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141. The Cornerstone and the Linchpin: Securing America’s Northeast Asian Alliances

Author:
Patrick M. Cronin
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
During an era in which strategic gravity is shifting to Asia, the United States cannot be careless in tending to its alliances with Japan and South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK). The three countries face persistent threats from North Korea and from China’s semi-transparent bid for regional hegemony. Meanwhile, rocky relations between Tokyo and Seoul are jeopardizing vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific. The latest disagreement between America’s premier allies raises new questions about alliance strategy, commitment, and burden-sharing. These fissures have become exacerbated as the U.S. pressures allies to increase their contributions to regional security and reciprocal trade. [...] This report seeks to explain why the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliance are still a vital means of achieving overlapping strategic interests. At the same time, it also argues that keeping these alliances fit for purpose requires radical change rather than business as usual. Both a rapidly changing security environment and growing intra-alliance squabbling pose dangers that require U.S. leadership. This report concludes with specific ideas for advancing bilateral and trilateral cooperation in the coming months and years, without trying to achieve too much too quickly.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, International Security, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

142. If You Can’t See ’em, You Can’t Shoot ’em: Improving US Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting

Author:
Seth Cropsey
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This report tracks the development of naval and maritime intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR/T) from the Cold War to the present day. It reveals the fluctuating relationship between ISR/T and weapons ranges that have adversely impacted the US Navy’s combat capabilities. While the United States developed longer-range weapons throughout the Cold War and revised tactics and fleet composition to better employ those weapons offensively, the gap that remained between weapons range and targeting information had a negative effect on US Navy combat power. Following the Cold War, while weapons and delivery-system range decreased, ISR/T capacity and capability rose, allowing for precision strikes against ground targets at short and medium range. Finally, the contemporary fleet, facing renewed great power competition, is increasingly receiving long-range strike weapons. However, it lacks the ISR/T complex to identify and hit targets at those ranges in most over-the-horizon combat situations. Second, this report reviews the current ISR/T capabilities to which the US Navy has access, primarily in the Pacific theater, and performs first-order sufficiency analysis to gain an understanding of the impact the current program of record has on operational requirements. Finally, the report concludes with several key recommendations to naval policymakers, civilian and military.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, and Surveillance
Political Geography:
Asia, North America, and United States of America

143. China’s Economic Slowdown: Root Causes, Beijing’s Response and Strategic Implications for the US and Allies

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This monograph attempts to argue and/or demonstrate three main points. First, it looks at why there were credible fears about the stability and viability of the Chinese economy — especially the financial and banking system — leading up to the end of the Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011–15), and what these were. To understand why Beijing was so concerned, the monograph draws out the serious structural problems that were leading inevitably to a permanent slowdown from the double-digit growth rates of the first three decades of reform. Second, the monograph looks at what occurred from 2015 to the present, and how China apparently overcame its economic difficulties. In fact, it has not overcome its problems, but deferred them to a future time in ways that only its unique authoritarian political economy is able to do.Third, it is clear the Communist Party is not passively awaiting an unhappy economic fate in connection with its mounting imbalances and domestic economic dysfunction. In many respects, its leaders have been highly creative in seeking solutions that do not entail a weakening of the party’s hold on economic power. On the contrary, the party has been busily shaping and pursuing grand strategic policies such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) to solve or alleviate many of its domestic political-economic problems. This monograph argues that these and other outward-focused initiatives stem most fundamentally from Chinese weaknesses and vulnerabilities but are being remade and recast into initiatives that will strengthen the position of the CCP domestically, ensure greater resilience for its political economy, and advance its ambitious strategic and international objectives at the same time. In summary, it is about the Communist Party cleverly transforming domestic vulnerability into grand strategy and using economic approaches to gain pre-eminence and “win without fighting.”
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, National Security, Geopolitics, Economy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

144. US-China Trade Tensions: Impact on Mexico | Estados Unidos-China Tensiones Comerciales: Impacto en Mexico

Author:
COMEXI
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI)
Abstract:
For the mid- or long-term, no country in the world—and much less Mexico—benefits from a strained environment in which there is no adherence to international trade rules. However, for the short-term, a strained trade environment produces adjustments to the supply chains, which could benefit competitors of those economies that are currently in conflict. Mexico, the second supplier of the United States only behind China, could reassert its position as a credible competitor of the Asian economy in the US. Likewise, in the context of trade friction, or even just the threat of a conflict, Mexico could strengthen its trade positioning in China by replacing part of the US offering. /// En el mediano o largo plazo, a ningún país del mundo, y menos a México, le conviene que exista un clima de tensiones donde no se respeten las reglas del comercio internacional. Ahora bien, en el corto plazo, el clima de tensiones comerciales genera ajustes en las cadenas de suministro, lo cual puede beneficiar a los competidores de las economías en conflicto. México, el segundo proveedor de Estados Unidos sólo después de China, puede reafirmar su posición como competidor creíble de la economía asiática en Estados Unidos, así como fortalecer su posición comercial en China, al sustituir parte de la oferta estadounidense, en un contexto de fricciones comerciales o su amenaza.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Economic growth, Trade Wars, Exports, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Mexico, and United States of America

145. Strategic autonomy for European choices: The key to Europe's shaping power

Author:
Giovanni Grevi
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre
Abstract:
Multi-level competition is on the rise in the international system and the standoff between the US and China risks becoming a defining feature of international affairs. However, the future is not predestined: the European Union (EU) will play a major role in the development of the international order, whether through its absence or its engagement. This Discussion Paper follows recent European Policy Centre publications and debates dedicated to revamping Europe’s approach to an increasingly challenging international context, which have delivered recommendations to: equip Europe with the tools to govern interdependence and mitigate confrontation; take a strong stance in defence of Europe while not endorsing a zero-sum interpretation of global affairs; turn the EU into a global shaping power by pursuing a ‘rules-first’ strategy; and frame Europe’s strategic autonomy in comprehensive terms, including the economic, technological and security and defence dimensions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Affairs, European Union, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

146. Crossed Wires: Recalibrating Engagement with North Korea for an Era of Competition with China

Author:
Kristine Lee, Daniel Kliman, and Joshua Fitt
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The United States’ current diplomacy with North Korea has enduring implications for its strategic competition with China. Yet within the American foreign policy establishment, rising to the China challenge and managing the nuclear threat emanating from North Korea are often treated as two distinct rather than connected strands of the United States’ agenda in Northeast Asia. The rationale for maintaining some degree of bureaucratic and substantive segmentation between the two issue sets is well-founded. Addressing the North Korean threat warrants energy, resources, attention, and expertise independent of the “great power competition” framework delineated in the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy. But excessive stovepiping may, at best, cause Washington to leave opportunities on the table that could advance its regional priorities, and at worst to risk the creation of mutually incompatible approaches to North Korea and China. U.S. negotiations with North Korea have already created strategic openings for China. The “security guarantees” that Pyongyang has demanded include, for example, the cessation of U.S. joint military exercises with South Korea and the removal from the Korean Peninsula of all American “strategic assets” such as nuclear-capable air and naval assets as well as anti-missile systems that could also be leveraged in a military contingency with China. As U.S. negotiators have locked horns with North Korean interlocutors since President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un’s initial diplomatic foray in June 2018, China has touted its role as a champion of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, while using its relative proximity to Pyongyang to systematically undercut America’s approach. During the United States’ “maximum pressure” campaign in 2017, Beijing cast Pyongyang a vital lifeline, facilitating illegal ship-to-ship transfers of North Korean coal and petroleum in 2018, while leading a concerted push with Russia at the U.N. Security Council to try to fragment the North Korean sanctions regime. And China is poised to open the floodgates of investments into North Korea, particularly through strategic infrastructure projects in the event that Pyongyang’s demands for the relief of international sanctions yield results. Despite all of this, U.S. officials at the highest levels have publicly downplayed intimations of China’s counterproductive activities, thereby validating Beijing’s narrative that it has played a constructive role in supporting the United States’ approach to North Korea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

147. A More Focused and Resilient U.S.-India Strategic Partnership

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The United States has made a “strategic bet” on India. This bet—“that India’s greater role on the world stage will enhance peace and security"—was a central pillar of the Obama administration’s rebalance to Asia, and it remains a central pillar of the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. For nearly two decades, Washington has embraced the strategic logic that it should facilitate the rise of India as a great power because a stronger India is indispensable in counter-balancing Chinese power and ambitions. In this policy of strategic altruism, Washington should not be overly concerned with specific Indian preferences, strategies, or capabilities—the general growth in Indian power would help to uphold a favorable regional balance of power. Recently, this strategic logic has begun to show signs of strain. In part, this is the result of emerging policy divergences on a range of issues from bilateral trade to Indian arms purchases from Russia.4More fundamentally, aside from differences in policy preferences, analysts question whether India will have the capacity to play a significantly greater role in global and regional security. India’s economy and military capabilities have expanded, but only incrementally and arguably at a pace insufficient to keep up with China’s growing power and assertiveness—or with American expectations. Even the firmest proponents of this strategic bet, like senior analyst Ashley Tellis, have openly pondered, “if India continues along this path, does our bet on it become a failed bet?"6 As Indian capabilities and U.S. expectations evolve, how can the two countries work together to uphold a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific? It is time for Washington to reframe its strategic bet on India. A close U.S.-India strategic partnership remains critical to meet the challenge a revisionist China poses. But the United States must adjust its policy approach to ensure the partnership is more focused on priority goals, and more resilient to inevitable disruptions. A more focused and resilient partnership would prioritize certain strategic tasks and geographic areas; in particular, the United States and India should cooperate to develop a denial strategy in the Indian Ocean.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

148. Escalation or Negotiation? Conclusions of a Tabletop Exercise on the Future of U.S.-Iran Relations

Author:
Elisa Catalano Ewers, Ilan Goldenberg, Nicholas Heras, and Kaleigh Thomas
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
On May 21, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) hosted an all-day tabletop exercise (TTX) in Washington, D.C., to game out three scenarios related to the crisis surrounding U.S.-Iran tensions over Iran’s nuclear enrichment program and destabilizing regional policies. The intent was to understand how key players would respond and act in these potential scenarios. The TTX included seven teams: the United States, Iran, Europe (representing primarily France, Germany, and the United Kingdom but also the European Union), China, Russia, Israel, and the Gulf Arab States (one player as Saudi Arabia/UAE and the other player as Oman). Teams featured American and foreign regional and functional experts with a deep experience in their respective areas. Players were asked to play the most realistic version of their government.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

149. Maintaining America’s Coercive Economic Strength: Five Trends to Watch in U.S. Sanctions

Author:
Howard Berman, Paula J. Dobriansky, Sue E. Eckert, Kimberly Ann Elliott, David L. Goldwyn, Peter Harrell, Theodore Kassinger, George A. Lopez, Richard Nephew, Michel Rademaker, Frederick Reynolds, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Daleep Singh, Julianne Smith, Adam Szubin, and Rachel Ziemba
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
U.S. foreign policy officials have embraced economic sanctions as a tool of choice for American foreign policy. Decisionmakers have deployed sanctions against strategic adversaries and national security threats ranging from Russia to non-state actors such as terrorist groups, drug cartels, and businesspeople who engage in corrupt activities. The appeal to both policy leaders and key constituent groups of the potent economic impacts of sanctions in several recent high-profile cases, particularly those of Iran, Russia, North Korea, and Venezuela, combined with broad bipartisan support for aggressive use of U.S. sanctions, suggests that the United States will favor this policy tool and be an active practitioner in the years ahead. This brief describes five of the most prominent and influential trends that could affect U.S. sanctions and other coercive economic measures in the future. The five trends are: (1) a shift toward more aggressive use of U.S. unilateral sanctions; (2) the growing role of Congress in enacting sanctions and managing their implementation; (3) an increased potential for unintended consequences as a result of growing complexity in sanctions; (4) accelerating efforts of foreign governments to insulate trade and payment channels from U.S. sanctions; and (5) new technological developments that may have the potential to both enhance and weaken the impact of U.S. sanctions in the years ahead.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Sanctions, Elections, and Economy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

150. Economic Dominance, Financial Technology, and the Future of U.S. Economic Coercion

Author:
Peter Harrell and Elizabeth Rosenberg
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
Coercive economic measures, such as sanctions, investment restrictions, trade controls, and tariffs, have become an increasingly important tool of U.S. foreign policy in recent years. Recent years have witnessed a strengthening of U.S. coercive economic measures, which are likely to remain powerful in the near and medium term. Over the longer term, purely commercial factors are likely to support continued U.S. coercive economic power. However, choices by both U.S. policymakers and foreign governments will be the primary determinant of whether coercive economic measures remain powerful tools of U.S. foreign policy over the longer term. Shifts in the nature of U.S. coercive economic power could prompt some shifts in the balance and nature of the type of coercive economic measures the United States deploys.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Science and Technology, Tariffs, and Trade
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America