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11. U.S. Foreign Policy an the War in Ukraine

Author:
James A. Russell
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
This essay assesses the impact of the war in Ukraine on American foreign policy. The thesis provided here is that the war in Ukraine must be viewed as a painful but maybe necessary shock therapy that has helped to relieve the residual hangover from America’s two-decade-long, ill-advised war on terror and the lost wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In parallel, the war has served as a vehicle for the reinvigoration of national grand strategy and the foreign policy that provides the vital connective tissue between ends, ways, and means. In this trinity, the foreign policy represents an instrumental tool to connect the assumptions that undergird grand strategy to the practical, real-world of international politics.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

12. Strategic Competition and Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Carl W Baker
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
There is a growing acceptance among countries in the Indo-Pacific region that strategic competition between the United States and China is changing perceptions about security and the adequacy of the existing security architecture. While some have characterized the competition between the two as a new Cold War, it is clear that what is happening in the region is far more complex than the competition that characterized the original Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the economic integration that has taken place since the early 1990s makes it much more difficult to draw bright ideological lines between the two sides. Further, the Asian context of the emerging competition is one where the two competitors have grown to share power. As the dominant military power, the United States has been the primary security guarantor in Asia and beyond. China, on the other hand, has emerged over the past decades as the primary economic catalyst in Asia and beyond. Currently, each side seems increasingly unwilling to accept that arrangement.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Strategic Interests, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

13. A History of Shared Values, A Future of Shared Strategic Interests: US-Australia Relations in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Rob York, Craig Kafura, Rick Umback, Rose Rodgers, and Thom Dixon
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The United States and Australia have been treaty allies for more than 70 years. This bond endured throughout the Cold War and the War on Terror, and it increasingly looks as though they will be close partners throughout the great power competition with the People’s Republic of China. The two partner countries were among the earliest critics of the PRC’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, have shared concerns over Chinese investment and its impact on their national security, and what growing PRC influence means for them the future of democracy in the Indo-Pacific. The two countries were early and enthusiastic members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which includes fellow Indo-Pacific democracies Japan and India, and which has moved to address pressing regional challenges such as pandemic response and climate change. Plus, with 2021’s announcement of the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) pact Canberra proved its willingness to defy not only Beijing, but also other democracies—especially in Europe—to build out its capacity to defend itself and counter the PRC’s growing regional power. The contributions to this volume each address the nature, not only of the alliance, but the challenges it will face in the years to come. Craig Kafula of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs notes that public polling in both countries reveals overwhelming agreement on most subjects related to the alliance and its forthcoming challenges, but also differences of opinion that will have to be navigated. Rick Umback of Australian National University’s School of Politics and International Relations examines the growth of PRC influence over local governments and Australia, and the ramifications this has for other liberal democracies in the Indo-Pacific. Rose Rodgers at the Center for Naval Analyses says the AUKUS has not limited, but actually increased the need for scrutiny of PRC investment in critical and emerging technologies, and other means of screening technological investments. Moving away from what the alliance means for relations with the PRC, Thom Dixon examines the field of cyberbiosecurity—the intersection of cybersecurity and biosecurity—and how US-Australian cooperation in this field is essential to meet two of the great challenges of this age: climate change and pandemic response. Taken together these analyses—brought to you by the next generation of American-Australian analysts—richly detail the nature of the challenges the allies face, and offer recommendations on how to meet them over the next 70 years of their partnership.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

14. US-Korea Relations: Nuclear New Year

Author:
Mason Richey
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol has tried to make a priority of transforming the traditional US-South Korea military alliance into a “global, comprehensive strategic alliance” with increasing ambitions beyond hard security issues on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia in general. Yoon and his foreign policy team get an “A” for vision and effort—joining the NATO Asia-Pacific Four (AP4) and releasing an Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022 are evidence. But, like Michael Corleone trying to go legit in The Godfather III, every time they make progress getting out, they get pulled back into the Peninsula. To wit, during the first trimester of 2023 Korean Peninsula security issues again commanded disproportionate attention from Seoul and Washington. The proximate cause for this dynamic is North Korea’s mafioso-in-chief, Kim Jong Un, who started 2023 with a January 1 missile launch and kept at it throughout the winter. This, of course, followed record-breaking 2022 North Korean missile tests and demonstrations, which totaled approximately 70 launches of around 100 projectiles. Given the near-zero prospects for North Korean denuclearization and the growing arsenal at Pyongyang’s disposal, it is understandable that any South Korean president would be distracted from interests further afield. The audacious nature of Yoon’s re-focusing on South Korean security was surprising and controversial, however. On January 11, apparently fed up with perceived South Korean vulnerability to its nuclear-armed consanguine, and perhaps irritated with the Biden administration’s slow realization of this South Korean sentiment, he made a pronouncement that no democratic leader in Seoul has ever made publicly before: he stated that South Korea—which benefits from US extended nuclear deterrence—could still consider acquiring its own nuclear weapons, if “North Korean provocations continued intensifying.” This set off a diplomatic kerfuffle that resonated—on both sides of the 38th parallel, as well as in Washington and Beijing—for much of the rest of the January-April reporting period. Given the provocative nature of Yoon’s statement, the South Korean presidential office later backtracked, “clarifying” that Yoon was simply expressing his “firm commitment to defending the nation” against North Korea’s nuclear threats, and while the “worst case scenario must be taken into consideration,” “the principle of abiding by the [Nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty holds.” In any event, Washington took notice of its anxious ally, responding with demonstrations of commitment to extended deterrence for South Korea—including a visit by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and strategic asset deployments to South Korea. All this was in addition to regular combined military exercises and naval exercises featuring US aircraft carrier strike groups. Washington also consented to more bilateral consultation with Seoul regarding the US nuclear umbrella. The saga has concluded—at least for now—with the Washington Declaration promulgated at the Biden-Yoon summit in late April. The Washington Declaration promises tightened US-South Korea extended deterrence coordination and consultation, while the leaders’ summit—in the context of Yoon’s state visit to celebrate 70 years of US-South Korea alliance relations—functioned as a renewal of Washington-Seoul ties. These ties are now perhaps as strong as they have ever been. If Pyongyang has reckoned that increased belligerence would decouple the US-South Korea alliance, it has seemingly miscalculated.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

15. Cautious Pragmatism: What is thе potential outcome of Washington's approach to thе Nigеr crisis?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On August 8, 2023, US Sеcrеtary of Statе Antony Blinkеn announcеd that diplomacy is thе prеfеrrеd way of rеsolving thе crisis causеd by thе coup in Nigеr. Following thе coup on July 26, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan strongly condemned any effort to detain or subvert thе functioning of Nigеr's dеmocratically еlеctеd govеrnmеnt, led by President Mohamеd Bazoum. Thеsе statements reflect thе ambiguity of Washington's stance regarding thе crisis in Nigеr.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Counter-terrorism, Crisis Management, Coup, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Niger, and United States of America

16. Normalizing U.S.–Pakistan Relations

Author:
Adam Weinstein
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The U.S.–Pakistan relationship is often portrayed negatively among the lawmakers, media, and general public of both countries, with a focus on mutual resentment and dysfunction. The early relationship was burdened by mismatched expectations regarding support in conflicts with India. Different priorities from the start of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan during the 1980s further strained the relationship. The United States also sanctioned Pakistan and India for developing nuclear weapons, which had a disparate impact on Pakistan, causing ongoing tension. Many in Washington’s policy and journalistic communities hold negative views of Pakistan, viewing it as an enabler of terrorism that seeks geopolitical rents but rarely delivers. Pakistanis often resent what they view as Washington’s use of the country as a “frontline state” in both the Cold War and the War on Terror, claiming tens of thousands of lives, only to discard it later. These grievances are largely dismissed in Washington as self–inflicted. Despite the negative public debate, serving officials in both governments generally hold a more nuanced view, recognizing the broad overlapping interests shared by the United States and Pakistan in areas like climate change, trade, and counterterrorism. There is already an exhaustive literature on terrorism in Pakistan, nuclear security, and potential conflicts along the Line of Control with India. This brief will instead focus on revitalizing U.S.–Pakistan relations through innovative diplomacy in areas that have received less attention, such as trade, regional integration, people–to–people connections, and climate change. Its principal recommendation is that Washington should resist viewing Pakistan through the narrow lens of the “War on Terror” or great power competition. Instead it should pursue its interests through more normalized relations, while recognizing U.S. limitations in influencing events in Pakistan or the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Counter-terrorism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

