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171. Iraq's Sunnis in Crisis

Author:
Stephen Wicken
Publication Date:
05-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
The political participation of the Sunni Arab minority in Iraq is critical to the security and stability of the state. At present, they are functionally excluded from government, with those that do participate coopted by the increasingly authoritarian Shi'a Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Without effective political representation, the Sunni in Iraq are left with few alternatives to address their grievances against the Maliki government. The important decisions lie ahead on whether to pursue their goals via political compromise, federalism, or insurgency.
Topic:
Security, Islam, Insurgency, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

172. A Proxy War in Syria

Author:
Sargon Hadaya
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
The regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria has been demonstrating a relatively high level of tenacity amid the proxy war raging in the country for over two years now. Indeed, the authoritarian regime in Tunisia folded up in two weeks; the Mubarak regime in Egypt, in slightly over four weeks; the Colonel Qaddafi regime collapsed after six months of NATO strikes. Russian expert Prof. Edouard Ozhiganov has offered a methodologically exact comment: “Any political regime can be described as stable to the extent to which it can neutralize inside and outside pressure using its own resources and instruments.”
Topic:
NATO, Civil War, Politics, War, International Security, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
Libya, Syria, and Tunisia

173. Russia's pressure politics: The Kremlin's uncompromising approach to opponents threatens political stability

Author:
Sean Roberts
Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
If Russia is to follow an evolutionary path to democracy, then the regime must be ready to draw the so-called 'non-systemic' opposition into political processes. This gradualist formula for democratic change is also the formula for political stability. A number of liberalising reforms conducted by the regime in response to widespread protests following the December 2011 State Duma election gave grounds for optimism that this process is now underway. However, any hopes that these events would kick-start democratic reforms were short-lived. Rather than draw in opponents, the regime has sought to isolate them, using a combination of reform, non-reform, dividing tactics and repression. But the results have not been positive. The non-systemic opposition is under increasing pressure, having seen its options all but reduced to more protesting. It is also showing signs of radicalisation. At the same time, the Kremlin's uncompromising approach is undermining regime stability. The pressure is building in the Russian political system. The combination of repression and radicalisation could easily see political stagnation degenerate into instability and the EU should take this new dynamic into account in its future policy planning.
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Democratization, Government, Political Economy, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

174. Time for the Strategy of Coevolution: How South Korea Can Shape the Future of the Kim Jong-un Regime

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
2012 is a critical time for North Korea as it has proclaimed that from this year it will achieve the status of a “strong and prosperous nation.” With Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, this immense task now falls upon the shoulders of Kim Jong-un. For the past seventeen years under Kim Jong-il’s rule, North Korea has tried to seek a way to ensure its regime’s survival and guarantee its national security through Songun or military-first politics and the possession of nuclear weapons. Yet, this has actually resulted in international isolation, economic hardships, and an overdependence on China. For North Korea, it was “lost two decades”. It is natural to wonder about what kind of impact Kim Jong-il’s sudden death will have on North Korea in the short run. However, it is more important now to think carefully about what lies ahead for North Korea over the next 20 years under Kim Jong-un’s rule. Upon such a consideration it is also critical to prepare necessary measures in terms of this long-term perspective. The most urgent priority for the newly established Kim Jong-un regime is domestic stability, which means that the regime will have to pursue the legacy of Kim Jong-il’s rule. In this respect, it will continue to possess nuclear weapons, seek economic gains from negotiations over its nuclear program, and attempt to accelerate its economic development under the banner of a “strong and prosperous nation” to gain political legitimacy. So long as Kim Jong-un sticks to “rule by his deceased father’s will,” then North Korea will face the inevitable dilemma it has faced for the last seventeen years. Pursuing regime security by huddling onto nuclear weapons will only continue to ensure Pyongyang’s international isolation. This isolation in turn brings about economic hardship, which consequently has a negative effect on the stability of the Kim Jong-un regime as its legitimacy is still rather weak. These interlinked problems of domestic politics, diplomacy, and economics can be easily locked in a vicious circle. The Kim Jong-un regime must deal with these pending issues in line with a long-term strategy that will guarantee its survival and help North Korea pursue reforms to meet the norms of the twenty-first century civilization. The first stage of this long-term strategy is to seek a policy shift. At some point in the future, Kim Jong-un has to make the strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons and switch from the current military-first politics to economy-first politics. Of course, such a shift is an extremely difficult decision to make, but it would be a good chance to prove the strength of Kim Jong-un’s leadership internally and externally. The second stage is transition and reform. With this step, North Korea will finally take measures toward peaceful development under the basis of a more enlightened Suryong or Great Leader Direct Rule system. Those measures include overcoming the demands for excessive security, moving forward to establish a security system without nuclear weapons, and plan for a North Korean-way of reforms and opening. In order to achieve these goals, North Korea will truly require support from South Korea and the international community. The third stage is the transformation of North Korea to meet the international standard of advancement. In this stage, it is crucial to find a way to encourage North Korea to transform into a nation that seeks moderate security capabilities as well as a new momentum for economic development, democracy, and normal diplomacy. If it succeeds, North Korea could then become a model country which serves for peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula and contribute toward development and stability in Northeast Asia. During this delicate period, it is an imperative to get over single-minded approaches to focus only on the collapse of North Korea or to call for the one-sided effort of either North Korea or the international community to resolve all the issues. Furthermore, it is time to understand the broad range of problems of North Korea and seek a path of coevolution which takes in a bigger picture of peace and stability for not only the Korean Peninsula but also East Asia.
Topic:
Regime Change, Authoritarianism, Leadership, Dictatorship, Totalitarianism, and Transition
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

175. The Return of Old Putin and the New Future of Russia

Author:
Beom-Shik Shin
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Vladimir Putin who cautiously entered the Kremlin upon his inauguration in March 2000 is now returning to the presidential office with more craft and determination this May 2012. Going by the announcements of Russia’s Central Election Commission (CEC), Putin received 63.75% of the votes, defeating Gennady Zyuganov (17.19%), Mikhail Prokhorov (7.82%), Vladimir Zhirinovsky (6.23%), Sergey Mironov (3.85%) and others to become the next president of the Russian Federation. It had been predicted that Putin would either win by a narrow margin after the second round of voting receiving around 40% of the votes, or he would have had an easy victory receiving around 50% of the votes. His victory though was an overwhelming one, with nearly 64% of the votes. There were controversies nevertheless regarding election fraud. The international election monitoring team dispatched by Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) raised concerns over a number of issues such as questions over the neutrality of Vladimir Churov, the chair of CEC and restrictive media regulations for opposition candidates. Despite these concerns, it would be virtually impossible for opposition candidates to overturn the results. In expectation of such controversies, the Russian government made efforts to minimize criticism of election fraud by installing webcams in ballot boxes. However, rectifying the lack of a fair judgment system should be regarded as a task of utmost urgency if Russia’s election system is to develop. Still, the disputes over election fraud will go on for some time as will the street demonstrations against Putin that appeared after his victory.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Elections, Leadership, and Rigged Elections
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

176. Predictions on Power Structure and Policy Changes of the Kim Jong-un Regime

Author:
Chang-Hyun Jung
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors. The new stage of North Korea’s leadership succession began with the rise to power of the third generation leader Kim Jong-un. On 15 April 2012, the newly-appointed First Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea Kim Jong-un made his first public speech during a military parade to commemorate Kim Il-sung’s centenary. It was the official announcement of the opening of the Kim Jong-un regime toward the world. A series of political events from the Meeting of Party Representatives to the Kim Il-sung centenary celebrations clearly show that the third generation of leadership is emerging as a new core power group backed by the second generation. This move means more than just a generational shift in North Korea’s power structure. It indicative of possible changes in policy lines on its internal and external affairs. Kim Jong-un conducted political reshuffles before and after the Meeting of Party Representatives in April 2012, as part of actions to implement a moderate shift in generation and to firmly secure his control over the military. Since smoothly establishing the hereditary succession process, Kim Jong-un not only moved toward assuming political leadership but also swiftly acquired a firm grip on the power elites in the party, government, and military by reorganizing and uniting power elites. It would seem Kim Jong-un’s rule is stable, at least in terms of power structure. The power structure of the Kim Jong-un regime has turned out to be a single leadership where the country is ruled by one strong man rather than a collective leadership. Instead of having “specific figures” as a regent or a guardian through a decentralization of power, North Korea seems to prefer to support the new supreme leader through “collective consultation.” The policies designed and implemented during the last three years of Kim Jong-il’s rule were in fact intended as a policy transformation process to prepare preparation for Kim Jong-un’s rule. These policy directions have been maintained since Kim Jong-un came to power. His first public speech on 15 April can be translated as an announcement on limited changes for a “knowledge-based economy.” This established a new period while inheriting the values of Jaju or independence from the Kim Il-sung era and Songun or military first politics from the Kim Jong-il era. In particular, Kim Jong-un emphasized the significance of “peace,” by stating in the speech, “for our party and the Republic’s government that consider powerful state construction and people’s livelihood improvement to be their general goal, peace cannot be more valuable.” Under Kim Jong-un’s rule with the keyword of “knowledge-based economy,” North Korea is expected to place priorities on improving people’s livelihood and will take on more flexible policy decisions from 2013 when the next administrations in South Korea and the United States will be established. As such it is an inevitable option for North Korea to rebuild its economy and attract foreign investment. Against this backdrop, the administrations in South Korea and the United States should not pressure North Korea but rather wait and respond calmly until the policy lines of the Kim Jong-un regime on economic change and openness are clearer. Above all the first priority should be placed on stable management of North Korean issues, given that many of the participants of the Six-Party Talks will enter into power transition process at the end of 2012. First, the U.S. administration needs to resume contacts with North Korea in order to implement the Leap Day Deal in which Pyongyang would place a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests, as well as freeze its nuclear programs. If the diplomatic pressure from the international community successfully leads North Korea to give up its nuclear activities and ease tensions, it would create the right environment for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Second, it will be worthwhile establishing contact through high-level channels to develop a clearer picture of what are Kim Jong-un’s intention regarding North Korea’s nuclear activities. In providing new opportunities for the North Korean leadership, a policy shift by Pyongyang may take place. Third, it is important that the Lee Myung-bak administration reopens channels for inter-Korean talks even at low-level so as to not leave too much of a burden for the next administration. Offering to hold inter-Korean family reunions for the second half of the year 2012 would be a good start. Fourth, the next administration in South Korea should be committed to establishing a more sustainable North Korean policy that can maintain consistency regardless of any power shift by comprehensively reflecting public opinion during a time when conflict among South Koreans on approaches toward North Korea is becoming worse. Whoever comes into power in South Korea after the presidential election, the main agenda of inter-Korean relations will be on the next inter-Korean Summit. Kim Jong-un has already expressed his willingness to talk, stating “(we) will go hand in hand with anyone who truly desires the country’s reunification and peaceful prosperity.” If the third inter-Korean Summit can be held in 2013, it would be a significant breakthrough in building confidence between two Koreas and solving the North Korean nuclear crisis as well as making progress toward peaceful coexistence.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Authoritarianism, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

