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111. Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security

Author:
Micah D. Lowenthal
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The history of science diplomacy for nuclear security is rich and includes, for example, establishing confidence in the verifiability of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, paving the way to many nonproliferation efforts, and damping potentially drastic responses to actions perceived by adversaries as provocative. The ingredients for success in science diplomacy may be summarized in terms of seven factors: openness to new possibilities, vision and leadership, good science, human connections, communication, time, and self-interest. Experts from Russia and the United States have identified topics that would benefit from or demand science diplomacy: nuclear energy and nonproliferation, nuclear arms reductions, countering nuclear terrorism, cooperation on ballistic missile defense, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Differing perspectives on goals in these areas, however, provide new opportunities to work together to promote security. A variety of policy measures and physical safeguards have been put in place to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Because of the technical complexities of nearly every aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle and its potential for exploitation and terrorism, science diplomacy can continue to make substantial contributions on these topics. Verification of treaties, including nuclear arms reductions and test bans, is perhaps the topic within arms control most susceptible to technical options. Joint exploration and development of technical options to enable proposals for verification of treaties is a valuable topic in which science diplomacy has an essential role to play. Cooperation on ballistic missile defense (BMD) is an area of tension between the United States and Russia today. Such cooperation has technical and political dimensions. So far, the political discussions have resurfaced underlying suspicions, suggesting that science diplomacy is the stronger option for building confidence and identifying technical options that enable BMD cooperation. Although the Cold War is over, the variety of nuclear and other threats has grown, and science diplomacy is needed now more than ever to address those threats. Science diplomacy practitioners who are daunted by the sensitivity of the topics of the day must remember the successes in science diplomacy between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning nuclear weapons. The topics are important in part because they are so sensitive, and today's generations owe it to future generations to take on the challenge of science diplomacy to address the new and vexing security challenges the world faces in the twenty-first century.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia and United States

112. Arms Control and Proliferation Challenges to the Reset Policy

Author:
Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
This monograph was presented at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)-Carnegie Council conference connected with the Council's U.S. Global Engagement Program. In this case, the engagement in question is with Russia, and this monograph specifically addressed the issues of how those aspects of the reset policy with Moscow that concern arms control and proliferation are proceeding. It duly addresses the question of whether further reductions in strategic offensive weapons are likely anytime soon, i.e., is it possible to go beyond the parameters in the recently signed and so-called New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaty with respect to reductions. Other critical issues involve the issues of missile defenses that Moscow vehemently opposes and the question of tactical or nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) wishes to have Russia reduce.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, North Atlantic, and Moscow

113. Forecasting Zero: U.S. Nuclear History and the Low Probability of Disarmament

Author:
Jonathan Pearl
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
When four luminaries of U.S. policymaking—Cold Warriors, all—penned a 2007 op-ed calling for global nuclear disarmament, a shock wave emanated through the policy community in Washington and abroad. Had age or the stress of public life finally taken its toll on these elder statesmen? How could the goal of disarmament be practically achieved? Was their plea, in fact, a cynical ploy to strengthen a conventionally dominant United States? Were not communist sympathizers, naïve world government types, or a periodically randy anti-nuclear movement the only ones who took disarmament seriously? Perhaps most important, did their statement reflect a convergence of sentiment in the United States in favor of abolition? Might the United States abolish nuclear weapons in our lifetime?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

114. Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Author:
Stephen J. Blank (ed.)
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
As of November 2010, the so-called “New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty)” treaty between the United States and Russia that was signed in Prague, Czech Republic, on April 8, 2010, awaits a ratification vote in the Senate. Regardless of the arguments pro and con that have emerged since it was signed, it is clear that the outcome of the ratification vote will not only materially affect the Obama administration's reset policy towards Russia, but also the strategic nuclear forces of both signatories. Indeed, throughout the Cold War, both sides built up their forces based on what each was thought to have or be building. Although the Bush administration (2001-09) rhetorically announced its intention to sever this mutual hostage relationship, it failed in that regard. As a result, critical aspects of that relationship still survive in Russia's orientation to the United States and in the language of the treaty, especially in its preamble, which explicitly affirms a link between nuclear offense and defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Czech Republic

115. The Political Ontology of Catastrophe: Inventing the Vulnerable Society, 1953-1958

Author:
Stephen J. Collier
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The New School Graduate Program in International Affairs
Abstract:
This paper explores “system vulnerability thinking” as a specific response to the exigencies of thermonuclear war in the 1950s. It is one part of a collaborative project with Andrew Lakoff on the government of catastrophe in the post - World War II United States. The project focuses on the forms of expertise, the knowledge practices, and the governmental institutions that have been invented to anticipate and manage potential catastrophes, from natural disasters, to pandemic disease, to terrorism, to energy crises. In this project we have identified the reconfiguration of US government in the early years of the Cold War as a crucial moment in which the government of catastrophe in the post - World War II US took shape.
Topic:
Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, War, and History
Political Geography:
United States

