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51. The Limits of Victory: Evaluating the Employment of Military Power

Author:
Michael H. Levine
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
On November 28, 1984, then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger appeared before the National Press Club in Washington, DC, to deliver a speech titled “The Uses of Military Power.” The previous year had brought mixed results in the deployment of U.S. combat troops overseas. An invasion of the small West Indies country of Grenada wrested regime control from the one-party socialist People’s Revolutionary Government in favor of a relatively stable democracy. In Lebanon, however, the bombing of a Marine Corps barracks complex in Beirut killed 305 troops and civilians, including 241 Americans, and led to the withdrawal of the multinational peacekeeping force months later. Perhaps most central to Secretary Weinberger’s speech was the Vietnam War, an event that two decades later still struck deep into the institutional fabric of the U.S. military. The Secretary argued that combat forces should be deployed resolutely with “the sole object of winning” in cases where vital national interests are at stake.1 Moreover, the use of force must meet six criteria: vital national interests, wholehearted commitment, clearly defined political and military objectives, congruent ends and means, domestic support, and last resort. Seven years later, many viewed the U.S. triumph in the Gulf War as a vindication of this doctrine. Today, this way of thinking is known as the Powell Doctrine, in reference to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, President George H.W. Bush gleefully declared, “By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.”2
Topic:
Defense Policy, History, Armed Forces, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

52. The 21st Century's Great Military Rivalry

Author:
Graham Allison and Jonah Glick-Unterman
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
A quarter-century ago, China conducted what it called “missile tests” bracketing the island of Taiwan to deter it from a move toward independence by demonstrating that China could cut Taiwan’s ocean lifelines. In response, in a show of superiority that forced China to back down, the United States deployed two aircraft carriers to Taiwan’s adjacent waters. If China were to repeat the same missile tests today, it is highly unlikely that the United States would respond as it did in 1996. If U.S. carriers moved that close to the Chinese mainland now, they could be sunk by the DF-21 and DF-26 missiles that China has since developed and deployed. This article presents three major theses concerning the military rivalry between China and the United States in this century. First, the era of U.S. military primacy is over: dead, buried, and gone—except in the minds of some political leaders and policy analysts who have not examined the hard facts.1 As former Secretary of Defense James Mattis put it starkly in his 2018 National Defense Strategy, “For decades the United States has enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted.”2 But that was then. “Today,” Mattis warned, “every domain is contested—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.”3 As a result, in the past two decades, the United States has been forced to retreat from a strategy based on primacy and dominance to one of deterrence. As President Joe Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and his National Security Council colleague Kurt Campbell acknowledged in 2019, “The United States must accept that military primacy will be difficult to restore, given the reach of China’s weapons, and instead focus on deterring China from interfering with its freedom of maneuver and from physically coercing U.S. allies and partners.”4 One of the architects of the Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy put it less diplomatically and more succinctly: “The era of untrammeled U.S. military superiority is over.”5
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and United States of America

53. Phantom Empire: The Illusionary Nature of U.S. Military Power

Author:
Richard Hanania
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The U.S. has become a “Phantom Empire,” a country that appears to be powerful because it has a robust military presence abroad but cannot use garrisoned forces to achieve geopolitical objectives. More than 225,000 U.S. troops and DoD personnel are stationed abroad in more than 150 countries. The largest deployments are to wealthy U.S. allies (Japan, Germany, and South Korea) capable of defending themselves. U.S. leaders often justify military commitments by arguing they preserve “influence.” But because American leaders are committed, in most cases, to maintaining troops abroad as a good in and of itself, the U.S. squanders most of its leverage to influence hosts. Threats to withdraw troops are not credible, making them irrelevant for most U.S. geopolitical goals. The sources of U.S. power and influence are ultimately rooted in economic prosperity and soft power. A foreign policy that cultivates these sources of strength over maintaining military commitments would better achieve U.S. geopolitical goals.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Soft Power, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

54. Redefining the U.S.-Turkey Relationship

Author:
Sinan Ülgen
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
At present, the relationship between Turkey and the United States is in a deep crisis. The meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the margin of the June 2021 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Brussels raised expectations that the U.S.-Turkey relationship can be put back on track. And yet recovery from the present crisis is uncertain, as the underlying factors that previously shaped the relationship have changed. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a more multipolar system have altered the nature of U.S.-Turkey engagement. In Washington, competition between global powers is now the overriding frame for U.S. foreign policy. Ankara, however, views the world very differently. The rise of Asia and the ascendancy of China are seen more as opportunities than threats. Ankara interprets these trends, as well as Russia’s growing regional activism, as signs of the lasting emergence of a multipolar world order. This understanding now shapes the strategic calculus of Turkish policymakers. Turkish political elites firmly believe that a successful repositioning of their country in this multipolar environment will benefit the nation in the long run. This growing divergence in terms of how Ankara and Washington see the world creates a challenging environment for constructively addressing the range of prevailing bilateral disputes. This paper examines five main areas of disagreement between the two countries and explores how the two sides might overcome these differences. At the top of the list of current disagreements are Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 air and missile defense system from Russia and ongoing U.S. support for Syria’s Kurdish military and political factions. Also important are the consequences of the erosion of democratic norms in Turkey; the U.S. position on the self-exiled Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, who many in the Turkish government believe was the architect of the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016; the possible impact of the Halkbank court case on grounds of past violations of Iran sanctions; and the Biden administration’s decision to use the word “genocide” to refer to the killings and deportations of Ottoman Armenians during World War I. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Turkey-U.S. relationship is in need of redefinition. The Turkey-U.S. relationship has long been defined as a strategic alliance underwritten by NATO. Today, this definition has become obsolete and does not capture the new reality of this relationship. Turkey undoubtedly will remain a strong NATO ally, but its relationship with the United States will no longer be shaped by the power asymmetry of this military alliance. In other words, the reality of the United States being the main security provider will not be sufficient to override and contain the centrifugal trends that have shaped the relationship since the end of the Cold War and that have gained momentum in the past decade as a result of the growing divergences between Ankara and Washington. Yet differences with Turkey cannot be managed with the same clinical approach reserved for adversaries of the United States. Turkey is not an adversary, and therefore, a categorical separation of areas of agreement and cooperation from areas of disagreement is unrealistic. Unlike in the case of the United States and its true adversaries, the perpetuation of areas of dispute will always hinder the scope of U.S. collaboration with Turkey. The underlying alliance relationship has a built-in expectation of solidarity and mutual trust. Without these values, the bilateral relationship cannot function effectively. Neither will the “grand bargain” approach favored by Ankara be successful. Turkey wants a diplomatic process with the United States that would involve deliberations on all the disputed areas in a flexible manner. These deliberations could then lead to trade-offs that would create the conditions for a mutually beneficial reset. Ankara could also showcase its flexibility provided that Washington demonstrates its willingness for compromise. And yet there is little interest in Washington in undertaking such an enterprise with the Erdoğan government. A scenario of gradual rapprochement as an alternative to the grand bargain championed by Turkey or the principled engagement currently favored by Washington can be promoted. The gradual rapprochement would entail a series of confidence-building actions. Positive areas of engagement could include future negotiations with Iran, the reconstruction of Syria, the normalization of Libya, the stabilization of governance reform in Afghanistan given Turkey’s interest to operate the Kabul airport even after the U.S. and NATO withdrawals, the countering of Russian aggressiveness (especially toward Ukraine), and collaboration in Africa to dampen the influence of China. The Turkey-U.S. relationship may in that sense be in acute need of gradual but concrete steps that over time will set a new tone for a more positive and constructive strategic partnership and reestablish mutual trust.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, Multipolarity, and Military
Political Geography:
Turkey, North America, United States of America, and Mediterranean

55. North Korea's Foreign Policy Towards South Korea and the U.S.

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In recent months, North Korea has intensified missile tests, while signalling the possibility of resuming talks with South Korea and the U.S. These signals of openness to dialogue indicate that North Korea wants the next South Korean president, who will be elected in March 2022, to be favourable to the inter-Korean dialogue. In turn, the demonstration of military capabilities serves to strengthen North Korea’s position ahead of possible negotiations with the U.S. to convince it to ease sanctions. The difficult domestic situation will not persuade North Korea to take a more conciliatory stance in the talks, however.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Dialogue, and Military
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

56. Hostile Harbors: Taiwan’s Ports and PLA Invasion Plans

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
The scale of an all-out Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) invasion by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) military—the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—defies human comprehension and would likely eclipse any historical comparison. In this important contribution to the field, Senior Director Ian Easton analyzes Chinese military studies frameworks and internal PLA documents to answer pressing questions that will help Taiwan and the United States both understand and better plan for potential crisis scenarios. He highlights the centrality of ROC port facilities—and Taiwan’s ability to defend them—in the PLA’s potential invasion plans for Taiwan, illustrating likely operational strategies explored by PLA leadership. In addition to postulating ports likely targeted in a PLA invasion, he provides recommendations that the Taiwanese government could undertake to ensure its port infrastructure security, as well as recommendations for the United States on how to be a supportive partner to Taiwan in that effort.
Topic:
Conflict, Port, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

57. Afghanistan: What Just Happened? What Comes Next?

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
in short order, a 20-year $1.2 trillion US effort at nation-building evaporated, disintegrated, went up in smoke. And while unreconstructed interventionists pummel President Biden for surrendering Afghanistan, the truth is that we never had it. What we held instead was a hollow construct of our own imagination and creation – a client pseudo-state. And when it was finally and fully tested, it (for the most part) threw down its arms and ran away. In a sense, the sudden collapse of Kabul’s government and security services provides the surest litmus test of America’s 20-year enterprise in Afghanistan. It tells us that coercive nation-building by a foreign power – indeed, an alien power – is an impossible mission. Outsiders lack the knowledge, indigenous roots, legitimacy, and degree of interest to succeed against local resistance. Their very presence is provocative, especially given differences of language, religion, and culture. It’s as likely to spur resistance as it is to quell it. At the same time, such interventions risk becoming intractable given domestic political dynamics and Washington’s fixation on preserving its superpower reputation, its claim to being the “indispensable power”.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Taliban, Conflict, and Military
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

58. Beyond Forever Wars and Great Power Competition: Rethinking the U.S. Military Role in the Middle East

Author:
Michael Eisenstadt
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
To meet future security challenges, the United States will need to reassess how it deters adversaries and conducts security force assistance in the region, while becoming more proficient in gray zone operations and information activities. Addressing cultural factors and trends such as climate change will require solutions outside the traditional national security toolkit. In the ninth in a series of TRANSITION 2021 memos, Michael Eisenstadt describes how even with a reduced military footprint, the United States can secure its interests in the Middle East while better positioning itself on the global stage. Since taking office, the Biden administration has declared that it will right-size the U.S. military presence in the Middle East and end America’s involvement in the region’s costly “forever wars” in order to focus on Great Power competition. To meet future security challenges in the Middle East, however, the United States will need to rethink how it deters adversaries and conducts security force assistance, while becoming more proficient in gray zone operations and information activities. Simultaneously, to address the structural and cultural factors that produce regional instability, along with destabilizing trends such as climate change, the United States must look outside the traditional national security toolkit. “The challenge,” the author explains, “is to develop new strategies and operational approaches that employ the military and other instruments of national power in different, more economical, and more effective ways as the attention of policymakers and U.S. force deployments increasingly shift to the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.” TRANSITION 2021 memos by Washington Institute experts address the broad array of issues facing the Biden-Harris administration in the Middle East. These range from thematic issues, such as the region’s strategic position in the context of Great Power competition and how to most effectively elevate human rights and democracy in Middle East policy, to more discrete topics, from Arab-Israel peace diplomacy to Red Sea security to challenges and opportunities in northwest Africa. Taken as a whole, this series of memos will present a comprehensive approach for advancing U.S. interests in security and peace in this vital but volatile region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, National Security, Military, and Competition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

59. Accidental Allies: The US–Syrian Democratic Forces Partnership Against the Islamic State

Author:
Michael Knights and Wladimir van Wilgenburg
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
To some, America's partnership with the SDF exemplified an economy-of-force effort that minimized U.S. casualties and wrested control of northeast Syria from the Islamic State. To others, it was a cautionary tale about a U.S. military hoodwinked into working with a terrorist group. The story of America’s military and political partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces is a controversial one. To some, it is a shining example of an economy-of-force effort that minimized U.S. casualties, wrested control of northeast Syria from the Islamic State, and improved the area’s general political trajectory. To others, it is a cautionary tale of a U.S. military that was hoodwinked by a charismatic and capable partner closely tied to a U.S.-designated terrorist group, the Kurdistan Workers Party, with Washington deliberately averting its eyes from the strategic, political, and moral costs of the partnership. The subject deserves a neutral, data-led investigation that follows the facts wherever they lead. In this volume—copublished by The Washington Institute and I.B. Tauris—military expert Michael Knights and journalist Wladimir van Wilgenburg dive deep into the U.S. relationship with the SDF. The study benefited from intensive debates on sourcing, objectivity, and the need to probe uncomfortable issues. The findings cast light not only on the successes and shortcomings of this particular alliance, but also on how Washington might most profitably pursue “by, with, and through” operations with other forces in the future.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Terrorism, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and Military
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

60. A Vanishing West in the Middle East: The Recent History of U.S.-Europe Cooperation in the Region

Author:
Charles Thépaut
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
To encourage a new multilateralism, Europe will need to gain credibility on hard security matters, the United States will need to reimagine how it deals with allies, and both will need to figure out when to let Middle East countries handle Middle East problems. Since the end of the Cold War, developments in the Middle East have frequently caused tension between the United States and Europe, from the 2003 invasion of Iraq to the Arab uprisings of 2011 and Washington’s 2018 decision to exit the Iran nuclear deal. Today, the Biden administration is reasserting its desire to reduce America’s regional footprint, even as its predecessors struggled to realize a similar goal. At the same time, the United States and Europe share an interest in a stable Middle East where governments keep energy supplies steady and contain threats posed by jihadism and mass refugee flows. In this illuminating book—copublished by The Washington Institute and I.B. Tauris—French diplomat Charles Thépaut examines thirty years of transatlantic cooperation in the region and proposes a more manageable and effective path forward. To encourage a new multilateralism, he explains, Europe will need to gain credibility on hard security matters, the United States will need to reimagine how it deals with allies, and both parties will need to figure out when to step aside and let Middle East countries handle Middle East problems. "After a decade over which the Middle East was profoundly shaken and transformed, over which U.S. foreign policy toward this region went through various revisions, and over which the transatlantic bond risked serious erosion, this book offers serious answers to questions with a bearing on the future: Is there still one ‘West,’ at least in relation to an ‘East’? What remains of the strategic interest the Middle East represents for both America and Europe? Charles Thépaut’s unique position, as a French diplomat working on the Middle East from Washington DC, gives this work irreplaceable value."
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Multilateralism, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and United States of America