Search

Begin New Search Topic War Political Geography United States

151. "Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japan's Security Policy"

Author:
Yasuhiro Izumikawa
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Since the late 1990s, Japan has sent increasing numbers of its military forces overseas. It has also assumed a more active military role in the U.S.-Japan alliance. Neither conventional constructivist nor realist approaches in international relations theory can adequately explain these changes or, more generally, changes in Japan's security policy since the end of World War II. Instead, Japan's postwar security policy has been driven by the country's powerful antimilitarism, which reflects the following normative and realist factors: pacifism, antitraditionalism, and fear of entrapment. An understanding of the influence of these three factors makes it possible to explain both Japan's past reluctance to play a military role overseas and its increasing activism over the last decade. Four case studies-the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, the anti-Vietnam War period, increases in U.S.-Japan military cooperation during détente, and actions taken during the administration of Junichiro Koizumi to enhance Japan's security profile-illustrate the role of antimilitarism in Japan's security policy. Only through a theoretical approach based on analytical eclecticism-a research strategy that considers factors from different paradigms-can scholars explain specific puzzles in international politics.
Topic:
Security and War
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, and Vietnam

152. The U.S. Senate and Iraq: Who Changed their Views, and Why?

Author:
Andrew Bennet and Andrew Loomis
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:
Focusing on the evolving views of the 77 U.S. Senators who voted to authorize the use of force in Iraq in 2002, we seek to explain why some political leaders changed their views markedly from 2002 to 2008 and others did not. We argue that in view of the great preponderance of evidence that the initial premises of U.S. intervention in Iraq were not fulfilled, Bayesian updating cannot by itself explain the persistence of divergent views on Iraq. It is also puzzling that a half-dozen senators persisted in their support of Bush's position on Iraq even though this may have contributed to their electoral defeat. We use a combination of political and psychological variables, including ideology, party affiliation, safety of the senator's seat, military service, cognitive style, and presidential aspirations to explain why some senators changed their public positions on Iraq within a year, others did so by 2006, still others in 2007, and some changed very little in more than five years. We combine these variables into a typological theory and test it against a qualitative analysis of 20 senators' views on Iraq. We conclude that our model is relatively successful in predicting not only when senators' views changed but what rationales they gave for why their initial expectations were not borne out. We also note several senators who prove important anomalies for our model, including Senators Lieberman, who was the only Democrat who did not move toward opposing Bush's policies, and McCain, who thus far has not moved toward the political center on Iraq despite having effectively secured his party's nomination.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Arabia

153. Obama's War: Prospects for the Conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Author:
Bruce Riedel
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
On coming into office, President Barak Obama immediately assembled a team to assess the US situation in Afghanistan and formulate a strategy for the mission. Heading up this team was Bruce Riedel, a former adviser to Presidents Clinton and Bush and a former CIA officer. This paper, based on a CIGI Signature Lecture given by Mr. Riedel in April 2010, discusses the history of the US war on terror since 9/11, specifically the actors involved in initiating the al-Qaeda declaration of war on the US and its allies, and the recent terrorist plots and attacks linked to al-Qaeda, which demonstrate that al-Qaeda and its allies continue to mount terrorist attacks despite the efforts of the US to thwart terrorism.
Topic:
Terrorism, War, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

154. Obama's New Af-Pak Strategy: Can "Clear, Hold, Build, Transfer" Work?

Author:
C. Christine Fair
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
On entering the White House, US President Barack Obama aimed to put the war in Afghanistan at the forefront of his security agenda following eight years of neglect by a Bush administration preoccupied by the war in Iraq. The Obama administration spent nearly On entering the White House, US President Barack Obama aimed to put the war in Afghanistan at the forefront of his security agenda following eight years of neglect by a Bush administration preoccupied by the war in Iraq. The Obama administration spent nearly a year reviewing the situation in Afghanistan and vetting war options amid protracted interagency deliberation and partisan debate. By the end of 2009, President Obama affirmed his administration's commitment to degrading the capabilities of terrorist groups ensconced in Afghanistan and Pakistan and announced that, by the end of July 2011, the US would begin a conditions-based transfer of responsibility to the Afghan government and security forces, enabling the United States to diminish its kinetic military activities in favour of a more "typical" presence with Washington continuing to providing development and economic assistance, plus training for military and civilian personnel. Thus the counter-insurgency mantra of "clear, hold and build" became, under Obama, "clear, hold, build and transfer." This paper evaluates the viability of the "clear, hold, build and transfer" approach in light of the structural challenges to each element and the pressure to deliver results in a short time-frame amid difficult security conditions.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Central Asia

155. Unions and the Decline of U.S. Cities

Author:
Stephen J. K. Walters
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Cato Journal
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The usual suspects in the tragic demise of many of America's core cities are well known. For decades, scholars, politicians, and pundits have condemned the racism that led whites to flee diverse urban populations after World War II, sneered at Americans' vulgar affection for cars and expansive lawns, criticized policies that encouraged us to indulge these tastes, and blamed capitalist greed and unwhole- some technological change for the deindustrialization that has wrecked urban labor markets.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
United States and America

156. An anvil of clay: Pakistan's military balks at Obama's Afghan surge

Author:
Robert Matthews
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
Pakistan's cooperation is crucial to the success of the current US and Nato strategy in Afghanistan. Yet the Pakistani military not only has misgivings about the Nato surge but also its own agenda. Central to the discord is the military's view of the Afghan Taliban as assets to counter rival India's spreading Afghan footprint. The military views the US surge and the 18-month timeframe as acts of desperation by the Obama administration – as well as a vindication of Pakistan's strategy of keeping its options open through a “selective counter-insurgency approach”. Thus, there is little indication that Pakistan is willing to undertake campaigns against militants in the tribal areas. Or play the role of anvil to the US hammer along the Afghan-Pakistani border.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and War
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and South Asia

157. A Nation at War, an Administration in Retreat: An Assessment of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the FY 2011 Defense Budget

Author:
Thomas Donnelly and Tim Sullivan
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) and the Fiscal Year 2011 defense budget proposal reveal a critical contradiction at the heart of the Obama Administration's national security policy. As the second sentence of the QDR states, "first and foremost, the United States is a nation at war." But the remainder of the report and, more importantly, the long-term budget, reflect an administration more interested in ending wars than winning them, and prepared to defer the modernization of the military resources necessary to maintain American leadership in the face of emerging threats. AEI's Center for Defense Studies (CDS) has developed a presentation, narrated by CDS director Tom Donnelly, assessing the key shortfalls of the QDR and the administration's defense budget proposal.
Topic:
Political Economy, Politics, and War
Political Geography:
United States

158. The Deception Dividend: FDR's Undeclared War

Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
When do leaders resort to deception to sell wars to their publics? Dan Reiter and Allan Stam have advanced a "selection effects" explanation for why democracies win the wars they initiate: leaders, because they must secure public consent first, "select" into those wars they expect to win handily. In some cases, however, the "selection effect" breaks down. In these cases, leaders, for realist reasons, are drawn toward wars where an easy victory is anything but assured. Leaders resort to deception in such cases to preempt what is sure to be a contentious debate over whether the use of force is justified by shifting blame for hostilities onto the adversary. The events surrounding the United States' entry into World War II is useful in assessing the plausibility of this argument. President Franklin Roosevelt welcomed U.S. entry into the war by the fall of 1941 and attempted to manufacture events accordingly. An important implication from this finding is that deception may sometimes be in the national interest.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
United States

159. Spain-United States: A Strong Partnership

Author:
Jorge Dezcallar
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
Relations between Spain and the United States are rooted in historical ties that date back to 1778, when Spain provided military and financial assistance to the fledgling nation during the American War of Independence. Since that time and following several historical developments, Spain and the United States have become friends and allies. We share the same values; we deal with the same threats. Our strategic vision of the world is similar, and we work together to meet today's global challenges.
Topic:
Government and War
Political Geography:
United States, America, and Spain

160. US Withdrawal and Iraqi Security Forces: The Need for Continuing Aid

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam Mausner
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The security arena will face the most drastic changes in U.S.-Iraqi strategic relations over the next two years. Iraq must assume all responsibility for its internal and external security once the United States withdraws by December 31, 2011, unless it invokes the terms of the Strategic Agreement to seek additional US aid. Iraq must both deal with its own insurgents and with problems in its relations with neighboring countries like Iran, Syria, and the Gulf states. This makes the continued improvement of all elements of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) vital both to Iraq and to the stability of the region, during the period of US withdrawal in 2010-2011 and in the years that follow.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Syria