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231. Enough to Go Around? Money Matters Complicate U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia-Pacific

Author:
Leon Whyte and Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia – also known as the “Asia Pivot” – has been a cornerstone of the Obama administration’s foreign policy since 2011. Hillary Clinton offered a detailed explaination of the concept in a 2011 Foreign Policy article.[1] The basic idea behind the Rebalance is that many U.S. core economic and security interests are increasingly centered in the Asia-Pacific region, so the United States needs to allocate more diplomatic, economic, military, and other assets towards the region. The Strategic Rebalance would do just that. The Defence Strategic Guidance relaeased by the Defence Department in January 2012 made supporting the rebalance a key Pentagon objective. The Obama Administration accordingly plans to increase the percentage of naval assets in the Pacific to 60 percent by 2020[2] in addition to stationing 2,500 Marines in Darwin, Australia, and 4 littoral combat ships in Singapore.[3][4] Given the region’s economic importance, this makes sense. The Asia-Pacific region accounted for 40 percent of global economic growth in 2013. In 2012, the U.S. exports to the region totaled $555 billion, which supported 2.8 million U.S. jobs.[5]
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economy
Political Geography:
Asia-Pacific and United States of America

232. Roadmap for a Code of Conduct for Cyberspace

Author:
Thomas McCarthy and Alison Russell
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Professor Martel, author of Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy, offers three guiding principles for U.S. grand strategy: rebuilding domestic foundations of power; exercising American leadership to restrain sources of disorder that directly threaten U.S. vital interests; and forging both alliances and partnerships to confront the most pressing threats to global stability.[2] The last of Martel’s three principles foreshadows the three cyber security activities at the heart of the newly released U.S. Department of Defense Cyber Strategy. The three activities around which the new U.S. DoD cyber strategy revolves are: Information sharing and interagency coordination; building bridges to the private sector; and building alliances, coalitions, and partnerships abroad.[3] These three coordinating and collaborating activities are the key to building relationships between actors influencing the development of the cyber domain, and are necessary to identify and counter threats. To advance global cyber security, the Cyber Strategy suggests the U.S. must “build and maintain robust international alliances and partnerships to deter shared threats and increase international security and stability.”[4] As part of this effort, the United States seeks to build security relationships to respond to shifts in the international environment, including sources of disorder. These relationships are built upon trust and cooperation of many actors with varied interests and objectives in cyberspace. Given the wide variety of actors and interests within the cyber domain, establishing relationships of trust based on a shared understanding of acceptable conduct, expected behavior, and governing principles represents a daunting challenge...
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Cybersecurity, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

233. The Bypass: Ahmad Chalabi, Dick Cheney and the Disbanding of the Iraqi Army

Author:
Michael Wackenreuter
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
On March 12, 2003, a week before the invasion of Iraq, a Principals Committee meeting of the National Security Council was held at the White House to formally decide the fate of the Iraqi Army.[1] The participants, having all received extensive briefings on the subject prior to meeting, voted unanimously and with little discussion that after disbanding the Republican Guard, the “regular soldiers” of the Iraqi Army would be called “back to duty.”[2] In spite of this decision, on May 23, 2003, L. Paul Bremer III—President Bush’s “special envoy” in Iraq—announced Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 2, “Dissolution of Entities.” Among the relevant entities to be dissolved by the decree was the Iraqi Army.[3] In an interview with the journalist Robert Draper at the end of his presidency, President Bush commented on this apparent dissonance when he remarked, “The policy was to keep the army intact; didn’t happen.” When asked further of his reaction when he found out about the decree, Bush replied, “Yeah, I can’t remember, I’m sure I said, ‘This is the policy, what happened?’”[4] Having endured significant criticism over CPA Order No. 2, Mr. Bremer was quick to defend himself, providing letters to The New York Times to and from the president “in order to refute the suggestion in Mr. Bush’s comment that Mr. Bremer had acted to disband the army without the knowledge and concurrence of the White House.”[5] Such a puzzling exchange over such an important topic serves to illustrate a larger point. That is, despite its centrality to America’s involvement in Iraq, from the emergence of the insurgency onward to its current conflict with ISIS, it still remains unclear how and why the decision to disband the Iraqi Army was made. In this paper, I demonstrate that the impetus for CPA Order No. 2 came from the prominent Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi, and was carried out under the authority of Vice President Richard “Dick” Cheney by a small group of Chalabi’s supporters in the Office of the Vice President and the Pentagon. I do so first by establishing the lengths to which those in the vice president’s office, in concert with like-minded officials at the Defense Department, were willing to go in order to support Chalabi, who favored disbanding the army. Secondly, I identify the striking similarities between the events surrounding the order and other instances involving the vice president that involved a bypass of the normal interagency policy-making process...
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, History, Army, Baath Party, and Iraq War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

234. What a Real Liberal Foreign Policy Would Look Like

Author:
Jeffrey Lewis
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Chris Murphy, Brian Schatz, and Martin Heinrich — three Democratic members of Congress — have written an essay in Foreign Affairs titled, “Principles for a Progressive Foreign Policy.” It is, of course, predictably, terrible. My colleagues are already forming up. Being a good progressive, I can’t resist embroiling myself in the coming silliness. What really bothers me about the essay is that, despite the title, there are no “principles” to be found anywhere in the text. Just some well-worn clichés (a “new Marshall Plan”) and anodyne recommendations (consult with allies). The essay does not offer a principle that might distinguish those of us on the left from our friends on the right or a principle that might link our domestic and foreign policies. That’s a pretty important thing if we hope that future Democratic administrations will be able to articulate a strategy that amounts to more than “Don’t do stupid shit.” As it happens, I believe there are such principles — or at least there are for lapsed philosophers like me. My very American strand of liberalism — and I prefer the phrase “liberalism” to “progressivism,” given my choice in philosophers — is defined by the work of the late John Rawls. He argued that justice is the first virtue of social institutions, and his works, A Theory of Justice and “Justice as Fairness,” made arguments about what a just society should look like. One particular principle stands out. After articulating the importance of certain liberties that could not be compromised and the importance of equality of opportunity, Rawls asked how society should view inequality.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Inequality, Leadership, and Liberalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

235. ¿Una estrategia coherente para una región en cambio? La política exterior de la administración Obama y la Primavera Árabe

Author:
Juan Tovar Ruiz
Publication Date:
10-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
La política exterior de la Administración Obama se vio claramente marcada por los procesos de cambios producidos en el Próximo Oriente como consecuencia de la denominada Primavera Árabe. A la discusión previa existente sobre la existencia o no de una doctrina Obama se ha añadido el debate sobre cual puede ser su estrategia hacia una región que se ha convertido en el principal campo de batalla de los grupos ideológicos de la política exterior estadounidense: realistas, neoconservadores y liberales intervencionistas. La necesidad de equilibrar los intereses estratégicos y de seguridad estadounidenses con la promoción de valores como la democracia y los derechos humanos parece haber dado paso a un regreso a una estrategia realista, de intervención limitada, fundamentada en intereses estratégicos clave y en soluciones diferenciadas para diferentes contextos. La situación actual en escenarios como Siria o Irak, con todo, marcan importantes incertidumbres que deberán ser afrontadas a corto plazo.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Democracy, Arab Spring, Ideology, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

236. La relation Pakistan – Etats-Unis : un patron et son client au bord de la rupture ? (The Pakistan-US relations : A relationship on the brink ?)

Author:
Christophe Jaffrelot
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales
Abstract:
During the Cold War the US-Pakistan relationship was one in which the US considered Pakistan as a necessary part of its effort to contain communism in Asia while Pakistan considered its relationship with the US as strengthening its position vis a vis India. The high point in this relationship was during the Soviet-Afghan war. The US tried to renew this relationship after 9/11, although when Obama replaced GW Bush he stated his intention to move US-Pakistani relations off the security agenda which the Pentagone and the Pakistani army considered a priority. However, Obama rain into resistance from the Pakistani army and from the national security establishment in Washington- as can be seen from the security-oriented distribution of US aid. But not even in the area of security have the two nations been able truly to collaborate. To begin with, the strengthening of US-India relations angered Pakistan. Then Islamabad protected the Taliban in its fight with NATO. Finally, Obama violated Pakistani sovereignty (the Drone strikes in the tribal belt and the Ben Laden raid). These conflicting interest, however, do not necessary means the end of the relationship.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, War, Peacekeeping, and State
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

237. The Foreign Policy Case For Senate Reform

Author:
Paul Nadeau
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Diplomatic Courier
Abstract:
In a famous story about the creation of the Senate, Thomas Jefferson and George Washington were debating a possible upper legislative chamber over tea, and Jefferson wanted to know why it was necessary to create an undemocratic body like the Senate. In response, Washington asked Jefferson why he had poured some of his tea into a saucer. “To cool it,” Jefferson answered, to which Washington replied “Even so, we pour legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it.” The story (even if it might be apocryphal) illustrates that the slowness and deliberation of the Senate were intentional and designed to offset the popular passions that might govern the House of Representatives. The Senate’s rules were designed to emulate a gentleman’s club (such as the filibuster, which originated from the idea that gentlemen would have the good sense to limit the length of their speeches and that it would be rude to cut them off) but have become archaic as the body changed from a club to a typical legislative chamber. The rules of the Senate as they are currently designed have resulted in giving the opposition a trump card that is usually disproportionate to their legislative power. While its original structure incentivized moderation and compromise, the electoral system that populates its membership has incentivized partisanship. As a result the Senate has changed its form but not its function. The Senate can be deferential and deliberate or it can be factional and partisan, but it can’t be both.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

238. The New U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance and Its Implications for South Korean Security

Author:
Young Ho Kim
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On January 5, 2012, U.S. President Barack Obama paid a rare visit to the Pentagon and unveiled his guidelines for the Department of Defense to set the goals and priorities of its defense strategy for the next ten years. The resulting eight-page-long guidelines, entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (hereafter DSG), contain the administration’s assessment of changing global security conditions and propose the roles and shape of the U.S. armed forces for the coming decade. Prepared through “unprecedentedly” close consultations between the President himself and senior leaders in the U.S. defense department and military including both service chiefs and combatant commanders, the DSG defines the present as a historic “inflection point” and envisions the future U.S. military as “smaller and leaner, but agile, flexible, ready and technologically advanced.” Moreover, in accordance with the DSG the U.S. defense budget will be cut by $487 billion and the sizes of the Army and Marine Corps will shrink by 80,000 and 14,000 respectively over the next ten years. While a more detailed picture will be revealed next month with the administration’s FY2013 budget request to Congress, the DSG reflects the Obama administration’s arduous effort to rebalance and redirect its defense priorities and spending under severe fiscal austerity. Because of the unusual timing of its publication and the magnitude of the reduction in defense spending, the DSG has generated controversy and concern domestically in the United States as well as internationally. In the United States, particularly people in the conservative wing of the Republican Party have been prompted to criticize the guidelines for putting the nation’s security in danger, whereas some people on the liberal side have advocated seeking deeper and bolder cuts in defense spending. Internationally, China was understandably the first to respond negatively to the DSG. For example, rebutting the DSG’s portrayal of Beijing’s military policy as lacking transparency as “groundless and untrustworthy,” Liu Weimin, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, stressed that Beijing was committed to peaceful development and “defensive” policy. What then are the implications of the DSG for South Korean security? Will there be any changes in U.S. defense policy or posture in the region under the DSG that may affect security conditions in South Korea significantly and, if so, require new measures or scrutiny by the South Korean government or the military? In fact, there have been largely four issues raised by the news media in South Korea. I will examine these four issues, and then discuss more challenging concerns that will require closer attention by South Korean foreign and security policy-makers.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

239. China, the United States, and the Changing Global Architecture

Author:
Seungjoo Lee
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
With the prospect of leadership change in China and the United States in 2012, the possibility for instability and uncertainty in the East Asia region is high. Despite such concerns, it is expected that the current structure of global governance will mitigate the difficulties associated with this period of transition. Considering the importance of global governance, it becomes necessary then to follow the changes in the global and regional architecture and think about how South Korea should meet this challenge. The trio of closely-related summit meetings that took place in November 2011 was such an occasion in which China and the United States grappled to shape the regional and global architecture. These meetings included the G20 Cannes summit on November 3, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit on November 12, and the East Asia Summit (EAS) on November 19. It is important to focus on the fact that during these meetings Beijing and Washington had the chance to examine the intention and capability of each other. In that sense, these meetings were akin to that of a boxing match fought over three rounds using not force but the complex elements of international politics in the twenty-first century that interact to design the regional and global architecture. These elements include power politics in international relations, cooperation and conflict in institutions and networks, and the knowledge power which allows for a consensus among countries by sharing the vision of a new order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, Hegemony, and Leadership
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

240. A Gilded Alliance: Global Korea’s G-20/Yeonpyeong Moment Revisited

Author:
Haejong Lee
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Alliance is an instrument for national interest, which is dependent upon the international environment and defined by domestic, democratic political processes. This commonsense notion of alliance was not fully embraced by the incoming South Korean administration of Lee Myung Bak in 2008. For the Lee administration, South Korea’s alliance with the United States was much more than an instrument of foreign policy. The alliance embodied South Korea’s political identity and was severely damaged by the preceding Roh Moo Hyun administration’s anti-American, pro–North Korean policies. The restoration of the Republic of Korea (ROK)–US alliance was both the goal and key to its national security strategy of Global Korea to enhance South Korean’s influence, contribution, and stature on a global scale. Thereafter, in a circle of the alliance’s cheerleaders in both Seoul and Washington, the alliance has almost taken its own life: the alliance should be protected from disruptive political forces and modernized/adjusted/expanded into new dimensions for the preservation of the alliance itself. In the post–Cold War years, the United States has tried to modernize its military alliances in order to preserve its influence at reduced costs. The Barack Obama administration had to mend US alliances strained during the George W. Bush administration’s war on terror. In 2009, Presidents Lee and Obama agreed on “a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope, based on common values and mutual trust.” The so-called Great Recession, triggered by the fall of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, has both brought to power and bedeviled the Obama administration; 9/15 has become a new historical marker, replacing 9/11. The very “common values” of the ROK-US strategic alliance—democracy and market economy—have been put to the test; the worries and cries over the decline of the US have arisen once again. In May 2010, the Obama administration published its national security strategy of national renewal and global leadership. Nation-building at home was the primary goal of and imperative to national security. Along with moral leadership to “live” American values, global architecture to embed both allies and challengers in US-centered institutional networks became a new feature of American global leadership. “The United States can, must, and will lead in this new century,” asserted Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in September 2010 at the Council of Foreign Relations, the oldest bastion of American global leadership. She went on to declare that “the complexity and connection of today’s world have yielded a new American moment, a moment when our global leadership is essential, even if we must often lead in new ways.” Confirming that “the 21st century will be another great American century,” President Obama argued at this year’s Air Force Academy graduation ceremony that “we have laid the foundation for a new era of American leadership.” Global Korea, with a comprehensive strategic alliance and a free trade agreement with the United States and hosting of a G-20 meeting and nuclear security summit, has been an integral part and a success story of American global architecture. The Lee administration was awarded with the first two-plus-two (foreign and defense ministers) meeting in 2010, which had been previously held only with Japan, and a state visit to Washington in 2011. “The relation between our two countries has never been stronger,” commended Secretary of State Clinton in this year’s second two-plus-two meeting. Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-Jin confirmed the 2015 operation control plan and expressed commitment to make “the alliance the best alliance in the world.” American Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta lauded an ongoing trilateral collaboration, including Korea and Japan, to deter North Korea as “another way to strengthen and modernize our alliance.” It is widely disputed that the Obama administration has seized a new American moment and laid the foundation for a new American century. The Obama administration has been beset with rampant unemployment and snowballing deficits. “The Moment of Truth,” a bipartisan commission’s report on the financial crisis, issued a warning in 2010 that it is imperative to raise revenues and to cut both defense and nondefense spending—in short, a complete overhaul of the existing American national security state and social welfare system. However, the political polarization of the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street and resultant partisan gridlock have foiled nation-building at home and led to the first downgrading of the US credit rating and a self-made financial cliff of sequester—mandatory across-the-board budget cuts in the next ten years beginning January 2013. Against its lean and mean years, the Obama administration’s rhetoric of a new American moment or century rings hollow. In contrast, the positive—it couldn’t be better—evaluation on the state of the ROK-US alliance is widely held. Nevertheless, the alliance’s success does not resonate with a (far from positive) strategic reality facing South Korea; nor does the alliance translate into a smooth-working component of American global architecture. The Lee administration has doubled down on its alliance with the US. With the Obama administration’s “strategic patience” or no policy toward North Korea, the Lee administration has succeeded in punishing/isolating North Korea but failed to prevent the latter’s development of nuclear capacity, not to mention the latter’s denuclearization. Or, to put it differently, when it comes to nuclear issues or power transition, North Korea has been on its own, with no South Korean leverage over the latter. Most critically and tragically, Global Korea’s prime moment of hosting a G-20 meeting in November 2010 (in the midst of the final renegotiation of a Korea-US free trade agreement) was followed by North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, which in turn led to a joint Korean-US military exercise including the USS George Washington aircraft carrier and which was opposed by China. In the G-20/Yeonpyeong moment, the Lee administration succeeded in synchronizing its strategic and comprehensive alliance with the US and global contribution but rather miserably failed to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula and manage its relationship with China. On the other hand, the ROK-US comprehensive and strategic alliance does not dispense with politics among allies; nor does it develop into a trilateral cooperation of the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The Lee administration has been at odds with the United States on the issues of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and missile development, albeit much out of public scrutiny. In addition, the Lee administration has recently confronted Japan with the territorial issue of Dokdo and Japanese colonialism, along with a public relations campaign, including President Lee’s visit to Dokdo in August 2012. This was an abrupt turnabout from its attempt to share information with Japan on North Korea through a military accord—a trilateral collaboration that Panetta mentioned as a way to modernize the ROK-US alliance. Faced with a public uproar against the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), the Lee administration canceled the latter’s signing ceremony at the last minute and turned to confront Japan, which reciprocated with its territorial claim and disavowal of historical responsibilities for colonialism, and even a threat to halt financial cooperation. In sum, despite of (or because of, if you will) the much touted success of the ROK-US alliance, South Korea is now in a diplomatic wilderness, isolated from all of its neighbors—North Korea, China, and Japan. Why? It is, I argue, because President Lee’s Global Korea was a vision for a bygone, pre–Great Recession, and pre-G-2 world. As long as the United States confronted an assertive China with allies and new partners, South Korea’s strategic alliance with the United States could serve both the former’s security interests and the latter’s regional architect. The sinking of the Cheonan happened in the context of such confrontations of the United States and China over the South China Seas, which led to the rescheduling of transfer of operational control (from the United States to South Korea) from 2012 to 2015 that had been requested by the Lee administration. However, as the United States began to embrace China and both deemed it necessary to contain security tensions on the Korean Peninsula, an assertive South Korea against North Korea and China became a liability to the United States, and South Korea’s strategic, global, comprehensive alliance with the United States became superfluous, if not necessarily inimical, to South Korea’s local and regional interests. Such was the case after the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Following is a reconstruction of an anticlimax of Global Korea in the historical contexts of the Obama administration’s struggles to forge a new American global leadership.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, G20, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America