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61. Does the New Saudi Reactor Justify Proliferation Fears?

Author:
Basel Ammane
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
In early April 2019, Saudi Arabia’s progress in constructing its first nuclear reactor with the assistance of Argentine firm INVAP was the subject of considerable media attention that speculated on the dangers of this development. This was made all the more alarming given the reported nuclear technological assistance to the kingdom that the American administration approved. In fact, a cursory review of events surrounding this development reveals that there are at least two indicators that can be seen as cause for concern. First, Saudi leadership rhetoric pertaining to proliferation has not been reassuring, as crown prince Mohammed bin Salman signaled his country’s resolve to pursue the path of nuclear armament in the event that Iran, its regional rival, moves in that direction too. Second, the construction of this reactor is seen as the first step toward acquiring the knowledge and experience necessary for developing a sizeable nuclear power infrastructure that will supply the kingdom’s needs in the future. The kingdom has plans to build two large nuclear reactors to diversify its energy sources and meet its electricity needs, as well as a number of small reactors for desalination purposes. As these plans begin to materialize, the importance of Saudi compliance under a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) will become indispensable and equivocation on the matter unacceptable. Having said this, speculation that is largely focused on a handful of events reported by the media is not good at providing a clear picture. Grounding analysis in an understanding of regional politics and global nonproliferation dynamics is likely to capture a clearer picture of the situation. There are at least two factors should be grounds for concern about potential Saudi nuclear proliferation.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Infrastructure, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Middle East and Saudi Arabia

62. Russia and China in the Middle East: Playing their best cards

Author:
Marco Siddi and Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Russia and China share a number of interests in the Middle East: limiting US power and maintaining good relations with all players in the region while remaining aloof from the key conflicts, especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Iran and Israel. Russia’s position has been based on political support for particular states, arms sales and the provision of civilian nuclear energy technology. Moscow has boosted its role by intervening militarily in the Syrian civil war. China has been strengthening its political position in the region for the last decade and its presence is more substantial from a financial-economic perspective. The current Chinese and Russian regional posture further marginalises the influence of the EU in MENA. In the Middle East, the EU is already a weaker economic actor than China and a weaker military player than Russia. However, the EU can cooperate with Russia and China on upholding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear programme.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Power, Military Intervention, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Middle East, and Asia

63. Can North Korean Nuclear Missile Crisis Be Resolved?

Author:
G. Ivashentsov
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
TENSION around the Korean Peninsula is one of the main threats to international security. North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear and missile weapon systems has become a new serious factor in global strategic sta- bility. Previously, during the cold war era, the only tool of control over strategic weapons was the relationship between Moscow and Washington. At present, the international situation has radically changed. New nuclear powers – India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea – regard- less of whether or not the original five members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) acknowledge them as such, are not under the control of either Washington or Moscow or Beijing: they act at their own discretion, as they see fit. The current polycentrism of nuclear proliferation is based on region- al rivalry. India has created its nuclear arsenal as a counterweight to China; Pakistan, as a counterweight to India; and Israel, as a shield against Arab states. None of these states, however, are seeking global supremacy and so their nuclear status is taken by the world community more or less in stride.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula

64. The Role of Nuclear and Gas in Romania-U.S. Relations

Author:
Jakub Pieńkowski
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The close alliance between Romania and the U.S. is focused on defence. Their cooperation also extends to energy issues, particularly nuclear energy, gas transit to the Balkans, and extraction from Black Sea deposits. However, Romania’s interests in energy security are only partially convergent with the U.S. goals of eliminating China’s and Russia’s influence in the region and becoming a key gas supplier to Central Europe.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Nuclear Power, and Gas
Political Geography:
Europe, Romania, North America, United States of America, and Black Sea

65. North Korea’s Nuclear Program through the Lens of Strategıc Culture

Author:
Emine Akçadağ Alagöz
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
This paper presents an application of the concept of strategic culture as a possible way to analyze North Korea’s nuclear program. The goal is to illustrate that the strategic culture approach is a useful method to understand North Korea’s determination to develop nuclear capability, demonstrating the link between culture and behavior through Alastair Johnston’s methodology. The question of the formation of a North Korean strategic culture will be scrutinized through scoring the speeches and written messages of three North Korean leaders in terms of the presence of key cultural assumptions. Then, it will accordingly suggest that North Korea’s strategic culture, affecting the practices of its security policy, leads this country toward an active defense strategy, which implies a credible nuclear deterrence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, Kim Jong-un, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

