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131. Reforming Pakistan's Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure: Is It Too Flawed to Fix?

Author:
Hassan Abbas
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
An efficient, well-functioning police service is critical to counterinsurgency as well as counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan, now and in the future. At the same time, the police force must also address rising crime rates and a deteriorating law-and-order situation, among many other tasks. The capacity of the Pakistan Police Service to deliver on all these fronts is severely diminished by political manipulation, the lack of forensic services, inadequate training and equipment, corruption, and weaknesses in the judicial sphere. Disconnect and lack of coordination between numerous kinds of policing and intelligence organizations are major hurdles on the path leading to collective strategizing. Upgrading the existing police system as the central law enforcement institution in the country cannot occur in isolation, however. Instead, it must be part of an overarching restructuring of the total law enforcement infrastructure, including a reform of the criminal justice system and the stripping of politically motivated amendments from the Police Act of 2002. Both traditional and innovative reforms would be expected to bear fruit in this arena. With a high degree of public consensus on the need for far-reaching law enforcement reforms in Pakistan, there is political space to make tough, reform-oriented choices. Pro-reform circles within police are also gaining strength.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Counterinsurgency, and Law Enforcement
Political Geography:
Pakistan and South Asia

132. Video-recorded Decapitations: A seemingly perfect terrorist tactic that did not spread

Author:
Martin Harrow
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
Video-recorded decapitations have an enormous impact, they are cheap and easy, and they allow the terrorists to exploit the potential of the Internet. With these advantages, the tactic would have been expected to quickly spread across the globe as a favored tactic. Yet, years after its invention in 2002, this has not happened. This paper using evolutionary theory finds that video-recorded decapitations have not caught on for locally specific reasons: in the West because the tactic is less accessible than one might expect; in Iraq because of the unwillingness to be associated with Zarqawi, and in the Afghan context, it has not spread because it is mainly relevant for mobilizing resources from abroad, which is not a priority for the Taliban. These are however situational variables, and just as suicide bombings took years to spread, there may be campaigns of video-recorded decapitations as conditions change.
Topic:
Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Iraq, Middle East, and Taliban

133. The Many Faces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

Author:
Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (“Tandhim Al Qaeda fi Bilad Al Maghrib Al Islami”, commonly referred to by its French acronym AQMI) is a reformed version of an Algerian terrorist group formed in September 1998, Al Jama'a Al Salafiya lil Da'wa wal Qital (Salafist Group for Predication and Combat, GSPC). Born in the context of the waning Algerian civil war that had raged in that country between 1992 and 1998, with an estimated 150,000 dead, the GSPC carried with it three consequential elements: the violent legacy of the civil war and its heavy toll on Algerian society; an entrenched radical Islamist identity prone to armed violence; and a design on the part of this group to not disarm and perpetuate its armed insurrection.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Arabia, Algeria, and North Africa

134. The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa'ida

Author:
Don Rassler and Vahid Brown
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The targeted killing of Usama bin Ladin at a compound in the garrison city of Abbottabad, Pakistan has raised a number of important questions about the infamous global jihadist's local connections. It has also highlighted how little is really known about the patrons and supporters that enabled al-Qa'ida's charismatic leader to hide in plain sight, and communicate with his key lieutenants, for so many years. Al-Qa'ida's successful integration into the complex local landscape of Islamist militancy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region is not a recent phenomenon, and since the 1980s Bin Ladin's organization has been dependent on a network of local supporters to conduct an increasingly global campaign of violence. Indeed, the inception, execution and continuity of al-Qa'ida's global jihad cannot be meaningfully separated from this local dimension, which today remains one of the least studied aspects of the organization's history. The present report aims to address this gap through an analysis of the history and organizational relationships of the Haqqani network, a single major constant that, for the entirety of al-Qa'ida's existence, has shaped the latter's local trajectory in the region.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Afghanistan

135. Joint Interagency Task Force-South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success

Author:
Evan Munsing and Christopher Lamb
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) is well known within the U.S. Government as the "gold standard" for interagency cooperation and intelligence fusion, despite its preference for keeping a low profile and giving other agencies the credit for its successes. It is often cited as a model for whole-of-government problem-solving in the literature on interagency collaboration, and other national security organizations have tried to copy its approach and successes. Despite the plaudits and attention, the way that JIATF-South actually operates has only received superficial analysis. In fact, few people actually understand why JIATF-South works as well as it does or how its success might be replicated.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, War on Drugs, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States

