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31. Israel and the United States Did Not See the 1973 War Coming

Author:
Zaki Shalom
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Israel’s mistaken pre-war assumptions about the 1973 War caused it to fail to foresee the potential outbreak of a war with Egypt and Syria. What were these calculations based on and why did the United States follow suit? In early October 1973, Israeli intelligence agencies began to receive information regarding Egypt’s (and Syria’s) intention to launch a war against Israel in the coming days. The timing of the expected offensive was not yet known. Only in the early morning of October 6, 1973, would a highly reliable intelligence agent of the Mossad inform Israeli authorities that war would begin in the late afternoon hours. The exact time was not mentioned, but for one reason or another the Israelis believed the Egyptian military offensive would begin at 6:00 pm. Concurrently, Egypt began to deploy massive military power along the Suez Canal, very close to Israel’s military forces on the other side of the canal. The war broke out at 2:00 pm—four hours before the expected time.
Topic:
Intelligence, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Armed Conflict, Military, and 1973 War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Syria, Egypt, and United States of America

32. The Conventional Wisdom About the Chinese Military Challenge: Incomplete and Unpersuasive

Author:
Steven Kosiak
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Now possessing the world’s largest economy and backed up by an increasingly capable military, in recent years China has grown into an ever more significant and complex concern for the United States, its friends and allies, and others in the Indo–Pacific region. It has become not only stronger and more capable but, in a variety of areas, including the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits, more assertive. In this light, it is only prudent that the United States remain engaged in the region and, along with its allies, maintain robust military capabilities. At the same time, however, it is difficult to understand some of the main features of what has emerged as the conventional wisdom concerning the magnitude, scope and shape of the challenge China represents, particularly in its military dimensions. Among other things, shortcomings in the conventional wisdom include the unsettling degree to which mainstream assessments of the Chinese military challenge have: • devoted enormous attention to various Taiwan contingencies and, by comparison, remarkably little attention to the Chinese military’s capacity — or lack thereof — to directly conquer or coerce any of the major powers in the region; • equated defending Taiwan, and other relatively small nearby economies, with preventing Chinese regional hegemony, without providing significant analytical support for the presumption; • argued that Taiwan is defensible, in part because of the vulnerability of seaborne invasion forces to precision-guided munitions, as well as the difficulties inherent strategies aimed at punishing adversaries into submission (e.g., through bombardment or blockade) — while seeming to ignore the logical inferences of those conclusions for the defensibility of the major powers in the region, which are larger, economically stronger and generally located much farther from China; • analogized the challenge posed by China today to the threats posed by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in World War Two and the Soviet Union during the Cold War in ways that — because of differences in, among other things, geography, technology, nationalism, and China’s role in the global economy (including its great dependence on international trade) — may do more to obscure than illuminate the challenge. These analytical shortcomings need to be addressed through additional, more rigorous and better focused research and analysis. While clearly needed, however, it seems unlikely that this additional analysis will come close to fully redeeming the conventional wisdom about the Chinese military challenge as articulated today, including the necessity of some key components of the U.S. military’s existing force structure, modernization and other plans. Taken together, the gaps, weaknesses, blind spots, and analytical leaps upon which the conventional wisdom rests appear too pervasive and deep for such to be the case. Given this reality, rather than the current U.S. strategy, embracing something akin to the Active Denial strategy proposed by a Quincy Institute panel in 2022 would seem to represent a more prudent approach. 1 This strategy embraces some cuts to force structure — especially among ground forces — yielding significant budgetary savings. But it retrains robust air, naval and other forces that would leave the U.S. military with a powerful capacity to deter and, if need be, counter Chinese aggression in the Indo–Pacific and, specifically, to support key U.S. allies and friends in the region. And better addressing the areas noted above could go far towards facilitating the refinement of this more restrained strategy, and ensuring that it is both as effective as possible and can be supported at an affordable and sustainable price.
Topic:
Nationalism, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Influence, and Military
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, and United States of America

33. March of the Four–Stars: The Role of Retired Generals and Admirals in the Arms Industry

Author:
William D. Hartung
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The revolving door between the U.S. government and the arms industry, which involves hundreds of senior Pentagon officials and military officers every year, generates the appearance — and in some cases the reality — of conflicts of interest in the making of defense policy and in the shaping of the size and composition of the Pentagon budget. This report looks at the post–government employment records of a subset of the larger flow of “revolvers”: four–star generals and admirals who retired between June 2018 and July 2023. Among the findings are the following: 26 of 32 four–star officers who retired after June 2018 — over 80 percent — went to work for the arms industry as board members, advisors, executives, consultants, lobbyists, or members of financial institutions that invest in the defense sector. The biggest category of post–retirement employment for four–stars, by far, was as board members or advisors for small and medium–sized arms contractors, with 15 choosing that option. This compares to five who became board members, advisors or executives for one of the top 10 arms contractors. Five retired four–stars became arms industry consultants, five became lobbyists for weapons companies, and four joined financial firms that make significant investments in the defense sector. This brief recommends a number of measures designed to limit undue influence and potential conflicts of interest on the part of retired four–star generals and other retired Pentagon officials and military officers who pass through the revolving door. Bar four–star officers from working for firms that receive $1 billion or more in Pentagon contracts per year. Extend “cooling off” periods before retired Pentagon officials and military officers can go to work on behalf of the arms industry. Increase transparency over post–government employment and activities on the part of retired Pentagon and military officials working on behalf of arms contractors, including reporting on their interactions with Congress and the executive branch. The most comprehensive current proposal to address the revolving door issue is Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Department of Defense Ethics and Anti-Corruption Act. 1 The bill would encompass many of the recommendations put forward in this report.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Industry, Military, and Military-Industrial Complex
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

34. Who Is an Ally, and Why Does It Matter?

Author:
Natalie Armbruster and Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In addition to the 51 allies the United States is obligated by treaty to defend, it has a number of quasi-allies: states the United States is not committed to defend but to which it provides a substantial degree of military and political support. By creating uncertainty about U.S. commitments both at home and abroad, quasi-allies’ ambiguous status creates dangers for both the United States and the quasi-allies. For the United States, the danger is entanglement; having quasi-allies can pull the United States into trouble outside its core interests, creating needless cost, risk, and even war. Quasi-allies may suffer a kind of moral hazard; they may falsely believe they have U.S. military protection and fail to secure themselves sufficiently or become emboldened and dangerously provoke adversaries. U.S. leaders should be more wary of these dangers and avoid loose talk and policy acts that imply a commitment to non-allies’ defense.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Alliance, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

35. Rocket’s Red Glare: Modernizing America’s Energetics Enterprise

Author:
Nadia Schadlow, Brayden Helwig, Bryan Clark, and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Energetic materials are critical chemicals that release huge amounts of energy in a very short amount of time. Energetics come in three main forms: explosives, which create the lethal effects in warheads; propellants, which produce thrust for missiles and rockets; and pyrotechnics, such as fireworks, which illuminate or mark targets for military and civilian applications. Nearly every weapon on the modern battlefield, from small arms to missiles to munitions, relies on some form of energetic materials. Improvements in energetics can offer significant benefits on the battlefield. In some cases, better compounds can boost the range of missiles by 40 percent or more—allowing the targeting of an adversary from a safer distance—while also improving lethality and decreasing munition size. These advantages can help the US military realize many of its operational concepts, such as those developed to counter the People’s Republic of China (PRC). China’s armed forces, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), aims to prevent the US military from operating near its shores by fielding thousands of anti-ship missiles. This concept is often referred to as an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. If China’s leaders act on their stated intention to invade the island of Taiwan, denying the PLA this objective would require large numbers of long-range, precision-guided munitions fired from outside the A2/AD “bubble,” coupled with other platforms that could penetrate the PLA’s defenses with powerful munitions. These types of US responses depend on energetics and the munitions that use these compounds. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the industrial base for munitions has grown increasingly brittle as innovation and investments in energetics have stagnated. Although the United States developed key compounds like CL-20—one of the world’s most powerful non-nuclear explosives—in the late 1980s, the US military still overwhelmingly uses the same energetic materials it deployed during World War II.1 Moreover, recent assessments of the industrial base have found that the DoD imports roughly a third of its energetic materials from foreign sources, with a significant portion of these sourced from China or other countries.2 For instance, one expert we spoke with stated that most trinitrotoluene (TNT) in the explosive fill of common US bombs comes from foreign sources. Other challenges include an aging network of twentieth-century production facilities, a broken business model that discourages innovation and investment, a shrinking workforce, and stifling regulations.
Topic:
National Security, Weapons, Supply Chains, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

36. Enabling a More Externally Focused and Operational PLA – 2020 PLA Conference Papers

Author:
Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, David Brewster, Christopher Cairns, Roger Cliff, and R. Evan Ellis
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Although the People’s Liberation Army is not yet a global expeditionary force on par with the US military, the former has nevertheless significantly expanded its ability to operate abroad. Through enhanced technological capabilities, robust relationships with foreign militaries, increased access to overseas military bases and dual-use facilities, and the implementation of major structural reforms, the People’s Liberation Army has built a more integrated joint force capable of conducting a wider and more complex array of missions. This volume advances the understanding of the People’s Liberation Army’s capability to conduct overseas missions by examining China’s military relations with Europe, Africa, and Latin America; the country’s military activities in the Indian Ocean, polar regions, and Pacific Island countries; and the emerging roles of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force and the Joint Logistic Support Force. This volume finds the People’s Liberation Army is engaged in a wide range of activities throughout the world, including port calls, joint exercises, seminars, and personnel exchanges. China sells weapons to some parts of the world and seeks to acquire military and dual-use technology from others. In addition, the People’s Liberation Army seeks to increase its capability to operate in parts of the world, such as the Indian Ocean, Pacific Island countries, and polar regions, where the organization has only had a minimal presence in the past.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

37. MANAGING CONFLICT BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL RIVALS

Author:
Elizabeth Radziszewski and Jeremy Berkowitz
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Sweden’s and Finland’s recent decisions to join NATO marked a historic moment for the two Nordic states known for their neutrality. The move not only reflects evolving security concerns about Russia’s aggression in Ukraine but marks a shift that is set to end decades of accommodation toward Russia. It also sheds light on a broader question about why some rival countries—or those that have a history of tensions—sustain policies of accommodation over the years, and what pushes them to abandon such policies. Why would Sweden and Finland refrain from alienating Russia for years only to break suddenly with this tradition with their unprecedented decision to apply for NATO membership?
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Military, and Conflict Management
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Asia, Spain, North Africa, Sweden, Morocco, and United States of America

38. U.S.-China Technological “Decoupling”: A Strategy and Policy Framework

Author:
Jon Bateman
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A partial “decoupling”2 of U.S. and Chinese technology ecosystems is well underway. Beijing plays an active role in this process, as do other governments and private actors around the world. But the U.S. government has been a primary driver in recent years with its increased use of technology restrictions: export controls, divestment orders, licensing denials, visa bans, sanctions, tariffs, and the like. There is bipartisan support for at least some bolstering of U.S. tech controls, particularly for so-called strategic technologies, where Chinese advancement or influence could most threaten America’s national security and economic interests. But what exactly are these strategic technologies, and how hard should the U.S. government push to control them? Where is the responsible stopping point—the line beyond which technology restrictions aimed at China do more harm than good to America? These are vexing questions with few, if any, clear answers. Yet the United States cannot afford simply to muddle through technological decoupling, one of the most consequential global trends of the early twenty-first century. The U.S. technology base—foundational to national well-being and power—is thoroughly enmeshed with China in a larger, globe-spanning technological web. Cutting many strands of this web to reweave them into new patterns will be daunting and dangerous. Without a clear strategy, the U.S. government risks doing too little or—more likely—too much to curb technological interdependence with China. In particular, Washington may accidentally set in motion a chaotic, runaway decoupling that it cannot predict or control. Sharper thinking and more informed debates are needed to develop a coherent, durable strategy. Today, disparate U.S. objectives are frequently lumped together into amorphous constructs like “technology competition.” Familiar terms like “supply chain security” often fail to clarify such basic matters as which U.S. interests must be secured and why. Important decisions are siloed within opaque forums (like the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States [CFIUS]), narrow specialties (like export control law), or individual industries (like semiconductors), concealing the bigger picture. The traditional concerns of “tech policy” and “China policy” receive outsized attention, while second-order implications in other areas (such as climate policy) get short shrift. And as China discourse in the United States becomes more politically charged, arguments for preserving technology ties are increasingly muted or not voiced at all. This report aims to address these gaps and show how American leaders can navigate the vast, perilous, largely unmapped terrain of technological decoupling. First, it gives an overview of U.S. thinking and policy—describing how U.S. views on Chinese technology have evolved in recent years and explaining the many tools that Washington uses to curb U.S.- China technological interdependence. Second, it frames the major strategic choices facing U.S. leaders—summarizing three proposed strategies for technological decoupling and advocating a middle path that preserves and expands America’s options. Third, it translates this strategy into implementable policies and processes—proposing specific objectives for U.S. federal agencies and identifying the technology areas where government controls are (or are not) warranted. The report also highlights many domestic investments and other self-improvement measures that must go hand in hand with restrictive action.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Authoritarianism, Economy, Espionage, Military, and Interdependence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

39. Spring 2022 edition of Strategic Visions

Author:
Casey VanSise and Alan McPherson
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Strategic Visions
Institution:
Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy, Temple University
Abstract:
News from the Director . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Spring 2022 Colloquium . . . . . . . . 2 Columnist Trudy Rubin at CENFAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Spring 2022 Prizes . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 First CENFAD Emerging Scholar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Thanks to the Davis Fellow . . . . . . 4 News from the CENFAD Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Note from the Davis Fellow . . . . . . . . 9 CENFAD Community Interviews Dr. Robert “Bob” Vitalis . . . . . . . 11 Dr. Elizabeth R. Varon . . . . . . . . . 15 Dr. Matthew Specter . . . . . . . . . . 19 Dr. Miguel La Serna . . . . . . . . . . 25 Dr. Paul Adler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Short Essay: “The Stable Republic of Brazil,” by Dr. Philip Evanson . . . . . 35 Book Reviews Her Cold War: Women in the U.S. Military, 1945-1980, reviewed by Ariel Natalo-Lifton . . . . . . . . . . . 40 American Exceptionalism: A New History of an Old Idea, reviewed by Graydon Dennison . . . . . . . . . 46
Topic:
Economy, History, Interview, COVID-19, Strategic Interests, and Military
Political Geography:
Brazil, Global Focus, and United States of America

40. WILL NATO MILITARY EXERCISES DETER RUSSIAN EXPANSION?

Author:
Brian Blankenship
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
As concerns that Russia might try to seize additional territory from Ukraine have mounted in recent weeks, policymakers in the United States and NATO have considered how best to shore up the alliance and discourage a Russian offensive. These efforts are hardly new. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the NATO alliance has attempted to dissuade Russia from further attempts to encroach on the territory of neighboring countries. These attempts have included the creation of a “Very High Readiness Joint Task Force” capable of deploying to crisis areas within 72 hours, as well as the “Enhanced Forward Presence” consisting of four multinational battalions stationed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland on a rotational basis. Additionally, NATO members have conducted a variety of military exercises with members around the alliance’s eastern flank, as well as some with Ukraine itself.
Topic:
NATO, Deterrence, Vladimir Putin, Joe Biden, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, United States of America, and Baltic States