66. Future Scenarios: What To Expect From a Nuclear North Korea

Author:
Daniel R. Russel
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
After decades of broken promises and failed diplomatic efforts, North Korea has become a nuclear power. Kim Jong Un’s charm offensive over the past year, as seen in summit meetings with U.S. President Donald Trump and other leaders, has enabled him to shed his pariah status without shedding his nuclear weapons. While Kim has frozen testing, he continues to expand the country’s nuclear arsenal, defy and evade Security Council resolutions, and is now getting support from China in his call for sanctions relief. In the wake of the failed February 2019 Hanoi Summit, North Korea is warning of a return to testing by year’s end. But even if Kim were to reverse course and agree to freeze his entire nuclear and missile program, North Korea’s capacity to threaten the U.S. and its allies with a formidable arsenal would be undiminished. What’s worse, Kim seems to be turning to a powerful new weapon of mass destruction to gain leverage. Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) Vice President for International Security and Diplomacy Daniel Russel asserts in this ASPI issue paper that North Korea’s next weapon of choice is likely to be cyber: a high-impact, low-cost, and low-risk digital-age weapon that North Korea already can and does use to steal money, hack secrets, and terrorize nations. In the 5G era, developed nations such as the United States are particularly vulnerable. North Korean cyber-attacks have already succeeded in crippling critical overseas infrastructure and stealing hundreds of millions of dollars, reducing the efficacy of international sanctions. Future Scenarios: What to Expect from a Nuclear North Korea details the consequences of North Korea’s slow but steady trajectory toward acceptance as a nuclear power. The report highlights the urgency of focusing U.S. national security efforts against the threat from North Korea’s rapidly growing cyber warfare capability. Russel writes that the combined threat from North Korea’s nuclear and cyber programs can only be reduced through “coercive containment” — a multi-pronged strategy of diplomacy, defense, deterrence, and denial that will require substantial cooperation among key international players.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, Donald Trump, and Kim Jong-un
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

67. The value of the US nuclear power complex to US national security

Author:
Robert F. Ichford and Bart Oosterveld
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In this analysis, the Atlantic Council has set out to estimate the value that the civilian nuclear power sector contributes to the United States’ national security apparatus. Based on a series of inputs, this analysis and conservative estimation found that the nuclear power complex contributes an equivalent of more than $42.4 billion to US national security, as broadly defined. In other words, the lack of a civilian nuclear sector would present an immediate and significant economic shock (and impact on the labor force)—which, in turn, would have immediate and longer-term budgetary implications for the US government. The definition of national security can be viewed narrowly or more broadly, in terms of both the scope of the institutional assets and providers of national security services and the types of functions or services they undertake. This analysis includes both nuclear utilities and nuclear generators, as well as US military and defense facilities, as providing critical national security functions. The utilities and generators provide secure and reliable electricity, accounting for 19.3 percent of total US electricity generation in 2018, and they contribute significantly to the diversified energy-generation mix that the United States enjoys. There are three main reasons for public support of the civilian nuclear industry for national security purposes, which are identified in the analysis that follows. The reasons are 1. the civilian nuclear industry generates a vast investment in human capital, which is a necessary condition for all applications of nuclear energy in the national security apparatus; 2. the civilian nuclear industry and its associated supply chain provide critical risk mitigation and procurement safety to the national security apparatus; and 3. the civilian nuclear industry’s value to national security priorities related to climate change.
Topic:
Energy Policy, National Security, Nuclear Power, Economy, and Business
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

68. The Rising Crisis between the United States and Iran

Author:
Amos Yadlin
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
After a year in which Iran opted for "strategic patience," in the hope that European nations would compensate for the United States sanctions, it now seeks to present a price tag for the US measures against it, and has thus embarked on a response comprising action in three realms: nuclear, military, and oil exports from the Gulf. In the current circumstances, Iran and the United States are demanding conditions that would make a resumption of negotiations difficult, although both sides apparently understand that dialogue may ultimately be the less dangerous option for them. The latest developments embody the potential for escalation and miscalculation that is liable to affect Israel's security, and therefore the security cabinet should convene to craft an appropriate policy for the near, medium, and long terms.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Oil, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, and North America

69. Exclusive Interview with the Ex-Minister of Defence of the UK

Author:
IWEP
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Institute of World Economics and Politics
Abstract:
The Kazakhstan-based Institute of World Economy and Politics (IWEP) interviews former British Secretary of Defense, Desmond Henry Brown, about nuclear weapons and international relations.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan

70. Nuclear Security, Arms Control and the U.S.-Russia Relationship

Author:
Steven Pifer
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
For nearly five decades, Washington and Moscow have engaged in negotiations to manage their nuclear competition. Those negotiations produced a string of acronyms—SALT, INF, START—for arms control agreements that strengthened strategic stability, reduced bloated nuclear arsenals and had a positive impact on the broader bilateral relationship. That is changing. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is headed for demise. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) has less than two years to run, and the administration of Donald Trump has yet to engage on Russian suggestions to extend it. Bilateral strategic stability talks have not been held in 18 months. On its current path, the U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control regime likely will come to an end in 2021. That will make for a strategic relationship that is less stable, less secure and less predictable and will further complicate an already troubled bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America