116. Paradox of Power: Sino American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability

Author:
David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Book
Abstract:
The United States and China each have or will soon have the ability to inflict grave harm upon the other by nuclear attack, attacks on satellites, or attacks on computer networks. Paradoxically, despite each country's power, its strategic vulnerability is growing. Particularly since September 11, 2001, Americans have sensed this vulnerability. The extent to which the Chinese sense it is unclear. Vulnerability to nuclear attack is familiar to both countries. But the United States and China are also becoming exposed to damage in space and cyberspace because of their growing reliance on those domains for their prosperity and security, as well as each side's increasing antisatellite (ASAT) and cyber war capabilities. For China, economic integration, production, and commerce-and thus, sustained growth and perhaps political stability-depend vitally on data sharing, making networks and satellites as strategic as they are for the United States. All three strategic domains are "offense dominant"-technologically, economically, and operationally. Defenses against nuclear, ASAT, and cyber weapons are difficult and yield diminishing results against the offensive capabilities of large, advanced, and determined states such as the United States and China. Nuclear weapons are patently offense dominant because a single explosion can destroy a city. Moreover, it is easier and cheaper for China to improve the survivability of its strategic missile launchers, to multiply deliverable weapons, and to penetrate U.S. missile defenses than it is for the United States to maintain a nuclear first-strike capability. Though it has yet to admit it, the United States cannot deny the Chinese the second-strike nuclear deterrent they are determined to have. Satellites are inherently vulnerable: conspicuous, easy to track, and fragile. Destroying them or degrading their performance is easier than protecting them. ASAT interceptors are much cheaper than satellites. Likewise, defending computer networks becomes harder and more expensive as the scale and sophistication of the attacker increase. The woes of the cyber defender are compounded by integrated global markets and supply chains for digital components and equipment-in which U.S. and state-affiliated Chinese corporations are leading competitors-increasing the potential for strategic degradation of network infrastructure and disruption of services. In general, strategic offense dominance gives each country an incentive to invest in offense, which in turn spurs the other to keep pace. Apart from offense dominance, the advance of technology has slashed the costs in lives and treasure of strategic attack, as capabilities have graduated from mass invasion to heavy bombing to nuclear weapons to ASAT and cyber war. If one ignores possible deaths resulting from disruption of public services, ASAT and cyber war might even be considered "nonviolent." As the number of expected casualties from strategic attack options drops, so could international opprobrium and the inhibitions of decisionmakers. Absent deterrence, thresholds for war in space and cyberspace could become perilously low as offenses improve.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, Communism, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

117. Deterrence and Escalation in Cross-domain Operations: Where Do Space and Cyberspace fit?

Author:
Vincent Manzo
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Warfare has become even more complicated since Richard Smoke wrote this description of escalation in 1977. The National Security Space Strategy describes space as “congested, contested, and competitive,” yet satellites underpin U.S. military and economic power. Activity in cyberspace has permeated every facet of human activity, including U.S. military operations, yet the prospects for effective cyber defenses are bleak. Many other actors depend on continued access to these domains, but not nearly as much as the United States.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

118. Low Numbers: A Practical Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions

Author:
James M. Acton
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
U.S. policy seeks to create the conditions that would allow for deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. This report offers a practical approach to reducing the U.S. and Russian stockpiles to 500 nuclear warheads each and those of other nuclear armed states to no more than about half that number. This target would require Washington and Moscow to reduce their arsenals by a factor of ten.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Washington, and Moscow

119. Iran Sanctions: Preferable to War but No Silver Bullet

Author:
Barbara Slavin
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The broadest and toughest sanctions regime imposed on any country except Libya has not convinced Iran's leaders to abandon a program that appears aimed at developing nuclear weapons. Instead of seeking even more crippling economic penalties—such as an oil embargo—that would fracture the international consensus on Iran, the United States should tighten implementation of measures already in force and enact more sanctions linked to human rights, which have a wide constituency in Europe and demonstrate to the Iranian people that international concerns extend beyond nuclear weapons. The U.S. should also work with its diplomatic partners to craft new proposals that would couple acceptance of limited uranium enrichment with rigorous international monitoring, and encourage China, Iran's major trading partner, to use its leverage in support of nonproliferation.
Topic:
Economics, Human Rights, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Iran

120. Bleak Outlook for 2011 Conference on Disarmament

Author:
Brian Rose
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The 2011 Conference on Disarmament (CD) began contentiously when Ambassador Zamir Akram, Pakistan\'s permanent representative to the United Nations, criticized United States\' support of India\'s membership in export organizations that would allow it to engage in nuclear trade. Pakistan believes such membership would further favor India and accentuate the asymmetry in fissile materials stockpiles of the two states. Strategic and security concerns drive Pakistan\'s commitment to block negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty. Progress during the CD seems unlikely if the United States and Pakistan remain entrenched in their respective positions.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, India, and Asia