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1. Will the Democratic Union (HDZ) remain in power in Croatia?

Author:
Corinne Deloy
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
On 15 March, the President of the Republic of Croatia, Zoran Milanovic, announced that general elections would be held on 17 April. This election is the first in a series to be held in the country in 2024: European elections on 9 June and presidential election at the end of the year. 3.7 million people are expected to vote on 17 April. Croatia has been governed since 2016 by the Democratic Union (HDZ), led by Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic, allied with the Serbian Independent Democratic Party (SDSS), led by Milorad Pupovac. The outgoing head of government is also the longest-serving prime minister. His coalition is supported by the Social Liberal Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja, the People's Party-Reformists (NS-R), the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Croatia, the Roma Alliance of the Republic of Croatia, the Union of Albanians and the Croatian Party of Pensioners (HSU). However, the Democratic Union is struggling somewhat. It has been criticised for appointing Ivan Turudic to the post of public prosecutor. This choice was confirmed by parliament: 78 MPs voted in favour, against 60 and 2 abstentions. Ivan Turudic's critics point to his links with controversial figures such as Zdravko Mamic, a former manager of Dinamo Zagreb football club who was convicted of tax fraud and fled to Bosnia to escape justice, and a number of senior Democratic Union officials suspected of corruption. The government also faced several demonstrations last March in the country's five largest cities (Zagreb, Split, Rijeka, Osijek and Varazdin) - organised by several left-wing opposition forces (Mozemo ("We can" in Croatian) and a coalition of 6 parties led by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) - which called on Croatians to rally under the slogan "Enough is enough". Afterwards, Social Democrat leader Pedja Grbin promised to "finish the job at the polling stations". Zoran Milanovic's "coup" The electoral campaign witnessed an unprecedented moment when Croatian President Zoran Milanovic announced at a press conference in mid-March, alongside Pedja Grbin, his candidacy for the general elections as head of the SDP list in Zagreb ... in the first constituency in which the outgoing Prime Minister, Andrej Plenkovic, is running. "Sometimes you have to leave your comfort zone if you want to have solid majority and form a government of national salvation," declared the head of state. Asked to rule on this unprecedented situation, the Constitutional Court stated on 18 March that it was absolutely impossible for the President of the Republic to stand as a candidate in the general elections. "The candidacy of the current President of the Republic in general elections is incompatible with the Croatian Constitution and the principle of the separation of powers. The President is a strictly non-partisan person and cannot take part in the activities of any political party. If he wants to be a candidate, he must resign", the Court ruled. Nor is the head of state authorised to campaign in favour of a particular list, at the risk of annulling the election. Zoran Milanovic responded by describing the members of the Constitutional Court as "illiterate peasants"; he stated that he would only resign once election victory was certain, and that he was therefore in a position to succeed Andrej Plenkovic as head of government. Zoran Milanovic, President of the Republic since 2020, was Prime Minister between 2011 and 2016.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Courts, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Europe and Croatia

2. Exploring the Effectiveness of the Human Rights Court in Indonesia: A Call for Humanitarian Action

Author:
Ria Wierma Putri, Yunita Maya Putri, and Eddy Rifai
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
Indonesia’s Human Rights Court, established under Law No. 26/2000, has faced criticism due to persistent unresolved cases, highlighting flaws in its legal foundation. The Court’s performance revealed that Indonesia has been ineffective in resolving serious human rights violation cases. This research emphasizes two main points: 1) exploring human rights enforcement in Indonesia based on the effectiveness of the Human Rights Court’s performance, and 2) scrutinizing the context of humanitarian intervention in cases of gross human rights violations in Indonesia. The article utilized a normative juridical research approach, followed by a descriptive analysis through a literature study. The research illustrated that human rights enforcement in Indonesia was inadequate, often stalling at the inquiry stage. Trials for the 1984 Tanjung Priok massacre, East Timor, and Abepura resulted in acquittals, raising doubts about the effectiveness of the Human Rights Court’s Law (No. 26/2000). Furthermore, humanitarian intervention was deemed necessary to address these unresolved violations, viewed not as a violation of sovereignty but as a means to enhance human rights protection. This requires national and international cooperation, focusing on resolving cases rather than debating jurisdiction.
Topic:
Human Rights, Courts, Humanitarian Intervention, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Political Geography:
Indonesia and Southeast Asia

3. What Will It Take to Eliminate the Immigration Court Backlog? Assessing “Judge Team” Hiring Needs Based on Changed Conditions and the Need for Broader Reform

Author:
Donald Kerwin
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
This paper examines the staffing needs of the US Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), as it seeks to eliminate an immigration court backlog, which approached 2.5 million pending cases at the end of fiscal year (FY) 2023. A previous study by the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) attributed the backlog to systemic, long-neglected problems in the broader US immigration system. This paper provides updated estimates of the number of immigration judges (IJs) and “judge teams” (IJ teams) needed to eliminate the backlog over ten and five years based on different case receipt and completion scenarios. It also introduces a data tool that will permit policymakers, administrators and researchers to make their own estimates of IJ team hiring needs based on changing case receipt and completion data. Finally, the paper outlines the pressing need for reform of the US immigration system, including a well-resourced, robust, and independent court system, particularly in light of record “encounters” of migrants at US borders in FY 2022 and 2023.
Topic:
Immigration, Courts, Borders, Asylum, and Department of Homeland Security
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

4. Judging disparities: Recidivism risk, image motives and in-group bias on Wisconsin criminal courts

Author:
Ludovica Ciasullo and Martina Uccioli
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:
This paper studies racial in-group disparities in Wisconsin, which has one of the highest Black-to-White incarceration rate ratios among all U.S. states. The analysis is motivated by a model in which a judge may want to incarcerate more due to three factors: (1) when the defendant has higher recidivism risk and is more likely to commit future crimes; (2) when the defendant is from a different group (anti-out-group preferences); and (3) when the defendant is of the same group but that group is responsible for a majority of crimes (image motives). Further, a judge may have better information on recidivism risk due to two factors: (4) becoming more experienced, and (5) sharing the same group as the defendant. We take these ideas to new data on 1 million cases from Wisconsin criminal courts, 2005-2017. Using a recidivism risk score that we construct using machine learning tools to predict reoffense, we find evidence that judges do tend to incarcerate defendants with a higher recidivism risk (1). Consistent with judge experience leading to better information on defendant recidivism risk (4), we find that more experienced judges are more responsive in jailing defendants with a high recidivism risk score. Looking at racial disparities between majority (White) and minority (Black) judges and defendants, we find no evidence for anti-out-group bias (2). Consistent with image motives (3), we find that when the minority group is responsible for most crimes, minority-group judges are harsher on their in-group. Finally, consistent with judges having better information on recidivism risk for same-group defendants (5), we find that judges are more responsive to the recidivism risk score for defendants from the same group
Topic:
Law Enforcement, Courts, Incarceration, Structural Racism, and Criminal Recidivism
Political Geography:
North America, Wisconsin, and United States of America