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21. Managing a Nuclear-Armed North Korea: A Grand Strategy for a Denuclearized and Peacefully Unified Korea

Author:
Seongwhun Cheon
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
Managing a nuclear-armed North Korea is South Korea’s grand strategy to protect the nation’s vital security interest in the short term and achieve peaceful unification in the long term. Its foundation rests on two pillars of containing the North’s military expansion and nuclear coercion, and promoting constructive changes in North Korean society. This strategy of management is neither appeasement based on unfounded optimism of the North Korean leadership nor an intimidation tactic to overthrow the Kim Family Regime. Under the assumption that genuine peace or national integration is not possible unless North Korea is denuclearized and its society transformed, it is a strategy that exercises full vigilance toward the North and applies all available means and methods to reduce political and military threats from Pyongyang. It also patiently encourages gradual and fundamental changes in North Korea as the ultimate path to a denuclearized and unified Korean peninsula. The management strategy understands that no dialogue with North Korea could resolve the nuclear problem at a single stroke, and thus, it keeps expectations low and objectives achievable. It does not anticipate a sweeping deal to denuclearize North Korea.
Topic:
Nuclear Power, Grand Strategy, Peace, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

22. Theater-level Command and Alliance Decision-Making Architecture in Korea

Author:
Shawn P. Creamer
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
The theater-level command relationships in the Republic of Korea are complex and nuanced. They are often misunderstood by American and South Korean military and civilian leaders. Available open source resources often focus on specific elements of the command relationships, sometimes over-relying on official rhetoric from the respective commands. These narratives don’t provide a complete picture of how these distinct organizations work together towards the common goal of defending South Korea from North Korean aggression. This paper consolidates and amalgamates relevant open source resources to provide clarity to what was previously an opaque understanding of the interconnected, yet distinct relationships between the four concurrently operating theater-level commands that have roles in defending South Korea. In particular, this paper dissects each command’s roles, its relationships with the commands, and guidance and direction governing each command.
Topic:
United Nations, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Alliance
Political Geography:
South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

23. China’s Uneven Response to THAAD and its Coercive Strategy Aimed at the ROK: Implications for the U.S.-ROK Alliance

Author:
George Hutchinson
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
The United States-Republic of Korea Alliance has arrived at a critical juncture. In July 2016, the countries jointly decided to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system to the Korean Peninsula to defend against North Korea’s accelerating nuclear and ballistic missile programs. China has long opposed an American-led, regional missile defense system, persistently warning South Korea against deploying THAAD. Since the deciding to deploy THAAD, the political landscapes in the U.S. and the ROK have changed dramatically. The new Donald J. Trump administration has signaled a change from the previous administration’s “strategic patience” policy, but details of the new approach have yet to emerge. North Korea, meanwhile, continues to aggressively test ballistic missiles and promote its nuclear weapons program. In South Korea, the impeachment and subsequent removal of Park Geun-hye triggered the need for a snap election, and a left-leaning candidate, Moon Jae-in, is leading in the polls. The election could mark a return of previous liberal administration policies that favored cooperation with North Korea. Additionally, Moon has signaled his opposition to THAAD. Nonetheless, the U.S. began deploying THAAD to South Korea in March 2017. China retaliated, implementing a series of economic, political, and military measures to pressure South Korea. This paper provides background on THAAD, analyzes the decision by Washington and Seoul to deploy the system to Korea, and examines Beijing’s concerns and coercive counterstrategy
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Military Strategy, Weapons, Missile Defense, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

24. North Korea’s Nuclear and Ballistic Threats and the Tailored Deterrence Strategy

Author:
Sam-man Chung
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs threaten South Korea and its neighbors. Pyongyang’s engineers are likely capable of producing a warhead small enough to place it atop a missile. As its ability to engineer warheads for flight and reentry improves, North Korea increasingly endangers the United States. Deterring Pyongyang is extremely difficult given North Korea’s conventional, unconventional, and cyber capabilities. South Korean and American strategists have reponspded by developing a tailored deterrence strategy to address specific threats. At the operational level, this is supported by the Combined Counter-Provocation Plan. Ballistic missile defense, including the ability to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy North Korea’s missiles, is critical to the success of the tailored deterrence strategy. South Korea opted to develop its Korean Air and Missile Defense and Kill Chain system. These systems are independent of American ballistic missile defense systems. The Korean systerms were conceived and developed amidst plans to transfer Wartime Operational Control from the U.S. to South Korea. Because transfer has been postponted, there is less rationale for maintaing separate systems. Despite the official desire to keep these systems independent, South Korea needs to develop options for enhancing interoperability with American missile defense systems to support the tailored deterrence strategy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

25. Will China Allow North Korea to Collapse?

Author:
Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
Relations between China and North Korea have deteriorated during the last year, but Beijing has not fundamentally changed its approach toward its neighbor because that approach serves vital Chinese interests. If the regime of Kim Jong Un should look like it might fail—and there are several reasons why it could—Beijing’s leaders will undoubtedly do all they can to effect a rescue. The Chinese state, however, is not as stable or as capable as it appears, and it may not be in a position to lend needed assistance.
Topic:
International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Authoritarianism, and Political stability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

