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61. Informal Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan

Author:
John Dempsey and Noah Coburn
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Faced with difficulties establishing legitimate, effective rule of law and the predominance of informal or traditional justice mechanisms in Afghanistan, the Afghan government and the international community have increasingly focused on engaging informal justice systems to resolve both civil and criminal disputes. While informal systems vary across the country, they are generally based upon restorative justice and the preservation of communal harmony. They currently resolve the vast majority of legal disputes and other conflicts in the country, particularly in rural areas. Engagement with informal systems and linking such systems to state institutions present some of the more effective opportunities for resolving conflicts and increasing access to justice for all Afghans because they are familiar, locally available, and involve relatively low costs. Such engagement, however, also faces significant logistical, cultural, political, and legal challenges. When engaging informal systems and/or implementing programs to link them to the state, it is important to have sound understanding of local power dynamics and how local dispute resolution systems function. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) has been working on informal justice in Afghanistan since 2002 and has run pilot projects in six districts that test ways of designing or strengthening links between the state and informal systems to increase access to justice. Some of the best practices identified from the pilot projects include the importance of regular and substantive communication between informal and state justice actors, the promotion of the use of written records of decisions by informal systems, and the monitoring of decisions to ensure applicable Afghan laws and international human rights standards are upheld.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

62. Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic Impact

Author:
T.X. Hammes
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
In Iraq and Afghanistan, the use of contractors reached a level unprecedented in U.S. military operations. As of March 31, 2010, the United States deployed 175,000 troops and 207,000 contractors in the war zones. Contractors represented 50 percent of the Department of Defense (DOD) workforce in Iraq and 59 percent in Afghanistan. These numbers include both armed and unarmed contractors. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, the term contractor includes both armed and unarmed personnel unless otherwise specified. The presence of contractors on the battlefield is obviously not a new phenomenon but has dramatically increased from the ratio of 1 contractor to 55 military personnel in Vietnam to 1:1 in the Iraq and 1.43:1 in Afghanistan.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Privatization, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

63. Global Commons and Domain Interrelationships: Time for a New Conceptual Framework?

Author:
Mark E. Redden and Michael P. Hughes
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Over the last several years, examination of U.S. national security interests within the context of the global commons has emerged as a major policy issue in the defense community. At the highest levels of the Department of Defense (DOD), there is now an awareness that the U.S. military will be confronted by a host of challenges “to stability throughout the global commons.” Furthermore, the Nation can “expect to be increasingly challenged in securing and maintaining access to the global commons and must also be prepared for operations in unfamiliar conditions and environments.” In response, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report has now assigned “assured access” to the commons as a top priority for U.S. military forces.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States

64. Preparing for One War and Getting Another?

Author:
Antulio J. Echevarria II
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Current trends in defense thinking show signs of being influenced by the notion that preparing for one form of war has brought about another. We find evidence of this notion in a number of official speeches, the 2008 National Defense Strategy, and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. It is captured in the almost routine claim that America's superiority in conventional warfare is so great that it is driving our adversaries toward irregular methods. All of these examples share the basic assumption that we are now fighting (and will likely continue to fight) conflicts for which we have not prepared—precisely because we have not prepared for them. Thus, the modern complement—a preparation paradox—to the old Latin adage “If you want peace, prepare for war,” might well be “If you want one kind of war, prepare for another.”
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Terrorism, War, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States and America

65. Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot

Author:
Eric T. Olson
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
If the U.S. Army's current experience in ongoing overseas operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan are any indication, reconstruction has become an integral part of the American way of war. And judging from the disappointing results of reconstruction efforts in these operations, measured mostly in terms of the effect that such efforts have had on the course of these wars, there is much lacking in the Army's understanding of reconstruction itself and the role that it will likely play in all future operations, especially in counterinsurgencies (COIN).
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Arms Control and Proliferation, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

