The 1994 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad was conducted by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to obtain complete and accurate data on U.S. direct investment abroad in 1994. Reporting in the survey was mandatory under the International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act.
The Division of Science Resources Studies (SRS) of the National Science Foundation publishes the biennial report, National Patterns of R Resources. This report describes and analyzes current patterns of research and development (R) in the United States, in relation to the historical record and the reported R levels of other industrialized countries. For years in which the full report is not produced, current, annual statistics on national and international R trends are released in data updates like this one.
The combined domestic and foreign operations of nonbank U.S. multinational companies (MNC's) continued to grow at a relatively fast pace in 1996. The growth in three key measures of MNC operations–gross product, employment, and capital expenditures — exceeded the average annual growth rate for 1989–95. According to preliminary estimates from the annual survey of U.S. direct investment abroad conducted by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), worldwide gross product of U.S. MNC's (U.S. parents and majority–owned foreign affiliates combined) increased 7 percent, compared with a similar increase in 1995 and an average annual increase of 5 percent in 1989–95; employment increased 2 percent, compared with a 1–percent increase in 1995 and negligible growth in 1989–95; capital expenditures increased 5 percent, compared with a 7–percent increase in 1995 and an average annual increase of 4 percent in 1989–95.
The net international investment position of the United States—U.S. assets abroad less foreign assets in the United States—at yearend 1997 was a negative $1,223.6 billion with direct investment valued at the current cost of tangible assets, and it was a negative $1,322.5 billion with direct investment valued at the current market value of owners' equity (table A, chart 1). For both measures, the net positions were more negative in 1997 than they were in 1996.
Since the surge in foreign direct investment in the United States in the late 1980's, much attention has focused on the role of foreign-owned firms in the U.S. economy, particularly in manufacturing. A question that is frequently posed concerns the degree to which U.S. affiliates of foreign companies are integrated into the U.S. economy through their sourcing behavior and value-added activity. A related question is whether U.S. manufacturing affiliates in comparison with domestically owned firms are more oriented toward producing for the U.S. market or for their home-country and other foreign markets.
China's emergence begs a fresh look at power in world affairs—more precisely, at how the spread of freedom and the integration of the global economy, due to the information revolution, are affecting the nature, concentration, and purpose of power. Perhaps such a look could improve the odds of responding wisely to China's rise.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Government, and International Law
The story of post-World War 2 European integration had started before integration theory gained popularity. One has to bear in mind, however, that the idea of European integration was launched with modest objectives in the 1950s. Except for some visionary statesmen, like Jean Monnet and some others, both the subject matters to be covered by integration and the geographical scope was limited. Six countries aimed at establishing a free trade zone and not much else was on their "plate" when they signed the Rome Treaty on 25 March 1957.
The single most striking feature of the post-Cold War environment is the diffusion, not the disappearance, of threats. The half-century extending from 1941 to 1991 was, for the United States, one in which threats were both focused and obvious. From the time of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor until the final collapse of the Soviet Union exactly fifty years later, we knew who our enemies were, or at least might be. As a consequence, we abandoned the isolationism that had characterized most of our history in favor of an unaccustomed but - as it turned out - highly effective internationalism.
Ever since the end of the Cold War, analysts have engaged in long discussions about what sort of international order would replace it. Though these discussions have ranged widely in their assessments, they usually took as their starting point a common assumption: that the Cold War order and the basic structure of international relations it represented, was over and done for. From 1989 until about 1995, this assessment seemed accurate: the alliance was falling apart, war broke out in Europe, the western economies were in a tailspin, and the delicate architecture that bound Germany to the states of Western Europe seemed to be in jeopardy, overburdened by the arrival of a united, powerful Germany. Whatever order we had, it didn't seem like anything we had seen before.