26. U.S.-Korea Economic Relations and the Next U.S. Administration

Author:
Troy Stangarone
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
When the next United States president is inaugurated on January 20, 2017, he or she may face one of the more challenging domestic political environments for international trade in the modern political era; at that time, the U.S. will need to make significant decisions regarding its economic relationship with East Asia, including South Korea. The most significant decision facing the next administration will be handling the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). While there is still time for the U.S. Congress to pass the TPP prior to the next administration taking office, it is increasingly likely that the next administration will have to grapple with either passing or renegotiating the Asia-Pacific-wide agreement, as well as determining how to bring South Korea into the region wide agreement. Bringing Korea into the TPP will further solidify the U.S.’ economic relationship with South Korea, enhancing efforts to move toward a free trade area within the Asia-Pacific. While South Korea’s accession to the TPP will likely be the next administration’s major economic objective, they should also work to strengthen the economic relationship with South Korea by deepening cooperation on small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), cyber security, the digital economy, energy, and New Frontier issues.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Politics, Partnerships, Digital Economy, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trade, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
East Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

27. Strength and Consistency: A Key to North Korean Nuclear Sanctions

Author:
Kim Taewoo
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
Pyongyang's fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, the February 2 test launch of the Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite (which in fact was a longrange missile), and other provocative activities amply reminded the international community of the reasons for strong and consistent sanctions. Such activities again proved the Kim Family Regime (KFR) will not accept voluntary changes or engage in denuclearization dialogue. Instead, the regime declared de facto "Nuclear-First Politics," thus ruling out the possibility of denuclearization. If the KFR is allowed to continue unhampered nuclear weapons development, it will become a nuclear power with over 50 nuclear weapons within a decade. Its weapons will include atomic bombs, boosted fission bombs, and hydrogen bombs. The KFR will also possess increasingly formidable delivery vehicles, such as Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. This situation must be a nightmare particularly to South Korea. However, the current international sanctions headed by the UNSCR 2270, along with unilateral sanctions, are unlikely to bear fruit in the foreseeable future due to China’s conflicting policies. Beijing’s attitude towards North Korean nuclear program has alternated between ‘pressure and connivance;’ its military relationship with the United States determining China’s position on sanctions. China’s alternating position prevents effective sanctions against North Korea. While the international community should endeavor to make sanctions concerted, strong and consistent, South Korea and the U.S. should think about a Plan B that includes presenting China the threat of nuclear proliferation in East Asia.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Nonproliferation, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

28. The ROK–U.S. Alliance and the Third Offset Strategy

Author:
Patrick M. Cronin and Seongwon Lee
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
The United States relies on its ability to project military power far forward of its shores in defense of national and allied interests. Yet the diffusion of technology, especially long-range and precision-guided munitions, poses profound challenges to this core assumption undergirding U.S. extended deterrence and alliance contingency response. The U.S. Department of Defense is seeking technological and operational innovations to deal with these unfavorable trends, largely through military modernization programs that are designed to preserve the United States’ capacity to deter aggression, dissuade adventurism, reassure allies, and defend allied and national interests in the event of conflict. Most analysis of America’s so-called “Third Offset Strategy” has focused on deploying leading-edge technologies to overcome China’s military modernization programs. Almost nothing has been written about a Third Offset Strategy through the prism of the Korean Peninsula. Yet the Third Offset Strategy can bolster the alliance’s response to North Korea, reinforce deterrence, and support regional security. This paper seeks to fill a gap in the analysis by assessing the emerging U.S. defense programs with respect to North Korea, Peninsula contingencies, and ROK–U.S. alliance cooperation on regional and outof-area security issues.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, South America, and United States of America

29. North Korea’s Fourth Nuclear Test and the U.S.-ROK Alliance

Author:
Yonho Kim
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2016 rekindled a stronger voice for independent nuclear armament among South Korean conservatives. It is noteworthy that the pro-nuclear view is mainly driven by feelings of profound frustration and helplessness over North Korea’s growing nuclear threat. To assuage concerns, Washington should start seeking new methods of reassuring its partner of its intention to honor its security commitments. The challenges to the U.S.-ROK alliance sparked by North Korea’s nuclear test also came from the liberals’ fierce criticism of the Park government’s decision to start talks with Washington on THAAD deployment. Opponents of THAAD emphasized potential “security anxiety” associated with THAAD deployment, which they argued would escalate regional tensions and introduce a new Cold War, endangering peace on the Korean Peninsula. The THAAD issue has become a political hot potato that could easily entrap major presidential candidates. To avoid any backlash, the candidates will refuse to choose between China and the U.S. while placing the alliance with the U.S. at the center of South Korea’s foreign policy.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

30. Analyzing Japan’s Role in Korean Security within the Framework of the Quasi-Alliance Model

Author:
James F. Durand
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
This paper assesses Japan’s role in Korean security using the quasialliance model. Developed by Professor Victor Cha, the quasi-alliance model to analyze the security relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea, “two states that remain unallied despite sharing a common ally.” Cha defined the quasi-alliance model as “the triangular relationship between two states that are not allied, but share a third party as a common ally.” A key assumption is that the third state serves as the “great-power protector of the two states, and therefore exit opportunities for the two are limited.” While historical issues affected relations between Tokyo and Seoul, American security policies were the primary determinant of cooperation between Japan and Korea. American policy changes produced distinct “abandonment” or “entrapment” responses within the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK security alliances: shared perceptions yielded cooperation, while differing views produced friction. This paper analyzes America’s East Asia policies during the Bush and Obama administrations to assess Japanese and Korean reactions. Analyzed through the quasi-alliance model, American policies produced asymmetric responses in Japan and Korea, inhibiting security cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul. Diverging views of China exacerbated inherent friction between Korea and Japan. Thus, Japan will play a limited role in Korean security.
Topic:
Security, Grand Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America