66. An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations

Author:
Suzanne C. Nielsen
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
During the 2 decades preceding the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. Army went through tremendous reform and rejuvenation. It recovered from the Vietnam War, transitioned to an all-volunteer personnel model, and refocused on a potential future war against a very capable adversary in Europe. The Army's transformation was evident to external observers: from being seen as an organization in distress in the early 1970s, by 1991 the Army became an organization whose professionalism was the source of admiration. Drawing on the relevant literature, the author seeks to explain this important case of military change.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Vietnam

67. U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap

Author:
Dennis E Keller
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Establishing an effective local police force is one of the most critical elements of successful counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations, but it is a task for which the U.S. Government is the least prepared and capable. The establishment of an effective police force is critical to security sector reform, justice sector reform, and the successful transition to the host nation's security forces. But the United States lacks the institutional capacity to provide an immediate and coordinated civilian police training and advisory effort, particularly in a failed or fragile state. Because hesitation in addressing such problems causes delays in forming and training new police forces, and, even worse, emboldens corrupt and abusive locals who enable insurgents, terrorist groups, and organized criminal networks, the U.S. military must be prepared to support stability operations at regional level and below by assessing, advising, and even training police units until such time as civilian police trainers and mentors arrive on the ground.
Topic:
Crime, Counterinsurgency, and Law Enforcement
Political Geography:
United States

68. U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan

Author:
Richard L. Armitage and Samuel R. Berger
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Al-Qaeda's attack on September 11, 2001, was the deadliest terrorist assault on the United States in history. In the hours and days that followed, Americans learned more about the perpetrators and their links to bases and networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Less than a month later, President George W. Bush launched Operation Enduring Freedom. Much changed nearly overnight as the United States focused military, economic, and diplomatic attention squarely on the region for the first time since the end of the Cold War. In Afghanistan, the Taliban regime—al-Qaeda's sympathetic host—was toppled. In Pakistan, the Pervez Musharraf regime was drafted into Washington's Global War on Terror.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

69. State of Affairs: Three Years After Nisoor Square: Accountability and Oversight of U.S. Private Security and Other Contractors

Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Human Rights First
Abstract:
On September 16, 2007, Black water Worldwide (now X e) private security contractors working for the U.S. Department of State killed 17 unarmed civilians and wounded 24 more in an unprovoked incident in Baghdad's Nisoor Square. A political firestorm immediately ensued in Iraq, the United States and around the world. The incident exposed what had been clear for several years: The United States lacked a coordinated, systematic policy for overseeing private contractors abroad and holding them accountable for serious violent crimes. Now, the United States' reliance on private security contractors in zones of armed conflict is increasing as is the urgent need for effective contractor oversight and accountability. Private contractors continue to outnumber U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both the surge in Afghanistan and the drawdown in Iraq require additional support from private security and other contractors. It is estimated that up to 50,000 contractors will be required to support the Afghan surge and, with the military drawdown in Iraq, the Department of State plans to more than double the number of private security contractors it employs from 2,700 to 7,000. As Iraq and eventually Afghanistan move from military to civilian control and private contractors replace military forces there, the so-called jurisdictional gap over non-Defense contractors widens. If we learned anything from Nisoor Square it is that oversight and accountability gaps must be filled prior to increasing our private contractor force in conflict zones.
Topic:
Security, Crime, Human Rights, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Arabia

70. Al Qaeda's Religious Justification of Nuclear Terrorism

Author:
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
When legendary jihadist Abdullah Azzam was assassinated under mysterious circumstances in November 1989, suspects in his murder included Osama bin Laden and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. After the Soviets were expelled from Afghanistan, Azzam sought to shift jihad to his homeland, Palestine. Zawahiri sought to focus the jihad on Egypt and the other secular Muslim states, in hopes of restoring the caliphate, the rule of Islamic clerics, which had ended after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. After Islamic rule had been re-established in the Islamic world, Zawahiri wrote, “then history would make a new turn, God willing, in the opposite direction against the empire of the United States and the world's Jewish government.”
Topic:
Islam, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Palestine, Egypt, and Assam