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Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Publication Year within 10 Years

31. German Leadership in Arms Control: Three Pillars to Achieve More Realism

Author:
Christian Mölling and Torben Schütz
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Arms control is traditionally at the core of Germany’s cooperative security approach. It is therefore a natural leader for a new Western arms control policy. But Germany must overcome the Cold War approach that no longer suits today’s security environment. A new approach should build on three pillars: security, military, and alliance realism. While such a change entails risk and uncertainty for German decision-makers, the price of upholding existing outdated arms control architectures is already higher.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

32. Asymmetrical Arms Control: How to Account for Innovation and Diversity in European Armed Forces

Author:
Torben Schutz
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Conventional arms control in Europe is in crisis. As it is based on a simple headcount of weapons systems, it does not reflect the qualitative changes to armed forces’ structures and assets brought about by technological innovation. It is high time to embrace asymmetrical arms control mechanisms which are a promising method to deal with the diversity of qualitative changes in European armed forces. Germany should push for such innovation within the OSCE.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

33. Renewed Arms Race, the NPT, and the New Start Treaty After the End of the INF Treaty

Author:
Elif Beyza Karaalioğlu
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center
Abstract:
The U.S. decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty left world observing about what might happen next. Indeed, the demise of the INF Treaty points out to an uncertainty on arms control and it brings new questions regarding international security. In the light of recent developments on the INF Treaty, this study attempts to make an analysis on the possible impacts of the end of the INF Treaty on international security. This study argues that the collapse of the INF Treaty raise concerns for renewed arms race and the withdrawal from the INF Treaty inevitably brings other treaties such as the NPT and the New START into close consideration.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

34. The end of nuclear arms control? Implications for the Nordic region

Author:
Tapio Juntunen
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The current discussion on the possible repercussions of the INF crisis have largely concentrated either on great power relations or on the level of NATO-Russia relations and the future of the transatlantic ties. This Working Paper aims to broaden the present discussion by reflecting on the potential implications of the negative trends in nuclear weapons politics and arms control from the perspective of the Nordic region. One of the key concerns for the Nordic countries in this regard is Russia’s significant arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the immediate vicinity of the region. The prospect of a looming nuclear weapons buildup in the North Sea areas and around its key locations is also something that the Nordic countries should be concerned about together with their allies and key partners. The Nordic countries should also aim to increase their agency in relation to the stalling nuclear arms control agenda. In addition to supporting the efforts to open up different possibilities to salvage the INF Treaty, the Nordic countries also have self-interest when it comes to integrating other categories of non-strategic nuclear weapons into these discussions. Tapio Juntunen
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia and Nordic Nations

35. The disarmament laboratory: Substance and performance in UK nuclear disarmament verification research

Author:
Tom Plant
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Over the last twenty years, the UK has researched nuclear arms control and disarmament verification in increasing breadth and depth. Although this principally technical activity has not yet been directly linked to any of the UK’s nuclear weapons stockpile reductions or postural changes, it does form much of the UK’s recent disarmament diplomacy. This is because more effective techniques for verification of nuclear arms control and disarmament are widely regarded as essential for the multilateral regimes that might be necessary if global nuclear stockpiles are to reduce. Thus, the UK balances its retention of nuclear weapons with plans – or at least the appearance of plans – for future disarmament. This balance stems in part from the degree of internal conflict in the UK about its nuclear weapon status, and the perceived need to take the lead in nuclear disarmament matters, set against decreasing room for manoeuvre in terms of substantive reductions to its declared nuclear arsenal; in the future it is likely to be increasingly central to the UK’s disarmament diplomacy. The degree to which UK verification research is genuinely intended to make a tangible disarmament contribution therefore merits scrutiny. This is particularly true for those states that are also working in the field or are interested in doing so. This paper lays out how Finland and other Nordic states could contribute by encouraging the UK to take more meaningful action, inter alia by linking UK verification research and its modernisation programme to potential arms control futures.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

36. Bio Plus X: Arms Control and the Convergence of Biology and Emerging Technologies

Author:
Kolja Brockmann, Sibylle Bauer, and Dr Vincent Boulanin
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Technological advances in the biological sciences have long presented a challenge to efforts to maintain biosecurity and prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. The convergence of developments in biotechnology with other, emerging technologies such as additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence and robotics has increased the possibilities for the development and use of biological weapons. This report, written by SIPRI experts on technology and arms control, provides a nuanced picture of the risks and challenges posed by this convergence. It analyses the extent to which concerns arising from new technological developments can be dealt with through existing governance mechanisms. Based on the limitations identified, the authors recommend the action that needs to be taken by national governments, international organizations, academia, the private sector and the DIY community.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Affairs, Arms Trade, Biological Weapons, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

37. Arms Flows to South East Asia

Author:
Siemon T. Wezeman
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The security environment of South East Asia is making more and more headlines and is increasing cause for concern. While old tensions and conflicts remain, China’s rise as a military power and its claims on the South China Sea not only add a new element of insecurity but also draw other powers into the mix. As this paper documents, states in South East Asia have significantly increased their military spending, their arms acquisitions and their arms inventories over the past decade. This growth has outpaced the global trend and the trends of most other regions. While the growth of military capabilities is not an uncontrollable arms race, there is cause for real concern. The increased size and capabilities of most armed forces in South East Asia—coupled with increased tensions in the region, especially over the South China Sea—lead to more military forces operating in close proximity to ‘unfriendly’ forces. Mechanisms and agreed rules to deal with the overall tensions or with unexpected confrontations of opposing military forces are lacking, which does not make it easy to prevent incidents from escalating. Furthermore, weak transparency in foreign and defence policy poses a risk of misunderstandings about why South East Asian states acquire weapons, what their ‘red lines’ are and what the response to crossing those lines would be.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Affairs, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Asia and Southeast Asia

