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161. Enough to Go Around? Money Matters Complicate U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia-Pacific

Author:
Leon Whyte and Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia – also known as the “Asia Pivot” – has been a cornerstone of the Obama administration’s foreign policy since 2011. Hillary Clinton offered a detailed explaination of the concept in a 2011 Foreign Policy article.[1] The basic idea behind the Rebalance is that many U.S. core economic and security interests are increasingly centered in the Asia-Pacific region, so the United States needs to allocate more diplomatic, economic, military, and other assets towards the region. The Strategic Rebalance would do just that. The Defence Strategic Guidance relaeased by the Defence Department in January 2012 made supporting the rebalance a key Pentagon objective. The Obama Administration accordingly plans to increase the percentage of naval assets in the Pacific to 60 percent by 2020[2] in addition to stationing 2,500 Marines in Darwin, Australia, and 4 littoral combat ships in Singapore.[3][4] Given the region’s economic importance, this makes sense. The Asia-Pacific region accounted for 40 percent of global economic growth in 2013. In 2012, the U.S. exports to the region totaled $555 billion, which supported 2.8 million U.S. jobs.[5]
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economy
Political Geography:
Asia-Pacific and United States of America

162. Accountability for Armed Contractors

Author:
Ian M. Ralby
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
On 16 September 2007, the accountability of private armed contractors became a global concern. A team of armed guards from the US company Blackwater Worldwide, operating on a US State Department contract, opened fire that day in Baghdad’s Nisor Square, killing seventeen Iraqi civilians and injuring an additional twenty. It took more than seven years before four of the individuals responsible were ultimately convicted of either first degree murder or voluntary manslaughter by a jury in a U.S. Federal District Court. A fifth member of the Blackwater team had previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter.[1] The initial lack of consequences and the slow speed of justice provided the watchful world with strong evidence that armed contractors operate in a zone of legal twilight, devoid of accountability. ​ The rise of private armed contracting was one of the most distinctive operational developments of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Erik Prince, founder of Blackwater, famously stated: “Our corporate goal is to do for the national security apparatus what FedEx did to the postal service.”[2] Throughout both conflicts, the hiring policies of several Western governments, particularly those of the United States, helped Blackwater and numerous other companies move toward that goal. By December 2008, for example, 69% of the United States’ total force in Afghanistan was comprised of private contractors, roughly 15% of which were armed.[3] While there are no reliable statistics on the size of the global private armed security industry, there is little doubt that it has grown and contracted with the surge and decline of Western engagement in armed conflict. New conflicts on the horizon, however, suggest the possibility of a resurgence of the industry, reigniting concerns about accountability. The proliferation of private armed security companies has coincided with a proliferation of initiatives aimed at developing accountability for the industry. Numerous codes, standards, mechanisms and proposals – developed by governments, international organizations, civil society groups, private companies, trade associations, individuals, academics and multi-stakeholder bodies – have sought to address different issues surrounding armed contractors. Most of them, however, have been developed in response to incidents that already occurred. This reactive approach to accountability, while useful for addressing past problems, may leave the industry exposed to future problems. In other words, a code, standard or mechanism set up to prevent another Nisor Square incident may be very effective in doing so, but may fail to prevent a different and even more worrying incident in the future. This article begins with a brief overview of the most credible accountability initiatives, suggesting that the resulting collection forms a patchwork, rather than a framework for governing the conduct of armed contractors. The analysis then focuses on the process of selecting contractors, with a particular emphasis on the US Government. While cost has been a key factor in determining selection, the various initiatives discussed have made it possible for accountability and quality to be added as essential metrics. Ultimately, however, the failure of the accountability initiatives to remain current, much less forward-looking, means that the objective determinants of ‘accountability and quality’ may not be fit for purpose as the US and other Western powers begin to engage the services of armed contractors for assistance in new conflicts...
Topic:
Security, War, Governance, Military Affairs, Regulation, and Accountability
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Middle East, and United States of America

163. Full Issue: Emerging Domains of Security

Author:
Meg Guliford, Thomas McCarthy, Alison Russell, Michael M. Tsai, Po-Chang Huang, Feng-tai Hwang, Ian Easton, Matthew Testerman, Nikolas Ott, Anthony Gilgis, Todd Diamond, Michael Wackenreuter, Sebastian Bruns, Andrew Mark Spencer, Wendy A. Wayman, and Charles Cleveland
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The theme of this special edition is “Emerging Domains of Security.” Coupled with previously unpublished work developed under a prior “Winning Without War” theme, the articles therein honor Professor Martel’s diverse, yet forward-leaning, research interests. This edition maintains the journal’s four traditional sections of policy, history, interviews, and current affairs. Our authors include established academics and practitioners as well as two Fletcher students, Nikolas Ott and Michael Wackenreuter. Each of the articles analyzes critical issues in the study and practice of international security, and our authors make salient arguments about an array of security-related issues. The articles are borne out of countless hours of work by FSR’s dedicated editorial staff. I deeply appreciate the time and effort they devoted to the publication of this volume. They are full-time graduate students who masterfully balanced a host of responsibilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Intelligence, International Cooperation, International Law, History, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Cybersecurity, Navy, Conflict, Space, Interview, Army, Baath Party, and Norms
Political Geography:
China, Iraq, Europe, Middle East, Taiwan, Germany, Asia-Pacific, Global Focus, and United States of America

164. Roadmap for a Code of Conduct for Cyberspace

Author:
Thomas McCarthy and Alison Russell
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Professor Martel, author of Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy, offers three guiding principles for U.S. grand strategy: rebuilding domestic foundations of power; exercising American leadership to restrain sources of disorder that directly threaten U.S. vital interests; and forging both alliances and partnerships to confront the most pressing threats to global stability.[2] The last of Martel’s three principles foreshadows the three cyber security activities at the heart of the newly released U.S. Department of Defense Cyber Strategy. The three activities around which the new U.S. DoD cyber strategy revolves are: Information sharing and interagency coordination; building bridges to the private sector; and building alliances, coalitions, and partnerships abroad.[3] These three coordinating and collaborating activities are the key to building relationships between actors influencing the development of the cyber domain, and are necessary to identify and counter threats. To advance global cyber security, the Cyber Strategy suggests the U.S. must “build and maintain robust international alliances and partnerships to deter shared threats and increase international security and stability.”[4] As part of this effort, the United States seeks to build security relationships to respond to shifts in the international environment, including sources of disorder. These relationships are built upon trust and cooperation of many actors with varied interests and objectives in cyberspace. Given the wide variety of actors and interests within the cyber domain, establishing relationships of trust based on a shared understanding of acceptable conduct, expected behavior, and governing principles represents a daunting challenge...
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Cybersecurity, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

165. Special Operations Today: FSR Interviews LTG Cleveland (Ret.) Former Commanding General, USASOC

Author:
Charles Cleveland
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Lieutenant General Charles T. Cleveland, an Army Special Forces Officer, relinquished command of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and retired after 37 years of military service on 01 July 2015. He previously commanded the Special Operations Command Central and Special Operations Command South as well as the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-North during Operation Iraqi Freedom. LTG Cleveland is a native of Arizona and a 1978 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. His military awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal and the Legion of Merit Medal.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Interview, Army, and Special Operations
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, Panama, and United States of America

166. Profiles in Security: CW5 Wendy A. Wayman

Author:
Wendy A. Wayman
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Wendy Ann Wayman never imagined she would still be serving her country more than three decades after enlisting in the United States Army, let alone rise to rank of Chief Warrant Officer 5 and become the first Command Chief Warrant Officer for Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). Born and raised in Aberdeen, South Dakota, CW5 Wayman has traveled the world and advised the highest-ranking military leaders in the United States. She has also amassed a legion of professional colleagues who describe her using such phrases as “no one better,” “shaping the future of military intelligence,” “a consummate professional,” “my dear mentor,” and “a complete badass.” The Fletcher Security Review is honored to feature INSCOM Command Chief Warrant Officer, CW5 Wendy Wayman’s “Profile in Security."
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Interview, and Army
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

167. Moving East and South: U.S. Navy and German Navy Strategy in the Eurasian Theater 1991- 2014, A View from Germany

Author:
Sebastian Bruns
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The Cold War ended rather suddenly in 1991. With it went the model on which the United States’ maritime strategy of the 1980s had rested. Driven by individuals like John Lehman, President Ronald Reagan’s long-time Secretary of the Navy, that series of strategic documents promulgated a forward, offensive, counter-force approach and the famous ‘600-ship Navy’ force structure. With the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, the sole challenger to U.S. naval power vanished practically overnight. Red Fleet warships were rusting away in port or dismantled altogether. In the United States, the military lost significant human capital through a number of force reduction rounds, which reflected how the U.S. Navy could and would take on the post-Cold War world intellectually. In the wake of this strategic recalibration, allied militaries and their navies—such as the Federal German Navy, soon to be renamed German Navy—also underwent substantial transformations. These were often guided by the shifting geopolitical landscape as well as the popular desire to reduce the inflated defense budgets of Cold War days in order to obtain a peace dividend. This analysis will focus on the Eurasian theater—very broadly speaking, the waters that surround the European and Southwest Asian landmasses[1]—in U.S. and German naval strategy between 1991 and 2014. The maritime sphere has become increasingly important as a domain of emerging security since the end of the Cold War, yet comparatively little time and resources are being devoted to research on naval strategy and relationships between allies at sea. As a result, the use of naval force for political and diplomatic ends and the dynamics of maritime geopolitics have suffered. This essay seeks to underline the challenges that have confronted the U.S. Navy in the past generation and analyze their long-term effects. While the U.S. Navy’s geographic focus and operational interests have increasingly shifted from Europe to the Middle East and Asia, and from control of the “blue water” high seas to the littorals, these key interests should not be overlooked. In the view of the author, the fall of the Soviet Union and the implication that allies like Germany would do more to patrol their own maritime neighborhood provided the U.S. Navy with a convenient reason to de-emphasize their previously highly valued naval hub in the Mediterranean Sea. In rebalancing from the Sixth Fleet area of responsibility (AOR) to other regions of the world, the U.S. Navy accepted the consequences for fleet design and ship numbers, perhaps willingly using it as a bargaining chip for force reduction rounds in Washington, D.C. Implicitly, European allies and the U.S. Air Force[2] were expected to fill the gap left behind in terms of naval presence and crisis response, in particular after the successful campaigns in the Adriatic Sea in responding to unrest and war in the Balkans. European allies, however, were largely uninterested in stepping up to the plate; they considered their near abroad safe enough. Most importantly, they were somewhat wary of delivering a combined ‘pocket Sixth Fleet’ of their own. Finally, they were preoccupied with managing German unification, enlargement of the European Union, and establishing a common market and currency, among other things. Accordingly, this paper sheds a light on some key German strategic documents for a time when the reunited country sought its new place in the security environment of the post-Cold War world. By taking a unique view from Germany, one of the U.S. Navy’s premier NATO allies, this analysis also considers the transformation of the Bundesmarine from an escort navy to an expeditionary navy.[3] It seeks to conceptually explain how Germany’s security policy addressed the maritime challenges of the new era. The German Navy was principally drawn south- and eastward geographically after 1991, usually in close cooperation with other allied and friendly navies (and mandated by NATO, the EU, or the UN).[4] It was increasingly asked to address maritime security challenges to which the U.S. Navy no longer, or only in a supporting role, responded. The German Navy went into the breach with what were essentially Cold War assets and a mindset fundamentally dominated by the inability to think strategically. This paper is split into two sections. The first section discusses the 1991-2001 timeframe and the second section covers the period from 2001-2014. 2001 marked the inauguration of President George W. Bush in January and the terrorist attacks on September 11 eight months later. Each section looks at the strategic developments of the U.S. Navy and the German Navy, their major naval operations, and some areas of cooperation between the two navies in Eurasia...
Topic:
Security, Cold War, History, Military Strategy, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

168. The Bypass: Ahmad Chalabi, Dick Cheney and the Disbanding of the Iraqi Army

Author:
Michael Wackenreuter
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
On March 12, 2003, a week before the invasion of Iraq, a Principals Committee meeting of the National Security Council was held at the White House to formally decide the fate of the Iraqi Army.[1] The participants, having all received extensive briefings on the subject prior to meeting, voted unanimously and with little discussion that after disbanding the Republican Guard, the “regular soldiers” of the Iraqi Army would be called “back to duty.”[2] In spite of this decision, on May 23, 2003, L. Paul Bremer III—President Bush’s “special envoy” in Iraq—announced Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 2, “Dissolution of Entities.” Among the relevant entities to be dissolved by the decree was the Iraqi Army.[3] In an interview with the journalist Robert Draper at the end of his presidency, President Bush commented on this apparent dissonance when he remarked, “The policy was to keep the army intact; didn’t happen.” When asked further of his reaction when he found out about the decree, Bush replied, “Yeah, I can’t remember, I’m sure I said, ‘This is the policy, what happened?’”[4] Having endured significant criticism over CPA Order No. 2, Mr. Bremer was quick to defend himself, providing letters to The New York Times to and from the president “in order to refute the suggestion in Mr. Bush’s comment that Mr. Bremer had acted to disband the army without the knowledge and concurrence of the White House.”[5] Such a puzzling exchange over such an important topic serves to illustrate a larger point. That is, despite its centrality to America’s involvement in Iraq, from the emergence of the insurgency onward to its current conflict with ISIS, it still remains unclear how and why the decision to disband the Iraqi Army was made. In this paper, I demonstrate that the impetus for CPA Order No. 2 came from the prominent Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi, and was carried out under the authority of Vice President Richard “Dick” Cheney by a small group of Chalabi’s supporters in the Office of the Vice President and the Pentagon. I do so first by establishing the lengths to which those in the vice president’s office, in concert with like-minded officials at the Defense Department, were willing to go in order to support Chalabi, who favored disbanding the army. Secondly, I identify the striking similarities between the events surrounding the order and other instances involving the vice president that involved a bypass of the normal interagency policy-making process...
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, History, Army, Baath Party, and Iraq War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

169. The Role of Special Operations Forces in a Sustainable U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy: Moving Beyond Kinetic Targeting in the Future Operating Environment

