The World Trade Center's twin towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington were on Tuesday subjected to devastating terrorist attacks. The atrocities will prompt a wide-ranging review of US security and intelligence systems which, on Tuesday's evidence, failed spectacularly.
The US Supreme Court heard oral argument last month on whether 'medical necessity' should override the federal government's blanket prohibition on the use of marijuana. If the Court were to accept this argument, it would provide a powerful boost to the medical marijuana movement and hamper the federal government's ability to pursue its current drugs policy. A ruling in favour of the federal government, however, would constrain the ability of states to formulate independent drug policies. The Supreme Court is likely to sidestep the substantive issue of whether 'medical necessity' allows the distribution of marijuana to seriously ill patients. Its inclination will be to decide the case on a narrow procedural ground which would leave the federal government to decide if it wishes to pursue criminal prosecutions.
Congressional criticism of 'Plan Colombia's' military component, and the advent of a new administration in Washington, are likely to lead to a strategic review of US policy. The outcome may be a policy that is less military focused, more regionally oriented, and based on closer cooperation with other aid donors. It has become increasingly clear that Plan Colombia can only be implemented if the EU and its member states are prepared to increase their financial contribution. This will give the Europeans considerable leverage, and they are likely to use it to insist on a less militarised approach. However, even with a change in policy emphasis, the prospects of success will remain poor.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Colombia, and South America
In 1967, Louis Halle published a book called The Cold War as History. If that title seemed jarring and premature in 1967, it would simply appear obvious and conventional today. The Cold War is receding from our collective consciousness with breathtaking rapidity. Cold War encyclopedias are appearing; an Oxford Companion to the Cold War will doubtless arrive at any moment. To the college freshmen of 2000 — seven years old when Ronald Reagan left the White House — the Cold War is merely a chapter in a textbook, an hour on the History Channel, not lived experience.
This Report identifies strategic options available to the Bulgarian government and its defense industry, as well as the United States and its NATO partners, for transforming and repositioning the industry for the 21st century and facilitating its integration into the NATO and European Union industrial base. Since other Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries that are aspirants to NATO membership face similar difficulties concerning their defense industries, many of the recommendations herein apply to these countries as well. The report is based on numerous interviews with officials of government entities, private sector firms, and nongovernmental organizations and a review of pertinent governmental and private reports and original documents. A number of the members of the Atlantic Council's working group visited Bulgaria and several of its defense firms in April 2001. Given limitations of time and access to information, the report does not, however, attempt to set forth a thorough review of each firm in the Bulgarian industry.
C. Richard Nelson, Chas W. Freeman Jr., Wesley K. Clark, Max Cleland, Gordon Smith, and Robert L. Hutchings
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
With U.S. leadership, the Alliance has undertaken an impressive transformation over the past decade: from the July 1990 London Summit, which heralded a “Europe whole and free,” to the April 1999 Washington Summit, which welcomed three former Warsaw Pact members as new allies, even as NATO forces were engaged in combat for the first time. But the Alliance has not yet realized its full potential as an institution embracing all democratic nations of Europe dedicated to collective defense and embodying the interests and values of the transatlantic community. Moreover, the allies still confront important challenges to their shared goal of bringing lasting security to the European continent as a whole, as well as to the overall vitality of the transatlantic relationship.
The bush administration is requesting $343.2 billion for the Pentagon in Fiscal Year 2002. This is $32.6 billion above current levels, and includes the $14.2 billion increase requested for the military in the March budget release (see below). This total also includes $14.3 billion for the defense functions of the Department of Energy.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Defense Policy
To prove he is serious about National Missile Defense, President George W. Bush must abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty now, according to the most strident critics of the treaty. The longstanding ABM accord with Russia, it is said, is thwarting the technology needed for missile defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
The security environment in Asia has become highly complex since the end of the Cold War. A legacy from that superpower struggle still affects security relations, but what is surprising is the re-emergence of issues associated with World War II and before. Asians have long memories. Their injuries are not forgotten. Past history is just yesterday.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Defense Policy
Verifying nuclear disarmament is a complex technical process. This paper examines the techniques that could be used to verify future nuclear weapon reductions and analyzes the motivation for the nuclear states to accept deep weapon cuts and the prospect for future nuclear reductions. To allow large nuclear reductions and assure credible verification, several steps are suggested in this paper: all nuclear warheads should be registered and tagged; the total inventories of plutonium and high-enriched uranium as well as the fissile cores dismantled from the warheads should be verified; the nuclear delivery vehicles and launcher numbers and types should be monitored as outlined in the START and INF treaties; and agreed nuclear-capable delivery vehicle production should also be monitored.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction