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1. Origins and Outcomes of U S Defense Policy Toward Israel with Josh Paul

Author:
Josh Paul
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:
The United States describes its commitment to support Israel as “iron clad” to the extent that our nation is providing diplomatic and military support while Israel conducts what the ICJ has described as a “plausible genocide” in Gaza. Former U.S. State Department official, Josh Paul, will examine how U.S. security and defense policy undermines American interests abroad and its most fundamental values at home.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Genocide, Strategic Interests, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, North America, and United States of America

2. Freedom isn’t Free: A cost-benefit analysis of support for Ukraine

Author:
Bob Deen and Roman de Baedts
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
More than ten years after the Russian annexation of Crimea and two years after the large-scale invasion, Ukraine is still holding its own against Russia. This is not only due to the courage and efforts of the Ukrainians themselves, but also thanks to the extensive military, economic, and financial support packages from Europe and the US. For 2024, the government had allocated three billion euros for military support to Ukraine in the fight against Russian aggression and also pledged an additional three billion for 2025. Following the UK, France, and Germany, the Netherlands has entered into a ten-year security cooperation agreement with Ukraine to ensure long-term support. The recently released AIV briefing note and a recent parliamentary letter also advocate for sustained support. However, this Western support is no longer a certainty or uncontested. Particularly in the US, but also in some European NATO countries, calls to halt support to Ukraine are slowly gaining more traction. The American support package of sixty billion dollars was stuck in the House of Representatives for months, causing significant difficulties for the Ukrainian armed forces. President Biden has scaled back his rhetoric from “as long as it takes” to “as long as we can”. New commitments for new aid to Ukraine stalled at the end of 2023 (with a nearly ninety percent drop), while promised ammunition quantities fell far short. A warning from French President Macron that a Western military intervention should not be ruled out received little support from his foreign counterparts. Although the issue of Western ‘boots on the ground’ also requires further attention, it is not addressed within this memo, and ‘support’ encompasses both economic and material assistance, but without the deployment of Western troops in Ukraine. Following Putin’s ‘election victory’ in March, the Kremlin escalated its war rhetoric. Government officials are now openly discussing ‘war,’ whereas previously, using that word could land one in prison. This fits into the rhetoric where NATO, rather than Ukraine, is portrayed as the aggressor. Additionally, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced the formation of two new combined arms Army Corps and accelerated the recruitment of new military personnel. Meanwhile, the Russian war industry is gearing up, producing large quantities of ammunition and equipment for the Russian war effort. The extensive import of artillery ammunition from North Korea and drones from Iran, among other capabilities, further complements Russian stocks. The consequences on the battlefield are already noticeable, as seen in the loss of the city of Avdiivka in February, and developments along the front since. Meanwhile, pressure on Ukrainian troops at the front is mounting. In an interview at the end of March, President Zelensky stated that Ukraine will have to cede more land if Western material support continues to be lacking. The renewed Northern front after the second Russian Kharkiv offensive is likely to further stretch Ukrainian defences and resilience in the near future. Despite overwhelming support in the Dutch parliament for continued support for Ukraine, there are nonetheless questions about the duration and scope of future assistance. The question regarding the costs and benefits of providing political, economic, and military support by the Dutch government is extremely relevant in this context. This constitutes more than a simple calculation where profit or loss is expressed in Euros. It also involves security risks and geopolitical and moral costs and benefits that cannot always be quantified in one-dimensional figures. It is therefore essential to adopt a broader understanding of costs and benefits, reasoned from the perspective of Dutch national security interests and the impact of international support on the outcomes of the conflict. An important consideration here is the extent to which support for Ukraine contributes to a military victory, a military loss, or a protracted conflict.
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

3. No silver bullet: Aid is not a shortcut to victory for Ukraine

Author:
Michael DiMino
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Delayed or insufficient Western aid is often blamed for Ukraine’s lack of success on the battlefield. The truth is more complicated. There is no aid “silver bullet” for what ails Ukraine’s war effort. More aid alone is unlikely to make a decisive difference in the outcome of the war, especially if Ukraine’s structural disadvantages and strategic deficiencies remain unaddressed. More aid is unlikely to fundamentally change the conflict because Ukraine lacks the manpower necessary to use it to generate enough new combat power to retake lost territory. Moreover, the West does not currently possess the industrial capacity needed to fulsomely sustain an indefinite Ukrainian war effort. Russian adaptability and battlefield innovation have successfully blunted the effectiveness of several Western weapon systems. And Ukrainian doctrine and tactics remain suboptimal even in the third year of the war, meaning Kyiv has failed to employ the aid it does receive with maximal effectiveness. Neither Washington nor Kyiv has articulated a clear theory of victory for Ukraine. Western aid was always a stopgap to buy Ukraine time, not a regime-change project to bring about the dissolution of the Russian state. Instead of continuing to placate maximalist fantasies of total victory, the U.S. should advocate for a shift to a defensive strategy and openness to a negotiated settlement that ends the war, such that a sovereign and independent Ukrainian state can be preserved in the face of fighting to collapse.
Topic:
Weapons, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

4. A defensive approach to Ukraine military aid

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The next administration is likely to continue U.S. military aid to Ukraine to some degree, yet thus far decisions about what aid to provide have been reactive and not connected to any strategy. The United States should use its military aid to push Ukraine to adopt a defensive strategy that will be more sustainable for the Ukrainians given manpower shortfalls and more responsible and fiscally feasible for the United States, while also reducing the risk of Russian escalation. This would be in line with America’s priorities in Ukraine, including preventing a Russian victory and preserving a sovereign Ukraine at lowest possible cost and without direct involvement in the war. This strategy would also put Ukraine in a good position for a settlement that trades some land for a ceasefire and supports Ukraine’s longer-term defense. A Ukraine aid framework centered on a defensive strategy would see the U.S. provide air defense, anti-tank mines, the material and equipment to build fortifications, short-range artillery and limited short-range missile variants, small uncrewed aerial systems, and some armored vehicles for transport. In many cases, however, quantities would be limited by the needs of U.S. forces or other U.S. partners. The U.S. would not provide most types of aircraft, long-range missiles, tanks, or other weapon systems that are primarily offensive in nature and could cross a redline for Vladimir Putin.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Weapons, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

5. Wars and elections: How European leaders can maintain public support for Ukraine

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
As Russia’s war on Ukraine approaches its second anniversary, the European Parliament and US presidential elections are also on the horizon. Against this backdrop, Vladimir Putin is banking on war fatigue in the West to help achieve a Russian victory. European public opinion can inform Europe’s leaders about how best to make the case to continue support for Ukraine in this difficult environment. Europeans seem pessimistic about Ukraine’s chances of winning the war, while a plurality think it will end in some kind of settlement. But most Europeans are not in the mood for appeasement either. They would be disappointed if Donald Trump were to be re-elected, and many believe his victory could also be a win for Putin. In most member states, a plurality would want Europe to maintain its current support or increase it in the event of the US scaling down its aid. Leaders in Ukraine and Europe need to adjust their language and define the meaning of a ‘durable peace’ to prevent Putin taking advantage of war fatigue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

6. The Role of America’s European Allies in the Russia-Ukraine War, 2022–24

Author:
John R. Deni and Lisa A. Aronsson
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
What more can US allies in Europe do to assist Ukraine militarily? More broadly, what can the United States expect from its closest allies in Europe in strategic competition with Russia and China? In this monograph, John R. Deni and Lisa A. Aronsson assess whether US allies and partners in Europe can continue providing military assistance to Ukraine or expand assistance, while preserving their own national security and fulfilling their NATO commitments. They also explore what the Russia-Ukraine War reveals about the role of European allies in future iterations of strategic competition. Their findings indicate European allies remain firmly in support of assisting Ukraine politically, even if the reasons for allied support vary across Europe. Despite agreeing support is necessary, European allies face several hurdles on the path toward scaling up military assistance to Ukraine. The reasons for the hurdles vary, and some exceptions exist, but Deni and Aronsson find without continued, sustained US engagement, leadership, and presence in Europe, Washington may find itself with few European allies by its side. To facilitate and sustain continued success in transatlantic burden sharing, the authors provide several practical recommendations for US policymakers to consider.
Topic:
NATO, Military Aid, Allies, Russia-Ukraine War, Security Cooperation, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

