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241. Next-Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser, Joshua Stone, Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, and Francesca Ghiretti
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The papers in this compendium were written by 11 members of the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) delegation: Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, Francesca Ghiretti, Heather Hwalek, Leland Lazarus, Lauren Racusin, Friso Stevens, Joshua Stone, Brian Volsky, Theresa Winter, Adrienne Wu. Transatlantic attention to Taiwan has surged in recent years for several reasons. First, Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to increased concern in the United States and Europe that Beijing’s growing military capabilities and declining confidence in its ability to achieve peaceful reunification will soon lead the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to attempt a takeover of Taiwan by force. The cost of such a war would carry a price tag of around $10 trillion, equal to about 10% of global GDP, according to Bloomberg Economics, far higher than the economic impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. The devastating impact of a Taiwan Strait conflict has provided a wake-up call for leaders in Europe who now echo the Biden administration’s warnings to PRC leader Xi Jinping to refrain from using violence to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In addition, Taiwan is now a regular agenda item in the US-EU Consultations on the Indo-Pacific and the US-EU Dialogue on China. Second, intensifying US-China strategic competition has increasingly focused on technology with chips at the center. Taiwan produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of the most advanced ones. A single company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), manufactures most of those chips. Recognition of Taiwan’s dominant role in the semiconductor supply chain has provided another reason to bolster deterrence. It has also sparked interest in “friendshoring” and “onshoring” semiconductor manufacturing. TSMC plans to start production at its first fab in Arizona in 2025 and will break ground on another in Dresden at the end of 2024 with an estimated completion date of 2027. Recognizing the rising geopolitical risks and their own strategic dependencies, the United States and the EU have made building resilient supply chains a priority, especially in semiconductors. In its 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy, Brussels explicitly committed the EU to engaging with Taiwan in creating resilient supply chains. Third, rising concern in the United States and Europe about election interference and disinformation have sparked interest in learning from Taiwan’s experience in combatting such threats. In the run-up to the January 13, 2024, presidential and legislative elections, PRC attempts to interfere in Taiwan’s politics surged to unprecedented levels through economic coercion, direct political meddling, displays of military force, and manipulation of social media. As the United States and many European countries prepare for their own national elections this year, they are engaging with experts from Taiwan to better understand PRC tactics and the tools that Taiwan successfully employed to counter PRC interference. Fourth, the United States and Europe increasingly recognize that Taiwan’s vibrant and successful democracy is under threat from an authoritarian regime. Taiwan has received high marks for protecting political rights and holding free and fair elections. Taiwan’s democratic achievements are even more impressive when set against the backdrop of a deterioration in freedom worldwide. Like other industrialized democracies, Taiwan faces a multitude of challenges that are especially difficult to address in the face of PRC efforts that prevent Taiwan’s government and its people from interacting with the world. Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations also hampers the world’s ability to develop effective solutions to myriad problems. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals from the United States to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. In 2022, TUPP was expanded to include young professionals from Europe in support of GMF’s mission of promoting transatlantic cooperation. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, DC, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The 2024 TUPP cohort traveled to Taiwan in February for an intense week of meetings and activities. Each participant gained insights into Taiwan and its role in their respective fields. This year’s delegation comprised five Americans and five Europeans. Over time, TUPP seeks to create a body of global experts with firsthand knowledge of Taiwan who support sustaining and expanding its international ties. I am grateful to the Henry Luce Foundation, the Global Taiwan Institute, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy for their support of this goal. The contributions here, written by the entire 2024 TUPP delegation, underscore the importance of deeper study and understanding of Taiwan. I sincerely hope that they stimulate continued transatlantic and global interest in Taiwan and its future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Poland, Germany, Latin America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

242. The End of Russia’s “Unipolar Moment” in the South Caucasus

Author:
Irakli Sirbiladze
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has exposed Russia’s weaknesses and ended its “unipolar moment” in the South Caucasus. This has affected the calculations of the three states in a region where Moscow traditionally had the upper hand over local and competing outside actors. Prior to the war, Russia had been able sustain its security, political, and economic leverage over Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, yet the extent of its influence varied over time and depending on the leadership in each country. Moscow was Armenia’s key ally, bringing the country into its security, political, and economic space. Russia also enjoyed close political and business ties with Azerbaijan, underpinned by shared authoritarianism. Baku joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) but stayed out of Russian-led security institutions. Moscow’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict gave it particular security leverage over Baku and Yerevan. Russia’s leverage with Georgia has fluctuated. The country joined the CIS but not other Russian-led organizations. Political ties started to erode in the early 2000s, especially following the 2003 Rose Revolution. The 2008 war weakened Russia’s leverage as Georgia left the CIS and cut diplomatic ties. Economic relations have improved since 2012 even as Tbilisi continued to seek EU and NATO membership. The war in Ukraine has weakened Russia’s sway over the region, accelerating what had started with the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War as Moscow sided with Azerbaijan rather than its treaty ally Armenia. This led to growing difference with Yerevan and convergence with Baku. Armenia is now looking for alternative security partners and engaging with the EU and the United States. Azerbaijan is taking advantage of Moscow’s focus on Ukraine to fully achieve its objectives, including the early departure of Russian peacekeepers from its territory. Georgia receiving EU candidate status could have reduced Russia’s leverage but its ruling party’s antidemocratic and anti-West turn keeps favoring Moscow’s influence. Western economic sanctions have further undermined Russia’s hold over the South Caucasus states: it needs them more to connect and trade with Asian markets. The new geo-economic reality favors the three countries and Moscow can now hardly use economic tools against them. Russia’s waning influence has made it one among other players in the South Caucasus. It can no longer ignore the role of China, the EU, Iran, Türkiye, and the United States there. The emerging geopolitical and geo-economic plurality in the region has made Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia more daring and transactional in their engagement with all outside powers. This has implications for the three countries in terms of peace and security, democracy, and geopolitical orientation. Azerbaijan is likely to remain undemocratic and to keep engaging with all powers transactionally to maintain national and regime security. Armenia finds itself in a complicated state of insecurity that affects democratization and makes multi-alignment its default foreign policy orientation. Georgia, whose democratic decline is the result of its own politics, is likely to sustain its multi-aligned and transactional foreign policy posture if the current government stays in power, while an opposition victory in the coming elections might turn the country back to democracy and a West-oriented foreign policy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Unipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, South Caucasus, and Black Sea

243. Time Is Almost Up

Author:
Martin Quencez and Gesine Weber
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The transatlantic partnership has long neglected structural weaknesses. Unless corrected, they could soon doom it. Download PDF 2025 will open a new chapter for the transatlantic relationship. The outcome of the US presidential election will accelerate ongoing changes in the country’s approach to Europe, while a rapidly shifting security environment will compel the partners to reform their alliance. The next year presents an important opportunity to do this, especially as the terms of the European Commission and the US president coincidentally align. When Joe Biden was elected four years ago, many European leaders expressed the hope that, in the president’s words, “the US is back” in the transatlantic relationship. The change of administration in Washington could have constituted an opportunity for the transatlantic partners to “seize the Biden moment”, but critical reforms never took place. Instead, the Democrat’s election relieved many European governments, prompting a continued reliance on muddling through critical challenges rather than developing European responses to them. The US administration, for its part, did not sufficiently pressure Europeans to play a greater role in world affairs. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced Europeans and the EU to respond with costly and unprecedented measures, but these policies remain to this day largely disconnected from a broader political discourse of the war as an “existential” threat to the future of the European project. Europe’s avoidance of such big-picture issues has negative implications for its ties to the United States. The current transatlantic relationship suffers from four major challenges that, unless tackled in the next four years, could lead, at best, to its dysfunction and, at worst, to its implosion. These challenges are: security-related structural problems, intra-alliance competition and policy toward China, a European gamble on time, and a widening power gap between the United States and Europe. Transatlantic Security Reform: Ukraine Has Muted The Debate The swift, coordinated, and strong reaction of the United States and Europe to the war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the most significant moment of transatlantic unity in recent years. US military and strategic leadership, and Biden’s personal involvement in overcoming Congressional resistance to supporting Ukraine, will constitute the cornerstones of his legacy in Europe. The continent has also done its part, providing significant military and humanitarian support—at times even surpassing that from the United States. All this has brought the transatlantic partners closer together while bolstering public approval of NATO. Sustaining unity on Ukraine, although an outstanding diplomatic and political success, has, however, overshadowed a more complex picture of the transatlantic relationship. The war’s outbreak put American security guarantees for Europe in the spotlight, but more contentious policy issues have been neglected. Prioritizing Ukraine over other aspects of the transatlantic relationship was justified, but it prevented the allies from preparing for potential future crises. This is unsustainable and dangerous. Persistent security-related structural problems may seem paradoxical. After all, 23 of the 32 NATO allies finally invested, as pledged a decade earlier, at least 2% of GDP in defense in 2024. The EU has also stepped up its efforts in this area. Nevertheless, two underlying problems fester. First, Europe’s chronic capability shortage means the United States still contributes more than 65% of the NATO allies’ total defense spending and 38% of their military personnel. NATO’s so-called European pillar remains underdeveloped, and Europe cannot defend itself on its own. Second, European and transatlantic security suffers from a lack of imagination. The Biden administration has demonstrated that it can defend the European security order, and Europeans have unquestionably overcome many political taboos to support Ukraine, but policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have been unable, or unwilling, to develop a vision for a needed new security order. A post-Cold War approach to alliance management has led the Biden administration and many European allies to preserve a form of status quo while the world undergoes considerable change. At the same time, there remains in certain political circles a desire to recreate the prewar relationship with Moscow, especially as a chronic lack of political leadership in key Western capitals impedes the development of an ambitious strategic agenda. Transatlantic leaders have repeatedly and rightly stated that Ukrainians will decide when they stop fighting, but this stance hides the lack of transatlantic consensus on a postwar European order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

244. Is the G7 still relevant?

Author:
Raffaele Trombetta
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In the first of our new Expert Analysis series, former Italian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Raffaele Trombetta, draws on his career experience to answer the question of whether the G7 is still relevant in today’s international order. Detailing a narrative of the G7’s history, confronting its challenges, and addressing its common criticisms, this paper deals with the alternatives (G20 and BRICS), as well as where the G7’s interests should lie in future relations with China and the African nations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, G20, G7, BRICS, and International Order
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Europe, and Asia

245. International Order Strategies: Past and Present

Author:
Aaron McKeil
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
At an important time in foreign policy planning, a new era of “strategic competition” widely noted by policymakers in Washington and allied capitals has produced a new wave of strategic thinking and evolving strategic practices aiming to maintain or modify “international order”. This collected research report aims to clarify how strategies for international order are being understood and formulated today, and how this strategic thinking and planning differs from past eras of strategic competition, toward an assessment of its policy implications today. Dr. Aaron McKeil convenes the International Orders Research Unit at LSE IDEAS. He is Academic Director of the LSE Executive MSc International Strategy and Diplomacy Programme at LSE IDEAS. He holds a PhD International Relations from the LSE. His forthcoming book with the University of Michigan Press explores the collapse of cosmopolitan globalism and rise of strategic competition.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and International Order
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

246. Soviet vs. Post-Soviet Russian Disinformation

Author:
Todd Leventhal
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
An intriguing and important question for students of disinformation and propaganda is: how do Soviet and post-Soviet Russian disinformation and propaganda differ, why, and what does this indicate for the future? I believe an unbiased analysis reveals that: there is a great deal of continuity between the goals and techniques of Soviet and post-Soviet Russian disinformation and propaganda. the new digital media environment offers unprecedented ways for new Russian disinformation and propaganda instruments, including RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik, to influence foreign audiences. the reelection of Donald Trump would offer unparalleled opportunities for Soviet influence on US international policy at the very highest level.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Propaganda, Disinformation, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:
Russia and Soviet Union

247. The Christmas Gift that Keeps Giving

Author:
Jack F. Jr Matlock
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
On December 24, 1989, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboimov informed me on behalf of the Soviet government, ‘We have given the Brezhnev Doctrine to you with our compliments. Consider it a Christmas gift.” Now, some thirty-four years later, I should explain what the Brezhnev Doctrine was, the circumstances under which the gift was conveyed, and why I believe that it was a gift that has infused US foreign policy to this very day.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Memoir, and Brezhnev Doctrine
Political Geography:
Soviet Union and United States of America

248. A New Face, But an Old Tactic: History Offers Clues on Stopping Russia’s African Advance

Author:
Herman J. Cohen
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
The conflict in Gaza has taken center stage in global affairs. But while the eyes of the world are drawn to the Middle East, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been working in the background to expand Russia’s influence in Africa. His tactics are drawn from the Soviet Union’s Cold War playbook. He offers military support, now via the mercenary Wagner Group, to unstable regimes across the continent, helping them retain power in exchange for diplomatic allegiance and natural resources. If the US does not meet this issue head-on, the consequences for African nations and the international community could be dire. US policymakers should look at the history of the Soviet Union’s diplomacy on the African continent– a period I witnessed personally as a diplomat on the ground– for clues on how to effectively respond to and combat this growing issue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, History, and Memoir
Political Geography:
Africa and Russia

249. The Modest Geopolitical Case for Pakistan

Author:
Ted Craig
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
Pakistan is no longer an imperative for the United States. With the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan and the fall of the Afghan government in August 2021, our critical need for Pakistan as the only reliable land and air route into that landlocked country has all but ended. The US embassy in Islamabad is working admirably with Pakistan authorities to ensure that Pakistan remains a viable exit route for the Afghan allies for whom we seek to provide refuge, but the daily necessity of Pakistan to supply our troops, diplomats, and development officers is over. Conversely, we are no longer compelled to engage Pakistan in the vain hope it will eliminate the sanctuary it long provided the Taliban. It never did, and the Afghan Taliban’s victory owes as much to the safe haven that Pakistan gave it as it does to the corrupted Afghan state that our overabundance of dollars helped create. After the United States’ humiliating exit from Kabul, there is an understandable impulse in Washington to wash our hands of the uncomfortable and often morally compromised relationship with Pakistan. We no longer need much from Islamabad (or Rawalpindi, the Army’s headquarters), and we have a seemingly more important relationship to build with Pakistan’s archrival India. But turning our backs on Pakistan is the wrong play. To date, the Biden administration has authorized some valuable diplomatic reengagement with Pakistan, cleared a sustainment package for previous Pakistan military purchases, and sent generous assistance in response to 2022 flooding. But the White House has not offered high-level engagement. In Washington corridors, there is a clear sense that the White House is Pakistan-skeptical.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Pakistan and South Asia

250. Has NATO Enlargement Enhanced US National Security?

Author:
Joshua Shifrinson
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
What effect has NATO enlargement had on US national security? Few issues have been as central to US foreign policy over the last three decades. Since the mid 1990s, a bipartisan foreign policy consensus has held that enlarging the alliance was critical to US national security and the only practical manner of consolidating what President Clinton termed a Europe “whole, free, and at peace.” This position is so well-established in the United States’ political culture that several rounds of NATO expansion proceeded without meaningful debate in the US Senate. Indeed, occasional efforts by some policymakers to question the merits of enlargement have been met with accusations of isolationism, or of “working for Vladimir Putin”. By this logic, not only does US national security benefit from an enlarged NATO, but were the United States to stop expanding NATO the sky would be likely to fall. In contrast, this paper makes the case that NATO expansion has been a net loss to US national security and ought not to continue. Note that I focus on US national security, not whether enlargement may have benefitted other actors. Drawing on over a decade of archival research into the origins and consequences of enlargement, I advance three specific arguments. First, claims that NATO benefitted US national security by anchoring the alliance, ensuring the stability of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and promoting democracy are almost certainly overstated. Instead – second – the alliance has generated a host of problems for the United States by encouraging allied cheap riding and reckless driving, limiting US strategic flexibility, and contributing to the collapse of relations with Moscow. As a result, future enlargement to states such as Ukraine is not in the United States’ interest. The remainder of this essay proceeds in three sections. First, I review and critically evaluate the purported benefits of NATO enlargement. From there, I discuss the variety of problems enlargement has posed to US national security. In both of these sections, I pay particular attention to the consequences of enlargement itself and to how alternative policy options may have affected US interests. I conclude by briefly reflecting on the future of enlargement at a time when Ukrainian accession in particular dominates policy debates.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, and Enlargement
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America