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31. Forecasting Zero: U.S. Nuclear History and the Low Probability of Disarmament

Author:
Jonathan Pearl
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
When four luminaries of U.S. policymaking—Cold Warriors, all—penned a 2007 op-ed calling for global nuclear disarmament, a shock wave emanated through the policy community in Washington and abroad. Had age or the stress of public life finally taken its toll on these elder statesmen? How could the goal of disarmament be practically achieved? Was their plea, in fact, a cynical ploy to strengthen a conventionally dominant United States? Were not communist sympathizers, naïve world government types, or a periodically randy anti-nuclear movement the only ones who took disarmament seriously? Perhaps most important, did their statement reflect a convergence of sentiment in the United States in favor of abolition? Might the United States abolish nuclear weapons in our lifetime?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

32. Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Author:
Stephen J. Blank (ed.)
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
As of November 2010, the so-called “New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty)” treaty between the United States and Russia that was signed in Prague, Czech Republic, on April 8, 2010, awaits a ratification vote in the Senate. Regardless of the arguments pro and con that have emerged since it was signed, it is clear that the outcome of the ratification vote will not only materially affect the Obama administration's reset policy towards Russia, but also the strategic nuclear forces of both signatories. Indeed, throughout the Cold War, both sides built up their forces based on what each was thought to have or be building. Although the Bush administration (2001-09) rhetorically announced its intention to sever this mutual hostage relationship, it failed in that regard. As a result, critical aspects of that relationship still survive in Russia's orientation to the United States and in the language of the treaty, especially in its preamble, which explicitly affirms a link between nuclear offense and defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Czech Republic

33. Paradox of Power: Sino American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability

Author:
David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Book
Abstract:
The United States and China each have or will soon have the ability to inflict grave harm upon the other by nuclear attack, attacks on satellites, or attacks on computer networks. Paradoxically, despite each country's power, its strategic vulnerability is growing. Particularly since September 11, 2001, Americans have sensed this vulnerability. The extent to which the Chinese sense it is unclear. Vulnerability to nuclear attack is familiar to both countries. But the United States and China are also becoming exposed to damage in space and cyberspace because of their growing reliance on those domains for their prosperity and security, as well as each side's increasing antisatellite (ASAT) and cyber war capabilities. For China, economic integration, production, and commerce-and thus, sustained growth and perhaps political stability-depend vitally on data sharing, making networks and satellites as strategic as they are for the United States. All three strategic domains are "offense dominant"-technologically, economically, and operationally. Defenses against nuclear, ASAT, and cyber weapons are difficult and yield diminishing results against the offensive capabilities of large, advanced, and determined states such as the United States and China. Nuclear weapons are patently offense dominant because a single explosion can destroy a city. Moreover, it is easier and cheaper for China to improve the survivability of its strategic missile launchers, to multiply deliverable weapons, and to penetrate U.S. missile defenses than it is for the United States to maintain a nuclear first-strike capability. Though it has yet to admit it, the United States cannot deny the Chinese the second-strike nuclear deterrent they are determined to have. Satellites are inherently vulnerable: conspicuous, easy to track, and fragile. Destroying them or degrading their performance is easier than protecting them. ASAT interceptors are much cheaper than satellites. Likewise, defending computer networks becomes harder and more expensive as the scale and sophistication of the attacker increase. The woes of the cyber defender are compounded by integrated global markets and supply chains for digital components and equipment-in which U.S. and state-affiliated Chinese corporations are leading competitors-increasing the potential for strategic degradation of network infrastructure and disruption of services. In general, strategic offense dominance gives each country an incentive to invest in offense, which in turn spurs the other to keep pace. Apart from offense dominance, the advance of technology has slashed the costs in lives and treasure of strategic attack, as capabilities have graduated from mass invasion to heavy bombing to nuclear weapons to ASAT and cyber war. If one ignores possible deaths resulting from disruption of public services, ASAT and cyber war might even be considered "nonviolent." As the number of expected casualties from strategic attack options drops, so could international opprobrium and the inhibitions of decisionmakers. Absent deterrence, thresholds for war in space and cyberspace could become perilously low as offenses improve.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, Communism, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

34. Deterrence and Escalation in Cross-domain Operations: Where Do Space and Cyberspace fit?

Author:
Vincent Manzo
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Warfare has become even more complicated since Richard Smoke wrote this description of escalation in 1977. The National Security Space Strategy describes space as “congested, contested, and competitive,” yet satellites underpin U.S. military and economic power. Activity in cyberspace has permeated every facet of human activity, including U.S. military operations, yet the prospects for effective cyber defenses are bleak. Many other actors depend on continued access to these domains, but not nearly as much as the United States.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

35. Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications

Author:
Richard B. Andres and Hanna L. Breetz
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
In recent years, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has become in - creasingly interested in the potential of small (less than 300 megawatts electric [MWe]) nuclear reactors for military use. 1 DOD's attention to small reactors stems mainly from two critical vulnerabilities it has identified in its infrastructure and operations: the dependence of U.S. military bases on the fragile civilian electrical grid, and the challenge of safely and reliably supplying energy to troops in forward operating locations. DOD has responded to these challenges with an array of initiatives on energy efficiency and renewable and alternative fuels. Unfortunately, even with massive investment and ingenuity, these initiatives will be insufficient to solve DOD's reliance on the civilian grid or its need for convoys in forward areas. The purpose of this paper is to explore the prospects for addressing these critical vulnerabilities through small-scale nuclear plants.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

36. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Strategic Asset or Unusable Liability?

Author:
M. Elaine Bunn and Vincent A. Manzo
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) concept calls for a U.S. capability to deliver conventional strikes anywhere in the world in approximately an hour. The logic of the CPGS concept is straight - forward. The United States has global security commitments to deter and respond to a diverse spectrum of threats, ranging from terrorist organizations to near-peer competitors. The United States might need to strike a time-sensitive target protected by formidable air defenses or located deep inside enemy territory. Small, high-value targets might pop up without warning in remote or sensitive areas, potentially precluding the United States from responding to the situation by employing other conventional weapons systems, deploying Special Operations Forces (SOF), or relying on the host country.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Debt, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

37. Beyond Geopolitics: Common Challenges, Joint Solutions?

Author:
Gustav Lindstrom
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The 2010 Gstaad Process meeting was held in Switzerland from 16-18 September. Entitled “Beyond Geopolitics – Common Challenges, Joint Solutions?”, the event was organised by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) with the financial support of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA). Additional partners and contributors were the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies in Monterey (California) and the PIR Center (Moscow).
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

38. The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy: The Case for No First Use

Author:
Michael S. Gerson
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Despite heightened expectations for significant change in U.S. nuclear policy—especially declaratory policy— the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review changes little from the past. The NPR's declaratory policy retains the option for the United States to use nuclear weapons first in a variety of circumstances, including in a first strike against Chinese, North Korean, Russian, and (perhaps) future Iranian nuclear forces. Equally important, the United States can threaten the first use of nuclear weapons to deter and, if necessary, respond, to a variety of nonnuclear contingencies, including large-scale conventional aggression by another nuclear power such as China or Russia and chemical or biological weapons (CBW) attacks from states such as Iran and North Korea.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, and North Korea

39. Strengthening the IAEA: How the Nuclear Watchdog Can Regain Its Bark

Author:
Gregory L. Schulte
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The United States has a great interest in the success of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), given the important role it can play in reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Stalled investigations of Iran and Syria have put the credibility of the IAEA at stake. The agency detected neither Iran’s hidden uranium enrichment facility near Qom nor the reactor being constructed by Syria near al Kibar. These examples underscore the importance of strengthening the agency’s verification capability, by both increasing its authority and sharing more information. The IAEA can also help shape the global growth of nuclear power, ensuring the highest levels of safety and security, while discouraging the spread of sensitive technologies that can be misused to build nuclear weapons. The IAEA Board of Governors’ recent decision to establish a nuclear fuel bank in Russia is a step in the right direction. Success requires a new “Spirit of Vienna”—a willingness of delegates to work toward consensus on even difficult topics—surrounding the agency’s important role in nonproliferation. It also requires a conscious effort by the new Director General to remove the politics from IAEA business and return the agency to its technical mandate.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Iran, Syria, and Vienna

40. Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent

Author:
John P. Caves, Jr.
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The United States needs to modernize and ensure the long-term reliability and respon¬siveness of its aging nuclear deterrent force and nuclear weapons infrastructure. It cannot otherwise safely reduce its nuclear weapons, responsibly ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, confidently deter and contain challenges from rising or resurgent nuclear-armed near peers, and effectively dissuade allies and partners from acquiring their own nuclear weapons. Modernization is fundamental to avoiding a future crisis of confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent..
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States