7. Cluster Bombs: What is the potential impact of American weapons on Ukraine’s counteroffensive?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The US Department of Defense officially announced on July 7, 2023, that the US would provide cluster bombs to Ukraine as part of a new military assistance package to support Kyiv in its counteroffensive against Russia. Cluster munitions are weapons that consist of a container that opens in mid-air to scatter up to 600 explosive submunitions or bomblets over a wide area. Most of these weapons are known for their lack of precision guidance, meaning they are not individually directed toward specific targets. Estimates suggest that these weapons' failure rate (dud rate) during conflicts ranges from 10% to 40%, posing a significant risk to civilians, especially because they can explode later upon contact or movement.
Topic:
Weapons, Military Aid, Russia-Ukraine War, and Cluster Bombs
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

8. A Surprising Shift: Is Somalia choosing Moscow over Washington?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Somali Foreign Minister Abshir Omar Jama made a surprise visit to Moscow on May 26, 2023, to meet with several Russian officials, including his counterpart Sergey Lavrov. His visit raised several questions regarding motives and implications, particularly in light of the Russian top diplomat’s statements about Russia’s readiness to supply Mogadishu with the necessary military equipment for its ongoing war against the terrorist group Al-Shabaab.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Engagement, Al-Shabaab, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Somalia, and United States of America

9. The Ukraine War & European Security: How Durable Is America’s Strategy?

Author:
Zachary Paikin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
More than a year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the morale of the United States and its Western allies appears high.1 Spurred into action by Moscow’s act of aggression, NATO appears more united, the EU has seemingly become more of a geopolitical actor, and Ukraine has resisted and repulsed the Russian onslaught to a degree that few initially thought possible. The Biden administration has thus far laudably managed to ramp up assistance to Kyiv without directly confronting Moscow. However, while the current U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine may be sustainable for some time, that does not mean it will never run out of road. Sanctions against Russia — a major global economy — have been ramped up to a level previously unseen, but they have not been effective in compelling Moscow to change course. The United States and its allies have yet to agree on what they deem to be an acceptable endgame to the war. Great power or not, Russia will remain a populous, powerful and potentially disruptive actor in Europe. Without clearly and credibly proposing policies that can lower the temperature, and without beginning to envisage what a future European security order might look like, the United States risks prolonging the conflict — with potentially unforeseeable consequences if popular war–weariness continues to grow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, Strategy, Military Aid, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

10. Less is More: A New Strategy for US Security Assistance to Africa

Author:
Elizabeth Shackelford, Ethan Kessler, and Emma Sanderson
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
The US strategy toward Africa today is neither effective nor sustainable. It’s time to flip the script. US policy in Africa has for too long prioritized short-term security to the detriment of long-term stability by prioritizing the provision of military and security assistance. This is done in hopes that partner countries will use this capacity to suppress radical groups at home and reduce the likelihood that they will spread disorder in the region or create threats to US interests at home and abroad. Yet, this strategy has neither produced security in Africa nor reduced threats to the United States and its interests. Washington should rein in its use of security assistance with partners that fail to demonstrate commitment to the reforms necessary to build long-term stability. Partnerships and military assistance with illiberal, undemocratic countries have delivered little, if any, sustainable security improvements, and in many cases have prompted further instability and violence by building the capacity of abusive security forces. They have also provided harmful associations between the US government and the abuses committed by those we arm and assist. Since terrorism in Africa poses a low threat to US national security interests, there is no justification for focusing on short-term security issues at the cost of good governance, rule of law, and other factors that contribute to long-term stability. The costs of doing so are increasingly being recognized, with Congress today more likely to apply existing legal provisions to end security cooperation with abusive regimes. But these interventions typically come too late and are too inconsistent to influence behavior of illiberal regimes. A more systemic approach is needed to break the pattern of poor outcomes. The rise of great-power competition exacerbates the risk that the US national security establishment will double down on its security cooperation strategy in the region out of concern that doing otherwise would leave a vacuum that America’s competitors might fill. In reality, however, the argument for being more selective in distributing security assistance is even stronger with the return of great-power competition, as values and reputation become increasingly important in attracting support for the United States over other great powers. Security and military assistance will continue to play a role in the region. However, the United States would be better off being more deliberate and cautious, only pursuing it after completing a holistic assessment of the potential impact of such assistance on governance, human rights, and broader stability. Security assistance can and must be more closely scrutinized with enhanced US government oversight tools to ensure it does not undermine governance and stability, and Washington should be more willing to choose different tools when shaping relationships with weak partners, to condition assistance to ensure it does not facilitate bad outcomes, and to cut it off when partner countries use it to abuse civilians.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America