Author:
Anthony Gilgis
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
For the past two decades, the United States military and the national security apparatus have focused their energy and capabilities on confronting Islamic terrorism as a kinetic target. Much of U.S. counterterrorism policy today consists of lethal raids and unmanned aerial vehicle strikes against targeted individuals. The U.S. government has come to rely heavily on the Special Operations Forces (USSOF) in particular for lethal raids, also termed “Direct Action” assaults, one of the ten “Core Activities” that Title X identifies for USSOF. Unfortunately, Direct Action has come to overshadow the broad array of missions that USSOF was originally intended to conduct. Unconventional Warfare, for example, is a core USSOF mission intended to prevent radical ideology from taking root in a society with a range of activities to build local good will towards friendly forces and animosity towards extremists. The U.S. can more effectively incorporate USSOF into a “whole-of-government” approach to counterterrorism by refocusing attention on non-kinetic, counter-ideology operations. To move beyond the recognized battlefields of the past decade, U.S. officials must embrace a multidimensional operating environment that requires simultaneous focus along multiple lines of effort. Future warfare will include complex, adaptive systems of ideology, economy, physical infrastructure, governance, and energy — which cannot be defeated through kinetic operations alone. The USSOF will need to transform its operations accordingly. During the last two decades of the twentieth century, a paradigm shift occurred in the realm of transnational terrorism and how nations responded to it. Shifting away from a focus on political goals, transnational terrorist groups began using religion as a motivating factor — both in their operations and in their recruitment. This new form of terrorism required a shift in response from the international community. It took the West almost a decade to recognize this shift and adjust its response to the emergent threat. Following 9/11, the United States fully engaged Special Operations Forces and paramilitary elements to actively counter this new religious ideology. SOF and paramilitary units were tasked to conduct raids against members of radical extremist groups. However, after almost 15 years of continuous warfare, the U.S. has arguably experienced limited success with its counterterrorism efforts as groups continue to conduct attacks and grow, gaining notoriety and establishing affiliated movements around the globe. Kinetic actions have created an entire generation of potential radicals who are victims of our counterterrorism “successes.” Populations sensitive to radicalization are also vulnerable to state-level terror in the form of unexpected and unpredictable military strikes. The battle against terrorism to date leaves the question, “As the United States looks to the future operating environment, can the Special Operations community find a more effective method to counter the ideology that creates the modern Islamic terrorist?” Since 2001, the West has increasingly focused on lethal targeting of individuals within religious-based extremist organizations. This method of conducting kinetic operations — either through direct action assaults by military or paramilitary units, or through the use of missile strikes from aerial platforms — has become the public face of the United States counter-terrorism effort. While the United States military has arguably raised man-hunting of individuals from an imprecise task to a methodical science, targeted lethal actions are nonetheless perceived as little more than indiscriminate state-level terror within the populations in which the operations are conducted. Looking to the future operating environment, the current policy of countering terrorist actions with targeted killing is unlikely to sway the underlying ideology in Americans’ favor. As such, it is necessary to develop a sustainable counterterrorism strategy that considers the human domain of local opinion as the future battlefield. The Special Operations Forces of the U.S. military will play a central role in any long-term strategy to counter violent extremist organizations; they are specifically designed to create a counter-ideology within the scope of unconventional warfare. Before looking at the role of U.S. Special Operation Forces within this emerging strategy, an understanding of the changing nature of warfare within a complex environment is necessary. Moving forward in the concept of developing a long-term counterterrorism strategy beyond the use of kinetic operations, we must understand that Islamic extremism is rooted in an ideology the West has displayed overt ignorance of and has been unprepared to counter. As stated by Patrick Sookhdeo, “Equally damaging has been the desire for a quick-fix and the reluctance to engage in a long-term struggle against the ideological struggle that nourishes and promotes Islamist terrorism.”
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Special Operations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

170. When War is Not Worth Winning

Author:
Matthew Testerman
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Winning a war requires the capacity to wage a war and an understanding of an end-state that equates to winning. These fundamental concepts, however, are not well defined. This essay draws from recent historical examples, contemporaneous strategy documents, and formal game theory to provide some additional degree of conceptual clarity that will enhance the debate about winning without war. In the past two decades, the U.S. has developed a demonstrated capacity to win with war. Victory in kinetic war fighting is nearly assured and can be accomplished with limited cost. Despite this, in the modern context, war has evolved to the point that war is not worth winning. It is far from the case that there are no wars to be fought, but the political and economic constraints of the international system have transformed the environment in which the U.S. operates militarily. Evidence of this is found in the strategic outlook of the U.S. military as documented in the revised U.S. naval strategy, especially when compared to earlier maritime strategy. To inform this discussion, game theoretic explanations of strategic interactions are helpful. The assumptions underlying recent U.S. naval strategy can be understood by applying the basic construct of a “game of strategic entry." Applying this construct, one finds that war is not worth winning– a conclusion that has substantive consequences for designing, organizing, and employing naval forces.
Topic:
Security, War, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Iraq War
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America