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11. Fragmentation nation: How Europeans can help end the conflict in Yemen

Author:
Helen Lackner
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
For eight years, Yemen has suffered a civil war, whose conduct has been exacerbated by outside powers, principally Saudi Arabia and the UAE on one side, while Iran has supported the other. Yemen is a politically, socially, geographically, and religiously fragmented country, including within the two broad areas controlled by the internationally recognised government and the Houthis respectively. Saudi Arabia and the UAE may soon decrease their military interference in Yemen – but their exit could expose divisions in both government and Houthi areas. Yemen was poor before the conflict, but a corrupt war economy has now taken hold, strengthening an array of local power holders, while the Yemeni people slip into ever-deeper destitution. Short-term measures introduced with the support of the international community have failed to stabilise the situation. Europeans should take a longer-term approach to Yemen. They should promote the country’s cause in their diplomacy with Gulf Arab states and make a commitment to economic support, a values-based approach, and an emphasis on human rights in Yemen.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Civil War, Diplomacy, Human Rights, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, North Africa, and United Arab Emirates

12. Useful enemies: How the Turkey-UAE rivalry is remaking the Middle East

Author:
Asli Aydıntaşbaş and Cinzia Bianco
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Turkey and the United Arab Emirates are engaged in a decade-long feud that is reshuffling the geopolitical order in the Middle East and North Africa. They see each other as existential rivals and are waging a series of proxy wars between the Horn of Africa and the eastern Mediterranean. Their rivalry also plays out in the halls of Washington and Brussels, the global media discourse, the energy industry, and, lately, ports and the high seas. Europe should avoid being sucked into this power struggle to redefine the Middle East and North Africa. Instead of using the UAE to push back against Turkey or vice versa, Europe should develop its own strategy on their rivalry. Europe should establish a NATO deconfliction mechanism, push ahead with the political process in Libya, and design a constructive new framework to insulate European-Turkey relations from the rivalry.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and United Arab Emirates

13. How Washington Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the UAE

Author:
Albadr AbuBaker Alshateri
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
When Dubai World Ports (DWP), a Dubai Government-owned entity, sought to purchase the British company Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation (P&O) in 2006, it faced huge opposition from the US Congress, local authority, and national security experts, despite the Bush Administration’s approval of the deal. The acquisition of P&O would have given the Dubai company the concession to run six major ports in the USA.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Exports, Trade, and Imports
Political Geography:
North America, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

14. Abraham Accords and Camp David Accords: Rethinking the Trajectories of the 'Arab Cause'

Author:
Yuko Ido
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
On September 15, 2020, a joint statement was issued in Washington concerning Israeli peace agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain (The Abraham Accords Declaration). These agreements brought to four the number of Arab nations that have official diplomatic relations with Israel, the first two being Egypt (since 1979) and Jordan (since 1994)1. US President Trump himself praised these as "historic agreements"; however, there was no Palestinian representative at this celebration. These agreements mainly focus on strengthening economic and security relations among the participating countries, and they have encountered both supporting and opposing views within the international community. In particular, Iran and Turkey, which are at odds with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the region, have strongly criticized the agreements, saying they run counter to resolving the Palestinian Question. Many readers might recall the Camp David Accords of about 40 years ago that led to the first peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. Let us now compare the two peace efforts and consider what the meaning of the 'Arab Cause' has been.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America

15. The Battle for the Soul of Islam

Author:
James M Dorsey
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
It is not the caliphate that the world’s Muslim powerhouses are fighting about. Instead, they are engaged in a deepening religious soft power struggle for geopolitical influence and dominance. This battle for the soul of Islam pits rival Middle Eastern and Asian powers against one another: Turkey, seat of the Islamic world’s last true caliphate; Saudi Arabia, home to the faith’s holy cities; the United Arab Emirates, propagator of a militantly statist interpretation of Islam; Qatar with its less strict version of Wahhabism and penchant for political Islam; Indonesia, promoting a humanitarian, pluralistic notion of Islam that reaches out to other faiths as well as non-Muslim centre-right forces across the globe; Morocco which uses religion as a way to position itself as the face of moderate Islam; and Shia Iran with its derailed revolution. In the ultimate analysis, no clear winner may emerge. Yet, the course of the battle could determine the degree to which Islam will be defined by either one or more competing stripes of ultra-conservativism—statist forms of the faith that preach absolute obedience to political rulers and/or reduce religious establishments to pawns of the state.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Islam, Politics, and Ideology
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates

16. Israel and the UAE on Iran: Shared Foe, Different Perspectives

Author:
Danny Citrinowicz
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Given past developments, the UAE’s and Israel’s recent announcement of normalization in exchange for shelving annexation plans should come as no great surprise, even if the timing was unexpected. There remains, however, frequently understated differences between one aspect of this relationship often assumed to be a common denominator: Jerusalem’s and Abu Dhabi’s perspectives on Iran. Understanding and accommodating these differences will be critical issue for a lasting relationship between the two countries, with the Israeli government in particular needing to acknowledge the differences as well as similarities between the two sides. It is no secret that Israel and the UAE see Iran as a common enemy; both countries have worked together covertly for years to prevent Iranian hegemony in the Gulf and Middle East at large. Since the beginning of their unofficial relationship several decades ago, the two countries have improved their intelligence-sharing and military relations, strengthened their diplomatic ties behind the scenes, and worked to improve their readiness for Iranian threats across the board. President Trump’s recent decisions to withdraw troops from parts of the Middle East region and the world at large have further catalyzed development of Israel-UAE relations in anticipation of weakened direct support from the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Gulf Nations
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United Arab Emirates

