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51. No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security, Thomas M. Nichols

Author:
Todd S. Sechser
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
At around 5,000 total warheads, the U.S. nuclear stockpile today is a fraction of its former self. One therefore might presume that U.S. nuclear doctrine has undergone an equally significant transformation since the end of the Cold War. Thomas M. Nichols disabuses readers of this notion, showing how the machinery of “mutual assured destruction” remains predominant even though the world that spawned this doctrine disappeared with the Soviet Union. But this doctrine is now obsolete, Nichols argues. Deterrence no longer requires—if it ever did—an expansive nuclear inventory with diverse delivery platforms, a launch-on-warning alert posture, and convoluted targeting plans. In Nichols's view, a pocket-sized nuclear deterrent would be adequate. Yet U.S. strategy remains saddled with the costly baggage of an arms competition that ended a quarter-century ago. - See more at: http://www.psqonline.org/article.cfm?IDArticle=19347#sthash.Giq99dtz.dpuf
Topic:
Security, Cold War, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States and Soviet Union

52. Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions

Author:
Gene Gerzhoy
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
When does a nuclear-armed state's provision of security guarantees to a militarily threatened ally inhibit the ally's nuclear weapons ambitions? Although the established security model of nuclear proliferation posits that clients will prefer to depend on a patron's extended nuclear deterrent, this proposition overlooks how military threats and doubts about the patron's intentions encourage clients to seek nuclear weapons of their own. To resolve this indeterminacy in the security model's explanation of nuclear restraint, it is necessary to account for the patron's use of alliance coercion, a strategy consisting of conditional threats of military abandonment to obtain compliance with the patron's demands. This strategy succeeds when the client is militarily dependent on the patron and when the patron provides assurances that threats of abandonment are conditional on the client's nuclear choices. Historical evidence from West Germany's nuclear decisionmaking provides a test of this logic. Contrary to the common belief among nonproliferation scholars, German leaders persistently doubted the credibility and durability of U.S. security guarantees and sought to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent. Rather than preferring to renounce nuclear armament, Germany was compelled to do so by U.S. threats of military abandonment, contradicting the established logic of the security model and affirming the logic of alliance coercion.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Germany, and West Germany

53. Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation

Author:
Francis Gavin
Publication Date:
08-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The United States has gone to extraordinary lengths since the beginning of the nuclear age to inhibit—that is, to slow, halt, and reverse—the spread of nuclear weapons and, when unsuccessful, to mitigate the consequences. To accomplish this end, the United States has developed and implemented a wide range of tools, applied in a variety of combinations. These “strategies of inhibition” employ different policies rarely seen as connected to one another, from treaties and norms to alliances and security guarantees, to sanctions and preventive military action. The United States has applied these measures to friend and foe alike, often regardless of political orientation, economic system, or alliance status, to secure protection from nuclear attack and maintain freedom of action. Collectively, these linked strategies of inhibition have been an independent and driving feature of U.S. national security policy for more than seven decades, to an extent rarely documented or fully understood. The strategies of inhibition make sense of puzzles that neither containment nor openness strategies can explain, while providing critical insights into post–World War II history, theory, the causes of nuclear proliferation, and debates over the past, present, and future trajectory of U.S. grand strategy.
Topic:
National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Soviet Union, and Germany

54. Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy

Author:
Mark S. Bell
Publication Date:
08-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
What happens to the foreign policies of states when they acquire nuclear weapons? Despite its importance, this question has not been answered satisfactorily. Nuclear weapons can facilitate six conceptually distinct foreign policy behaviors: aggression, expansion, independence, bolstering, steadfastness, and compromise. This typology of foreign policy behaviors enables scholars to move beyond simple claims of “nuclear emboldenment,” and allows for more nuanced examination of the ways in which nuclear weapons affect the foreign policies of current and future nuclear states. The typology also sheds light on Great Britain's response to nuclear acquisition. Britain used nuclear weapons to engage in greater levels of steadfastness in responding to challenges, bolstering junior allies, and demonstrating independence from the United States, but it did not engage in greater levels of aggression, expansion, or compromise. The typology and the British case demonstrate the value of distinguishing among different effects of nuclear weapons acquisition, have implications for scholars' and policymakers' understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in international politics, and suggest avenues for future research.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States

55. Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why?

Author:
Ron E. Hassner and Jason Wittenberg
Publication Date:
08-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Fortified boundaries are asymmetrical, physical barriers placed along borders. These boundaries are more formidable in structure than conventional boundary lines, but less robust than militarized boundaries. Their goal is to impose costs on infiltrators and in so doing deter or impede infiltration. A novel dataset of all such boundaries worldwide shows that states are constructing these barriers at an accelerating rate. More than half of barrier builders are Muslim-majority states, and so are the vast majority of targets. A multivariate analysis demonstrates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, states that construct such barriers do not tend to suffer disproportionately from terrorism, nor are they apt to be involved in a significant number of territorial disputes. Instead, differences in state wealth and migration rates are the best predictors of barrier construction. Qualitative case studies suggest that the most effective fortified boundaries are found where the initiating state controls the territory beyond a boundary that blocks the only access route into the state.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Global Security
Political Geography:
United States, Soviet Union, and Mexico

56. Tehran Calling: Understanding a New Iranian Leadership

Author:
Cornelius Adebahr
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
After years of tension, sanctions, and deadlocked negotiations, Hassan Rouhani, Iran's relatively moderate new president, has provided an opening for improved relations between the Islamic Republic and the West. While Rouhani has not ushered in a new Iran, Tehran has adopted a more conciliatory tone on its nuclear program since he took office. This shift is more than just talk, but the West will have to carefully calibrate its response to determine whether Rouhani's changed rhetoric signals the beginning of a new direction for Iran.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Islam, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

57. U.S. and Japan: New Policies toward the Korean Situations

Author:
Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
The new national security leaders in Japan, the United States, China and the two Koreas have assumed office at a precarious time. Despite the recent relaxation of tensions, conditions are ripe for further conflict in Northeast Asia. The new DPRK leadership is as determined as its predecessor to possess nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles while resisting unification or reconciliation with South Korea and its allies. The new government in Tokyo is also augmenting its military capabilities. Meanwhile, despite Chinese efforts to restart the Six-Party Talks, the Obama administration has refused to engage with the DPRK until it demonstrates a willingness to end its nuclear weapons program and improving intra-Korean ties. But this policy of patiently waiting for verifiable changes in DPRK policies may be too passive in the face of North Korea' s growing military capabilities, leading the new South Korean government, striving to maneuver between Beijing and Washington, to consider new initiatives to restart a dialogue with the North even while reinforcing its own military capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Government, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

58. Nuclear Deterrence: The Wohlstetter-Blackett Debate Re-visited

Author:
Rajesh Basrur
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The Cold War debate between Albert Wohlstetter and Patrick Blackett over the requirements of effective deterrence is of profound relevance half a century later. The two thinkers offered systematic arguments for their maximalist (Wohlstetter) and minimalist (Blackett) positions. How we conceive of these requirements shapes the kinds of nuclear weapons doctrines, forces and postures we adopt. Whereas the Wohlstetter-Blackett debate was based largely on deductive logic, the opposing arguments can today be assessed on the basis of evidence drawing from nearly seven decades of strategic behaviour between nuclear rivals. An analysis of major confrontations in five nuclear dyads – United States-Soviet Union, United States-China, Soviet Union-China, India-Pakistan, and United States-North Korea – clearly offers much stronger support for Blackett?s minimalist case than for Wohlstetter?s maximalist one. Effective deterrence does not require second-strike capability as defined by Wohlstetter and the nuclear balance has no effect on a state?s capacity to deter. Consequently, the central tenets of orthodox nuclear deterrence theory and doctrine are shown to be without foundation. For policymakers, the optimal forces and postures required for effective deterrence are therefore less demanding and the hurdles in the path of arms control and at least partial disarmament less difficult to cross.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, China, India, and North Korea

59. Governing Uranium in the United States

Author:
Sharon Squassoni, Robert Kim, Stephanie Cooke, and Jacob Greenberg
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) participated in a global project on uranium governance led by the Danish Institute for International Studies that looks at uranium accountability and control in 17 uranium- producing countries. The project seeks to identify governance gaps and provide policy recommendations for improving front- end transparency, security, and regulation. The impetus for the project is the concern that monitoring activities at the front end—uranium mining, milling, and conversion—could be strengthened.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, International Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States

60. Nuclear Notes

Author:
Sarah Weiner
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence has been a central element of U.S. national security policy. The United States' nuclear guarantee became the foundation of its security strategy and that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was created to deter the Soviet Union and served as a core part of the alliance's victorious emergence from the Cold War. Just as many questioned the purpose of the alliance after the Cold War, many allies along with the United States currently debate the continued role of U.S. nuclear deterrence in Europe.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States and Europe