Search

Begin New Search Topic Nuclear Weapons Political Geography United States

131. Going Critical: Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Reactor Starts Up

Author:
Simon Henderson and Stefanie Peterson
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
At a ceremony near the southern Iranian coastal city of Bushehr this Saturday, Russia will begin the process of loading fuel rods into Iran's first civilian nuclear reactor. Theoretically distinct from the rest of the regime's disturbing nuclear program, the Bushehr plant nevertheless remains a major international concern. The low-enriched uranium in the fuel rods would, if diverted, substantially increase Iran's existing stock of the material, which many suspect is already being used to develop nuclear weapons. Even if they were used solely for electricity generation, the rods would eventually produce plutonium-rich residue that could also be reprocessed for use in a weapon. For Iran, the Bushehr event will be a gesture of defiance against U.S.-led international pressure; for Russia, a sign of Moscow's different diplomatic approach to the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran; and for the United States, an exception to the tightening sanctions regime, which officials claim is forcing Tehran to reconsider the wisdom of its policies.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and Moscow

132. President Obama's Cairo Speech: A First-Year Scorecard

Author:
J. Scott Carpenter and Dina Guirguis
Publication Date:
06-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Although likely eclipsed in the media by recent Israeli naval action against blockade runners, the first anniversary of President Obama's much-quoted address in Cairo occurs on June 4. In his remarks, described as a "new beginning," he identified seven issues at the heart of tensions between the United States and the world's 1.2 billion Muslims: the need to confront violent extremism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iran's drive to obtain nuclear weapons, democracy, religious freedom, women's rights, and economic development. For each issue, the president indicated where American action was required. On violent extremism, for instance, he highlighted his decision to close the Guantanamo Bay detention center within the year. Given that two issues -- the Arab-Israeli peace process and Iranian nuclear issue -- have garnered the lion's share of attention over the past year, it is timely and useful to assess progress on the other five.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Israel, and Egypt

133. Three Critical Weeks in the Middle East: Insights into U.S. Policy

Author:
Robert Satloff
Publication Date:
06-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
It is important to recall that the Gaza incident had the unintended consequence of wiping from the headlines much discussion about the U.S. decision to accede to the final resolution of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference. Indeed, if Gaza had not occurred, there would be much more intense focus on how the decision to acquiesce in a deeply flawed NPT document gave clarity to the administration's priorities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and Israel

134. Smaller is Safer: A New Plan for Nuclear Postures

Author:
Bruce Blair, Valery Yarynich, Matthew McKinzie, Victor Esin, and Pavel Zolotarev
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
On April 8, sitting beside each other in Prague Castle, U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Just two days earlier, the Obama administration had issued its Nuclear Posture Review, only the third such comprehensive assessment of the United States' nuclear strategy. And in May, as a gesture of openness at the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in New York, the U.S. government took the remarkable step of making public the size of its nuclear stockpile, which as of September 2009 totaled 5,113 warheads. For proponents of eliminating nuclear weapons, these events elicited both a nod and a sigh. On the one hand, they represented renewed engagement by Washington and Moscow on arms control, a step toward, as the treaty put it, "the historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat." On the other hand, they stopped short of fundamentally changing the Cold War face of deterrence. The New START agreement did not reduce the amount of "overkill" in either country's arsenal. Nor did it alter another important characteristic of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals: their launch-ready alert postures. The two countries' nuclear command, control, and communication systems, and sizable portions of their weapon systems, will still be poised for "launch on warning" -- ready to execute a mass firing of missiles before the quickest of potential enemy attacks could be carried out. This rapid-fire posture carries with it the risk of a launch in response to a false alarm resulting from human or technical error or even a malicious, unauthorized launch. Thus, under the New START treaty, the United States and Russia remain ready to inflict apocalyptic devastation in a nuclear exchange that would cause millions of casualties and wreak unfathomable environmental ruin. In the next round of arms control negotiations, Washington and Moscow need to pursue much deeper cuts in their nuclear stockpiles and agree to a lower level of launch readiness. These steps would help put the world on a path to the elimination of nuclear weapons -- "global zero." And they can be taken while still maintaining a stable relationship of mutual deterrence between the United States and Russia, based on a credible threat of retaliation, and while allowing limited but adequate missile defenses against nuclear proliferators such as Iran and North Korea.
Topic:
Cold War and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, North Korea, and Moscow

