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Begin New Search Topic Nuclear Weapons Political Geography United States

171. Technical Challenges Associated with the New U.S. Nuclear Agenda

Author:
Jessica Yeats
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
At the 3 November 2009 SNL-LLNL-CSIS workshop, participants identified a number of key technical challenges and opportunities associated with Congress and the Obama Administration's new U.S. nuclear agenda. These key judgments can be distributed into four principal issue areas: 1) broad policy considerations; 2) challenges and opportunities facing the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise; 3) challenges and opportunities facing monitoring and verification; and 4) challenges and opportunities in cooperative threat and risk reduction. Within each sub-set, participants identified challenges that are common to nuclear futures ranging from a world without nuclear weapons to a highly proliferated world, as well as those challenges that are unique to a particular future.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States

172. Extended Deterrence and Iran

Author:
Shahram Chubin
Publication Date:
01-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Strategic Insights
Institution:
Center for Contemporary Conflict
Abstract:
Despite nearly seven decades of Nuclear weapons, (NWs) and four decades of Cold war in which they figured prominently, we still do not know very much about, or with any degree of assurance, what NWs can and cannot do beyond create widespread destruction. Questions about deterrence, extended deterrence and the political utility of NWs and whether these are general propositions/ laws or culturally or state specific, cannot be reliably answered.
Topic:
Cold War and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

173. Reframing Nuclear De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals

Publication Date:
10-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
Nearly twenty years after the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States continue to maintain hundreds of nuclear weapons capable of striking the other side, and to have at least some of these nuclear forces at Cold War levels of alert, that is, ready to fire within a few minutes of receiving an order to do so. Even during the Cold War, alert levels were not static and moved up or down in step with changes in the strategic and tactical environments. While the operational readiness of some weapon systems has been reduced, there has been no major change in the readiness levels of most of the nuclear weapon systems in the post–Cold War era. This is in considerable part because Russia and the United States believe that despite fundamental changes in their overall relationship, vital interest requires maintaining a high level of nuclear deterrence. The post–Cold War experience also demonstrates that alert levels can be reduced and measures can be taken to reduce the risk of accidents or unauthorized takeover of nuclear weapons. Further measures could be taken to reduce operational readiness of nuclear arsenals. U.S. and Russian experts alike stressed survivability as a key element in the acceptance of these measures because of its importance to maintaining deterrence.
Topic:
Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and United Nations

174. Turkey's Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament

Author:
Henri J. Barkey
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In principle, Turkey would welcome the global elimination of nuclear weapons. For the current government, the possession of nuclear weapons by other states is a factor that, indirectly at least, reduces Turkey's regional (if not global) aspirations and power. However, in the medium term, it remains deeply ambivalent on the future of nuclear weapons and its own plans regarding nuclear energy and weapons development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Turkey, and Germany

175. Achieving Peace and Security in Korea and Northeast Asia: A New U.S. Diplomatic Strategy toward North Korea

Publication Date:
02-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The Atlantic Council promotes constructive U.S. leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in meeting the international challenges of the 21st century.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Asia, and Korea

176. Diplomacy and Security in the Twenty-first Century

Author:
Janne E. Nolan
Publication Date:
01-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:
The findings of this first phase of our inquiry raised many questions about how the United States might improve discourse among intelligence and policy professionals in ways that could advance U.S. security interests in the twenty-first century. We were fortunate to receive additional support from The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation in 2006 to expand our study, allowing us to focus on the use of diplomatic engagement to protect against emerging security threats to U.S. interests—specifically on the spread of nuclear capabilities among new regional powers. The major purpose of this second inquiry is to examine whether diplomatic engagement is feasible and effective for addressing twenty-first century security challenges and to develop different examples of what such challenges might require.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Intelligence, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States

177. Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Author:
Nikolai Sokov, Miles A. Pomper, and William Potter
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Control of tractical nuclear weapons (TNW) has remained an elusive goal since the early 1990s when the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia adopted a set of unilateral parallel political obligations to reduce and store at central locations the larger part of their TNW forces. Efforts by the international community to nudge the two countries to give these unilateral statements a legally binding, verifiable character did not succeed, and one can point to little headway with respect TNW arms control in the intervening 18years.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Soviet Union

178. Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism

Author:
Michael A. Levi
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Policymakers consistently identify nuclear terrorism as one of the greatest threats facing the United States and the world. Indeed, the diffusion of technology, the rise of extremist ideology, and the steady spread of nuclear materials conspire to make nuclear terrorism an increasingly worrying prospect.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, New York, and Washington

179. Iran Says “No”—Now What?

Author:
George Perkovich
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Neither Iran nor the United States can achieve all it wants in the current nuclear standoff. Iran has demonstrated its unwillingness to comply with IAEA and UN Security Council demands to cease its enrichment activities or to negotiate seriously toward that end. The United States and other interlocutors should offer Iran a last chance to negotiate a suspension of its enrichment program until the IAEA can resolve outstanding issues in return for substantial incentives. If that package were rejected, the P-5 plus Germany should withdraw the incentives and commit to maintaining sanctions as long as Iran does not comply with IAEA demands. Simultaneously, the U.S. should take force “off the table” as long as Iran is not newly found to be seeking nuclear weapons or committing aggression.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Organization, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

180. Special Report No. 205: Why We Should Still Study the Cuban Missile Crisis

Author:
Michael Dobbs
Publication Date:
06-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Some scholars have questioned the utility of studying the Cuban missile crisis as a model for executive decision making during times of crisis, arguing that it offers little guidance for policymakers today. Many accounts of the missile crisis are incomplete, inaccurate, and too narrowly focused on the “rational actors” at the center of the drama while overlooking the “irrational actors.” Nonetheless, the Cuban missile crisis remains the best-documented study of presidential decision making at a time of supreme national danger. It offers policymakers and students of history unique insights into the interplay between the debates in the Oval Office and fast-moving events in the rest of the world. For decades, the Cuban missile crisis has been studied and analyzed as a case study in presidential power and crisis management. It is better understood as an example of the limits of presidential power and the haphazard returns of crisis management. The missile crisis illustrates the sometimes pivotal role of personality in politics. Had someone else been president in October 1962, the outcome could have been very different.
Topic:
Cold War, International Political Economy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States and Cuba