17. The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Pandemic

Author:
Sara Nowacka
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The fight against the spread of the coronavirus in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has forced cooperation between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, which were in conflict within the GCC. At the same time, the UAE took advantage of other countries’ need for support in countering COVID-19 to strengthen relations with China, Iran, and Syria, among others. The UAE’s activity emphasizes its ambition for domination of the region, which may lead to a new dispute within the GCC between the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:
Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Gulf Nations

18. The difficult promise of economic reform in the Gulf

Author:
Karen E. Young
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
The six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman—are in a period of profound change, both economic and social. The economic changes are a long overdue reaction to natural resource revenue dependency in their fiscal policies, while the social changes are a reaction to compounded migration and demographic shifts. The resilience of Gulf political economies will be defined by the ability to change both fiscal governance and policies of inclusion. Inclusion, in the context of Gulf political economies, means social protection for vulnerable groups, but it also means access to compete in a rule-based economy. The promise of economic reform, therefore, is a promise to reconfigure relations between citizen and state, and to renegotiate the provision of benefits to citizens in the form of subsidies of fuel, electricity, and water, as well as generous health and education services. And there will be taxes and new fees on everything from toll roads to sugary drinks to tobacco, and employment fees for foreigners. In exchange, citizens are promised—in some way—a retreat of the state from its predatory control over economies, though not its control over the political space and activism. Nonetheless, for many political economies of the GCC, the opening of opportunities in private ownership and investment in the sale of state assets—such as power and water plants, ports, and airports, as well as schools and hospitals—poses a challenge to the state’s track record in the provision of services. These privatizations also pose a risk to a constituency unaccustomed to fees-based service and corporate liability. Will citizens accept services from private entities at cost? Will citizens jump at the opportunity to own new companies that meet the needs of their compatriots for profit? And, perhaps most importantly, who will be left behind? The concept of resilience is often used in the literature on economic development to describe how governments can protect both citizens and their economies from external shocks, whether in the form of natural disasters, black swan events, or dramatic policy shifts. The regulatory environment and the capacity of the state to react and respond to different needs of its population, especially vulnerable groups, are key. For Gulf states, the current reform agenda is not so much a shock as a delayed reaction to a problem identified long ago. Diversification from oil-based revenue is necessary, and population growth has created an oversupply of candidates for public-sector employment that is not very productive. Generating growth has to shift, in its source and its deployment among a larger and more diverse population. The Gulf states have created their own middle-income development trap. This paper offers a wide-ranging analysis of some aspects of the reform agenda underway across the GCC. It explores specific case analyses of challenges facing individual countries (Saudi Arabia and Oman), and the organization of the GCC as a whole. It also addresses subsidy reform, the introduction of taxes and fees, and some experimental policies related to regulating labor markets and encouraging citizens to move out of public-sector employment.
Topic:
Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Cooperation Council

19. Solitaire Arabian Style

Author:
A. Frolov
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
LAST SPRING, an event in the Arab world shocked everyone. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) withdrew their ambassadors from Doha, the capital of Qatar, their ally. One of the smallest members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) was accused of supporting “anyone threat- ening the security and stability of the GCC whether as groups or individ- uals – via direct security work or through political influence ... and hos- tile media.” On June 5, 2017, the KSA, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt officially dis- continued diplomatic relations and all types of communication with Qatar. Later, they were joined by the Maldives, Mauritius and Mauretania. Jordan and Djibouti lowered the level of their diplomatic representations in Doha. Several African countries – Senegal, Niger and Chad – recalled their ambassadors. Kuwait and Oman, both GCC mem- bers, stayed away from the action. Later, the three initiators handed Doha a list of 13 demands to end a major Gulf crisis, insisting that Qatar should shut down the Al Jazeera network, close a Turkish military base and scale down ties with Iran. They gave Qatar 10 days to comply with the demands and agree to annu- al audits in the following 10 years.1 Qatar rejected this ultimatum as inter- ference in its sovereignty. Possible repercussions notwithstanding, what happened to Qatar can be described as a manifestation of the deeply rooted social and political changes in the Arab East caused by the color revolutions unfolding amid globalization, informatization, democratization, gradual destruction of the traditional values of Eastern societies, and the frantic efforts to find adequate answers to these challenges.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

20. Power play: The United Arab Emirates’ new approach to geopolitics

Author:
JMEPP
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
Power – be it tangible, intangible, natural, military, or economic – shapes the capacities of the state and its role within the international system. The Middle East is no exception to this realist reading of international affairs. The Arab Spring, the Syrian conflict, the war in Yemen and the Iranian nuclear deal have all created a battleground, often quite literally, for state power interests to compete with one another. How are these power configurations linked to identity? The United States sees itself as a stronghold of liberal democracy, Japan as the quintessential trading nation, and Switzerland is comfortably ensconced in its 200-year-old neutralism. This “sense of self,” or who states are, shapes and defines what they do. Power and identity routinely mould and inform each other. For a country like the United Arab Emirates, described by many analysts as a middle, regional, or rising power, these questions hold particular relevance as the UAE reshapes its position in the world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Soft Power, Identities, and State
Political Geography:
Middle East, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations