

150. Iraq and US Strategy in the Gulf: Shaping and Communicating US plans for the Future in a Time of Region-Wide Change and Instability

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
During the coming months, the US must reshape its strategy and force posture relative to Iraq and the Gulf States. It must take account of its withdrawal of most of its forces from Iraq, and whether or not it can give real meaning to the US­Iraqi Strategic Framework Agreement. It must deal with steadily increasing strategic competition with Iran, it must restructure its post-­Iraq War posture in the Southern Gulf and Turkey, and define new goals for strategic partnerships with the Gulf states and its advisory and arms sales activity. It must decide how to best contain Iran, and to work with regional friends and allies in doing so. In the process, it must also reshape its strategy for dealing with key states like Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Yemen.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Turkey, Yemen, Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan