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91. March 2017 Issue

Author:
Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Seamus Hughes, Andrew Zammit, Ahmet S. Yayla, Matthew Dupee, and Daniel H. Heinke
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In our feature article, Seamus Hughes and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens focus on the threat to the United States from the Islamic State’s “virtual entrepreneurs” who have been using social media and encryption applications to recruit and correspond with sympathizers in the West, encouraging and directing them to engage in terrorist activity. They find that since 2014, contact with a virtual entrepreneur has been a feature of eight terrorist plots in the United States, involving 13 individuals. In our other cover article, Ahmet Yayla, the former police counterterrorism chief in the Turkish city of Sanliurfa near the Syrian border, outlines how investigations into the New Year’s Eve Reina nightclub attack in Istanbul have made clear the “immense scale of the Islamic State threat to Turkey.” While the attack, remotely steered by Islamic State operatives in Raqqa, was the work of a single gunman, a 50-strong network in Istanbul with access to at least half a million dollars provided logistical support. With the Islamic State declaring all-out war on Turkey, Turkish counterterrorism capacity severely weakened by recent purges, as many as 2,000 Islamic State fighters already on Turkish soil, and the possibility that Islamic State fighters will flood into Turkey as the caliphate crumbles, Yayla warns of severe implications for international security. Daniel Heinke, the director of the state bureau of investigation (LKA) in Bremen, outlines the key findings of an official German study of almost 800 German foreign fighters—the largest such study by a Western government—and the takeaways for smarter counterterrorism. He notes that while the number of Germans traveling to join the Islamic State has slowed to a trickle, there has been a surge in violent Islamist extremism inside the country, creating concern that returning foreign fighters will add “lethal capabilities to an already highly adrenalized Islamist community.” Andrew Zammit outlines how the jihadi threat in Australia has transformed since the Islamic State called for attacks in Western countries. While there has been an increase in attacks and plots in Australia, they have also become less sophisticated and ambitious. Finally, Matthew DuPée examines the growing financial windfall the Afghan Taliban and other jihadi groups are extracting from illegal mining in Afghanistan, which is now providing the Taliban with as much as $300 million in revenue per year.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Terrorism, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Mining, Jihad, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, Germany, Australia, Syria, North America, and United States of America

92. May 2017 Issue

Author:
Paul Cruickshank, Frank Straub, Jennifer Zeunik, Ben Gorban, Franc Milburn, Michele Groppi, John Horgan, Mia Bloom, Chelsea Daymon, Wojciech Kaczkowski, and Hicham Tiflati
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In the early hours of June 12, 2016, an Islamic State-inspired gunman carried out the deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 9/11, shooting dead 49 people in an Orlando nightclub. The attacker was finally killed after a three-hour hostage standoff, leading to questions raised in the media over the police response. One year later, Frank Straub, Jennifer Zeunik, and Ben Gorban look at the lessons learned from the police response to the Orlando and San Bernardino terrorist attacks based on critical incident reviews they conducted for the Police Foundation. In our cover article, they outline how regular police units who were first to respond to the attacks were faced with chaos and “unimaginable devastation … with victims begging for help, people dying, and others who were already deceased” as well as adversaries armed with powerful weapons with explosives or making threats to use them against hostages. The authors argue that with the Islamic State calling for attacks in all 50 U.S. states, police forces across the country need to adapt their training and equipment to prepare for IED, suicide bombing, and hostage situations. Their review found that while Orlando police followed current best practices designed to avoid the deaths of hostages and unreasonable danger to police, new protocols may be necessary for terrorist hostage attacks. In our interview this month, James Gagliano, a former counterterrorist operator for the FBI Hostage Rescue Team, argues that with Islamic State-inspired hostage-takers seeking to kill as many as possible before being killed themselves, the new guidance in these cases should be for law enforcement to more quickly or immediately implement rescue plans to save as many hostages as possible. John Horgan, Mia Bloom, Chelsea Daymon, Wojciech Kaczkowski, and Hicham Tiflati examine the Islamic State’s older fighters. As the group finds it increasingly difficult to replace its fighters, preliminary evidence documented by the Georgia State University researchers suggests an emerging and increasingly aggressive role for older adults, especially as suicide bombers. Michele Groppi warns the terrorist threat to Italy may come to resemble that in France because of growing societal tensions. Franc Milburn provides an overview of Iranian Kurdish insurgent groups, who he argues may emerge as significant players in the region.
Topic:
Terrorism, Insurgency, Counter-terrorism, and Kurds
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, Italy, North America, and United States of America

93. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) – Volume 9, Issue 10: The Defeat of IS & the Southeast Asian Terrorist Threat

Author:
Rohan Gunaratna, Paul Hedges, Jasminder Singh, and Muh Taufiqurrohman
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
October 2017 has been a fateful month for the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group. In Syria, its de facto ‘capital’ Raqqa has fallen to an alliance of Kurdish and Arab fighters backed by the US-led coalition. Earlier in Hawija, the last remaining IS stronghold in northern Iraq, about 1,000 IS fighters surrendered to Iraqi forces rather than fighting for ‘martyrdom’. Over in Southeast Asia, the Philippines authorities announced the liberation of Marawi after a five-month battle and the killing of IS top leaders, Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute. The string of losses suffered by IS since 2016 nullifies and invalidates the IS slogan of ‘remaining and expanding’ and constitutes a huge symbolic blow to its standing as leader of the global ‘jihadist’ movement. It is likely that the fall of Raqqa was expected by the top leadership of IS and that plans have been made well in advance for al-Baghdadi and his senior commanders to go into hiding, and for the ‘jihadi’ struggle to persist in some form in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. This is already evident from IS’ decentralisation of its ‘jihad’ and ‘virtualisation’ of its so-called caliphate (from a territory-based entity). The ‘decentralisation of jihad’ through its various wilayats and online presence (including videos and publications), is similar to Al-Qaeda’s post-9/11 franchising strategy. IS has been urging its affiliates in different parts of the world to continue the so-called ‘caliphate’ project by granting them more autonomy and freedom to mount operations. Against this backdrop, Southeast Asia has to contend with the threat of IS and other terrorist groups engaging in recruitment and proselytisation, and planning attacks through the online domain. This context necessitates close monitoring of hotspots in Southeast Asia, including Marawi in the Philippines, Rakhine in Myanmar and the southern provinces in Thailand. In the Philippines, security forces have successfully managed to contain, isolate and eliminate the IS threat in Marawi. Although the battle is almost over with the deaths of IS Philippines leaders Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute, the threat of terrorism in the region is far from over. Rohan Gunaratna discusses the situation in Marawi, the activities of the militants, the government’s response and future trends. Despite the elimination of top leaders and fighters in Marawi, IS will prevail in Southern Philippines and pose a security threat to Southeast Asian countries as the leadership outside Mindanao remains intact. In addition, other militant groups are joining IS’ East Asia Division, indicating efforts to expand from the Philippines to Northeast and Southeast Asia. While IS has failed to hold territory, it has been successful in cyberspace, with regular online publications of battle news, ‘religious’ articles, showing exploits of IS fighters and propaganda videos. In this connection, Jasminder Singh and Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani discuss the unprecedented appearance of a Singaporean national in an IS-propaganda video last month and its possible implications. In the midst of IS decline in the Levant, the video attempts to rally the ‘jihadists’, boost their morale, and gives the false impression that IS will prevail. The video underlines the need for continued high-level vigilance against extremist teachings and ‘jihadist’ propaganda and radicalisation in the real world and the murky cyber world. Muh Taufiqurrohman et al. examine the issue of jihadist radicalisation and activities in Indonesia’s prisons at Nusa Kambangan. They observe that lax security measures, understaffed prison facilities, low budgetary provisions and overworked prison guards have enabled high-profile jihadists such as Aman Abdurrahman, Iwan Darmawan, Abdullah Sonata and Abu Hanifah to recruit, preach, communicate, plan and execute attacks without hindrance. They recommend placing terrorist inmates in special prisons or solitary confinement, employing full-time religious counsellors, recruiting more qualified prison guards and increasing the prisons’ operational budget. On the issue of radicalisation, a better conceptual understanding of the subject is required. Paul Hedges explores and clarifies key issues associated with the term radicalisation. He argues that radicalisation is largely linked to socialisation and that there is no commonly accepted personality profile nor a linear pathway to radicalisation; basically, the landscape and trajectory of terrorism in terms of recruitment and evolution are both changing and fluid. In order to counter the booming youth ‘jihadist’ cultural milieu, he argues that it is necessary to have credible moderate role models and voices messages that are packaged to appeal to the youth. He added that any response to address the issue of trajectories into violence needs to be measured, targeted, evidence-based, and empathetic to the communities involved.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Philippines, Syria, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

94. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) – Volume 9, Issue 09: ‘Diverse and Enduring Terrorist Threat‘

Author:
Iftekharul Bashar, Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Marguerite Borelli, and Farhan Zahid
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
This September marked the sixteenth anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US by Al-Qaeda. Since then, the global terrorist threat situation has gotten worse. Despite the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, forty percent of the former is under the Taliban control while until late last year, large swathes of territory in Iraq and neighbouring Syria were under the control of the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group, which broke away from Al-Qaeda and established a so-called ‘Caliphate’ in 2014. The killing of Al-Qaeda’s chief Osama Bin Laden in 2011 and IS emergence undermined Al-Qaeda’s position as the leader of global jihad. However, Al-Qaeda’s threat is far from over despite its low profile in recent years. As IS is losing ground in the Middle East, its main jihadist rival Al-Qaeda is catching up. While the international community was fixated with fighting the IS threat, Al-Qaeda has silently regrouped, reorganised and rebuilt its ideological and operational ties with local militant groups in Africa and Asia. The transnational jihadist group is not only well-entrenched within these two regions, it also poses an enduring terrorist threat of a qualitatively different nature. It has shifted its focus from the “far-enemy” (attacking the US and its Western allies) to the “near-enemy” i.e. helping local and regional ‘jihadist’ and insurgent groups in local conflicts. Reflecting these developments, Farhan Zahid discusses the emergence of a pro-Al-Qaeda militant group Jamat Ansar Al-Shariah in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda’s policy of ‘wait and see’ appears to have paid off as the group re-strategise and escalate its activities in the ungoverned spaces of Pakistan and Afghanistan. US President Donald Trump’s new Afghanistan-South Asia Policy that will prolong the war in Afghanistan provides Al-Qaeda with a suitable propaganda narrative for new recruits. Similarly, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is attempting to exploit the ongoing persecution of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar to mobilise fighters. On 3 September, AQAP leader Khalid bin Umar Batarfi issued a video message urging Muslims in Bangladesh, Indonesia and Malaysia to support the Rohingya and directed its sister organisation AQIS to launch attacks in Myanmar. The Rohingya crisis and jihadist groups’ attempt to exploit the issue can have negative implications for Bangladesh’s national security as discussed by Iftekharul Bashar. Alarmingly, the Rohingya crisis has resulted in a groundswell of support among Southeast Asian ‘jihadists’, specifically from Indonesia, with calls to relocate to Myanmar’s Rakhine state to wage jihad. An Indonesian militant group Islamic ­Defenders Front (FPI) issued a call for ‘jihadist’ volunteers to defend the Rohingya, raising the dangers of Southeast Asian ‘jihadists’ making their way to Myanmar. The perceived lack of adequate response and initiative by neighbouring countries and the international community have turned the plight of stateless Rohingya into a festering wound that the ‘jihadists’ are now exploiting to their advantage. This issue also takes a look at how the Indonesian police is fighting the twin threats posed by Al-Qaeda, IS, and other violent Islamist elements as well as separatist (ethno-nationalist) groups in the country. Police General Muhammad Tito Karnavian explains the different nature of the two threats, and provides a perspective of Indonesia’s strategies, using both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ approaches to deal with the two different sets of “insurgents”. While counter-ideology efforts are critical in defeating the Islamists, economic development and raising living standards are key to dealing with the separatists. The article concludes with recommendations that includes community policing, preventative measures, rehabilitation efforts and stronger legislation. Beyond Indonesia, Marguerite Borelli takes a critical look at the efforts of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) to counter the persistent terrorist threat in the region. ASEAN has developed a substantive counter-terrorism arsenal since the September 11 attacks, and has served as a viable forum on counter-terrorism issues. However, while substantive, its arsenal still remains insufficient. She highlights the counter-terrorism insufficiencies created by structural factors and the lack of preventative counter-terrorism measures within the current framework. She argues that ASEAN’s lack of responsiveness to contemporary developments and a general lack of political appetite for collective security and responsibility in the region have prevented it from acting as a driving force and an architect of regional counter-terrorism. There is however a strong impetus for regional cooperation and collaboration given the transnational nature of the terrorist threat and problems linked to returning IS fighters from the Middle East and Marawi City.
Topic:
Terrorism, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Bangladesh, East Asia, Southeast Asia, Myanmar, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

95. The Evolving Terrorism Threat from Nixon to Trump

Author:
Edward Marks and Michael B. Kraft
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
The issues that faced the Obama administration and will face the Trump administration—as well as the basic policies and programs—had roots in previous generations, some of them going back to the 1970’s and President Richard Nixon’s administration. Many programs conceived and developed during previous administrations continued, evolved, and were expanded during subsequent administrations. These programs include antiterrorism training for American and foreign law enforcement officials, the interagency Counter Terrorism Financing (CTF) and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs, and the ever pressing need for improved international cooperation and intelligence sharing. They are likely to continue, in one form or another, as ongoing efforts. This article is adapted from a draft of a forthcoming book: U.S Counterterrorism efforts, from Nixon to Bush. (CPC Press/Taylor&Francis Group).
Topic:
Science and Technology, History, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and 9/11
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

96. 6 Steps the Trump Administration Should Take in Iraq

Author:
Andrew Kim, Daniel Benaim, and Hardin Lang
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The ongoing battle to retake Iraq from the Islamic State, or IS, also known as ISIS or ISIL, is one of the most dynamic foreign policy challenges that the Trump administration confronts as it takes office. A fierce fight is underway to recapture Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul, with American soldiers operating near the frontlines of a bewilderingly complicated battle space. Major questions remain regarding how Mosul will be stabilized and governed once the city is liberated, and how a still-fractured Iraq can approach the enduring challenge of national reconciliation. President Donald Trump has issued a new executive order requesting an anti-IS strategy in 30 days.1 But the new president has already undercut America’s position in Iraq through his words and deeds. He has repeated his campaign calls for the United States to take Iraq’s oil as spoils of war, including in front of a memorial to fallen Central Intelligence Agency, or CIA, officers.2 And his first major action related to Iraq—an executive order restricting Iraqis’ travel to America—insults the nation’s Iraqi partners who have been at the frontline of the fight against IS and weakens U.S. influence in Iraq.3 The Trump administration’s reckless rhetoric on Iran, including Trump’s accusation that Iran is “taking over more and more of Iraq,” undercuts the anti-IS campaign and undermines broader efforts to counter Iran’s malign regional influence.4 The 2003 Iraq war ended a U.S. policy of dual containment of Iran and Iraq, and the fallout from the Iraq war contributed to Iran’s rising influence across the region. More than a decade later, however, Iraqi nationalism remains strong, and the recent enhanced U.S.-Iraqi cooperation in countering IS has helped reaffirm Iraq as an independent actor not beholden to any other regional forces, including Iran. Trump’s saber-rattling against Iran risks making Iraq a battleground for the United States and Iran. It heightens the chances of conflict between U.S. troops and Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militants—an outcome that would set back the campaign against IS and quickly wear out America’s welcome in Iraq. The time is now for President Trump to change course and set a more responsible path for U.S.-Iraqi relations. His team will confront policy decisions in its first 100 days that will have consequences for years to come. The good news is that the new administration inherits an anti-IS campaign with considerable momentum. President Barack Obama left behind a global coalition on the cusp of a major military victory in Mosul.5 With U.S. and coalition support, Iraqis have already liberated most of their country and are now degrading remaining IS sanctuaries.6 Trump’s challenge will be to correct his early missteps, see the last administration’s effort through to its conclusion, and chart a stable course for post-IS Iraq. To this end, the Trump administration should take the following six steps.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and ISIS
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

97. Setting the Terms for U.S.-Egypt Relations

Author:
Daniel Benaim, Mokhtar Awad, and Brian Katulis
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Donald Trump’s first meeting as president of the United States with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah Al Sisi offers a significant opportunity but also some risks for U.S. security interests and values. U.S.-Egypt ties have witnessed historic strains in the past few years at a time when the broader Middle East slipped into a state of violent fragmentation that threatens both U.S. interests and the global order. The region faces the confluence of global terrorist networks based within its territories; civil wars, state collapse, and mass migration; proxy battles between regional and global powers; and tensions between authoritarian states and young populations facing high unemployment. Egypt currently appears tenuously positioned to avoid the worst fates of its neighbors. However, Cairo’s new political and economic order remains inchoate and brittle, lacking a concrete plan for defeating terror networks, advancing large-scale job creation, or offering more effective or representative governance. Instead, the country’s civic space has been smothered to deny openings for the open exchange of ideas needed to defeat extremism, while Egypt’s economy goes from crisis to crisis.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, Counter-terrorism, and Peace
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, Egypt, and United States of America

