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101. Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the Nuclear-Weapon States

Author:
Peter Crail and Xiaodon Liang
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Following a decade-long impasse, the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) is finally on a path to being endorsed by the world's five recognized nuclear-weapon states—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Agreement by these nuclear powers to respect the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia and to provide legal assurances that they will not use such weapons against zone members helps to strengthen the commitment by regional states not to pursue nuclear weapons, and contributes more broadly to global nonproliferation and disarmament efforts,
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, France, and Southeast Asia

102. Iran and the Gulf Military Balance - I: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The most threatening form of US and Iranian competition takes place in the military and security arena. The areas where this competition now gets primary attention are the nuclear and missile arena, and Iranian threats to “close the Gulf.” US and Iranian tensions over Iran's nuclear program have grown steadily over the years. They now threaten to reach the crisis point as Iran produces highly enriched uranium and develops all of the technology necessary to produce nuclear weapons, and as US, European, and UN sanctions become steadily stronger.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Oil, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United Nations

103. Nuclear Notes

Author:
Sarah Weiner
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia is experiencing the most significant level of public dissatisfaction with Vladimir Putin since he assumed power a decade ago. While the sizeable street protests in Russia may well signal a political and social watershed moment for the country, a more minor political event a few months ago provided a telling sign regarding one of the regime's most important projects—a massive program for military modernization.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

104. Dividing the Korean Peninsula: The Rhetoric of the George W. Bush Administration

Author:
Sarah Teo
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
This paper suggests that an examination of the discourse and rhetoric of the George W. Bush administration offers a more comprehensive understanding of the developments that occurred during the years of South Korea's Sunshine policy (1998-2008). Such an approach supplements the traditional neorealist perspective and helps to account for the direction of certain policies. The paper argues that in its inter-Korean discourse, the Bush administration framed South Korea as an ally and partner against North Korea, while imagining the North as part of the “axis of evil” and a threat to international security. Since the US occupies an essential role in inter-Korean affairs, its framing of North and South Korea as unalterable opposites impeded inter-Korean reconciliation under the Sunshine policy. Rhetoric from two events will illustrate this point –the 2001 US-South Korea summit and the 2004 US Presidential Elections campaign.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States and Korea

105. Gambit or Endgame? The New State of Arms Control

Author:
Alexei Arbatov
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The pursuit of nuclear arms control has enjoyed something of a renaissance recently, with the signing of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in spring 2010 in Prague. Whether that momentum will dissipate after New START or lead to further nuclear arms control agreements depends on several factors: The new U.S. and Russian nuclear doctrines. While there is always some distance between a state's declared policy and that policy's implementation, both documents show that, behind their more ambitious disarmament rhetoric, the United States and Russia maintain conservative nuclear policies that make radical nuclear disarmament unlikely—to say nothing of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The peculiarities of the recently signed and ratified New START agreement. Among these are the modest cuts stipulated by the treaty relative to its predecessors; the acrimonious ratification debates in both the U.S. and Russian legislatures; and the dim prospects for a follow-on agreement (in sharp contrast to the mood prevailing after past START agreements). The dynamics of obsolescence and modernization of U.S. and Russian strategic offensive forces. The United States should have little problem cutting its forces to get below New START's limits. Russia, however, will have problems, not in reducing its numbers, but in raising them to treaty ceilings, due to their removal of obsolete weapons from service and slow deployment of new systems. Either Russia can negotiate a New START follow-on treaty with even lower ceilings or it can accelerate the development and deployment of new systems. While the former is obviously a more attractive alternative, it would require the United States and Russia to resolve many thorny arms control issues, such as ballistic missile defense, conventional strategic weapons, and tactical nuclear weapons. Ballistic missile defense. President Obama's decision to modify the Bush administration's ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe opened the way for New START and eased Russian concerns, even if they could never have been allayed entirely. Moscow believes that U.S. ballistic missile defense programs are ultimately designed to degrade Russia's nuclear deterrent, and it is far from clear that U.S. proposals to jointly develop such capabilities with Russia would allay those concerns—or that the idea even makes any sense. Russia's perceptions of U.S. conventional strategic weapons. Russian officials are especially concerned about the U.S. Prompt Global Strike concept and do not trust American assurances that such capabilities are only directed at terrorists and rogue states. There has already been some progress made in dealing with these weapons in negotiations, and future progress on this issue will likely depend on legal agreements and confidence-building measures to scale U.S. capabilities in ways that would threaten Russia's (or China's) strategic deterrent. Joint development of ballistic missile defenses with Russia. This issue could seriously complicate Washington's and Moscow's strategic relations with China and India. Officials on both sides would do well to start small and proceed step-by-step, using incremental successes to build the momentum necessary to work through more difficult issues. Non-strategic—that is, tactical—nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, the United States and Europe relied on tactical nuclear weapons to counterbalance Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces in Europe; today, the situation is reversed, with Moscow relying on tactical nuclear weapons as a counterbalance not only to NATO conventional superiority but also to U.S. strategic nuclear superiority and long-range precision-guided weapons. No one now knows which weapons systems should be categorized as non-strategic, and how limits across regions could be accounted for and verified. In addition, reviving the moribund Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is essential to dealing with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Washington, and Moscow

