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121. The Dangers of Nuclear Iran

Author:
Eric S. Edelman and Evan Braden Montgomery
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Iran's acquisition of a nuclear bomb would upend the Middle East. It is unclear how a nuclear-armed Iran would weigh the costs, benefits, and risks of brinkmanship, meaning that it could be difficult to deter Tehran from attacking the United States' interests or partners in the region.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

122. Russia's Revival: Ambitions, Limitations, and Opportunities for the United States

Author:
John W. Parker
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Independent Russia is approaching the start of its third decade of post-Soviet existence. After the economic chaos of the Boris Yeltsin decade and the recovery and stabilization of the Vladimir Putin decade, Russia's leaders have high ambitions for a return to great power status in the years ahead. Their aspirations are tempered, however, by the realities of Russia's social, economic, and military shortcomings and vulnerabilities, laid painfully bare by the stress test of the recent global financial crisis. Looking ahead, some also calculate that Russia will be increasingly challenged in the Far East by a rising China and in the Middle East by an Iran that aspires to regional hegemony.
Topic:
Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, International Affairs, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
Russia and United States

123. Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications

Author:
Richard B. Andres and Hanna L. Breetz
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
In recent years, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has become in - creasingly interested in the potential of small (less than 300 megawatts electric [MWe]) nuclear reactors for military use. 1 DOD's attention to small reactors stems mainly from two critical vulnerabilities it has identified in its infrastructure and operations: the dependence of U.S. military bases on the fragile civilian electrical grid, and the challenge of safely and reliably supplying energy to troops in forward operating locations. DOD has responded to these challenges with an array of initiatives on energy efficiency and renewable and alternative fuels. Unfortunately, even with massive investment and ingenuity, these initiatives will be insufficient to solve DOD's reliance on the civilian grid or its need for convoys in forward areas. The purpose of this paper is to explore the prospects for addressing these critical vulnerabilities through small-scale nuclear plants.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

124. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Strategic Asset or Unusable Liability?

Author:
M. Elaine Bunn and Vincent A. Manzo
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) concept calls for a U.S. capability to deliver conventional strikes anywhere in the world in approximately an hour. The logic of the CPGS concept is straight - forward. The United States has global security commitments to deter and respond to a diverse spectrum of threats, ranging from terrorist organizations to near-peer competitors. The United States might need to strike a time-sensitive target protected by formidable air defenses or located deep inside enemy territory. Small, high-value targets might pop up without warning in remote or sensitive areas, potentially precluding the United States from responding to the situation by employing other conventional weapons systems, deploying Special Operations Forces (SOF), or relying on the host country.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Debt, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

125. China and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review

Author:
Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China is increasingly factored into U.S. nuclear strategy. When President Obama released the administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)—a document that guides America's nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities, and force posture for the next five to ten years—in April 2010, China was named 36 times. By contrast, China was barely mentioned in the last NPR completed in 2002. The United States expressed its desire to enhance strategic stability with China, but there needs to be a better understanding of how China perceives America's nuclear posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Israel

126. The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy: The Case for No First Use

Author:
Michael S. Gerson
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Despite heightened expectations for significant change in U.S. nuclear policy—especially declaratory policy— the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review changes little from the past. The NPR's declaratory policy retains the option for the United States to use nuclear weapons first in a variety of circumstances, including in a first strike against Chinese, North Korean, Russian, and (perhaps) future Iranian nuclear forces. Equally important, the United States can threaten the first use of nuclear weapons to deter and, if necessary, respond, to a variety of nonnuclear contingencies, including large-scale conventional aggression by another nuclear power such as China or Russia and chemical or biological weapons (CBW) attacks from states such as Iran and North Korea.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, and North Korea

127. Strengthening the IAEA: How the Nuclear Watchdog Can Regain Its Bark

Author:
Gregory L. Schulte
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The United States has a great interest in the success of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), given the important role it can play in reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Stalled investigations of Iran and Syria have put the credibility of the IAEA at stake. The agency detected neither Iran’s hidden uranium enrichment facility near Qom nor the reactor being constructed by Syria near al Kibar. These examples underscore the importance of strengthening the agency’s verification capability, by both increasing its authority and sharing more information. The IAEA can also help shape the global growth of nuclear power, ensuring the highest levels of safety and security, while discouraging the spread of sensitive technologies that can be misused to build nuclear weapons. The IAEA Board of Governors’ recent decision to establish a nuclear fuel bank in Russia is a step in the right direction. Success requires a new “Spirit of Vienna”—a willingness of delegates to work toward consensus on even difficult topics—surrounding the agency’s important role in nonproliferation. It also requires a conscious effort by the new Director General to remove the politics from IAEA business and return the agency to its technical mandate.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Iran, Syria, and Vienna

128. Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent

Author:
John P. Caves, Jr.
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The United States needs to modernize and ensure the long-term reliability and respon¬siveness of its aging nuclear deterrent force and nuclear weapons infrastructure. It cannot otherwise safely reduce its nuclear weapons, responsibly ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, confidently deter and contain challenges from rising or resurgent nuclear-armed near peers, and effectively dissuade allies and partners from acquiring their own nuclear weapons. Modernization is fundamental to avoiding a future crisis of confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent..
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

129. Ahmadinezhad's Bomb Rhetoric: Opportunities for U.S. Policy

Author:
Patrick Clawson
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On July 31, according to Iran's semiofficial Mehr News Agency, presidential chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashai claimed that the West had raised no objections to President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad's open proclamation that the Islamic Republic could build a nuclear bomb. How should this surprising claim be interpreted? And what implications might it hold for Iran's domestic politics, especially when viewed alongside Ahmadinezhad's history of confrontational rhetoric?
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Politics, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

130. Internal Divisions among Iranian Hardliners Come to the Fore

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
During an August 9 visit to Syria, Ali Akbar Velayati, influential advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, stated that Iran is ready to negotiate with the United States regarding its nuclear program. Yesterday, however, Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast announced that Iran has no plans for bilateral negotiation with Washington. These and other conflicting signals point to deep internal divisions among former allies in Iran's hardline camp. Such divisions are part of a longstanding pattern in the Islamic Republic: as soon as one faction seizes power by cutting out its opponents, it splits into warring parties.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Syria