Publication Year: within 10 Years / Topic: Term Limits

Author:: Joanna Marszalek-Kawa
Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The problem of the lack of “generational replacement” in Poland is particularly ev- ident on the local self-government level. For years, there has been an ongoing public debate on the adoption of legal solutions introducing term-limits for the office of commune head, mayor and president of the city. Politicians of Law and Justice returned to their idea from 2005 and, shortly before the local elections of 2018, decided to prepare new regulations in this respect. They argued that the adopted solutions create real prospects for implementing projects by young politicians and activists. However, the issue was hotly debated and the ini- tiators’ motives were put into question. There is no doubt that a two-term limit in local self- government units has always stirred up emotions. A lot of self-government officials perceive it as a regulation which violates the provisions of the Constitution of the RP. The aim of this paper is to present the public debate on the adopted solutions and discuss their assumptions.
Topic:: Elections, Legislation, Local, Term Limits, and Political System
Political Geography:: Europe and Poland

Author:: Adrian Lucardi and Maria Gabriela Almaraz
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Institution:: German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:: How do incumbents manage to relax term limits when they cannot impose their preferences unilaterally? Interpreting constitutional reforms as a bargaining game between a term-limited executive and the opposition, we argue that reforms involving term limits should be more likely when (a) the incumbent party can change the constitution unilaterally, or (b) the opposition is pessimistic about its future electoral prospects; moreover, (c) this second effect should be stronger when a single opposition party has veto power over a reform because this precludes the executive from playing a “divide-and-rule” strategy. We examine these claims with data from the Argentine provinces between 1983 and 2017. In line with expectations, the results show that the probability of initiating a reform is highest when the executive’s party controls a supermajority of seats, but falls sharply when a single opposition party has veto power over a reform and this party expects to do well in the next executive election.
Topic:: Reform, Domestic politics, Institutionalism, Local, and Term Limits
Political Geography:: Argentina, South America, and Latin America

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