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292. The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material
- Author:
- Matthew Bunn
- Publication Date:
- 03-2000
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Nothing could be more central to U.S. and world security than ensuring that nuclear warheads and their essential ingredients—plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)—do not fall into the hands of terrorists or proliferating states. If plutonium and HEU become regularly available on a nuclear black market, nothing else we do to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons will succeed. Similarly, unless stockpiles of nuclear warheads and fissile materials can be secured, monitored, and verifiably reduced, it will be impossible to achieve deep, transparent, and irreversible reductions in nuclear arms. Measures to control warheads and fissile materials, therefore, are central to the entire global effort to reduce nuclear arms and stem their spread. The tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of plutonium and HEU that remain in the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles represent a deadly legacy of the Cold War, and managing them securely must be a top U.S. security policy priority.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Terrorism
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia
293. Arms Control and Missile Defense: Not Mutually Exclusive
- Author:
- Charles V. Peña
- Publication Date:
- 07-2000
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- Traditionally, strategic offensive arms control and ballistic missile defense have been viewed as mutually exclusive. During the Cold War, the general belief was that anti–ballistic missile (ABM) systems would call into question the ability of the superpowers to successfully survive a first nuclear strike and inflict sufficient damage with a second strike. That is, missile defense could allow one superpower to launch a first strike and then use its defenses to intercept a second strike with the other superpower's surviving warheads—thereby undermining deterrence and stability. Furthermore, the thinking was that this situation would result in a dangerous offensive arms race as each side sought to counter the effects of the other's defenses.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia
294. China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment
- Author:
- Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts
- Publication Date:
- 04-2000
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- Historically, U.S. nuclear strategists and arms control experts have paid little attention to the People's Republic of China (PRC). China has not been a major factor in the U.S. nuclear calculus, which has remained centered on U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals as the principal framework for arms control and arms reductions. Yet today China is the only one of the five de jure nuclear weapons states qualitatively and quantitatively expanding its nuclear arsenal.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia
295. Overthrowing Saddam Hussein: The Policy Debate
- Author:
- Max Singer
- Publication Date:
- 03-2000
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- Abstract:
- Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator, has biological weapons capable of killing hundreds of thousands of Israelis with infectious diseases such as anthrax. These weapons could be delivered either by missiles, by small pilotless planes, or by infecting the passengers of a plane landing at Ben-Gurion Airport with less than an ounce of agent spread through the plane's air conditioning system. Saddam also has at least several nuclear weapons that are missing only highly enriched uranium which he is likely to be able either to make himself or to buy this year.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- United States and Middle East
296. Preventing a Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia
- Author:
- David Cortright and Samina Ahmed
- Publication Date:
- 01-2000
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame
- Abstract:
- The United States must unequivocally demand that India and Pakistan join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states. The United States should retain punitive sanctions which target Indian and Pakistani institutions and policymakers responsible for their nuclear weapons programs. Targeted incentives should be provided that seek to diminish internal support for nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. The United States should fulfill its obligation under Article VI of the NPT to achieve global nuclear disarmament.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- United States and South Asia
297. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Next Steps
- Author:
- Thomas Jr. Graham and Christopher Chyba
- Publication Date:
- 07-2000
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International Security and Cooperation
- Abstract:
- Dr. Sid Drell: With the end of the Cold War there's been a major change in the U.S. nuclear weapons program, because the continuous cycle of developing and testing and deploying new warheads has ended. President George Bush announced in 1992 that we have no need for new nuclear weapons designs for deployment. It was this decision that, of course, opened the possibility of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which is why we now have a Stockpile Stewardship Program with the three requirements: we must maintain an enduring stockpile that's reliable, effective and safe for the indefinite future without nuclear explosive testing; we must maintain competence in nuclear weapons; and we must retain a technical capability and a manufacturing infrastructure in order to respond if required to any change in strategic circumstances. This will be one of the factors in our net assessment of whether to enter a CTBT.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, International Law, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- United States
298. The U.S. Enlargement Strategy and Nuclear Weapons
- Author:
- Michael M. May
- Publication Date:
- 03-2000
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International Security and Cooperation
- Abstract:
- The United States is often accused of lacking a global security strategy. The United States, so the accusation goes, makes foreign policy and security decisions on an ad-hoc basis, prompted by the demands of politics and pressure groups, and in alternating bursts of idealism and realpolitik. Since none of these factors can safely be dismissed, there has to be something to the accusation. In an unpredictable world, a certain respect for the ad hoc may even be a good thing: a global strategy, carried out without regard to circumstances, would confine the United States to a conceptual straitjacket, depriving it of needed flexibility.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- United States
299. A Verification Regime for Warhead Control
- Author:
- Liu Suping
- Publication Date:
- 01-2000
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International Security and Cooperation
- Abstract:
- After a brief period of progress, the U.S.-Russian nuclear reduction process has reached a stalemate. This situation causes us to rethink the following issues: What is the motivation for the two nuclear superpowers to conduct nuclear reductions? How can the focus of the nuclear arms reduction process be changed from verification of reduction of delivery vehicles to verification of reduction of warheads and nuclear materials? What is the objective for future nuclear reductions? What kind of verification regime will be required for future nuclear reductions?
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia
300. Defending America: Redefining the Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defense
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 09-2000
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- There is a wide spectrum of potential threats to the American homeland that do not involve the threat of overt attacks by states using long-range missiles or conventional military forces. Such threats include covert attacks by state actors, state use of proxies, independent terrorist and extremist attacks by foreign groups or individuals, and independent terrorist and extremist attacks by residents of the US. These threats are currently limited in scope and frequency. No pattern of actual attacks on US territory has yet emerged that provides a clear basis for predicting how serious any given form of attack will be in the future, what means of attack will be used, or how lethal new forms of attack will be if they are successful.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Political Geography:
- United States and America