17. Winning the Majority: A New U.S. Bargain with the Global South

Author:
Sarang Shidore
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The ongoing Ukraine war has exposed the waning influence of the United States in the vast arc of the world stretching from Latin America to Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands known as the Global South. Most Global South states, while opposed to the Russian invasion, have not backed the United States on its strategies of sanctioning Russia or seeking a defeat of Moscow. Some have explicitly criticized what they see as Washington’s double standards. Despite the region’s great diversity and heterogeneity, a new nonalignment is emerging in the Global South. However, it is not the same as its previous version (of the Non-Aligned Movement) in important respects — being much less institutionalized, less ideological, and based more on national interests. This makes it more durable and harder to counter through tools that the United States has traditionally employed. The United States cannot succeed in a world where power is increasingly diffuse without strong ties to the Global South. It is the region where the majority of humanity lives. It contains sites of crucial natural resources, supply chains, major markets, and increasing innovation. It is an essential partner to solve the climate challenge. Its states are wealthier and more assertive when it comes to their interests and resources. Over the past two decades, most have built deep economic ties with China, and continue to value ties with Russia. In general, the states of the Global South wish to leverage all of their international relationships for their own benefit and not take sides in or support a new cold war between the great powers. Most are unconvinced or alienated by Washington’s rhetoric of “democracy v. autocracy” and the “rules–based order.” They feel particularly threatened by U.S. policies of secondary sanctions designed to limit or end their ties with U.S. rivals. But the current U.S. strategy is inadvertently pushing the Global South toward Beijing and Moscow. This is an unforced error Washington can ill afford.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Interests, Russia-Ukraine War, and Nonalignment
Political Geography:
United States of America and Global South

18. Four Contending U.S. Approaches to Multilateralism

Author:
Stewart Patrick
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The era of U.S. president Donald Trump exposed the shortcomings of a unilateralist and hypernationalist approach to the pursuit of U.S. global objectives. Although that orientation still commands support in some Republican quarters, a more compelling foreign policy debate for the United States has emerged: What form of multilateralism is currently best suited to advance U.S. national interests and international stability? This historical moment is defined by two countervailing trends, as described in the 2022 National Security Strategy issued by U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration. The first is a profusion of transnational challenges that can only be addressed, mitigated, or resolved through collective action, such as climate change and pandemic disease. The second is a resurgence of geopolitical competition that hinders that very cooperation.1 The imperative for collective action has never been greater, yet the world remains, as United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Antonio Guterres bemoans, “gridlocked in colossal global dysfunction.”2 Biden has turned the page on Trump’s “America First” foreign policy, but the debate over alternative approaches to intergovernmental cooperation has just begun.3 Within the U.S. foreign policy establishment, four distinct models vie for primacy—and the administration’s attention. The first is a charter conception of multilateralism, focused on the UN’s model of universal membership. The second is a club approach, which seeks to rally established democracies as the foundation for world order. The third is a concert model, which seeks comity and joint action among the world’s major powers. The fourth is a coalition approach, which would tailor ad hoc frameworks to each global contingency. Each of the so-called four Cs lays claim to a respective virtue: legitimacy, solidarity, capability, and flexibility.4 As the Biden administration begins its third year—and as internationalists continue to advocate for different modes of multilateralism to tackle a daunting global agenda—the time is ripe for the United States to take a more strategic and intentional approach to international cooperation. Each of the four Cs rests on specific assumptions, makes distinct causal and normative claims, and poses real-world trade-offs for the pursuit of U.S. preferences and prospects for effective collective action. To be able to weigh their relative merits in specific circumstances, policymakers first need to better understand their conceptual underpinnings and practical implications.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

19. What Losing the Iran Deal Could Mean for the Region

Author:
Seyed Hossein Mousavian
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
If President Joe Biden is seeking to restore sustainable peace and security in the region, he has to start with reviving the JCPOA
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Peace, JCPOA, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

20. America’s Best Choice in Sudan Is the Least Bad Option

Author:
Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Long-simmering tensions between Sudan’s two most powerful generals broke into open warfare on April 15. A series of ceasefires have failed, and fighting continues in the capital city, Khartoum, and in other areas throughout the country. Street protests in April 2019 prompted Sudan’s security services to oust the former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, and forced them to include civilians in the subsequent transitional government. Ever since, the United States has tried to help those civilians consolidate power.1 In October 2021, however, the two most senior generals in the transitional government—Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (usually known as “Hemeti”), leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)—forced the civilians out. Still, the United States supported negotiations between the junta and elements of the civilian protest movement until both generals’ desire for supreme power forced the confrontation that now threatens to dismember the country.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, Leadership, Armed Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, and United States of America