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21. Main Strategic Considerations of Contemporary Israel

Author:
Yossi Peled
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The relocation of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem draw once again the attention of international community to Israel. The event of relocation is in line with the decision of the Trump administration reached in December last year, a move that has its legal foundation in the Jerusalem Embassy Act that was passed by the US Congress as far as 1995. For more than twenty years, the American administrations have been delaying the decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, and the Jerusalem Act was void of presidential signature until Donald Trump became president. In the same year when he took of�ice president Donald Trump recognized Jerusalem as the capital city of the State of Israel and ordered the relocation of the US embassy from Tel Aviv. Ever since the time of David, the king of Israel who conquered Jerusalem more than three thousand years ago, and his son king Solomon who built the First Temple, Jerusalem was the Holy City for Jews around the world and the center point for Israel and Judaism. At the same time Jerusalem is a holy site for the Palestinians and the Muslim world, hence a source of confrontation for the two sides. Notwithstanding, people of Israel believe that Jerusalem cannot be divided and that only Jerusalem due to its cultural, historical and religious importance for the Jews, is and can be the only capital city of the State of Israel. However, this status of Jerusalem is still not fully internationally recognized, with a number of United Nations states who do not acknowledge the right of Israel to sovereignly rule in Eastern Jerusalem, including the Old City where most sacred sites of Judaism are located – the Western Wall and the Temple Mount.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Imperialism, International Cooperation, Religion, and Anti-Semitism
Political Geography:
United States, Israel, Palestine, and Jerusalem

22. Poland, US bases and geopolitical games

Author:
Robert Barić
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
Recent Polish proposal for financing permanent US military presence in Poland isn't motivated only to counter current Russian aggressive posture. This offer is a part of a wider Poland strategy for achieving long term security. In pursuing this strategy, Warsaw risks not only to undermine NATO cohesion, but also to deepen growing East-West divide inside the EU.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Imperialism, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Poland

23. U.S. Strategy, the JCPOA Iranian Nuclear Arms Agreement, and the Gulf: Playing the Long Game

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Few recent American foreign policy decisions have been as divisive as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear arms control agreement with Iran. Advocates of the agreement have focused far too exclusively on its potential benefits. Opponents equally exclusively on its potential faults. Both sides tend to forget that any feasible arms control agreement between what are hostile sides tends to be a set of compromises that are an extension of arms races and potential conflicts by other means. As a result, imperfect agreements with uncertain results are the rule, not the exception. President Trump has made it clear that he opposes the agreement and would like to terminate it. His dismissal of Rex Tillerson as Security of State, and his replacement by Mike Pompeo – along with his dismissal of General H.R. McMaster and replacement with John Bolton – indicate that President Trump may well seek to terminate the agreement in the near future – action which might or might not have significant bipartisan support. He faces a May 5th to decide whether to again waive economic sanction against Iran, a decision which comes up for renewal every 120 days.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

24. Enhancing the U.S.-Indonesia Strategic Partnership

Author:
Brian Harding and Andreyka Natalegawa
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States and Indonesia are natural partners. Despite our geographic distance, we have striking similarities. We are large, diverse, and democratic societies. We both seek an international order in the Indo-Pacific region based on rules that enable all countries to have a voice. Our shores each span two oceans, imbuing our countries with a deep maritime heritage and culture that shapes how we approach the world. When each plays its natural role as a leader in regional affairs, both parties benefit. In recognition of the great mutual benefit that a close U.S.-Indonesia partnership could bring, Presidents Barack Obama and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono launched a comprehensive partnership in 2010 to build closer government-government, economic, and people-people ties between our two countries. Critically, the agreement created a framework for collaboration across a multitude of government departments and ministries under a joint commission co-chaired by the U.S. secretary of state and the Indonesian minister of foreign affairs. In 2016, under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), the comprehensive partnership was elevated into a strategic partnership, further signaling the relationship’s importance to both countries. Yet despite having many common interests and recent high-level efforts to push the relationship forward, U.S.-Indonesia relations are not meeting their potential. Bilateral economic interaction is limited compared to the size of our economies. Official interaction is often bureaucratic and rarely strategic. And people-people relations, including of education exchanges, are minuscule considering that Indonesia and the United States are the third- and fourth-most-populated countries in the world. President Donald Trump’s political ascent has also created additional headwinds for U.S.-Indonesia relations. Candidate-Trump’s statements regarding the Muslim world caused unease in Indonesia and his policies as president toward Israel and Palestine have damaged Indonesian views of the United States. In Asia, the Trump administration’s framing of great-power competition with China and the administration’s nontraditional economic statecraft have created uncertainty in Jakarta. From Washington’s perspective, the Jokowi administration’s relative disinterest in playing a leading role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and in the broader Indo-Pacific region has dampened enthusiasm in some quarters for investing in the relationship. Recognizing the importance of both the U.S.-Indonesia relationship and its continued underperformance, on May 3, 2018, the CSIS Southeast Asia Program convened a first annual bilateral, track 1.5 strategic dialogue in Washington, D.C., to inject new momentum into the relationship and to begin building deeper connectivity between policy experts in the two countries. This report outlines conclusions and recommendations that surfaced during the dialogue. However, the report reflects the opinions of the authors, and does not necessarily reflect those of the dialogue participants.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Culture, Maritime, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, Indonesia, North America, and Indo-Pacific

