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21. Kosovo in Russian Foreign Policy- Discourse Fostering Instability in Kosovo and Countering Euro-Atlantic Integration

Author:
Ramadan Ilazi, Ardit Orana, and Jeta Loshaj
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
Russian influence and interests in the Western Balkans are primarily centered around Serbia. According to a 2024 survey by the International Republican Institute (IRI), for Kosovar citizens, after Serbia (83%), Russia (8%) is seen as the main threat to the country, while 87% say that the country’s foreign policy should only be pro-European Union and pro-West, and 59% say that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is completely unjustified. Main takeaways from this paper include: Russia deploys state-controlled media (RT, Sputnik) and partners with Iranian outlets to spread narratives portraying Kosovo as a failed state, full of instability. Russia capitalizes on deep cultural, religious, and political ties with Serbia to maintain influence in the Balkans, utilizing ties with the the Serbian Orthodox Church and with Serbian elites to the detriment of Kosovo. There are indications that Russia had prior knowledge of or involvement in the Banjska terrorist attack in Kosovo, aimed at escalating tensions. By stirring instability in Kosovo, Russia aims to divert Western attention and resources away from Ukraine, creating a multi-front challenge for NATO and the EU.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Strategic Interests, Instability, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Serbia, and Western Balkans

22. Strategic Change in U.S. Foreign Policy

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis, Jennifer Kavanagh, Sahil Lauji, Adele Malle, Samuel Orloff, Stephen Wertheim, and Reid Wilcox
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Making strategic changes in foreign policy is difficult for the United States. Consider, for example, the challenges that former president Donald Trump and current President Joe Biden faced in their administrations’ efforts to withdraw U.S. military forces from Afghanistan. Despite years of failing efforts to bring peace and stability to that country, and limited evidence that much improvement would come without a major reorientation of the U.S. approach, resistance to changing course was enormous. It took an outsider, Donald Trump, to set the process in motion and a long-time insider, Joe Biden, to finish it. The early 1970s U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, which very few would criticize today, also took several years, even after a huge protest movement at home and abroad demanded it. For strategic change to materialize, the election of a president who wants change is necessary but not sufficient. Trump’s effort to put America’s global role on a new course, whatever its strengths and weaknesses, is a case in point. In areas where his ideas challenged received wisdom in the Republican Party, Congress, or the national security bureaucracy, he was stymied. Only where Trump pursued goals already favored by important groups in the foreign policy establishment did he get results. For example, he was able to tear up the Iran nuclear deal because this action had long-standing and deep support among Republican leaders, but he failed to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria because few others agreed. Trump’s approach to foreign policy generated immense drama but limited change in America’s role in the world. Regardless of whether one thinks this outcome was for better or worse, it is testimony to the power of continuity in U.S. foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Donald Trump, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

23. Russia and China in Central Asia: Cooperate, Compete, or De-conflict?

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Lisa Curtis, Kate Johnston, and Nathaniel Schochet
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Despite the many proclamations that Russian and Chinese interests would collide in Central Asia, Moscow and Beijing continue to work together in service of their shared objectives. These include, most importantly, keeping the United States and the West—and democracy—out of the region, maintaining stability, and pursuing economic benefits. Fissures between Moscow and Beijing exist, especially in the economic sphere, where China has become the more dominant power, and over the potential development of the Middle Corridor trade route, which could significantly disadvantage Russia. However, Russia and China are managing these divergences, and the overarching imperative to weaken the United States provides a powerful motive for reducing or preventing any friction from derailing their broader partnership. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened the Central Asian states’ apprehensions about Russia, including about its capacity to uphold its security role in the region. However, the Kremlin remains committed to maintaining its influence in the region, and the war in Ukraine is restructuring economic dynamics in ways that will enable the Kremlin to limit the extent of its declining economic influence. Looking forward, the most significant change in Russia-China relations in Central Asia is likely to occur in the security sphere, where China is likely to take on a greater role, especially as Russia’s military and security services are preoccupied in Ukraine and with the domestic challenges the war creates. Any rise in instability in the region—which could result from an uptick in terrorist threats in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, or from the region’s brittle autocracies—could propel China to step into a sphere where Russia has historically played the primary role but that the Kremlin will struggle to fulfill while the war in Ukraine continues. For Russia and China, Central Asia is also likely to be an important building block in their larger counterorder-building effort. The two countries are likely to sustain—and step up—their efforts to build an alternative order in Central Asia, including by deepening cooperation and broadening the number of countries participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to legitimize and demonstrate the benefits of their collective global leadership. This effort will face resistance from the Central Asian states that object to the concept of a Russia-China condominium of power in their region and have shown an ability to come together to resist attempts to turn the SCO into a forum that would strengthen a collective Russia-China security role in the region. The United States has an opportunity to redouble its engagement in Central Asia. The Central Asian states highly value U.S. political support for their independence and sovereignty, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Washington can encourage greater connectivity and cohesion among the countries, demonstrating its support for their increasing cooperation with one another in ways that could strengthen the region’s economic attractiveness and political agency. This contrasts with the way in which Russia has traditionally dealt with the region, which is to try to capitalize on divisions and disputes among the countries. While it cannot match China dollar for dollar or supplant Russia’s cultural and political influence in the region, the United States can enhance its trade, investment, energy, counterterrorism, and diplomatic ties to these countries. Enhancing U.S. and European investment in Central Asia, especially for development of the Middle Corridor, could help prevent Russia and China from further deepening their grip on the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, Cooperation, Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia

24. Enhancing Trilateral Security Cooperation: Korea, the United States, and Indonesia

Author:
Sook-yeon Lee
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Sook-yeon Lee argues that Indonesia serves as an ideal partner for the United States and South Korea to advance their objectives in the Indo-Pacific region and that the three countries should expand areas for trilateral cooperation. While the bilateral South Korea-Indonesia and US-Indonesia partnerships have deepened over the past several decades, trilateral security cooperation remains unexplored due to the differing scopes of cooperation between the two bilateral relationships. Lee outlines several areas in which the three countries should expand trilateral cooperation and contribute to strengthening regional security. Due to Indonesia’s desire for neutrality and South Korea’s concerns regarding its ties with China, Lee recommends a cautious approach to initiating trilateral cooperation in maritime security and counterterrorism before gradually expanding to additional areas. Such an approach both addresses Indonesia’s immediate cooperative needs and aligns with areas that South Korea and the United States have already identified within their respective partnerships with Indonesia. However, the primary challenge facing trilateral security cooperation is maintaining mutual trust and ensuring the leaders of all three countries are committed to upholding trust as the foundation of trilateralism. Domestic politics and foreign policy considerations of the three countries further complicate efforts to enhance trilateral security cooperation. Thus, Lee recommends that the three countries strengthen strategic dialogues to understand and respect the differences in each country’s respective core interests to ensure the establishment of a durable trilateral partnership between South Korea, Indonesia, and the United States.
Topic:
International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, Regional Security, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:
Indonesia, South Korea, North Korea, Southeast Asia, and United States of America