98. Playing the Long Game

Author:
Hardin Lang and Alia Awadallah
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
During the last week of August 2017, the Lebanese government completed its largest counterterrorism operation in years, pushing Islamic State (IS) militants from the group’s stronghold along the Lebanese border with Syria. As many as 7,000 soldiers from the Lebanese army and special operations forces took part.1 The offensive underscored Lebanon’s contribution to the global counter-IS coalition and the key role that its military and security services have played in blocking the expansion of Sunni militant groups in the region. None of this would be possible without the long-term support of the United States, which has quietly bolstered Lebanon’s counterterrorism capabilities over the course of a decade. The cornerstone of the American effort has been a program to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) that was launched after Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon in 2005.2 In particular, Lebanon’s special operations community has made impressive strides in confronting the threat posed by Salafi-jihadi terror groups.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and War on Terror
Political Geography:
Middle East, Lebanon, North America, and United States of America

99. The Future of U.S.-Jordanian Counterterrorism Cooperation

Author:
Hardin Lang, William F. Wechsler, and Alia Awadallah
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
As the United States and Jordan enter the next phase of bilateral counterterrorism cooperation, they should work together to continue to strengthen Jordan’s security services.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, Jordan, and United States of America

100. Guantanamo’s Last Year

Author:
Ken Gude
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
With one year left in his administration, President Barack Obama remains committed to closing the prison at Guantanamo Bay during his time in office. Congress has prohibited, at least for now, one aspect of the president’s preferred pathway to close the prison—transferring some detainees into the United States for trial or continued law of war detention. Much of this debate has focused on the question of whether President Obama will use executive action to override the congressional transfer ban. Doing so would be impractical and extremely unwise. The Obama administration should state publicly that it will not use executive action to bring large numbers of Guantanamo detainees into the United States in defiance of congressional statute. A better strategy would be to pursue alternative options for closing Guantanamo that, even given current statutory constraints, remain entirely in the control of the executive branch. Amid disappointment at the failure to close Guantanamo, it is easy to forget that President Obama originally believed it was feasible to identify, categorize, prosecute, and transfer all 242 detainees in just one year—the same amount of time he has left for the remaining 91 detainees. While congressional resistance is a new obstacle not present at the time of President Obama’s original pledge, moving the majority of detainees out of Guantanamo is now mostly about the implementation of policies and decisions already made, a much more manageable challenge than the one that Obama faced in 2009. If that goal is to be achieved, however, President Obama must command a greater level of urgency throughout his administration and especially at the Pentagon. The risk is not simply a failure that becomes a stain on the president’s legacy; rather, the much more serious risk is that the next administration could resume sending detainees to Guantanamo, which is on the wish list of many conservatives. The latter would do irreparable harm to American national security—and be a colossal waste of money. Holding a detainee at Guantanamo now costs $4 million per year per detainee, compared with less than $100,000 per inmate in the highest security prison in the United States. And while it is fair to say that the salience of Guantanamo as a recruiting tool for terrorist groups has faded during the Obama administration’s efforts to close it, it is not gone. Hostages held by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, are not dressed in Guantanamo-like orange jumpsuits by accident. And if new detainees were to be sent to Guantanamo by the next administration, the prison would roar back to prominence in terrorist propaganda and be an enormous self-inflicted wound on the country. We cannot afford to risk this possibility. Guantanamo must be closed during the Obama administration. This can be achieved by completing the following steps: Hold Periodic Review Board hearings for all eligible detainees by July 1, 2016. Accelerate transfers of those detainees designated for transfer or release. Order the Department of Justice to review detainee cases for prosecution and potential plea bargain in federal court. Pursue agreements with countries to prosecute under their laws any Guantanamo detainees accused of serious crimes. Engage the Afghan government to seek an agreement to transfer back to Afghan custody any remaining law of war detainees captured in connection with the war in Afghanistan. Some of these options may not represent the best or preferred method for the Obama administration to close Guantanamo, but this is a feasible and realistic path to close the prison in one year. Some of these choices will be difficult, but when measured against the possibility that Guantanamo could be back in the business of accepting new detainees in 2017, those difficulties should not be disqualifying. A reinvigorated effort from the Obama administration is urgently needed to make 2016 Guantanamo’s last year.
Topic:
Terrorism, Prisons/Penal Systems, Counter-terrorism, and Detention
Political Geography:
Caribbean, North America, United States of America, and Guantanamo