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Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Political Geography United States

221. Corporate Welfare for Weapons Makers the Hidden Costs of Spending on Defense and Foreign Aid

Author:
William D. Hartung
Publication Date:
08-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The defense and foreign aid budgets are the largest single source of government funding for private corporations. More than half of U.S. weapons sales are now being financed by taxpayers instead of foreign arms purchasers. During fiscal year 1996 (the last year for which full statistics are available), the government spent more than $7.9 billion to help U.S. companies secure just over $12 billion in agreements for new international arms sales. The annual $7.9 billion in subsidies includes taxpayer-backed loans, grants, and government promotional activities that help U.S. weapons makers sell their products to foreign customers. Also, the provision of low-cost facilities and extensive subsidies for research and development and mergers and acquisitions to major contractors fosters a “risk-free” environment in which weapons makers have little economic incentive to produce effective systems at affordable prices. Furthermore, a portion of the $120 billion the Pentagon spends each year on contracts with U.S. defense contractors is being wasted on defense pork—that is, redundant or unneeded weapons systems. Such subsidies and spending for defense pork can interfere with the fulfillment of legitimate security needs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Climate Change, Government, and Industrial Policy
Political Geography:
United States

222. U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: A Second Look

Author:
Michael J. Green, James T. Laney, and Morton I. Abramowitz
Publication Date:
07-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
In May, former Secretary of Defense William Perry traveled to North Korea with a comprehensive proposal to increase outside assistance for its isolated and declining Stalinist regime in exchange for steps by the North to reduce its threatening military posture. The Perry proposal was designed to test North Korea's intentions not only to abide by the 1994 Agreed Framework, which aimed to cap Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions, but also to stop further missile tests and military provocations. It is unlikely that North Korea will respond positively. The regime has survived for five decades only by maintaining a belligerent stance. Pyongyang has rebuffed South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's unprecedented efforts to improve North-South relations and has continued to produce military tensions, even in the wake of the Perry visit. But it is too soon to give up on a comprehensive package to reduce tensions with North Korea. Despite the illusion of self-sufficiency, or juche, the North is increasingly dependent on outside help to sustain itself. It is possible that over time Pyongyang will find no alternative to greater interaction with the outside world. Barring an increase in threatening North Korean actions, the United States should keep the Perry proposal on the table and continue to support Kim Dae Jung's policy of engagement. A second Taepodong missile test by North Korea would not violate any existing North Korean commitments, but it would significantly change the situation in Northeast Asia. We should make every effort to deter a launch, but if one takes place, the United States, Japan, and South Korea will have to examine ways to enhance defense against a different North Korean threat. South Korea should suspend new investment in North Korea and Japan should impose new sanctions and consider restrictions on financial transfers to the North. The United States should lower its diplomatic activity toward Pyongyang, keeping channels open, but forcing North Korea to provide incentives for greater dialogue. A missile launch should not end our attempts at diplomacy or cause us to forget that North Korea's relative military capabilities are in decline, but if a test is conducted business cannot continue as usual. Although a North Korean missile launch would do great damage to political support for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in the United States, Japan, and South Korea, it should not be a reason for us to abandon our commitments under the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework stands as the major bulwark against a return to the kind of calamitous military steps the United States was forced to consider in 1994 to stop North Korea's nuclear program. Inspections of suspicious underground facilities at Kumchangri in May revealed no North Korean violation of the Agreed Framework. Although we cannot assume from this that Pyongyang has forsaken its nuclear ambitions, we do know that implementation of the Agreed Framework remains the best approach to preventing nuclear weapons development in the North. In the end, there is no easy solution to the intractable North Korean problem. Efforts to reduce tensions and build North-South reconciliation have yielded little. We are strong enough to test inducements for change in the North, but our policy must be based on robust deterrence and close defense cooperation with our allies.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, East Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula

223. Transcript: North Korea Task Force

Author:
James Laney and Michael J. Green
Publication Date:
07-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Good morning. Thank you for coming. I'm Michael Green, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations here in Washington, and the director of this independent task force on Korea policy, which is sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. We are here today to release and explain our recent study on policy towards North Korea. This is, in many ways, the culmination of a two-year effort by the Council.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, East Asia, North Korea, and Korea

224. Arms Control Today: Interview with Richard Butler

Author:
Richard Butler
Publication Date:
07-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
After two years as the United Nations' chief arms inspector in Iraq, Ambassador Richard Butler resigned June 30 executive chairman of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). Butler's departure from UNSCOM, whose operations in Iraq have been suspended since the U.S.-British air and missile attacks in December 1998, coincides with the apparent demise of UNSCOM due to Baghdad's continuing refusal to fulfill its disarmament obligations and the widening rift within the UN Security Council as to how to deal with the government of Saddam Hussein.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Baghdad

225. Transcript: Mock National Security Council Meeting on North Korea

Author:
Arnold Kanter, Donald A. Baer, Donald P. Gregg, Bernard E. Trainor, and Robert L. Gallucci
Publication Date:
04-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci (Dean, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University; Former Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State): Looking at the situation with respect to domestic stability in the north, we judge their regime as stable, which is to say, that we do not see a near-term deterioration in the ability of Kim Jong Il to maintain power, notwithstanding this economic situation that he confronts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States, East Asia, and North Korea

226. Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015

Publication Date:
09-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
The worldwide ballistic missile proliferation problem has continued to evolve during the past year. The proliferation of technology and components continues. The capabilities of the missiles in the countries seeking to acquire them are growing, a fact underscored by North Korea's launch of the Taepo Dong-1 in August 1998. The number of missiles in these countries is also increasing. Medium- and short-range ballistic missile systems, particularly if armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) warheads, already pose a significant, threat to US interests, military forces, and allies overseas. We have seen increased trade and cooperation among countries that have been recipients of missile technologies from others. Finally, some countries continue to work toward longer-range systems, including ICBMs.
Topic:
International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
United States and North Korea

227. The Cox Committee Report: An Assessment

Author:
Michael M. May, Alastair Iain Johnston, W.K.H. Panofsky, Marco Di Capua, and Lewis R. Franklin
Publication Date:
12-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
The Cox Commission of the U.S. Congress was established in June 1998 to investigate concerns over Chinese acquisition of sensitive U.S. missile and space technology in connection with the launching of U.S. civilian satellites using Chinese launchers on Chinese territory. The investigations were broadened in October 1998 to include alleged security problems and possible espionage at the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories. Some conclusions were released in January 1999 by the White House together with the administration's response. The full declassified (redacted) version of the report of the Cox Commission was released on May 25, 1999.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

228. The Nonproliferation Regime under Siege

Author:
George Bunn
Publication Date:
09-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
The nuclear nonproliferation regime was challenged in 1998 by nuclear-weapon tests in India and Pakistan, by medium-range missile tests in those countries and in Iran and North Korea, by Iraq's defiance of UN Security Council resolutions requiring it to complete its disclosure of efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and by the combination of “loose nukes” and economic collapse in Russia. Additional threats to the regime's vitality came in 1999 from the erosion of American relations with both China and Russia that resulted from NATO's 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia—with additional harm to relations with China resulting from U.S. accusations of Chinese nuclear espionage and Taiwan's announcement that it was a state separate from China despite its earlier acceptance of a U.S.-Chinese “one China” agreement. Major threats to the regime also came from the continued stalemate on arms-control treaties in the Russian Duma and the U.S. Senate, from a change in U.S. policy to favor building a national defense against missile attack, and from a Russian decision to develop a new generation of small tactical nuclear weapons for defense against conventional attack.
Topic:
International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, Economics, Government, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, United States, China, Europe, Iran, South Asia, Middle East, Israel, East Asia, Asia, and Korea

229. The Never-Ending Iraqi Crisis

Author:
Bjørn Moller
Publication Date:
03-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
There is little doubt that Iraq was in blatant violation of the 1991 ceasefire agreement in general and of the famous “mother of all resolutions”, UNSCR 687 (3 April 1991) in particular, in which the extent and modalities of the disarmament of the defeated aggressor were detailed: The Security Council..... 8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of: a) all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities; b) all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres... 34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of this resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Law, and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States and Middle East

230. Tilting at Windmills: Post-Cold War Military Threats to U.S. Security

Author:
Ivan Eland
Publication Date:
02-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Serious military threats to U.S. security have diminished dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The threat from conventional Russian military forces has all but disintegrated and would take many years to reconstitute. China would take 20 to 30 years to transform its bloated and obsolete military into a major threat to U.S. vital interests. The militaries in both nations should be watched, but they may never develop into credible threats.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States