135. Toward Deeper Reductions in U.S. and Russian Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Micah Zenko
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
President Barack Obama has made reductions in the United States' nuclear arsenal and a decreased reliance on nuclear weapons major foreign policy priorities for his administration. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), signed in April 2010 by President Obama and Russia's president, Dmitry Medvedev, represents concrete movement toward these goals—goals that both presidents share. This follow-on accord to the 1991 START Treaty limits the United States and Russia to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear and conventional war - heads, 800 strategic launchers, and 700 deployed strategic missiles and bombers. Yet while the New START Treaty represents a substantial decrease from Cold War levels, the United States will retain around 2,000 deployed strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and Russia will maintain approximately 3,500 deployed strategic and tactical nuclear weapons—which together will constitute over 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia and United States

136. "No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy"

Author:
Michael S. Gerson
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
A persistent theme in U.S. nuclear weapons policy is that the United States has always retained the option to use nuclear weapons first in conflict. The threat of nuclear first use played a key role in NATO's military strategy throughout the Cold War, and even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, successive U.S. administrations have retained—implicitly or explicitly—the first-use option. Yet, in a speech in Prague on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama pledged to “put an end to Cold War thinking” and to “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same.” This commitment, coupled with President Obama's embrace of the vision of a nuclear weapons–free world, appeared to foreshadow important changes in U.S. nuclear policy— especially declaratory policy—in the administration's much-anticipated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States

137. "China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure"

Author:
M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
On October 16, 1964, China exploded its first nuclear weapon at the Lop Nor test facility in Xinjiang. China's subsequent development of its nuclear strategy and force structure presents a puzzle for scholars and policymakers alike. Following its initial development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities, China built a small, unsophisticated, and, arguably, highly vulnerable nu - clear force. In addition, for more than three decades, the pace of China's nuclear modernization efforts was slow and gradual despite the continued vulnerability of its force. In relative terms, China's nuclear forces were far smaller and less diverse than those of the United States or the Soviet Union both during and after the Cold War. At the same time, China did not develop detailed operational doctrine for overcoming its relative inferiority, let alone for the effective use of its arsenal. Such a nuclear posture called into question the credibility of China's ability to deter states with much larger arsenals, more refined doctrines, and more powerful conventional military forces. In retrospect, the degree of vulnerability that China was willing to accept after developing nuclear weapons is striking.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States and China

138. Al Qaeda's Religious Justification of Nuclear Terrorism

Author:
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
When legendary jihadist Abdullah Azzam was assassinated under mysterious circumstances in November 1989, suspects in his murder included Osama bin Laden and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. After the Soviets were expelled from Afghanistan, Azzam sought to shift jihad to his homeland, Palestine. Zawahiri sought to focus the jihad on Egypt and the other secular Muslim states, in hopes of restoring the caliphate, the rule of Islamic clerics, which had ended after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. After Islamic rule had been re-established in the Islamic world, Zawahiri wrote, “then history would make a new turn, God willing, in the opposite direction against the empire of the United States and the world's Jewish government.”
Topic:
Islam, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Palestine, Egypt, and Assam

139. Taming the Revisionist State: The Effects of Military Defeats on the War-Proneness of Germany vs. Iraq

Author:
Benjamin Miller and Moran Mandalbaum
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:
Following the post - 2003 US intervention in Iraq, and with a potential US use of force against Iran, one key analytical question stands out, which has major policy implications: Does military defeat by the great powers have stabilizing or de - stabilizing effects on the aggressive behavior of revisionist states? Somewhat similarly to the pre - 2003 Iraq invasion debate, the great powers have a number of options for dealing with the potential Iranian nuclear threat: diplomatic engagement, deterrence, or resort to military power -- either to bring about a regime change, or to destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities. Taking into account the possibility of resorting to force against Iran, an intriguing question emerges: what does IR theory lead us to expect -- and what does the historical record show -- with regard to the effects of military defeats on the war - propensity of revisionist states? In other words, why do some militarily defeated states become war - like, while others peaceful?
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Regime Change
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Germany

140. Deter and Assure: Charting a Course for America's Asian Alliances in a New Nuclear Age

Author:
Tim Sullivan
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
As home to a number of the world's most dynamic economies, two rising powers, and six nuclear states, Asia is a region of enormous strategic importance to the United States. For over six decades, America has functioned as the preeminent power in Asia, playing a vital role in providing security and ensuring a stable balance of power that has allowed the region's states to flourish politically and economically. The U.S. security framework in the region has rested historically upon a series of bilateral alliances and strategic partnerships. The arrangement has impressively stood the test of time despite concerns that the lack of an overarching, multilateral security architecture would lead to inefficiencies in the United States' pursuit of regional stability.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Emerging Markets, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States and Asia