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141. The North Korean Air Force: A Declining or Evolving Threat?

Author:
Noam Hartoch and Alon Levkowitz
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests during the Kim Jong-un era have strengthened the country’s military power, deterring South Korea, Japan and, in particular, the United States. While North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities are rapidly improving, parallel developments aren’t occurring in the traditionally technical air and air defense forces. Plagued with aging airframes, technical problems, parts shortages and budget shortfalls, the North Korean Air Force no longer challenges the South Korean and American air forces. This paper examines the North Korean Air Force, analyzing its organization and deployment, air defense and early warning capabilities, aircraft acquisition, and aircraft production. Shortfalls in each of these areas caused Pyongyang to develop, test, and operate an increasingly sophisticated drone fleet. While North Korea won’t be able to build a state-of-the-art aircraft industry, it will nonetheless find creative ways to strengthen its air force capabilities.
Topic:
Nuclear Power, Weapons, Drones, Missile Defense, and Air Force
Political Geography:
Russia, China, South Korea, North Korea, Poland, Soviet Union, New Zealand, and United States of America

142. Compelling Priorities for Global Health

Author:
Tedros Adhanom, Lee C. Bollinger, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Elizabeth Cameron, Gavin Schmidt, and Wilmot James
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Columbia University World Leaders Forum
Abstract:
A discussion featuring an address by Dr. Tedros Adhanom, Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO). The world today is trying to manage health risks associated with population growth, climate change, deforestation, institutional collapse, state failure, accidents, human error, war and terrorism. The full range of risks include infectious disease outbreaks, biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear spill-overs or attacks, multiple hazards, food insecurity, state fragility and cyber security failure or attacks. This is a breath-taking range of risks and no single institution can tackle it alone. It truly is humanity's common concern. As the UN agency responsible for global health, the World Health Organisation (WHO) is the organizational expression for humanity's common concern and we are honored to have the recently elected Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom address us on the priorities for his leadership. To discuss and debate with Dr. Tedros, we are delighted to have world leading experts in development, disease control and prevention and climate change and health dissect the opportunities and challenges in managing the health risks the world faces today. Welcoming remarks by Lee C. Bollinger, introduction by Jeffrey D. Sachs. Participants: Jeffrey D. Sachs, Elizabeth Cameron, and Gavin Schmidt. Moderator: Wilmot James
Topic:
Climate Change, Health, War, World Health Organization, Nuclear Power, and Food Security
Political Geography:
New York, Global Focus, and United States of America

143. North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program: The Known and Unknown

Author:
Hyun-Kyung Kim, Elizabeth Philipp, and Hattie Chung
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Amidst the growing threat of North Korea’s nuclear program, the assassination of Kim Jong-Un’s half-brother via VX nerve agent in February 2017 brought renewed interest in North Korea’s other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs—chemical and biological weapons. If used on a large scale, these weapons can cause not only tens of thousands of deaths, but also create panic and paralyze societies. Nevertheless, the vividness of the nuclear threat has overshadowed other weapons programs, limiting the attention and policy input that they deserve. This paper focuses on North Korea’s biological weapons (BW).
Topic:
International Security and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
North Korea

144. A UN Special Envoy to manage the Middle East WMD-Free zone conference process

Author:
Marc Finaud
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In view of the failure of efforts to convene a conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery vehicles (DVs) in the Middle East (WMD/DVs-free zone), the Arab countries and the Russian Federation proposed that the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General appoint a special representative to lead the preparatory process for the conference. A process facilitated by such a UN envoy would be compatible with consultations among regional states, including Israel, as advocated by the United States (US). Also, it would allow for broad discussions on both the regional security context and disarmament issues. Such a process would also be an opportunity for submitting contributions from nuclear-weapon states, relevant international organisations, and providers of ideas at the Track II level.
Topic:
International Affairs and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Middle East

145. Do the Original Assumptions Underlying the Iran Nuclear Agreement Have Any Basis Today?

Author:
Ambassador Dore Gold
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
Abstract:
The Iranian nuclear agreement (JCPOA) of 2015 was based on several key premises. Secretary of State John Kerry said that Iran was just two months away from having enough fissile material for an atomic bomb. With the agreement, that breakout time could be stretched out to a year or more.
Topic:
International Affairs and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran

146. Strengthening the ROK-US Nuclear Partnership

Author:
Miles A. Pomper, Toby Dalton, Scott Snyder, and Ferenc Dalnkoki-Veress
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Over the last forty years, South Korea (or the Republic of Korea, or ROK) and the United States have become essential partners on nuclear matters. The United States provided the technology and knowhow necessary for Korea to establish a nuclear sector. Koreans mastered that technology and have worked to improve on it, with the twin goals of expanding their country’s energy independence and becoming a leading exporter of nuclear power production facilities. The two states’ nuclear energy industries have become intertwined. They cooperate on multiple initiatives to strengthen international nuclear security and nonproliferation measures. Collaborative research ties amongst nuclear scientists from both countries run deep. Arguably, each state is the other’s most important nuclear partner. As with all maturing relationships, there remain differences of view and priority that must be managed. Though unlikely, a disruption in ROK-US nuclear relations would have wide-ranging, deleterious effects on both states. For this reason, the conclusion in June 2015 of a new bilateral treaty, the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (hereafter referred to as the 123 agreement after section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, the relevant US statute) is a critical milestone. The new agreement establishes the terms for nuclear cooperation for the next twenty years. It is expansive and forward-looking, providing the basis for unusually broad and deep nuclear ties. The 123 agreement will bring predictability to the relationship at a time when the global nuclear energy outlook remains in flux. However, the new nuclear agreement only managed to partially resolve several deep-seated differences between the two sides that were illustrated by the fact that negotiations on a new agreement lasted more than four years and required an extension to complete. The agreement creates a new political framework for managing divergent views over how to cooperate most effectively, but differences may yet re-emerge and frustrate cooperation. The challenge before the two governments now is to implement the new agreement in ways that can either resolve or remove these differences and solidify existing ties. In other words, the two countries should seek to build a nuclear partnership in deed, not just in word. This report articulates a vision for ROK-US nuclear partnership for the next two decades, a period which aligns with the duration of the new agreement for cooperation. It highlights challenges and opportunities and provides recommendations intended to deepen and expand the range of existing cooperation in ways that will support a stable and sustainable nuclear partnership. The objective of the report is to describe a desirable and stable end-state for the relationship—an enduring partnership—and to identify steps along the path to achieve it. It discusses multiple areas of cooperation, assesses strengths and weaknesses of existing ties, and identifies practical activities both parties can pursue toward building the partnership.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

147. Replacing HEU in Naval Reactors

Author:
George M. Moore
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is the simplest nuclear material to use for an improvised nuclear device, making it a target for terrorist groups seeking to inflict mass destruction. This paper examines the current status of HEU in naval propulsion programs worldwide, with a specific focus on the U.S. Navy’s program. It includes a technical assessment of less risky low-enriched uranium (LEU) alternatives and recommendations to enable conversion to such alternate technologies.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Nuclear Power, Navy, and Uranium
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

148. Improving the Security of All Nuclear Materials

Author:
Mark Fitzpatrick, Elena Sokova, Miles A. Pomper, Laura Rockwood, Ferenc Dalnkoki-Veress, and Matthew Cottee
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
About four-fifths of the weapons-usable nuclear materials in the world are in non-civilian programmes. This means not only as the explosive core in active or reserve nuclear weapons, but also as fuel in naval and military research reactors, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium at production sites, in storage, or declared excess to military uses, but not yet transferred to other programmes or eliminated. Yet coordinated global efforts to enhance the security of nuclear materials have been almost exclusively concentrated on the estimated 17% of such nuclear materials in the civilian sector. Ideally, all HEU and plutonium of the same grade should have at least the same level of adequate security regardless of the possessor or purpose, since the materials pose the same threat. In practice, however, the security of materials can vary depending on whether they are used in the civilian or military sectors. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (CPPNMNF – as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was renamed after the 2005 amendment came into force in May 2016), as well as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) security guidelines such as INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, describe how civilian materials should be secured. No such explicit guidelines exist on how to secure materials outside of the civilian sector. Nor is there comprehensive public knowledge about the state of security of such materials in all countries with nuclear weapons programmes. It has often been asserted that nuclear materials in non-civilian use are well protected because they are under military control. However, the number of troubling security breaches involving nuclear material in military use, as well as some examples involving civilian nuclear facilities, belies this casual assumption, underscoring why the world should not simply accept the unsubstantiated ‘solemn word’ of authorities that security is as tight as needed. The list of incidents includes insider threats, peaceful incursions for demonstration purposes, theft, armed attack, and, most recently, over-flights by drones and computer hacking. Our report includes a number of examples of incidents at civilian facilities as well because they demonstrate areas of vulnerability that may also apply to the noncivilian sector. The record offers a compelling case for why security must be enhanced for all nuclear material.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

149. Iran’s Resurgence as Power after International Sanctions Relief / El resurgimiento de Irán como potencia tras el levantamiento de las sanciones internacionales

Author:
José Ignacio Castro
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
Nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 Group become a reality at the beginning of 2016, with the Iranian engagement on declaration and reduction of her nuclear capabilities, for a temporary period. Parallel to the agreement accomplishment, Iran has increased her power towards her geopolitical enlargement area in the Mesopotamia and Levant region. Iran´s resurgence has caused a conventional weapons´ proliferation, where ballistic missiles are the main stress´s source. At international level, Iran has achieved better business opportunities, although her economic evolution is still slow, mainly due internal power´s dynamics. At global order level, the agreement has brought main actors power´s redesign in Middle East and other global areas. Inside Iran, the agreement has reinforced institutional authority and at the same time it is opening up the way for hope and for a better future for the Iranian people.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

150. Heavy Water Loophole in the Iran Deal

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Although President-elect Donald Trump’s position on the Iran nuclear deal remains unclear, he and his allies in the Congress are expected to at least better enforce and strengthen the Iran deal. They should start by focusing on the deal’s heavy water loophole, whereby Iran can store offshore in Oman heavy water it owns and controls in excess of the nuclear deal’s limits, awaiting its eventual sale. To date, if the stocks in Iran and Oman are counted together (a reasonable view since Iran owns and controls both stocks), Iran has far exceeded the nuclear deal’s stated limit of maintaining a stock of only 130 metric tons of heavy water. Yet, this loophole was sanctioned by the executive body of the Iran deal, the Joint Commission. Despite such generous treatment, Iran has even so twice violated the narrow limit of 130 metric tons of heavy water it can hold inside Iran since the deal started in January 2016. Iran should no longer be facilitated in its overproduction of nuclear-related heavy water. Oman would do the world a favor by halting its willingness to accept Iranian heavy water and send any back to Iran for downblending. The return of the heavy water and its blending down would dramatically signal to Iran that violations of the Iran deal are no longer going to be tolerated, or worse, facilitated. Moreover, any further overproduction should be seen by the United States as a violation of the deal. It should work to end the Oman loophole and mitigate damage caused by a U.S. purchase of Iranian heavy water.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East