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151. MENA’s Frozen Conflicts

Author:
Marc Lynch
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Abstract:
Over the last year, the MENA region’s simmering conflicts have seemed frozen in place. The internationally-fueled civil wars in Syria, Yemen and Libya have long since settled into an equilibrium in which no side can either truly win or truly lose. Those conflicts have been held in place in part by local ecologies and war economies and in part by the competitive interventions by regional and international powers on behalf of their proxies and clients. But are these conflicts truly frozen? What does viewing them through such a lens gain, and what are the theoretical and analytical costs? To explore these questions, POMEPS convened a virtual research workshop on September 25, 2020, with scholars from diverse empirical and theoretical backgrounds.
Topic:
Security, Civil War, Politics, Citizenship, Military Intervention, Conflict, Syrian War, Mental Health, Crisis Management, Peace, Justice, Capital, and Mobilization
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Libya, Yemen, North Africa, Lebanon, Syria, and United States of America

152. Joe Biden’s US Election Victory in the Eyes of Egyptians

Author:
Michael Barak
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In this issue of Beehive, Michael Barak analyzes the reactions in the social media to the election of Joe Biden to the US Presidency among supporters and opponents of the Egyptian regime, including exiled dissidents. The growing probability of Joe Biden victory during the election week gained widespread attention on social media among Egyptian citizens and exiled dissidents. While al-Sisi’s supporters responded coldly, expressing concern about the tightening of the new administration’s policy towards the Egyptian regime, Egyptian exiled dissidents showed mixed feelings. On the one hand, there are those who express optimism, joy, and anticipation for a change of the American policy that they criticize for being sympathetic to the Egyptian regime. On the other hand, there are those who seek to cool the sense of euphoria, arguing that the American presidency does not intend to change its sympathetic attitude towards its traditional allies. Yet, some of the Egyptian exiled dissidents believe that this is the right time to erode the power of the Egyptian regime.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, and Social Media
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, Egypt, and United States of America

153. The Best and Worst States for Women: The US Women, Peace and Security Index 2020

Author:
Peace and Security (GIWPS) Georgetown Institute for Women
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:
The US WPS Index offers the most comprehensive measurement of women’s rights and opportunities across 50 states and the District of Columbia. It goes beyond women’s inclusion in the economy and politics to capture key aspects of justice and legal protections, as well as women’s security against violence in their homes and in their communities.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Law, Women, Economy, Violence, Justice, Inclusion, and Gender
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

154. 2020 Report on American Attitudes Toward the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Troy Stangarone and Juni Kim
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
KEI’s 2020 Report on American Attitudes Toward the Korean Peninsula focuses on U.S. views on relations with South Korea, U.S. awareness of South Korean brands and cultural products, and views on North Korea and was conducted by YouGov. The results reveal that while Americans have a favorable view of South Korea and about half are supportive of maintaining U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula, few Americans watched or listened to Korean cultural products in the last year. Americans also view North Korea as one of the three critical challenges for the United States, but fewer than 1-in-3 approve of the administration’s handling of North Korea.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Human Rights, Politics, Culture, Public Opinion, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:
North America, Korean Peninsula, and United States of America

155. Is the “show-the-flag” strategy relevant for Visegrad countries in securing the EU?

Author:
Hana N. Hlaváčková
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The European security environment has changed and the EU has become more independent in its security policy. New threats faced by the EU in 2014 (the migration crises) and other remaining threats (such as terrorism, organised crime, piracy) need solving by its greater involvement in the region. One problem that the EU tries to solve is the inconsistency of member states in security issues. In this article, we focus on the V4 group and their opinions towards EU security. This article examines strategies adopted by small/new EU member states to protect European borders and European territories and regions outside the EU that affect their security. For a long time, the V4 countries only participated sporadically in EU missions. The article shows what changes took place and what were the reasons for the decision to participate or not in the EU activities. The article raises the question of whether the showthe-flag strategy adopted by the V4 countries and their participation in EU missions is relevant for ensuring European security nowadays.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Politics, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and United States of America

156. Central Europe in the new Millennium: The new Great Game?

Author:
Šárka Waisová
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
After the fall of communism, Central Europe (CE) was a region with relatively high US interest and support. Washington supported the NATO membership of CE countries, provided financial as well as technical assistance to the region and several American high-positioned political representatives visited the region. However, during the last few years, it is evident that CE is a space where the Russian and Chinese presence and influence have been risen. The present article analyses several questions aiming to scrutinize the Russian and Chinese presence and activities in CE, particularly, when and how Russia and China penetrated into CE, what are the consequences of the rising Russian and Chinese influence and who are the supporters and opponents of Moscow and Beijing in CE. The article concludes that, the main competing actors in CE are Washington and Russia, while China profits from the US-Russia clash. While the US and Russian interests are dominat in security and political issues, China aims to penetrate CE economics.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Economics, Politics, and Influence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Europe, and United States of America

