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31. What It Will Take to Secure Afghanistan

Author:
Max Boot
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Afghanistan is approaching a major inflection point in its long and turbulent history. In 2014 most of the foreign military forces are due to pull out. With them will go the bulk of foreign financing that has accounted for almost all of the state's budget. Twenty fourteen is also the year that Afghanistan is due to hold presidential elections. Hamid Karzai, the only president the country has known since the fall of the Taliban, has said he will not seek another term in office. Thus Afghanistan is likely to have a new president to lead it into a new era. This era will be shaped by many factors, principally decisions made by Afghans themselves, but the United States has the ability to affect the outcome if it makes a sustained commitment to maintain security, improve the political process, and reduce Pakistani interference so as to build on the tenuous gains achieved by the U.S. troop surge since 2010.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Democratization, Islam, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban

32. Aid and Conflict in Pakistan

Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
International, particularly U.S., military and civilian aid has failed to improve Pakistan's performance against jihadi groups operating on its soil or to help stabilise its nascent democracy. Lopsided focus on security aid after the 11 September 2001 attacks has not delivered counterterrorism dividends, but entrenched the military's control over state institutions and policy, delaying reforms and aggravating Pakistani public perceptions that the U.S. is only interested in investing in a security client. Almost two-thirds of U.S. funding since 2002 ($15.8 billion) has been security-related, double the $7.8 billion of economic aid. Under an elected government, and with civilian aid levels at their highest in decades, the U.S. and other donors can still play a major part in improving service delivery, supporting key reforms and strengthening a fragile political transition vital to internal and regional stability. Re-orientation of funding from military security purposes to long-term democracy and capacity building support is the best way to guarantee the West's and Pakistan's longterm interests in a dangerous region. But aid policies must be better targeted, designed and executed.
Topic:
Democratization, Terrorism, Foreign Aid, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, and South Asia

33. Subnational Governance, Service Delivery, and Militancy in Pakistan

Author:
Robert D. Lamb and Sadika Hameed
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This report presents the results of a study on the link between the rise of militants and the quality of subnational governance in Pakistan: whether a link exists and, if so, what the United States can do about it, if anything. Its basic finding is that Pakistan's governance problems are not caused by militancy, and its problems with militancy are not directly caused by its governance problems, but improving governance will be necessary (though not sufficient) to counter militancy. Pakistan's governance problems are extensive and will take a long time to overcome. But they are not insurmountable, and recent trends offer reason for hope: the military's prestige has declined, the civilian government is likely to complete its full term, the judiciary is increasingly independent, civil society is increasingly confident even in the face of militant intimidation, and recent reforms—the Local Governance Ordinance of 2001 and the Eighteenth Amendment to the constitution—have put in place a set of institutions and incentives that are likely to contribute to improvements in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Democratization, Development, Armed Struggle, Bilateral Relations, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, and South Asia

34. Homegrown Terrorism

Author:
Ally Pregulman and Emily Burke
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Incidents of “homegrown terrorism”—extremist violence perpetrated by U.S. citizens or legal U.S. residents, and linked to or inspired by al Qaeda's brand of radical Sunni Islamism—have increased in the aggregate since 9/11. Homegrown extremists, as defined in the CSIS report A Threat Transformed: Al Qaeda and Associated Movements in 2011, are “radicalized groups and individuals that are not regularly affiliated with, but draw clear inspiration and occasional guidance from, al Qaeda core or affiliated movements.” A growing number of Muslims—both naturalized citizens and American-born—have communicated with extremists who are linked to al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM), have sought terrorist training, or have attempted to carry out attacks either inside the United States or abroad. While not official members of al Qaeda or its affiliates, these individuals and small groups have been influenced by and have sought to involve themselves in AQAM's global war against the West.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States and America

35. Radicalization in the U.S. Beyond al Qaeda: Treating the disease of the disconnection

Author:
Clint Watts
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The attacks of September 11, 2001 spawned a decade of al Qaeda inspired radicalization of disaffected Middle Eastern and North African youth and a handful of young Western men. Ten years later, foreign fighters to Afghanistan, Iraq and other jihadi battlefields appear to be declining while in contrast analysts have pointed to an uptick in United States (U.S.) based “homegrown extremism” - terrorism advocated or committed by U.S. residents or citizens.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Middle East, and North Africa

36. Success, Lethality, and Cell Structure Across the Dimensions of Al Qaeda

Author:
Scott Helfstein and Dominick Wright
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The death of Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011 represents the culmination of a decade long fight to bring the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks to justice. Sustaining the effort needed to arrive at this point is a testament to the resilience of the counterterrorism community and nation, but it subsequently raises a series of questions regarding the future of al‐Qa'ida and the violent social movement spawned by bin Laden and fellow entrepreneurial jihadis. It is tempting to view his death as the end of a long struggle, but the violent extremists radicalized and mobilized by al‐Qa'ida's global jihadi narrative regard this as the end of the opening act. The terrorist threat that the United States and its allies face today has evolved in the years since September 11. Over that time, experts have engaged in heated debates over al‐Qa'ida's strategic center of gravity, with some stressing the importance of central leadership while others emphasize the threat from radicalized individuals unconnected with any formal organization. This seemingly academic debate about the nature of al‐Qa'ida is crucial to understanding the possible manifestations of the threat following bin Laden's death, as well as guiding the way forward for policymakers, practitioners, and the general public. The attached article tries to assess the threat al‐Qa'ida poses by looking across the different operational levels: the core, periphery, and movement. The core represents those in a hierarchical organization, marked by a leadership cadre tied to their followers. Those connected to the al‐Qa'ida network, but outside the control of core leadership, are the peripheral actors. For al‐Qa'ida, this is often best represented by affiliated or associated groups such as al‐Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) or al‐ Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The final level is made up of those who are unconnected from the larger network, but motivated to action through the principles espoused by the ideological leaders. These individuals are part of a broader social movement that adheres to the narrative and perpetrates violent action, but remains distinct from the core or connected affiliates.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, War, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States

37. Bin Laden's Symbolic Death Won't End Extremism

Author:
Steven Cook
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Steven Cook expects bin Laden's death to have a minimal impact on al-Qaeda, and says extremist activity targeting countries in the Middle East and the United States is likely to continue.
Topic:
Political Violence, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and Arabia

38. After bin Laden: What's Next for Obama

Author:
James Lindsay
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
James Lindsay discusses how bin Laden's death will influence U.S. foreign policy, President Barack Obama's public opinion, and the war in Afghanistan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

39. Osama bin Laden is Dead

Author:
Rohan Gunaratna
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS)
Abstract:
Now that Osama bin Laden is dead, the big question to ask is whether global terrorism will die with him. What did bin Laden leave behind?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Globalization, Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

40. Counterrevolution in the Gulf

Author:
Toby C. Jones
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Saudi Arabia is pursuing a combination of domestic and regional policies that risk destabilizing the Persian Gulf and that risk undermining the United States interests there. Amid calls for political change, Saudi Arabia is failing to address pressing concerns about its political system and the need for political reform. Instead of responding favorably to calls for more political openness, the Kingdom is pursuing a risky domestic agenda, which ignores the social, economic, and political grievances that might fuel popular mobilization.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Democratization, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and Arabia