America's security alliances with Japan and South Korea made headlines last month. In addition to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's address to a joint session of Congress, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter visited both Japan and South Korea. Their main focus was on how to fortify Seoul's and Tokyo's security alliance ties with the US against possible Chinese and North Korean military threats.
After nearly 20 months of near continuous negotiations, in 2015 Iran and the P5+1 reached a deal designed to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons capability in exchange for relief from the sanctions that have been crippling its economy over the course of the past decade.
How was this momentous agreement reached? This Strategic Update traces the story of this major diplomatic breakthrough, through the historical context of long term US-Iran relations and the tireless international effort to prevent domestic political crises from derailing the negotiations.
On April 14, 2015, a Japanese court ordered a halt to the government’s plan to restart the Takahama Nuclear Power Plant. The ruling cited safety fears, whereas the Japanese nuclear regulatory watchdog had given the opera on its consent. There are currently 48 commercial reactors in Japan, all of which remain offline a er the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. The Japanese government has been cri cized for its insistence on viewing nuclear energy as an important base‐load power source despite its official policy of reducing dependence on nuclear energy.
But restar ng nuclear reactors—assuming that they meet the revised safety requirements—does not necessarily contradict that policy inasmuch as the transparency of the safety review process is guaranteed. Moreover, the issue is intertwined with broader concerns that extend beyond Japan’s borders, including U.S.‐Japan rela ons and the interna onal nonprolifera on regime. It is this interna onal context, o en overlooked in Japan and elsewhere, that makes it unrealis c and rather dangerous for Japan to immediately abandon nuclear energy altogether.
On July 14, 2015 the so-called P 5 + 1 (the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) concluded a historic deal with Iran over its nuclear program. The present paper argues that the Iranian nuclear program and the international controversy over it are derivatives of both the experimental model of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its behaviour, in which it acts as an empire.
Political leaders and defense planners in the Republic of Korea (ROK), or South
Korea, are cognizant that worsening security in Northeast Asia could lead to additional
states, including the ROK, to consider and even develop nuclear weapons. In particular,
Korean President Park Geun-hye warned in May 2014 that another nuclear bomb test by
North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) would be “crossing a
Rubicon” and would make it “difficult for us to prevent a nuclear domino from
occurring in this area
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Nuclear Power