136. The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

Author:
Andre Le Sage
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The United States faces an important strategic question in northwest Africa: what level of activity by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) would constitute a sufficient threat to U.S. national security interests to warrant a more aggressive political, intelligence, military, and law enforcement response? AQIM already poses the greatest immediate threat of transnational terrorism in the region, and its operational range and sophistication continue to expand. Since 2007, the group has professed its loyalty to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda's senior leadership and claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks in the subregion. These attacks have included the use of suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices, kidnapping operations, and assassinations.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Arabia, and North Africa

137. Policing and COIN Operations: Lessons Learned, Strategies and Future Directions

Author:
Samuel Musa, John Morgan, and Matt Keegan
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Book
Abstract:
At the time of this writing, the United States and the other members of the International Security Assistance Forces are completing nearly a decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. What started as more conventional or traditional fights has degenerated over time into insurgency warfare, something U.S. Forces have had to re-learn and re-build to fight. Re-learn and re-build are key elements as U.S. Forces have fought insurgencies in the past, but consistently maintained forces to fight more conventional warfare. Counterinsurgency (COIN) is very different from armored vehicles rolling through the Fulda Gap, or the race to Baghdad. It is a fight not against a Government as much as it is a fight for control of the mind-set of the population by non-state actors in a race to gain popular support. It is a grassroots battle that not only requires military force, but security established at the local level through everyday police presence that represents the Rule of Law, the national Government, and safety and stability locally. It is against this backdrop that the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) and the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) came together to look at Policing and COIN and the ways, methods, and techniques that could be shared to help overcome the insurgencies Coalition forces face. The efforts of the CTNSP at the National Defense University (NDU) and the CTTSO culminated in a one-day workshop held on September 29, 2010, on Policing and COIN Operations: Lessons Learned, Strategies, and Future Directions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

138. The Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda: Lessons in Post-September 11 Transnational Terrorism

Author:
Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Al Qaeda rose and fell between 1989 and 2011. Ten years after it conducted its most lethal operation in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, it had mutated into a movement that no longer resembled what it started as. From a hierarchical and centralised group, led by the bicephalous leadership of Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al Dhawahiri, it had become a regionalised and decentralised organisation with several competing leaders following the death of Bin Laden in May 2011.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
New York and Washington

139. Aid and Conflict in Afghanistan

Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
After a decade of major security, development and humanitarian assistance, the international community has failed to achieve a politically stable and economically viable Afghanistan. Despite billions of dollars in aid, state institutions remain fragile and unable to provide good governance, deliver basic services to the majority of the population or guarantee human security. As the insurgency spreads to areas regarded as relatively safe till now, and policymakers in Washington and other Western capitals seek a way out of an unpopular war, the international community still lacks a coherent policy to strengthen the state ahead of the withdrawal of most foreign forces by December 2014. The impact of international assistance will remain limited unless donors, particularly the largest, the U.S., stop subordinating programming to counter-insurgency objectives, devise better mechanisms to monitor implementation, adequately address corruption and wastage of aid funds, and ensure that recipient communities identify needs and shape assistance policies.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, War, Foreign Aid, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

140. Civilianising warfare: ways of war and peace in modern counterinsurgency

Author:
Colleen Bell
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of International Relations and Development
Institution:
Central and East European International Studies Association
Abstract:
This article examines the emergence of counterinsurgency doctrine in Coalition interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. While counterinsurgency is complimentary to the tenets forwarded by its classical military predecessors in several respects, the article shows that it is also more than a refashioning of conventional military practice. Counterinsurgency is intimately tied to institutional practices that shape global liberal governance. It can be traced to dominant trends in international humanitarian, development and peace interventionism since the end of the Cold War and it deepens the links between the social development of war-affected populations and the politics of international security. Rather than simply a shift in military practice, counterinsurgency is distinguished by its investment in civilian modes of warfare. Counterinsurgency retells the narrative of intervention as part of the evolution of political and economic liberalisation, marking a passage from interventionary force to post-interventionary governance. Modern counterinsurgency, it is concluded, exposes the widening indistinction between contemporary modes of peace and those of war in international relations.
Topic:
International Relations, Cold War, Economics, War, Counterinsurgency, and Governance
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Iraq