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52. Dividing Britain? polarisation and fragmentation trends in the UK
- Author:
- Bobby Duffy, Tim Bale, Maria Sobolewska, and David Wiletts
- Publication Date:
- 10-2019
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- -Bobby Duffy, Professor of Public Policy and Director of the Policy Institute at King’s College London -Tim Bale, Deputy Director of The UK in a Changing Europe and -Professor of Politics at Queen Mary University London -Maria Sobolewska, Professor of political science, University of Manchester -Lord David Willetts, former science and universities minister
- Topic:
- European Union, Brexit, Political Science, Public Policy, and Polarization
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
53. Battle of Ideas: Brexit: a revolution by or against the establishment?
- Author:
- Lisa Mckenzie, Anand Menon, Daniel Moylan, and Waterfield
- Publication Date:
- 11-2019
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- Can Brexit be understood as representing a genuinely revolutionary moment in British history, or are there much deeper, longer-term trends that explain the current moment? Speakers included: Lisa Mckenzie, Durham University Professor Anand Menon, UK in a Changing Europe Daniel Moylan, Urban Design London Bruno Waterfield, The Times
- Topic:
- European Union, Brexit, Referendum, and Elites
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
54. Consensus for Action: Towards a More Effective EU Sanctions Policy
- Author:
- Tom Keatinge and Emil Dall
- Publication Date:
- 11-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy
- Abstract:
- Sanctions are a key tool of foreign policy but have taken on greater salience over the last 20 years as governments have reached for leverage in negotiations but foregone the use of force. During this period, the alignment of the design and implementation of sanctions by the European Union and the United States has, on the whole, been an article of faith as the transatlantic allies have pursued mutual foreign policy objectives. Yet despite the consistency of objectives, the bureaucratic structures, technical mechanisms, and processes by which the European Union and the United States design and implement sanctions differ significantly. These differences—always present—have been amplified by the current stresses in transatlantic relations and may be further exacerbated when the United Kingdom leaves the European Union in March 2019. The reasons behind these differences are myriad and touch upon both structural matters (such as the construction of the European Union and the manner in which its member states can enact policy) and more philosophical matters, as the focus on due process and human rights in EU sanctions policy demonstrates. But given the importance of transatlantic ties and cooperation in managing the sorts of problems that sanctions are usually developed to address, it is important for both the United States and the European Union to work through these differences. Toward that goal, this paper provides a European perspective on US sanctions activity, where there are differences in approach, in particular EU attitudes toward secondary sanctions put in place by the United States, and it explains the complications that may result from the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. The paper concludes with recommendations for how the European Union can address the challenges it faces in achieving an effective sanctions policy. In short, it recommends the following: The European Union should work through its structural issues to create a more decisive and effective EU sanctions policy. The implementation and enforcement of sanctions at the member state level must be improved, and a formal EU-level sanctions body is needed to independently monitor compliance with sanctions across the European Union. A clear mechanism for ensuring the coordination and effectiveness of EU-UK post-Brexit sanctions policy must be established. The global centrality of both the European Union’s economy and the United Kingdom’s financial sector combine to present a powerful sanctions force and must thus be closely coordinated to ensure maximum effectiveness. The European Union should directly address the matter of human rights exemptions by incorporating it as a key consideration of the EU-level sanctions body identified in the first recommendation. The European Union should establish a clear channel for human rights exemptions throughout the lifetime of sanctions regimes. The European Union should consider its options to address the ability of non-EU actors to abuse EU-originating supply chains and financial services, which represents a considerable sanctions implementation vulnerability. Finally, though US-EU misalignment on sanctions is growing, policy makers must stay seized of the necessity to maintain and improve communications and coordination to prevent current schisms from having serious long-term effects on international security.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Sanctions, European Union, and Brexit
- Political Geography:
- United States, United Kingdom, and Europe
55. European Strategic Autonomy and Brexit
- Author:
- Peter Round, Bastain Giegerich, and Christian Mölling
- Publication Date:
- 06-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The United Kingdom is among the few European Union member states with full-spectrum military and defence-industrial capabilities. Through Brexit, the EU could lose 20% of its military and 40% of its defence-industrial capabilities, and thereby its influence and credibility as a security actor. The pertinent question is how to arrange the UK’s future participation in European defence. Decision-making on defence matters in the international arena requires skilled diplomacy and the momentum to carry plans through the scrutiny of multiple parliaments. The EU risks inaction through inertia without the UK’s soft powers, placing strategic decision-making at risk. The Union needs the UK’s military enablers, but only until it can deliver its own. In addition, with the UK’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States suffering, London’s influence is on the wane. More autonomy for the EU is possible within a framework of political partners that reaches beyond the EU, incorporating actors such as the UK, and also Norway.
- Topic:
- Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
- Political Geography:
- United States, United Kingdom, Europe, and North America
56. Fostering a Defense-Industrial Base for Europe: The Impact of Brexit
- Author:
- Torben Schütz and Christian Mölling
- Publication Date:
- 06-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The European defence technological industrial base (DTIB) represents a core element of European defence and deterrence – it is a strategic asset. Strong defence industries multiply the deterrent effect of the armed forces. However, national industries in most countries cannot offer the full range of supplies needed by national armed forces. Despite the fragmentary nature of its industries, Europe collectively has most of the range of defence-industrial capabilities, enabling, at least notionally, security of supply for EU and NATO partners. The UK’s share of defence-related turnover among European companies is almost 40%. The UK also makes defence-industrial contributions to many multi- national projects. While Brexit does not remove the UK’s defence-industrial base from the wider European environment, it will complicate its involvement. The EU’s growing role in defence-industrial matters, through regulation and financial resources, is shaping the wider European DTIB. At the same time, the Union’s ambition as a security actor creates an obligation to ensure that European partners outside the EU can contribute as effectively as possible to European defence and deterrence. In order to do this: The UK, EU institutions and EU governments should work toward as close a common understanding as possible that safeguarding a sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is in the strategic interests of all political partners in Europe. The UK and its EU partners should establish politically and structurally significant flagship armament projects. Such projects would support a shared objective, namely to consolidate the still fragmented European DTIB, and in the process make it more competitive. A European Defence Industrial Review should be launched to help identify key industrial branches and companies that are of structural relevance to the European DTIB, and therefore to European defence and deterrence. For future regulations related to the defence industry, the EU should take a ‘systemic view’, i.e. also take into account how a regulation affects European partners and contributors outside the EU.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, and London
57. Opportunities for Defense-Industrial Collaboration after Brexit
- Author:
- Douglas Barrie
- Publication Date:
- 06-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The United Kingdom should seek to continue to support defence-technology cooperation with the European Union and partner states across all military domains. Avoiding, or at least minimising, the second-order effects of Brexit on wider defence cooperation with European partners will be easier if the UK is directly involved in the EU’s defence-technology initiatives. Specific opportunities present themselves across the military domains: Pursue cooperation in the air domain with regard to future combat- aircraft technology. While collaboration at the platform level is unlikely in the near term, exploring common R&D in key systems, such as radar, propulsion, avionics, sensors and weapons, is achievable. In the land domain, explore partnership with France and Germany on participating in the development of a next-generation main battle tank. Collaboration on applicable technologies at the component and sub- system levels should also be encouraged. This could include armour and armament R&D, and laser weapons. In the maritime domain, support cooperation in the air-defence arena, including the use of laser weapons for ship self-defence, and the use of naval vessels for ballistic-missile defence. In the space domain, examine potential cooperation on next-generation communication satellite requirements, and wider collaboration on geospatial intelligence.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Brexit, Maritime, and Space
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, France, London, Germany, and Brussels
58. UK Participation in the EDA and the new EU defense package in the context of Brexit
- Author:
- Lucie béraud-Sudreau
- Publication Date:
- 06-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- To continue United Kingdom participation in European Union defence cooperation: The UK, the European Commission and EU member states should strive to avoid near-term decisions that would shut out the UK from future participation in EU defence policies. Pursue agreement on the nature of a ‘third-state’ position as applied to the UK, ensuring the goals of Brussels and London are met. Identify ways for London to show its commitment to supporting the EU’s defence ambitions, signalling clearly a change from previous opposition. Brussels and London need to agree the key preconditions that will under- pin any deal over the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The UK should aim to ensure a single point of entry through the European Defence Agency for defence cooperation with the EU, in the absence of a Commission directorate-general for security and defence. Reach agreement on an overarching financial contribution covering access to the EDA, the EDF and PESCO, while London also commits to contributing funding to specific projects it wishes to take part in.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Brussels
59. The UK’s potential role in enabling EU–NATO cooperation after Brexit
- Publication Date:
- 06-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The United Kingdom, having expressed interest in a strong EU–UK security partnership and having indicated that, if anything, its commitment to NATO will be even stronger after Brexit, has an opportunity to be a leader and facilitator in the context of EU–NATO cooperation in meeting emerging threats. Several of the priority areas and action items defined by these two organisations, following a declaration to enhance their cooperation at NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit, play to the UK’s strengths: To increase the level of cooperation between the EU and NATO, and in order to implement the cooperation agenda, the UK should invest both financially and in terms of personnel, via voluntary national contributions to NATO. The UK taking on a leadership role in the area of inter-organisational cooperation would signal to EU partners that stronger support for NATO is not intended to weaken EU initiatives; it is an opportunity to stress the complementary nature of EU and NATO capabilities. Given its limited resources, the UK could, in effect, use engagement in EU–NATO cooperation to hedge its bets on both organisations. Stronger support for NATO can directly benefit the EU’s security and defence initiatives, while making sure that cooperation results in added value in both multinational frameworks, rather than fostering institutional competition.
- Topic:
- NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
- Political Geography:
- United States, United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Brussels
60. Could the EU deliver on its military ambitions after Brexit?
- Author:
- Douglas Barrie, Ben Barry, Henry Boyd, Marie-Louise Chagnaud, Nick Childs, Bastain Giegerich, Christain Möelling, and Torben Schutz
- Publication Date:
- 11-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- he ability of the European Union to act in defence, today and in the future, is an important reference point in the debate about EU strategic autonomy in the context of Brexit. The EU has set itself a military level of ambition. Under the heading of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), EU member states want to be able to conduct a range of military operations. Together with the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), this study assesses to what extent the EU is able to fulfil this level of ambition, today and with an outlook towards 2030. The IISS and DGAP have developed policy-compliant scenarios to assess where possible capability shortfalls lie. Our findings benchmark existing and future EU member state capabilities against the force requirements the EU level of ambition generates.
- Topic:
- Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Germany