157. The Election Official’s Handbook: Six steps local officials can take to safeguard America’s election systems

Author:
David Levine
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies warn that Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign actors will seek to interfere in the 2020 presidential election.1 Foreign actors are increasingly sophisticated at using cyber tools and social media to probe and penetrate electoral infrastructure, manipulate public opinion, and cast doubt on the integrity of the election process. On one hand, the United States is better prepared to address these threats now than during the 2016 presidential election. For example, after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated election systems as critical infrastructure in 2017, it established the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which enabled states and localities to more easily share information about threats to elections. This mechanism has had the additional benefit of making DHS better at helping states manage risks, as well as distributing information from the federal government to the states about possible threats.2 On the other hand, in many states there are still vulnerabilities in election infrastructure that foreign actors can exploit. These vulnerabilities exist at almost every step of the election administration process, including registering voters, verifying their registration at polling places, securing the devices that capture and tally the vote, transmitting that data to a central location on election night, and executing an accurate recount.3 While states usually make decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking),4 localities are typically responsible for the “nuts and bolts” of running an election — such as finding polling places and recruiting poll workers.5 Local election officials also help preserve the integrity of America’s elections by protecting against hacks into voter rolls and local election websites and working closely with federal and state officials to ensure the security of their voting systems.6 As the February 3, 2020 Iowa Democratic caucuses demonstrated, such vulnerabilities are not merely theoretical. During the caucuses — which were administered by political party officials, not election officials — the new app that the Iowa Democratic Party planned to use to report its caucus results did not work. Many of the nearly 1,700 precinct chairs who were responsible for transmitting the results did not receive training on how to use the app, and a large number appear to have been unable to successfully download it.7 Revisions and updates to the app were made as late as two days before the caucuses, making it nearly impossible to vet and test adequately.8 Although the federal government recently agreed to allocate an additional $425 million in election administration and security funds to state election offices,9 federal resources will likely be insufficient to address all outstanding vulnerabilities before the 2020 presidential election. It is also unclear how much of this funding will be distributed to local elections officials in time for the 2020 presidential election. This handbook, therefore, provides a list of steps that local election officials can implement at relatively little cost to fortify their elections systems before the 2020 presidential election.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, North America, and United States of America

158. October Surprise: Simulating a Foreign Interference Crisis on the Eve of the 2020 Election

Author:
Nathan Kohlenberg
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The United States, like many other democracies, faces concerted and sophisticated operations aimed at disrupting, delegitimizing, and in some cases altering the outcomes of its elections. While foreign interference operations are not bound by election cycles, elections constitute a unique window of increased vulnerability. To better understand how well U.S. institutions have adapted since the 2016 election, the Alliance for Securing Democracy conducted a table-top exercise to assess potential gaps in policies and practices by government, social media platforms, and campaigns. The exercise also considered the options, challenges, and trade-offs that politicians, policymakers, and corporate officers might face in the days leading up to the 2020 election. The exercise was conducted virtually in July 2020 with a bipartisan group of 14 experts representing senior government, political organizing, and technology industry leaders. The results were clear: information sharing stalled, lines of communication were lacking, and distrust was rampant. Parochial interests and the mitigation of personal and organizational risk often took priority over national interests. Meanwhile, many leaders struggled to gather the information they needed to commit to a course of action. Although a simulation can never capture the complexity of the systems and relationships it aims to approximate, this exercise underscores that there is work to be done to improve resilience in all three sectors analyzed: the U.S. government, professional politics, and the technology sector. Many shortcomings were immediately apparent to the experts who participated, while others became evident in the after-action analysis. Working with the participants and other experts on election interference, we have summarized in this report a number of lessons learned from the exercise in order to spotlight recent progress and remaining challenges. Our simulation strongly suggested that current policies and structures are insufficient to facilitate the cooperation between stakeholders that would be necessary to mitigate a sophisticated information operation targeting the election. In particular, our participants concluded that response mechanisms remained troublingly dependent on the personal integrity of decisionmakers in Washington and Silicon Valley, and current government and social media policies are insufficiently precise and unambiguous to provide clear guidance in many situations, especially as relate to privacy and First Amendment concerns. Nevertheless, the particular course of the exercise and approaches taken by the participants also shed light on what can be done to build greater responsiveness into the range of public and private institutions responsible for ensuring the integrity of our elections.
Topic:
National Security, Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
United States of America

159. Britain's No-Deal Debacle? The Costs at Home and Likely Setbacks Abroad

Author:
John Ryan
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
For much of the past four years, and increasingly in the past few months, the United Kingdom has drifted in the direction of a No-Deal Brexit. In this Strategic Update, John Ryan explores the economic and political consequences for the United Kingdom of such a situation, as well as the domestic factors in Ireland and the United States that may provide unanticipated problems for the Johnson government.
Topic:
Economics, Government, Politics, Brexit, and Trade
Political Geography:
Britain, United Kingdom, Europe, Ireland, and United States of America

160. Battleground Southeast Asia: China's Rise and America's Options

Author:
Charles Dunst
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Southeast Asia, while still a reservoir of goodwill for the US, has in recent years come increasingly under China's umbrella. In this Strategic Update, Charles Dunst analyzes China's expansion there, discusses Southeast Asians' American predeliction, and offers steps the US can take to "win back" the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, International Affairs, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Southeast Asia, and United States of America