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51. First Joint Russian-U.S. report on Cyber Conflict

Author:
Karl Rauscher and Andrey Korotkov
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
In the spirit of the reset of relations between Moscow and Washington, Russian and U.S. security and cyber experts undertook to model new cooperative behavior for dealing with the most challenging security topic of our age: cybersecurity. Until now, the conventional wisdom has been that setting the “rules of the road” for cyber conflict would be both tedious and extraordinarily difficult. In this first effort, the joint team demonstrated that progress can be and is being made. This paper presents five joint recommendations that are immediately actionable and, if implemented, would be effective in preserving key humanitarian principles of the Laws of War. The progress demonstrated here can serve as a catalyst for further progress to achieve that goal. This joint paper presents the consensus findings of the Russian and U.S. experts on the Rendering of the Geneva and Hague Conventions in Cyberspace. The work is a product of a Track 2 bilateral program that seeks to open dialogue, build sustainable trust and have a positive impact in the most difficult, most critical areas for international security. In recent history, Russia and the United States have had an outsized influence on international issues. When these two countries can agree on a common approach to any particular problem, other countries are prone to listen seriously. For that reason, top experts from Russia and the United States agreed to tackle the problem of cybersecurity together. The hope is that other countries will join in this process.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Washington, and Asia

52. The Need to Pursue Mutual Interests in U.S.-PRC Relations

Author:
Thomas J. Christensen
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Sino-U.S. cooperation should be based on the pursuit of mutual interests rather than on a framework of mutual respect for “core interests,” as pledged in the 2009 Joint Statement. There is a perception in Beijing that when China assists the United States with problems on the international stage it is doing the United States a favor, and thus it expects returns in kind. This is inaccurate since almost everything that the United States asks of China is directly in China's own interest. If the Six-Party Talks process fails permanently, many countries, including China and the United States, will suffer costs. The biggest losers will be the North Korean people, but second will be China, not the United States. The Chinese government has been increasingly sensitive to a domestic political environment of heated popular nationalism, expressed in the media and on the blogosphere. China suffers from a stunted version of a free press, in which most criticism of government policy is from a hawkish, nationalist direction. A cooperative U.S.-China relationship should be built around the pursuit of mutual global interests. The two countries have worked together successfully on several projects, including antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and there is potential for further cooperation on issues such as climate change, nuclear nonproliferation, and counterterrorism, to name a few.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, China, Beijing, and North Korea

53. Making Peace in Afghanistan: The Missing Political Strategy

Author:
Minna Jarvenpaa
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The proposition that a political settlement is needed to end the war in Afghanistan has gained increasing attention in recent months. Channels for preliminary talks with Taliban leaders have been sought and a High Peace Council created. However, despite upbeat military assessments, the insurgency has expanded its reach across the country and continues to enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan. Afghans increasingly resent the presence of foreign troops, and the Taliban draw strength from grievances by ordinary Afghans against their government. External money to supply military bases and pay for development projects often ends up fueling conflict rather than creating stability. For their part, President Karzai and many Afghan political elites lack genuine commitment to reform, calling into question the viability of a state-building international strategy and transition by 2014. Missing is a political strategy to end the conflict that goes beyond dealing with the Taliban; it must define the kind of state that Afghans are willing to live in and that regional neighbors can endorse. Knowing that such a settlement could take years to conclude does not diminish the urgency of initiating the process. Given doubts about Karzai's ability to manage the situation effectively, the international community needs to facilitate a peace process more pro-actively than it has. To be sustainable, the process will need to be inclusive; women's rights, human rights, and media freedoms cannot become casualties of negotiations. Afghanistan's international partners should commit to a peace process and lay the groundwork to appoint a mediator. This includes gauging the interests of parties, identifying actual participants in talks, and structuring an agenda. In the meantime, international military efforts must be realigned to avoid action that contradicts the ultimate aim of a peace settlement.
Topic:
NATO, Treaties and Agreements, War, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban

54. Creating New Facts on the Ground

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Although meaningful cooperation in the region surrounding Afghanistan is of vital importance, it has been elusive because Afghanistan\'s key neighbors have significantly divergent aims. Engineering a successful regional solution would require the United States to fundamentally transform either these actors\' objectives or their dominant strategies. Achieving the latter may prove more feasible, most crucially vis-à-vis Pakistan. The region\'s history of discord is mainly rooted in the troubled relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although Pakistan\'s involvement in Afghanistan is colored by its rivalry with India, its relations with Afghanistan are a geopolitical challenge independent of India because of its fears of disorder along its western borders, the unwelcome idea of “Pashtunistan,” and a related long-standing border dispute. Pakistan\'s reaction to these problems has only exacerbated them. As Islamabad, by supporting the Taliban insurgency, has sought to exercise preponderant, if not overweening, influence over Kabul\'s strategic choices, it has earned Kabul\'s distrust, deepened the Kabul–New Delhi partnership, and increased the risk to its relations with Washington—not to mention threatening the lives of U.S. and other coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. Despite widespread support in Afghanistan for ending the war through a negotiated settlement if possible, the Afghan Taliban leadership is unlikely to consider reconciliation unless it is faced with the prospect of continued losses of the kind sustained as a result of coalition military operations in 2010. A regional solution is similarly unlikely as long as Afghanistan and its neighbors, including India, perceive Islamabad as bent on holding Kabul in a choking embrace. Solving these problems lies beyond the capability of American diplomacy, and right now even of the promised diplomatic surge. The best hope for progress lies in continuing military action to alter the realities on the ground— thereby inducing the Taliban to consider reconciliation, while simultaneously neutralizing the Pakistani strategy that is currently preventing a regional solution. To increase the probability of military success, however, President Obama will need to forgo the politically calculated drawdown of combat troops this summer and instead accept the advice of his field commanders to maintain the largest possible contingent necessary for the coming campaign in eastern Afghanistan. Hard and unpalatable as it might be for the president, this course alone offers a solution that will protect the recent gains in Afghanistan and advance American interests over the long term.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Peace Studies, Treaties and Agreements, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, America, and Washington

55. Gambit or Endgame? The New State of Arms Control

Author:
Alexei Arbatov
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The pursuit of nuclear arms control has enjoyed something of a renaissance recently, with the signing of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in spring 2010 in Prague. Whether that momentum will dissipate after New START or lead to further nuclear arms control agreements depends on several factors: The new U.S. and Russian nuclear doctrines. While there is always some distance between a state's declared policy and that policy's implementation, both documents show that, behind their more ambitious disarmament rhetoric, the United States and Russia maintain conservative nuclear policies that make radical nuclear disarmament unlikely—to say nothing of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The peculiarities of the recently signed and ratified New START agreement. Among these are the modest cuts stipulated by the treaty relative to its predecessors; the acrimonious ratification debates in both the U.S. and Russian legislatures; and the dim prospects for a follow-on agreement (in sharp contrast to the mood prevailing after past START agreements). The dynamics of obsolescence and modernization of U.S. and Russian strategic offensive forces. The United States should have little problem cutting its forces to get below New START's limits. Russia, however, will have problems, not in reducing its numbers, but in raising them to treaty ceilings, due to their removal of obsolete weapons from service and slow deployment of new systems. Either Russia can negotiate a New START follow-on treaty with even lower ceilings or it can accelerate the development and deployment of new systems. While the former is obviously a more attractive alternative, it would require the United States and Russia to resolve many thorny arms control issues, such as ballistic missile defense, conventional strategic weapons, and tactical nuclear weapons. Ballistic missile defense. President Obama's decision to modify the Bush administration's ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe opened the way for New START and eased Russian concerns, even if they could never have been allayed entirely. Moscow believes that U.S. ballistic missile defense programs are ultimately designed to degrade Russia's nuclear deterrent, and it is far from clear that U.S. proposals to jointly develop such capabilities with Russia would allay those concerns—or that the idea even makes any sense. Russia's perceptions of U.S. conventional strategic weapons. Russian officials are especially concerned about the U.S. Prompt Global Strike concept and do not trust American assurances that such capabilities are only directed at terrorists and rogue states. There has already been some progress made in dealing with these weapons in negotiations, and future progress on this issue will likely depend on legal agreements and confidence-building measures to scale U.S. capabilities in ways that would threaten Russia's (or China's) strategic deterrent. Joint development of ballistic missile defenses with Russia. This issue could seriously complicate Washington's and Moscow's strategic relations with China and India. Officials on both sides would do well to start small and proceed step-by-step, using incremental successes to build the momentum necessary to work through more difficult issues. Non-strategic—that is, tactical—nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, the United States and Europe relied on tactical nuclear weapons to counterbalance Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces in Europe; today, the situation is reversed, with Moscow relying on tactical nuclear weapons as a counterbalance not only to NATO conventional superiority but also to U.S. strategic nuclear superiority and long-range precision-guided weapons. No one now knows which weapons systems should be categorized as non-strategic, and how limits across regions could be accounted for and verified. In addition, reviving the moribund Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is essential to dealing with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Washington, and Moscow

56. Good News and Bad News from the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Donald P. Gregg
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
The good news out of the Koreas is that President Barack Obama, as no other president before him, has recognized that South Korea is America's most reliable and active ally in Asia. The President mentioned South Korea in his January 25 State of the Union speech far more than any other country, praising its teachers, its technical prowess, its growing economic status, and urging quick ratification of the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement. If any further proof of Seoul's current status was needed, David Sanger in The New York Times of February 20, 2011, said flatly, “South Korea…is now Washington's favorite ally in Asia.”
Topic:
Economics and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
United States, New York, Washington, Asia, South Korea, and Sinai Peninsula

57. Palestinian Reconciliation: Plus ÇA Change...

Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Hamas and Fatah surprised all with their announcement of a reconciliation accord. What had been delayed since Hamas took over Gaza in 2007 and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas asked Salam Fayyad to form a government in the West Bank was done in Cairo in hours. Shock was matched by uncertainty over what had been agreed and the course it would take. Would the factions produce a national strategy and unify fractured institutions? Or would the agreement codify the status quo? Even some of the more pessimistic scenarios were optimistic. Reconciliation stumbled at its first hurdle, naming a prime minister – though that is not the only divisive issue. Neither side wants to admit failure, so the accord is more likely to be frozen than renounced, leaving the door slightly ajar for movement. Palestinian parties but also the U.S. and Europe need to recognise that reconciliation is necessary to both minimise the risk of Israeli-Palestinian violence and help produce a leader- ship able to reach and implement peace with Israel.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Treaties and Agreements, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Arab Countries

58. Korea, Colombia, Panama: Pending Trade Accords Offer Economic and Strategic Gains for the United States

Author:
Mauricio Cá¡rdenas and Joshua Meltzer
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
A trio of trade agreements now pending before Congress would benefit the United States both economically and strategically. Carefully developed accords with South Korea, Colombia and Panama will boost U.S. exports significantly, especially in the key automotive, agricultural and commercial services sectors. Among the other benefits are: increased U.S. competitiveness enhancement of U.S. diplomatic and economic postures in East Asia and Latin America new investment opportunities better enforcement of labor regulation and improved transparency in these trading partners' regulatory systems.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, and Labor Issues
Political Geography:
Kenya, United States, Israel, Colombia, and Latin America

59. Where Do We Stand in the Field of Nuclear Disarmament: What Is Next After the New START

Author:
Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center
Abstract:
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement, without any doubt, has started a new debate on whether the international community has finally entered a renaissance in the field of disarmament after a long period of stalemate. In this regard, the New START agreement, together with the New York Nuclear Safety Summit of 2010 and the NPT Review Conference of 2010, seems to be creating a rather positive atmosphere. Yet, if one examines the discussions that took place at the US and the Russian parliament's before and after the ratification of the New START, he/she will come to the conclusion that the progress on nuclear disarmament, at the levels of both strategic and nonstrategic weapons, will not be an easy one. The situation will remain unchanged unless certain contentious military issues between Washington and Moscow are somehow resolved. In this regard, the next round of the New START agreement will be crucial. This situation will not only affect the future of the US and the Russian militaries' relationships to one another, but it will also change the balance of relations among the nuclear “haves” and “have nots” of the NPT Treaty. It is, therefore, expected that the NPT's two tracks, namely disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation, will be affected either in a positive or negative way in the future, depending on the evolution of the post New START era. Within this perspective, the possibility that US and Russia will implement new disarmament agreements has gained utmost importance in the aftermath of the New START for the future implications of the US President Barack Obama's “Global Zero Policy.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and New York

60. Proposed Liability Framework for Geological Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide

Author:
Wendy B. Jacobs
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Harvard Law School's Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic* supports immediate large-scale carbon capture and sequestration ("CCS") demonstration projects as part of a larger national and global effort to address climate change. Large-scale CCS projects (those that sequester at least 1.5 million tons of captured carbon dioxide ("CO2") annually) must be demonstrated soon to confirm CCS as a viable strategy to combat climate change and to show the commitment of the United States to achieving meaningful reductions in domestic CO2 emissions.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
United States