38. Europe in a multipolar missile world – Why the EU and NATO should not try to salvage the INF Treaty

Author:
Bruno Hellendorff
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
On 1 February 2019, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that his country had suspended its compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty, and would withdraw from it within six months. The INF Treaty, little known outside of arms control and disarmament circles, was a landmark Cold War agreement between the United States of America and the USSR – the first to ban an entire category of weapons (ground-based medium- and intermediate-range missiles). The US withdrawal, announced in dramatic terms by President Donald Trump in October 2018, followed the claim that Russia had recently developed and fielded a missile with performances forbidden by the INF Treaty. The end of this little-known treaty is not anecdotal. Not only will it further strain the US-Russia relationship and antagonise allies, it will also contribute to the erosion of what is left of the global arms-control architecture and incentivise arms-race behav- iours among great powers. In a world where security is increasingly less a question of multilateral deliberation and rules-based interactions, the end of the INF Treaty is a further signal that missile technologies are again becoming a venue for competition between great powers: only this time, at least three are playing the game (United States, China and Russia) rather than two (United States and USSR). Additionally, missile technology proliferation has turned into a major dimension of contemporary battlefield realities, and missile programmes of countries such as Iran and North Korea continue to pose important diplomatic and non-proliferation challenges. Meanwhile, Europe is, by and large, left watching as its regional security architecture erodes. Welcome to what US National Security Advisor John Bolton recently termed ‘a multipolar missile world’. The EU should not try to salvage the INF Treaty. Its diplomatic capital might be better spent in areas where it could potentially make a difference, rather than in a treaty to which it is not even party. Existing multilateral regimes and agreements with the EU or its Member States as parties are already in dire need of reinforcement in the face of technological progress, a volatile diplomatic environment and self-centred, competitive political narratives. These include, inter alia, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) framework (including its Structured Dialogue), multilateral export control regimes (MECR) like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), transparency and trust-building mechanisms like the Hague Code of Conduct against missile proliferation (HCoC), and nuclear-related frame- works like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or ‘Iran deal’) or the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Process. These, however, may simply fail to meet the challenge of a multipolar missile world. Renewed efforts, both conceptual and in the realm of capabilities, are needed in a NATO framework to reinforce the linkage between deterrence and diplomacy. NATO-EU dialogue and cooperation on defence issues could be further enhanced, and European countries should work more with like-minded partners at both bilat- eral or multilateral levels on the challenges of non-proliferation and disarmament in the twenty-first century. The demise of the INF Treaty should therefore re-energise the debate on European strategic autonomy, help support collective capability building – not least in NATO – and prompt new discussions on stronger multilateral rules on missile development, use and proliferation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

39. The End of the INF-Treaty: Context and Consequences

Author:
Didier Audenaert
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
On 2 August both the US and the Russian Federation will no longer be restrained by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1987). Early this century it gradually became clear that Russia wanted to step out of the Treaty, by which it felt itself to be solely restrained. European nations should now take up a greater share of the burden of missile defence, which should get a broader mission than it has today. The debate on EU strategic autonomy can be an instrument in this endeavour. Because of the worsening security environment NATO’s non- strategic nuclear capability becomes even more important. European NATO allies and EU member states may very soon be confronted with difficult and fundamental choices for a future without the INF Treaty, which need to be communicated and explained to their national population.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and INF Treaty
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

40. Risk Realism: The Arms Control Endgame for North Korea Policy

Author:
Van Jackson
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
While the reasons for seeking North Korean denuclearization are sensible, continuing to pursue that goal makes the United States and its allies less secure. In word and deed, North Korea has shown it has no interest in nuclear disarmament. Because denuclearization is antithetical to Kim Jong Un’s bottom line, U.S. attempts at diplomacy to that end are self-sabotaging. As long as disarmament of North Korea remains America’s professed goal, Kim Jong Un has every incentive either to avoid the negotiating process or favorably manipulate it at America’s expense—by stalling for time, making unfulfilled promises, and securing concessions without reciprocity. Worse, as the 2017 nuclear confrontation showed, making denuclearization an actionable goal of U.S. policy creates real risks of crisis instability—justifying extreme measures and extreme rhetoric in the name of what has become an extreme aim. But policymakers can avoid the pitfalls of the past by attempting something more realistic than denuclearization—an arms control approach to North Korea. The United States has significant unexploited margin to take diplomatic and political risks aimed at probing and potentially shifting North Korea’s approach to its nuclear arsenal. An arms control approach would seek to reorient U.S. North Korea policy to prioritize what matters most: reducing the risk of nuclear or conventional war without forsaking other U.S. interests at stake in Korea. Using diplomacy to enhance regional stability and foreclose the possibility of an avoidable nuclear war requires pursuing a negotiated outcome that both sides can accept, and that tests North Korea’s willingness to uphold commitments short of disarmament. U.S. policy often seeks to test North Korean intentions, but without offering the accommodations and concessions that would serve as a meaningful test. Remedying this problem through an arms control approach requires taking considerable unilateral actions consistent with U.S. interests before proceeding to a phased negotiating process.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Risk, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea