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162. Two years of war in Ukraine: Will the West need another shock to act decisively?
- Author:
- Arkady Moshes
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- The West is failing to provide Ukraine with sufficient resources to resist Russia’s invasion, and lacks a vision for the future of West-Russia relations. This may push Ukraine to the brink of defeat as early as 2024. Western capitals should realize the risks and stop procrastinating.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
163. The EU Joint Communication on the ClimateSecurity Nexus One Year On
- Author:
- Eleonora Milazzo
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- To mark one year since the adoption of the Joint Communication on ‘A New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus’ in June 2023, last summer the Belgian Presidency of the EU and the Egmont Institute, together with the EEAS, organised a workshop to take stock of the progress in its implementation. The conclusions reached during the workshop indicate that the Joint Communication has consolidated ‘climate and security’ as a key policy area. The broad approach of the Communication to climate change and environmental degradation, and peace, security and defence, ensures new thematic and operational connections – both at the global level and in specific local contexts. At the same time, in the next policy cycle, it is important to continue to support the operationalisation of this nexus across the whole spectrum of relevant policy areas including human security, conflict prevention, peace, and development and humanitarian action. To achieve this, it is fundamental to strengthen evidence use through existing tools, ensure necessary human and financial resources, devise localised solutions, and engage with a broad range of partners.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, Migration, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe
164. The Politics behind the EU-Rwanda Deal(s) and its Consequences
- Author:
- Kristof Titeca
- Publication Date:
- 11-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- On the 14th of October, the news emerged that the EU is in the final stages of a discussion to award €20 million to the Rwandan army for its operations in Mozambique – where it is fighting insurgents in the oil-rich Gabo Delgado province. It would be the second time in two years that the EU awards this amount under the European Peace Facility (EPF): it also did so in December 2022. At that time, the decision was met with anger in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as it was already documented by the UN how the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) were supporting the M23 rebellion in Eastern DRC. In the meantime, this support has become clearer, with the last report from the UN Group of Experts from June 2024 extensively documenting the RDF operations with M23 in Eastern DRC. The news of potentially another €20 million is therefore met with anger in Congolese politics and society, primarily directed at the EU. It is a question which puzzles many: why does the EU want to award €20 million to the Rwandan army, in the midst of its violations of international law in Eastern DRC? This piece will unpack this question and reflect on the consequences for the regional dynamics and the EU.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, International Law, Politics, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, and Rwanda
165. Procurement by Proxy: How Sahelian Juntas Acquire Equipment from Ousted Security Partners
- Author:
- Nina Wilén
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- During the past two years military juntas in Mali and Niger have ousted three multilateral security missions in addition to French, and more recently American, forces deployed to fight jihadists in the two countries. Although being preceded by deteriorating relations, the decisions to kick out the international partners have been announced abruptly and the departures have been rushed as juntas have increased pressure for the missions to leave. After making the decision to oust the missions, the juntas have also mounted new obstacles for the missions and their departures, either taking, or forcing the missions to leave a large amount of equipment and material behind. This article argues that this is a deliberate strategy by the military juntas in Mali and Niger to acquire new equipment and material for their security forces, in some cases to be used with new security partners, such as Russia.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, and Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Mali, Sahel, and Niger
166. Uganda’s Chess Game in Eastern DRC: With or Without M23?
- Author:
- Kristof Titeca
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- Uganda has various economic, political and security interests in Eastern DRC. The latter is for example a vital export market for Ugandan products, and an important source of gold, Uganda’s most important export product. In this situation, a careful tactical game is played, in which Kampala seeks to protect these interests in Eastern DRC – for example from Kigali. This does not only involve a clear engagement with Kinshasa, but to a lesser extent also with M23. This is particularly the case because M23 is expanding (and keeping) its territory; creating an incentive for regional actors to engage with them.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Politics
- Political Geography:
- Uganda, Africa, and Democratic Republic of the Congo
167. The Migration Agreements in Euro-Mediterranean Relations for a Geopolitical Europe
- Author:
- Ezgi Irgil
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- IEMed/EuroMeSCo
- Abstract:
- The discussion about the implications of an objective like strategic autonomy has primarily circled the question, could the Europeans defend themselves against a Russian offensive without US support? (Barrie et al., 2019; Meijer & Brooks, 2021). This scenario is a critical one, especially considering the long-term implications of the Russia-Ukraine war. Nevertheless, it presents a narrow view of European security interests shaped only by challenges from its eastern flank. As a result, the debate tends to emphasize the need to invest in European ground and air capabilities for a Cold War-like scenario of military operations on the continent. This paper does not discount the demands of the Russian challenge on Europe’s military posture, but it offers a different perspective by looking at an under-researched topic: the concurrent need to secure European interests in the maritime domain vis-à-vis threats originating from the area going from the Mediterranean to the Strait of Hormuz.
- Topic:
- Security, Migration, Geopolitics, and Strategic Autonomy
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Mediterranean
168. Grand Strategy: Shield of the republic
- Author:
- Christopher McCallion
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- Grand strategy is a state’s theory about how to provide for its own security. Leaders must decide how to best translate scarce means into political objectives. Limited resources and the high stakes of national survival force leaders to prioritize. Military power is dependent on wealth, industry, geographical endowments, population size, and effective domestic institutions. The various conditions in which states find themselves help motivate and constrain the grand strategy formulated by their leaders. The United States is still the most powerful, secure, and prosperous country in the world, with a favorable geographic position and many internal advantages. U.S. grand strategy has historically been concerned with preventing the rise of a regional hegemon in Eurasia by maintaining the balance of power. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became the only great power in the world. Unfortunately, it squandered the “unipolar moment” by pursuing a costly and counterproductive grand strategy of “liberal hegemony,” which has left it overextended. The United States’ secure geostrategic position and the improbability of a Eurasian hegemon allows it to adopt a grand strategy of restraint. This shift will help the United States to preserve its power, minimize risks, and adapt to the rise of new great powers. This strategy requires the United States to adopt a more rigorous definition of its vital interests and to shift to its allies the main burden of defending themselves.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, and Unipolarity
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
169. Grand Strategy: Geography
- Author:
- Christopher McCallion
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- Geographic distance and the current state of military technology interact to favor defense while diminishing the threat of conquest. The stopping power of water in particular obstructs the ability of even the most powerful states to project power overseas. Proximate land powers are the most likely to engage in security competition and conflict, while distant or sea powers are relatively isolated from potential adversaries. This strategic insularity is even greater if a state has a large and diversified economy and the resources to be relatively self-sufficient. The United States is separated from other great powers by thousands of miles of ocean to both its east and west, and is the most powerful, prosperous, and secure state in the world. However, many of the same conditions which make the United States secure also make it difficult to project power, carry out wars far abroad, and maintain military primacy on land in Eurasia. The United States should both embrace its abundance of security and accept the limits to its offensive power, using its position as a continent-sized maritime power to act as an offshore balancer rather than a hegemon on the flanks of the Eurasian landmass.
- Topic:
- Security, Grand Strategy, Geography, and Balance of Power
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
170. The Newest Allies: Finland and Sweden in NATO
- Author:
- Tony Lawrence, Tomas Jermalavicius, and Jan Hyllander
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Sweden’s flag was raised at NATO headquarters at midday on 11 March 2024, ceremonially marking one of the most surprising outcomes of Russia’s war in Ukraine. In the face of Russia’s aggression and the risks it presented to their own security, Finland, which joined NATO in April 2023, and Sweden had abandoned decades-long policies of neutrality and non-alignment to become the Alliance’s 31st and 32nd member states. Our report examines the consequences of these changes, largely from the perspective of the defence of the Baltic states. Although Finland had developed armed forces to cope independently with any military aggression, the brutality of Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine led to a rapid and substantial shift in public opinion in favour of NATO membership, which was quickly embraced by the leadership. Public opinion shifted rapidly in Sweden too, but the debate there was also heavily influenced by Finland’s inescapable move towards the Alliance, which essentially undercut the logic of Sweden’s continued non-alignment. The two countries submitted their applications to join NATO on the same day in May 2022. As Allies, Finland and Sweden will bring great benefits to the security of the Nordic-Baltic region. Politically, their accession will strengthen NATO, including by creating a large bloc of states in northern Europe whose memberships of security organisations are (mostly) aligned and who demonstrate broadly similar security thinking. At the operational level, their accession will plug a large hole in NATO territory, reducing the isolation and vulnerability of the Baltic states and allowing military commanders many more options for preparing for and dealing with a possible conflict with Russia. At the tactical level, they add modern, capable armed forces to NATO’s inventory. Nonetheless, their accession is not without challenges and risks. The most difficult practical challenge for both countries will likely be developing deployable ground forces to meet the requirements of NATO membership. However, perhaps the more difficult challenges related to accession will be mental and cultural. For Finland, these relate to adjusting an independent, highly self-reliant defence model, held in great regard by both the leadership and population, to meet the needs of collective defence; and to the requirement to bolster Allied cohesion by speaking more openly about threats to the Allies’ common security interests, in particular, Russia. For Sweden, neutrality has been fostered not only as a defining element of its self-identity as a distinctive international actor, but also as a necessary vehicle for the development of a unique democracy and welfare state. These ideas are deep-seated and Sweden’s mental transition to Allied status may be difficult and lengthy. Among the risks is that the addition of two strong Allies will encourage other Allies or their publics to believe that deterrence and defence in the Nordic-Baltic region is complete, needing no further attention. A second is that the low-key approach Finland and Sweden expect to take to their membership, at least in the years immediately following accession, may mean that the benefits of their joining will be only partly realised. It would be a missed opportunity, for example, if Sweden declined to take a leadership role in the Nordic-Baltic region. There is also a risk that Finland and Sweden’s commitment to a strong Nordic regional identity, while useful for promoting practical security and defence cooperation, may be disadvantageous to Baltic security if its pull were to result in the diminished engagement of the two countries in the Baltic region. The tension between the two countries northern and Baltic identities has already been apparent in a discussion concerning their place in NATO’s operational-level command structure. Finally, there is a risk that imprecise talk about ‘strategic depth’ that has sometimes been part of the discussion about the benefits that Finland and Sweden bring to NATO may suggest that other parts of Allied territory are somehow less important. This would be unhelpful to coherent deterrence by denial on the north-east flank. While Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO greatly benefits the security and defence of the Baltic states, it is important that such risks and challenges are recognised, in order that they can be mitigated. We make several recommendations to Finland and Sweden as they continue their integration into the Alliance.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Enlargement
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Finland, Sweden, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States