Number of results to display per page
Search Results
42. Osama bin Laden is Dead
- Author:
- Rohan Gunaratna
- Publication Date:
- 05-2011
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
- Abstract:
- Now that Osama bin Laden is dead, the big question to ask is whether global terrorism will die with him. What did bin Laden leave behind?
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Globalization, Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan and United States
43. Counterrevolution in the Gulf
- Author:
- Toby C. Jones
- Publication Date:
- 04-2011
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- United States Institute of Peace
- Abstract:
- Saudi Arabia is pursuing a combination of domestic and regional policies that risk destabilizing the Persian Gulf and that risk undermining the United States interests there. Amid calls for political change, Saudi Arabia is failing to address pressing concerns about its political system and the need for political reform. Instead of responding favorably to calls for more political openness, the Kingdom is pursuing a risky domestic agenda, which ignores the social, economic, and political grievances that might fuel popular mobilization.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Democratization, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- United States, Middle East, and Arabia
44. Making Peace in Afghanistan: The Missing Political Strategy
- Author:
- Minna Jarvenpaa
- Publication Date:
- 02-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- United States Institute of Peace
- Abstract:
- The proposition that a political settlement is needed to end the war in Afghanistan has gained increasing attention in recent months. Channels for preliminary talks with Taliban leaders have been sought and a High Peace Council created. However, despite upbeat military assessments, the insurgency has expanded its reach across the country and continues to enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan. Afghans increasingly resent the presence of foreign troops, and the Taliban draw strength from grievances by ordinary Afghans against their government. External money to supply military bases and pay for development projects often ends up fueling conflict rather than creating stability. For their part, President Karzai and many Afghan political elites lack genuine commitment to reform, calling into question the viability of a state-building international strategy and transition by 2014. Missing is a political strategy to end the conflict that goes beyond dealing with the Taliban; it must define the kind of state that Afghans are willing to live in and that regional neighbors can endorse. Knowing that such a settlement could take years to conclude does not diminish the urgency of initiating the process. Given doubts about Karzai's ability to manage the situation effectively, the international community needs to facilitate a peace process more pro-actively than it has. To be sustainable, the process will need to be inclusive; women's rights, human rights, and media freedoms cannot become casualties of negotiations. Afghanistan's international partners should commit to a peace process and lay the groundwork to appoint a mediator. This includes gauging the interests of parties, identifying actual participants in talks, and structuring an agenda. In the meantime, international military efforts must be realigned to avoid action that contradicts the ultimate aim of a peace settlement.
- Topic:
- NATO, Treaties and Agreements, War, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban
45. Joint Interagency Task Force-South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success
- Author:
- Evan Munsing and Christopher Lamb
- Publication Date:
- 06-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Abstract:
- Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) is well known within the U.S. Government as the "gold standard" for interagency cooperation and intelligence fusion, despite its preference for keeping a low profile and giving other agencies the credit for its successes. It is often cited as a model for whole-of-government problem-solving in the literature on interagency collaboration, and other national security organizations have tried to copy its approach and successes. Despite the plaudits and attention, the way that JIATF-South actually operates has only received superficial analysis. In fact, few people actually understand why JIATF-South works as well as it does or how its success might be replicated.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, War on Drugs, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- United States
46. The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
- Author:
- Andre Le Sage
- Publication Date:
- 07-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Abstract:
- The United States faces an important strategic question in northwest Africa: what level of activity by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) would constitute a sufficient threat to U.S. national security interests to warrant a more aggressive political, intelligence, military, and law enforcement response? AQIM already poses the greatest immediate threat of transnational terrorism in the region, and its operational range and sophistication continue to expand. Since 2007, the group has professed its loyalty to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda's senior leadership and claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks in the subregion. These attacks have included the use of suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices, kidnapping operations, and assassinations.