25. U.S.-Nepal Relations: Leveraging Operational Efficiencies to Achieve Our Objectives

Author:
Alaina B Teplitz
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassador's Review
Abstract:
Nepal, that mythical Shangri-La nestled in the Himalayas, has long captured the hearts and imaginations of Americans. In the 70 years since the United States established formal relations with the erstwhile hermit kingdom, Nepal has seen dramatic socio-economic progress—often stemming from its partnership with the United States. But in many ways, it still remains under-developed, fragile and vulnerable. As the U.S. Embassy in Kathmandu celebrated the 70th anniversary of our partnership in 2017, we pursued a dozen month-long campaigns around today’s policy objectives to highlight our historical collaboration and leverage this retrospective to draw attention to the need for further progress. Combining diplomatic engagements and public events targeted at thought leaders and policy leaders, our campaigns moved forward our shared U.S.-Nepali priorities. As the U.S. government revisits its approach to the Indo-Pacific region and new Nepali leaders form what promises to be the country’s first multi-year government in decades, we now face a unique opportunity to advance our mutual objectives of a stable, prosperous Nepal that is a robust partner of the United States. Coming at the same time as potential adjustments to foreign affairs budgets and staffing, Embassy Kathmandu is reorganizing how we do business to improve our effective­ness, find efficiencies and enhance our focus on an agenda that delivers results. Rather than organize ourselves by the agency that pays our salary, we have structured our unified U.S. government team according to what each unit is doing. Our interagency Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) Teams—co-chaired by section chiefs from separate agencies and physically co-located within the chancery—have designed common strategies for how the U.S. Embassy intends to pursue major objectives and coordinate approaches, as well as explicitly identifying those nice-to-pursue efforts that limited staffing or resources require relegating to the back burner. Through action plans, each ICS Team identifies strategic, impactful and tangible targets to achieve each year—institutionalizing best practices from our 70th anniversary campaigns to sustain meaningful progress toward our goals. As the stakes and challenges facing U.S. diplomacy continue to grow, Embassy Kathmandu is using the strategic opportunity that current U.S.-Nepal relations offer to develop a proof of concept for how a 21st century embassy can organize our people and operations to maximum effect.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and Nepal

26. French Guiana and the Falklands: The Military Presence of France and the United Kingdom in the South Atlantic and the South American Continent

Author:
Marcos Valle Machado De Silva
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The issue of the Falklands catalyzes the attention of researchers in studies of the military presence of extraregional actors in South America. However, France, a state equally exogenous to the South American nations, is present in the region, keeping a colonial territory, where contingents and military installations are located, almost always ignored in regional security studies. In this context, this paper aims to highlight the military presence of France and the United Kingdom in America and South Atlantic, and to analyze the tensions arising from this presence in relation to the regional Brazilian view of defense.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Imperialism, International Cooperation, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, France, Brazil, Argentina, South America, Falkland Islands, and South Atlantic

27. Are Iran’s ballistic missiles designed to be nuclear capable?

Author:
Michael Elleman and Mark T. Fitzpatrick
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Iran has the largest and most diverse ballistic-missile arsenal in the Middle East – could these systems one day be used to launch nuclear weapons? In a new report, IISS analysts Michael Elleman and Mark Fitzpatrick offer a detailed assessment of the design intentions behind each missile within Iran’s inventory. The result is a clear picture as to which platforms the United States and its allies should seek to remove, and which ones can be discounted. The common claim that Iran’s missile development must be stopped altogether because these systems could deliver nuclear weapons in the future rests on broad generalisations. While there is reason for concern, priority attention should be given to those missiles that might realistically be used for such a purpose, if Iran were to go down a perilous nuclear path. The international standard – but not treaty – for determining the inherent nuclear capability of missiles is the threshold developed in 1987 by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which seeks to forestall exports of missile systems able to deliver a 500kg payload a distance of 300km or more. Eight of Iran’s 13 current ballistic missile systems – the largest and most diverse arsenal in the Middle East – exceed this threshold and are thus deemed to be nuclear capable. The other five, all within the Fateh-110 family of missiles, are certainly lethal, especially when shipped to Hizbullah for use against Israel, but they are clearly not intended for nuclear use. Because capability does not equal intent, the MTCR guidelines should be just the first step in an assessment of Iran’s intentions for its missiles. When the United Nations Security Council drafted a new resolution in July 2015 to accompany the Iran nuclear agreement finalised that month, an element of intent was added to previous sanctions resolution language that prohibited launches of Iranian missiles that were ‘capable of delivering nuclear weapons’. The 2015 resolution calls upon Iran not to engage in activity concerning missiles ‘designed to be’ capable of delivering nuclear weapons. What it means ‘to be designed’ is undefined. Judging intent is partly subjective, but technical clues and intelligence information can guide analysis. The soundest approach is to disaggregate Iran’s various missile systems, and to assess design intentions on the basis of the technical capabilities and lineage of the different missiles.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and North America

28. The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
James Hackett
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
As US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un meet in Singapore on 12 June, it is useful to keep in mind what is at stake. The long-standing tinderbox of the Korean Peninsula, if ignited through another provocation or miscalculation, could spark a full-scale war that could well go nuclear. The prize of diplomacy – sustainable peace on the peninsula – is all the more valuable when one considers the range of military capabilities potentially in play. This information is of use in assessing both the goals of diplomacy and the risks should the current efforts fail. Weapons based on the Korean Peninsula have become faster, more precise and more powerful. North Korea has tested a thermonuclear weapon, an intercontinental ballistic missile and more accurate shorter-range missiles, all designed to offset the relative qualitative weakness of its broader conventional forces. It has also pursued advanced cyber capabilities. South Korea, meanwhile, has focused on developing military systems allowing for more rapid and precise strikes. US forces on the peninsula have introduced yet more advanced capabilities. For these reasons the IISS provides this independent, measured and detailed analysis of military dynamics on the peninsula. The report focuses on the defence policies and military capabilities of the two Koreas, and the US military forces stationed in South Korea which can be brought to bear in a crisis. While it does not ignore unconventional systems, it principally focuses on conventional capabilities. Due to its poverty and isolation, North Korea’s conventional forces have become relatively weaker, compared with those of South Korea and its US ally. Aware of this qualitative inferiority, Pyongyang has invested in asymmetric capabilities, particularly the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver them. Nonetheless, Pyongyang’s armed forces remain equipped with a wide range of conventional military systems, including large numbers of artillery pieces and multiple-launch rocket systems. Its armed forces, at around 1.2 million, are the fourth-largest in the world. Its conventional military power remains significant, not least because of these numbers (for instance, 4,000 main battle tanks and 8,500 self-propelled- and towed-artillery systems) and the weight of fire they could rapidly bring to bear if employed. Seoul, for instance, is within range of many of North Korea’s artillery systems. North Korea has also developed increasingly advanced cyber capabilities as another aspect of its asymmetric power. The North will continue to improve these, if only to slow the decline in military parity between it and the South. US and South Korean defence authorities assume that the North will, in the event of major conflict, use cyber attacks against South Korean critical infrastructure and command-and-control networks. However, recent events like the Wannacry ransomware attacks have shown that North Korea is now using its cyber power for another purpose: raising revenue to support the regime. Meanwhile, South Korea’s defence policy and military posture is dominated by the security challenge from the North. This has led Seoul to pursue military capabilities, and strategies, designed to defeat North Korean provocations. These range from developments in air-defence, intended to tackle North Korea’s air force and missile capabilities, to strategies designed to pre-empt a potential North Korean provocation. To enable these strategies, South Korea has developed and procured increasingly advanced military systems, ranging from its own Hyeonmu ballistic- and cruise-missiles, to advanced air-to-ground air-launched weapons and, in the next few years, squadrons of F-35A combat aircraft. Working closely with the South Korean armed forces, the US maintains a military presence some 28,500-strong in South Korea, augmented by advanced military systems on the peninsula like the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic-missile-defence system, and the military power deployed by the US in the broader Indo-Pacific. This publication builds on the contributions of expert analysts of military power on the Korean Peninsula, and the extensive information holdings available in the IISS Military Balance+ database. It was prepared with the support of the Korea Foundation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

29. Reducing the Risk of Iran Developing an ICBM

Author:
Michael Elleman
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
With the Iran nuclear accord currently on life support, it is not too late to pursue diplomatic measures that address the growing challenge posed by Iran’s ballistic missiles, argues Michael Elleman in a new report. The lack of curbs on Iran’s missile programme was cited by President Donald Trump in May 2018 as one of the principal reasons for withdrawing from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). With the nuclear accord consequently on life support, it is not too late to pursue diplomatic measures that address the growing challenge posed by Iran’s ballistic missiles. The most promising would be to lock in, through negotiations, the 2,000 kilometre-range limit that Iran has previously stated is its maximum requirement. While this would not reduce the threat perceived by Iran’s regional neighbours, it would forestall development of systems that could target Western Europe or North America. Tehran is not likely to commit to verification measures for such negotiated range limits, however, without receiving something in return. One bargain that could be considered would be to allow Iran to continue its satellite-launch programme, under certain conditions, while capping the maximum range of its ballistic missiles. Such a trade-off may also be relevant to the North Korean case.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

30. Ministers For Foreign Affairs 1972-83

Author:
Melissa Conley Tyler and John Robbins
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) is pleased to present the latest book in the Australian Ministers for Foreign Affairs series. In May 2016 the AIIA held a one-day forum to examine the achievements of Australia’s foreign ministers between 1972-83. This forum and publication is the third book in the AIIA’s Australian Ministers for Foreign Affairs series following on from Ministers for Foreign Affairs 1960-72 and R.G. Casey: Minister for External Affairs 1951-60.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, Diplomacy, Human Rights, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Indonesia, Asia, and Australia