177. It's Not Only Rents: Explaining the Persistence and Change of Neopatrimonialism in Indonesia

Author:
Nina Korte
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
Indonesia has long been associated with neopatrimonialism, corruption, collusion, and nepotism as the main modi operandi of politics, economics and public administration. Despite various measures and initiatives to fight these practises, little evidence for a significant decline can be found over the years. Rather, longitudinal analysis points to changes in the character of neopatrimonialism. Based on more than 60 in-depth interviews, focus-group discussions, and the analysis of both primary and secondary data, the aim of this article is, first, to describe the changes that have taken place, and, second, to investigate what accounts for these changes. Political economy concepts posit the amount and development of economic rents as the explanatory factor for the persistence and change of neopatrimonialism. This study's findings, however, indicate that rents alone cannot explain what has taken place in Indonesia. Democratisation and decentralisation exert a stronger impact.
Topic:
Corruption, Democratization, Economics, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

178. Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses

Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
A swift, violent rebellion swept into the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek in early April 2010, sparked by anger at painful utility price increases and the corruption that was the defining characteristic of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev's rule. In less than two days the president had fled. Some 85 people were killed and the centre of the capital was looted. The thirteen-member provisional government now faces a daunting series of challenges. Bakiyev leaves be- hind a bankrupt state hollowed out by corruption and crime. Economic failure and collapsing infrastructure have generated deep public resentment. If the provisional government moves fast to assert its power, the risks of major long-term violence are containable: there are no signs of extensive support for Bakiyev or of a North-South split. The speed with which the Bakiyev administration collapsed is a salutary reminder of the risks of over emphasising Western security concerns in framing policy towards the region.
Topic:
International Affairs, Fragile/Failed State, Governance, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan

179. Overmanaged Democracy in Russia: Governance Implications of Hybrid Regimes

Author:
Henry E. Hale, Nikolai Petrov, and Masha Lipman
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Can autocratic governments that incorporate elements of democracy provide good governance? The authors approach this question with an inductive study of Russia, which is widely regarded as a leading hybrid regime and an innovator in the field. They argue that for most of the past decade, and especially during Vladimir Putin's second term as president, Russia has been characterized by a hybrid regime that strongly resembles those in many other Eurasian states, as well as Venezuela and Iran. This type of regime combines a high degree of state centralization with the gutting of democratic institutions, and their sys-tematic replacement with substitutions that are intended to serve some of their positive functions without challenging the incumbent leaders' hold on power.
Topic:
Government, International Affairs, Political Theory, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

180. Exit During Crisis: How Openness, Migration, and Economic Crisis Affect Democratization

Author:
Joseph Wright
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kellogg Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
Does economic crisis lead to authoritarian regime breakdown and democratization? In this paper, I argue that the availability of exit options for citizens conditions the relationship between economic crisis and democratization. Where citizens have more viable exit alternatives, economic crisis causes citizens to exit rather than protest, making democratization less likely. I measure exit options in three ways: a geographic instrument for bilateral trade; neighboring country GDP per capita; and past net migration. I use time series, cross - section data on up to 122 authoritarian regimes in 114 countries from 1946 – 2002 to test this argument and find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that more attractive exit options insulate dictators from the liberalizing effects of economic crisis.
Topic:
Democratization, Economics, Government, Political Theory, Financial Crisis, and Authoritarianism