- Topic:
- Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- United States, Middle East, Arabia, and North Africa
47. Policing and COIN Operations: Lessons Learned, Strategies and Future Directions
- Author:
- Samuel Musa, John Morgan, and Matt Keegan
- Publication Date:
- 01-2011
- Content Type:
- Book
- Abstract:
- At the time of this writing, the United States and the other members of the International Security Assistance Forces are completing nearly a decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. What started as more conventional or traditional fights has degenerated over time into insurgency warfare, something U.S. Forces have had to re-learn and re-build to fight. Re-learn and re-build are key elements as U.S. Forces have fought insurgencies in the past, but consistently maintained forces to fight more conventional warfare. Counterinsurgency (COIN) is very different from armored vehicles rolling through the Fulda Gap, or the race to Baghdad. It is a fight not against a Government as much as it is a fight for control of the mind-set of the population by non-state actors in a race to gain popular support. It is a grassroots battle that not only requires military force, but security established at the local level through everyday police presence that represents the Rule of Law, the national Government, and safety and stability locally. It is against this backdrop that the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) and the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) came together to look at Policing and COIN and the ways, methods, and techniques that could be shared to help overcome the insurgencies Coalition forces face. The efforts of the CTNSP at the National Defense University (NDU) and the CTTSO culminated in a one-day workshop held on September 29, 2010, on Policing and COIN Operations: Lessons Learned, Strategies, and Future Directions.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia
48. Aid and Conflict in Afghanistan
- Publication Date:
- 08-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- After a decade of major security, development and humanitarian assistance, the international community has failed to achieve a politically stable and economically viable Afghanistan. Despite billions of dollars in aid, state institutions remain fragile and unable to provide good governance, deliver basic services to the majority of the population or guarantee human security. As the insurgency spreads to areas regarded as relatively safe till now, and policymakers in Washington and other Western capitals seek a way out of an unpopular war, the international community still lacks a coherent policy to strengthen the state ahead of the withdrawal of most foreign forces by December 2014. The impact of international assistance will remain limited unless donors, particularly the largest, the U.S., stop subordinating programming to counter-insurgency objectives, devise better mechanisms to monitor implementation, adequately address corruption and wastage of aid funds, and ensure that recipient communities identify needs and shape assistance policies.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, War, Foreign Aid, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan and United States
49. Afghanistan: The Impossible Transition
- Author:
- Gilles Dorronsoro
- Publication Date:
- 06-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- A combination of two critical problems threatens to undermine the mission of the United States-led coalition in Afghanistan: the failure of the counterinsurgency strategy and a disconnect between political objectives and military operations. If anything, the current strategy is making a political solution less likely, notably because it is antagonizing Pakistan without containing the rise of the armed opposition. That has put the coalition in a paradoxical situation, in which it is being weakened militarily by a non-negotiated and inevitable withdrawal while at the same time alienating potential negotiating partners.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, War, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan and United States
50. Iraq, Afghanistan and the future of British military doctrine: from counterinsurgency to Stabilization
- Author:
- Stuart Griffin
- Publication Date:
- 03-2011
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Institution:
- Chatham House
- Abstract:
- The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have had profound effects on both the British and US militaries. Among the most important is the way in which they have challenged traditional assumptions about the character of unconventional conflict and the role of the military within comprehensive strategies for encouraging sustainable peace. In the UK, the most important doctrinal response has been JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: the military contribution. Security and Stabilisation is an ambitious attempt to synthesize elements of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peace support and state-building within a single doctrine that reflects the lessons learned from recent British operational experience. This article examines the purpose, impact and potential value of this important innovation in British doctrine. To do so, the article explores the genesis of Stabilization; analyses its impact upon extant British doctrine for counterinsurgency and peace support; discusses its relationship with the most important related US doctrines, FM 3-24: the counterinsurgency field manual and FM 3-07: the stability operations field manual; and debates the function of doctrine more broadly. It concludes by summarizing the primary challenges Security and Stabilisation must overcome if it is to make a serious contribution to the theory and practice of such complex interventions.
- Topic:
- Security and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and United Kingdom