106. The Idea of a Strategist's Education

Author:
Steven Anthony Pomeroy
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This essay adopted from “Ancient Alexandria, Alexander, and History: The Relevance of Humanistic Thought in the Contemporary Strategic Environment,” a talk the author gave on December 28, 2009, Broadmoor Hotel, Colorado Springs, Colorado. The comments herein are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Unites States Air Force Academy, the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. The author wishes to thank the following professors: Colonel (Dr.) Thomas A. Drohan, Dr. James R. Titus, and Dr. John Farquhar of the Military and Strategic Studies Department at the United States Air Force Academy. The comments herein are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force Academy, the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), 406. Contending that nuclear weapons had fundamentally changed the character, if not the nature, of warfare, Brodie emphasized the importance of rigor and a scientific approach to strategic problem solving in the nuclear era.
Topic:
Climate Change, Education, Government, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States and Colorado

107. The Battle of Dubai: The United Arab Emirates and the U.S.-Iran Cold War

Author:
Karim Sadjadpour
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As the United States seeks to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions through economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has come to play a critical yet often ambiguous role. The UAE, namely the emirate of Dubai, is a top source of Iranian imports and a key transshipment point for goods-legal and illegal-destined for the Islamic Republic. Dubai's bustling and loosely regulated ports have repeatedly frustrated international sanctions against Iran.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Dubai

108. Where Do We Stand in the Field of Nuclear Disarmament: What Is Next After the New START

Author:
Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center
Abstract:
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement, without any doubt, has started a new debate on whether the international community has finally entered a renaissance in the field of disarmament after a long period of stalemate. In this regard, the New START agreement, together with the New York Nuclear Safety Summit of 2010 and the NPT Review Conference of 2010, seems to be creating a rather positive atmosphere. Yet, if one examines the discussions that took place at the US and the Russian parliament's before and after the ratification of the New START, he/she will come to the conclusion that the progress on nuclear disarmament, at the levels of both strategic and nonstrategic weapons, will not be an easy one. The situation will remain unchanged unless certain contentious military issues between Washington and Moscow are somehow resolved. In this regard, the next round of the New START agreement will be crucial. This situation will not only affect the future of the US and the Russian militaries' relationships to one another, but it will also change the balance of relations among the nuclear “haves” and “have nots” of the NPT Treaty. It is, therefore, expected that the NPT's two tracks, namely disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation, will be affected either in a positive or negative way in the future, depending on the evolution of the post New START era. Within this perspective, the possibility that US and Russia will implement new disarmament agreements has gained utmost importance in the aftermath of the New START for the future implications of the US President Barack Obama's “Global Zero Policy.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and New York

109. Attacks on Nuclear Infrastructure: Opening Pandora's Box?

Author:
Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Advocates argue that air strikes against the nuclear infrastructure of a targeted state can deny it the option of producing nuclear weapons or at least create delays in its nuclear weapons program. Critics counter that such attacks may intensify the state's determination to acquire nuclear weapons and make a difficult problem more challenging in the long term. Despite the apparent appeal of targeted strikes, states rarely resort to them.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States and Iraq

110. A Detour Strategy for the Test Ban Treaty

Author:
Liviu Horovitz
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Arms control supporters are impatient with the Obama administration as it completes its third year in office. Neither the strength nor the pace of nuclear policy reform has been to their liking. In retrospect, the credit they gave the administration for the New START treaty with Russia appears somewhat tarnished. Once the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty in December 2010, the obvious next step on the agenda was to push for ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). But in spite of the promises made by the White House, the prospects for a swift CTBT approval process are grim. The administration traded away all its chips in exchange for New START support, and the political landscape for the rest of President Obama's term appears anything but promising. The road to success requires a new approach.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, and India